PETER JACKSON

The Mongols and the Islamic World

FROM CONQUEST TO CONVERSION

‘An important and refreshing work.’
Peter Frankopan,
author of The Silk Roads
THE MONGOLS AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD
For Rebecca
# CONTENTS

*List of Plates and Maps*  
*Preface*  
*List of Abbreviations*  
*Author’s Note*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medieval Authors on the Mongols</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Islamic World and Inner Asian Peoples down to the Mongol Invasion</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mongol Westward Advance (1219–53)</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apportioning and Governing an Empire (c. 1221–c. 1260)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hülegü’s Campaigns and Imperial Fragmentation (1253–62)</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devastation, Depopulation and Revival in the Age of Conquest</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Era of Inter-Mongol Warfare</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pax Mongolica</em> and a Transcontinental Traffic</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediated Sovereignty: The Client Muslim Kingdoms</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbelieving Monarchs and their Servants</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rule of the Infidel</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Onset of Islamization: (a) Common Themes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The Onset of Islamization: (b) Royal Converts and Muslim Resurgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Epilogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Conclusion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Appendix 1</strong> [Glossary of technical terms]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Appendix 2</strong> [Genealogical tables and lists of rulers]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Notes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Index</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PLATES AND MAPS

Plates

1. A Mongol court feast: Diez-Album A, fo. 70, S. 22, no. 1, from Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʾ al-tawārīkh (reproduced courtesy of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz)

2. Siege operations: Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʾ al-tawārīkh, Edinburgh University Library, ms. Or. 20, fo. 124b (reproduced courtesy of Edinburgh University Library)

3. Siege operations: Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʾ al-tawārīkh, Edinburgh University Library, ms. Or. 20, fo. 130b (reproduced courtesy of Edinburgh University Library)

4. Prisoners being led away by the Mongols: Diez Album A, fo. 70, S. 19, no. 2, from Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʾ al-tawārīkh (reproduced courtesy of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz)

5. The Mongols torturing their prisoners: Diez Album A, fo. 70, S. 6, no. 1, from Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʾ al-tawārīkh (reproduced courtesy of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz)

6. The Prophet recognizing Alī as his rightful successor: al-Bīrūnī, Āthār al-bāqiya, Edinburgh University Library, ms. Or. 161, fo. 162a (reproduced courtesy of Edinburgh University Library)

7. The Prophet’s birth: Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʾ al-tawārīkh, Edinburgh University Library, ms. Or. 20, fo. 44a (reproduced courtesy of Edinburgh University Library)
Maps

1. Asia on the eve of Chinggis Khan’s expedition to the west 70
2. The Iranian world from Chinggis Khan’s invasion down to c. 1250 94
3. The campaigns of Hulegu’s armies 1255–60 137
4. The Mongol dominions after 1260 152
5. The Jochid territories 193
6. The Ilkhanate 196
7. The dominions of Qaidu and the Chaghadayids 200
8. The Eurasian commercial network in the Mongol era 221
I first conceived the project of writing a book on Muslims under infidel Mongol rule in 2006. Heather McCallum at Yale University Press gave the idea a warm welcome, and I have greatly appreciated her continued enthusiasm and interest, over a considerably longer period than either of us anticipated. I am also grateful to both Heather and her colleagues Rachael Lonsdale, Melissa Bond and Samantha Cross for seeing the book through to publication, and to Richard Mason for being a thorough and efficient copy-editor.

While working on this book, I have incurred many debts. I must mention the unfailing helpfulness, patience and courtesy of staff in the following institutions: Cambridge University Library, the Bodleian Library, the Library of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, the British Library, the Warburg Institute Library, the Wellcome Library, the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Birmingham University Library and the John Rylands University Library in Manchester. From the last three of these institutions I have been able to borrow books under the SCONUL scheme, an invaluable privilege indeed that should not be taken for granted, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge here the assistance of the scheme. I am also grateful for the assistance of staff in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, and (some years ago) in the Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi and the Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, Istanbul.

I benefited greatly from the opportunity to try out an early version of part of chapter 6 at a symposium on ‘The Mongol Empire and Its World’, organized by Professor David Morgan in April 2010 at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I also benefited from reading papers relating to the Mongols and the Islamic world that, in different ways, incorporated ideas
more fully developed in chapters 11, 12 and 13, at seminars in the Universities of Warwick, Birmingham, St Andrews, Sheffield and Keele, and at All Souls College, Oxford. In addition, I was glad of the chance to experiment with one of the themes of chapter 13, by delivering a paper with the less than electrifying title ‘The Conversion of the Chaghadayids in Comparative Perspective’ at a conference on ‘New Directions in the Study of the Mongol Empire’ in Jerusalem in June–July 2014, convened by Professors Michal Biran and Hodong Kim. I am especially grateful for the stimulating questions that the audience fired at me on each of these occasions.

Nobody who has worked since the 1970s on the Mongol empire and its successor-states can fail to be aware of the increase in the number of editions or translations of primary sources and, still more obviously, of the extraordinary explosion in scholarship on the subject in both article and book form. Personal contact with various academic colleagues in the field has proved a bigger boon to me, I am sure, than to them. To certain individuals, who provided me with photocopies or digitized copies of material unavailable in any repository within the UK – Professor Biran, Professor Anne-Marie Eddé, Dr George Lane, Dr Roman Pochkaev and Dr Miklós Sárközy – my obligation is considerable. In addition, Professor Peter Golden, Dr Colin Heywood and Professor Nikolai Kradin each kindly presented me with a copy of their collected articles. Several scholars have given me copies or offprints of articles that might otherwise have taken some months to come to my notice, and Professor Hodong Kim has sent me successive issues of the *Journal of Central Eurasian Studies*, published in Seoul. In many instances, my debt to colleagues is a matter simply of conversations, answers to questions or the sharing of a reference – by no means negligible favours. I am also extremely grateful to Professors Biran and Morgan, who read the penultimate draft on behalf of Yale University Press and whose comments and suggestions both refined my ideas and dispelled various errors and misconceptions. It goes without saying, naturally, that none of the help I have received diminishes my responsibility for any failings still to be detected in this book.

My last debt requiring a mention here, though far from the smallest, is the tireless support of my wife Rebecca, who has, on different occasions, read drafts of every chapter, in equal measure offering encouragement and challenging my arguments or my style. I dedicate this book to her, not least because without her I could not have written it.

*Peter Jackson*

*Madeley, Staffordshire*

*September 2016*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>al-Ṣafadī, Aʾyān al-ʾaṣr</td>
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<td>AK</td>
<td>Ibn Shaddād al-Ḥalabī, al-Aʾlāq al-khaṭīra</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>(anonymous), Akhbār-i mughūlān dar anbāna-yi Qutb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Bar Hebraeus, Maktbānūt zabnē, ed. and tr. Budge, The Chronography of Gregory Abû’l-Faraj</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>al-Yūnīnī, Dhayl Mirʾāt al-zamān [Hyderabad edn unless otherwise specified]</td>
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<tr>
<td>GW</td>
<td>Waṣṣāf, Tajziyat al-amṣār, partially ed. and tr. Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte Wassaf's [I, text and trans.; II, III and IV, trans. only]</td>
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<td>HJ</td>
<td>(anonymous), al-Ḥawādīth al-jāmiʿa [page references are to the editions by Jawād and al-Shabībī (1932) and by Maʿrūf and Raʿūf (1997), in that order]</td>
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<td>Juwaynī, Tārīkh-i jahān-gushā, tr. Boyle, The History of the World-Conqueror</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fi l-taʿrīkh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Ibn Abī l-Faḍā‘il, <em>al-Nahj al-sādīd</em></td>
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<td>IB</td>
<td>Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, <em>Tuhfat al-nuẓẓār</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>Ibn al-Dawādārī, <em>Kanz al-durar</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>IF</td>
<td>Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, <em>Talkhīṣ Majma‘ al-ādāb</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>IKPI</td>
<td>Abuseitova et al. (general eds), <em>Istoriia Kazakhstana v persidskikh istochnikakh</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>JQ</td>
<td>Jamāl al-Qarshī, <em>al-Mulḥaqāt bi l-Ṣurāḥ</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFW</td>
<td>Rubruck, tr. in Jackson and Morgan (eds), <em>The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Christopher Dawson (ed.), <em>The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in China and Mongolia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTD</td>
<td>Ibn al-ʿIbri (Bar Hebraeus), <em>Mukhtasār ta‘rīkh al-duwal</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>Mustawfī, ZN</td>
<td>Ḣamd-Allāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī, <em>Ẓafar-nāma</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>MZ</td>
<td>Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, <em>Miรวāt al-zamān</em> [Hyderabad edn]</td>
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</tr>
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<td>NT</td>
<td>Bayḍāwī, <em>Niẓām al-tawārīkh</em> [1st recension and Muḥaddith’s edition, unless otherwise specified]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Anastasius Van den Wyngaert (ed.), <em>Sinica Franciscana</em>, I: <em>Itinera et relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi XIII et XIV</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td>Mongghol’un niucha tobcha’an (Secret History of the Mongols)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH-ZN</td>
<td>Shāmī, Nizām al-Dīn, Zafar-nāma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMIZO</td>
<td>V. G. Tizengauzen (ed.), Sbornik materialov, otnosiashchiksia k istorii Zolotoi Ordy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Rashīd al-Dīn, Shu’ab-i panjgāna</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSQ</td>
<td>Simon de Saint-Quentin, Historia Tartarorum</td>
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<tr>
<td>TG</td>
<td>Hamd-Allāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī, Ta’rikh-i guzīda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>al-Dhahabī, Ta’rikh al-Islām</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIG</td>
<td>Juwaynī, Ta’rikh-i jahān-gushā, ed. Qazwīnī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TN</td>
<td>Jūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt-i Nāşiri</td>
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<td>TR</td>
<td>Haydar Dughlāt, Ta’rikh-i Rāshīdī</td>
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<td>TU</td>
<td>Qāshānī, Ta’rikh-i Ujlāitū Sulṭān</td>
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<td>VB</td>
<td>Vincent de Beauvais, Speculum historiale</td>
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<tr>
<td>WR</td>
<td>Rubruck, Itinerarium, ed. Chiesa</td>
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<tr>
<td>WW</td>
<td>al-Šafādī, al-Wāfi bi l-wafayāt</td>
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<td>YS</td>
<td>Yazdī, Sharaf al-Dīn ‘Ali, Zafar-nāma [references are to ‘Abbāsī’s edition unless otherwise specified]</td>
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<td>ZF</td>
<td>Song Lian et al. (eds), Yuan shi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Studies, series titles, journals and reference works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAS</td>
<td>Asian and African Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEMA</td>
<td>Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Asiatische Forschungen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMTM</td>
<td>Asian Medicine: Tradition and Modernity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOASH</td>
<td>Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOAW</td>
<td>Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEO</td>
<td>Bulletin d’Études Orientales de l’Institut Français de Damas</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIAL</td>
<td>Brill’s Inner Asian Library</td>
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<td>CAJ</td>
<td>Central Asiatic Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHC, VI</td>
<td>Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett (eds), The Cambridge History of China, VI. Alien Regimes and Border States 907–1368 (Cambridge, 1994)</td>
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<td>CHEIA</td>
<td>Denis Sinor (ed.), The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (Cambridge, 1990)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHI, V</td>
<td>J. A. Boyle (ed.), <em>The Cambridge History of Iran, V. The Saljuq and Mongol Periods</em> (Cambridge, 1968)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHI, VI</td>
<td>Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart (eds), <em>The Cambridge History of Iran, VI. The Timurid and Safavid Periods</em> (Cambridge, 1986)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIC</td>
<td>Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTT</td>
<td>Crusade Texts in Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHC</td>
<td>Documents relatifs à l'histoire des Croisades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td><em>Dumbarton Oaks Papers</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIr</td>
<td><em>Encyclopaedia Iranica</em>, ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York etc., 1980–in progress; and <a href="http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles">www.iranicaonline.org/articles</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM[S]</td>
<td><em>Études Mongoles [et Sibériennes]</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Eurasian Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Freiburger Islamstudien</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMS</td>
<td>Gibb Memorial Series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HJAS</td>
<td><em>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Hakluyt Society Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUS</td>
<td><em>Harvard Ukrainian Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHC</td>
<td>Islamic History and Civilization. Studies and Texts</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJMES</td>
<td><em>International Journal of Middle East Studies</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td><em>Iranian Studies</em></td>
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<td>IU</td>
<td>Islamkundliche Untersuchungen</td>
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<td>IUUAS</td>
<td>Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series</td>
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<td>JA</td>
<td><em>Journal Asiatique</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>JAH</td>
<td>Journal of Asian History</td>
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<td>JAOS</td>
<td>Journal of the American Oriental Society</td>
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<td>JCES</td>
<td>Journal of Central Eurasian Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JESHO</td>
<td>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNES</td>
<td>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSAI</td>
<td>Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam</td>
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<td>JSS</td>
<td>Journal of Semitic Studies</td>
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<td>JSYS</td>
<td>Journal of Song-Yuan Studies</td>
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<td>JTS</td>
<td>Journal of Turkish Studies</td>
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<td>JWH</td>
<td>Journal of World History</td>
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<td>MED</td>
<td>Ferdinand D. Lessing et al., <em>Mongolian-English Dictionary</em> (Los Angeles, 1960; reprinted with corrections, Bloomington, IN, 1982)</td>
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<td>MRTB</td>
<td>Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyō Bunko</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Mongolian Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>Mamlûk Studies Review</td>
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<td>OM</td>
<td>Oriente Moderno</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFEH</td>
<td>Papers on Far Eastern History</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIA</td>
<td>Papers on Inner Asia</td>
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<td>PIAC</td>
<td>Permanent International Altaistic Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLNV, b.s.</td>
<td>Pamiatniki Literatury Narodov Vostoka, bolshaia serii</td>
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<td>PPV</td>
<td>Pamiatniki Pis’mennosti Vostoka</td>
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<tr>
<td>QSA</td>
<td>Quaderni di Studi Arabi</td>
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<tr>
<td>REI</td>
<td>Revue des Études Islamiques</td>
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<td>SI</td>
<td>Studia Islamica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sochineniiia</td>
<td>W. Barthold (V. V. Bartol’d), <em>Sochineniiia</em>, ed. B. G. Gafurov, 9 vols in 10 parts (Moscow, 1963–77)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOLL</td>
<td>Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures</td>
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<td>Spuler, Mongolen⁴</td>
<td>Bertold Spuler, <em>Die Mongolen in Iran</em>, 4th edn (Leiden, 1985)</td>
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ABBREVIATIONS

StIr  Studia Iranica
TP    T’oung Pao
TSCIA  Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia
Turkestan¹ V. V. Bartol’d, Turkestan v epokhu mongol’skogo nashestviia (1898–1900)
Turkestan² W. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, 3rd edn (1968)
ZAS    Zentralasiatische Studien
ZDMG   Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft

Miscellaneous

Ar.  Arabic
BL  British Library
BN  Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris
Ch.  Chinese
EUL  Edinburgh University Library
IO  India Office
Mo.  Mongolian
Pers.  Persian
pl.  plural
sing.  singular
SK  Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul
SOAS  Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
TSM  Topkapı Sarayi Müzesi, Istanbul
Tu.  Turkish
AUTHOR’S NOTE

Transliteration

For Mongol and Turkish proper names and terms, I have slightly modified the system adopted in J. A. Boyle’s translation of volume 2 of the first part of Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmi’ al-tawāřīkh: The Successors of Genghis Khan (1971). In particular, I give the title of the Mongol conqueror in its Mongolian form (Chinggis), rather than the form used by Persian authors (Chingīz) or its bowdlerized European derivatives (such as ‘Jenghiz’ or ‘Genghis’), and hence I call the dynasty he founded the Chinggisids. By contrast, although Tamerlane appears here under his Turco-Mongolian name (Temür), I have adhered to the spelling ‘Timurids’ generally used for his dynasty. In addition, whereas the name of Chinggis Khan’s second son is here given under the Mongolian form Chaghādai, the Turkic language named after him is spelled in the Turkish fashion as Chaghatay. I have frequently used q to transcribe the guttural consonant in Mongolian sometimes rendered by kh or gh (thus Qubilai, qaghan, quriltai, rather than Khubilai, khaghan, khuriltai). Here the reader will detect further inconsistencies: thus I have employed Ghazan for the celebrated Itkhan, but Qazan for the Chaghadayid khan of a slightly later period, on the grounds that these usages are well established in historiography – and despite the fact that the two khans’ names are one and the same in the Uighur script (and mean ‘cauldron’). For place names in modern Turkey, modern Turkish spelling is used. Naturally, Mongol and Turkish names and terms that appear within a quotation from a Muslim source are spelled as Arabic and Persian.

For Arabic and Persian, I have used the conventions observed in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn (1954–2009), except that I employ ch (in
AUTHOR’S NOTE

place of č), j (replacing dj) and q (not k). Persian is transliterated as if it were Arabic: thus th rather than s, ḍ rather than ā, and w rather than v; the exception is the Arabic conjunction wa- (‘and’), which generally appears as -u in Persian phrases. Persian-Arabic spelling is also used even where an author’s nisba is derived from a Turkish locality (thus Āqsarā’ī rather than Akserayi), but the Arabic definite article al- is omitted in the nisbas of persons of non-Arab stock (as with Juwaynī). For place names where an anglicized form is in common use (e.g. Merv, Herat, Aleppo, Damascus) and for titles/ranks that have long been Europeanized (e.g. caliph, amir; but wazir in preference to ‘vizier’), these forms are used. Terms that recur frequently in the text (e.g. quriltai, noyan, tümen, ortaq, amīr, malik, dhimmī, dinār, Shārī’a) are given in roman type rather than italics, and without diacritics, after their first appearance. The names of dynasties appear without diacritics (thus Salghurids rather than Salghūrids). I have employed the form ‘Mamlūk’ for the power that so tenaciously resisted the Mongols, while using ‘mamluk’ (with no macron) for the elite military slaves from whom the regime takes its name. The Arabic-Persian patronymic (bin, ibn) is regularly abbreviated to ‘b’, except when it is commonly used to designate a particular individual, usually an author, as in the case of Ibn al-Athīr.

Given the fact that various letters in the Arabic-Persian script differ only in the placing of diacritical points, the reading of proper names in the primary sources (either printed or in manuscript) can be problematic. The reconstruction of a hypothetical form is preceded by an asterisk. I have used capitals, particularly in the notes, to indicate the spelling of an uncertain name in a text: here Č represents the double consonant ch, Ġ stands for gh, Š for sh, T- for th and X for kh, and the long vowels ā, ū and ĭ are represented by A, W and Y respectively. When diacritical points seem to be lacking in the manuscript original, I have shown the Arabic-Persian consonant in the form in which it appears there, but in italics. Thus Ḥ [ح, خ] might in fact have stood for J [ﺝ, ڵ], Č [ﭺ, چ] or X [ﺥ, خ]. A mere ‘tooth’ without diacritical points, which could accordingly represent B, P, T, T-, N, Y or ’ (if simply the bearer of the hamza, ە), is indicated in transcription by a dot.

For Chinese I have employed the pinyin system. Russian is transliterated as follows:

| 
| и | ་ | ж | zh | щ | shch | 
| э | é | х | kh | ь | 
| ы | y | ц | ts | 
| ю | iu | ч | ch | 
| я | ia | ш | sh |
Qur’anic quotations

Quotations from the Qur’ān are taken from the translation by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, *The Qur’an* (Oxford, 2005; repr. with corrections, 2010). In citing verse numbers I have followed the text established by Gustav Flügel, *Corani textus arabicus*, 3rd edn (Leipzig, 1893).

Dates

Where dates are cited from Muslim sources, the date according to the Hijrī calendar appears first and is followed by that according to the Common Era: thus 659/1260–1.

Referencing

In many cases I have cited more than one edition/translation of a work (for instance, Rashīd al-Dīn’s *Tārīkh-i mubārak-i Ghāzānī*, the anonymous *Hawādith al-jāmi’a* and the final volume of Ibn Wās’il’s *Mufarrij al-kurūb*). This is because I have frequently found an author’s habit of using a single version of a text or translation (particularly one I do not myself possess) extremely frustrating, and hope that the convenience of access to alternatives will more than offset the disadvantage of what may strike some readers as excessively cluttered notes.
I A Mongol court feast: Diez-Album A, fo. 70, S. 22, no. 1, from Rashid al-Din, Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh (reproduced courtesy of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz). Notice the boghtaq worn by the Mongol ladies.
II and III Siege operations: Rashid al-Din, *Jami′ al-tawārīkh*, Edinburgh University Library, ms. Or. 20 (dated between 1306 and 1314), fos. 124b and 130b (reproduced courtesy of Edinburgh University Library). These miniatures depict, anachronistically, sieges conducted by Mahmūd of Ghazna in 1003 and 1012 respectively. The engines are operated by Muslims, but the other warriors wear Mongol armour.
IV Prisoners being led away by the Mongols: Diez Album A, fo. 70, S. 19, no. 2, from Rashid al-Din, Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh (reproduced courtesy of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz).

V The Mongols torturing their prisoners: Diez-Album A, fo. 70, S. 6, no. 1, from Rashid al-Din, Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh (reproduced courtesy of the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz). Illustrations of this kind have helped to reinforce Mongol brutality.
VI The Prophet recognizing ‘Ali as his rightful successor at Ghadir Khumm: al-Bīrūnī, Ḥārāt al-bāqiya, Edinburgh University Library, ms. Or. 161 (dated 1307), fo. 162a (reproduced courtesy of Edinburgh University Library). The illustration may reflect the Shi‘i leanings of the contemporary Ilkhan Öljeitū.

Plate VII The Prophet’s birth: Rashid al-Dīn, Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, Edinburgh University Library, ms. Or. 20, fo. 44a (reproduced courtesy of Edinburgh University Library). The model for this miniature is believed to have been a Christian Nativity scene.
INTRODUCTION

This book sets out to explore two questions. First, it investigates the impact on the Islamic world (Dār al-Islām) of the campaigns of conquest by the armies of Temūjin, better known as Chinggis Khan (d. 1227), and his first three successors, under whom the empire of the Mongols (or Tatars, as they were often termed) came to embrace all the Muslim territories east of Syria and the Byzantine Greek oecumene. And second, it examines the character of Mongol rule over Muslims down to, and just beyond, the conversion of the various khans to Islam, and the longer-term legacy of subjection to the infidel. These themes have naturally surfaced in the standard work on the conquerors, David Morgan’s The Mongols (1986; 2nd edn, 2007), as well as in Bertold Spuler’s Die Mongolen in Iran (1939; 4th edn, 1985), and various collaborative enterprises, most recently The Cambridge History of Inner Asia (2009) and The New Cambridge History of Islam, III (2010). But they have not, to the best of my knowledge, been the discrete focus of any single-authored book.

The research is based largely on the works of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century authors writing in Persian and Arabic, and to a lesser extent on material in Latin and Old French, produced by Western European observers and visitors to the Mongol empire. My linguistic capacity, regrettably, does not extend to the sources in Armenian, Georgian, Syriac and Chinese, which I have had to consult in translation, or in Tibetan, where I depend on secondary literature. Nor does it include Mongolian: relatively little material from these two centuries survives in Mongolian, however, and I have used the only surviving contemporary narrative in that language, the so-called Secret History of the Mongols, in the splendid translation (with voluminous commentary) by Dr Igor de Rachewiltz.
Historiography has not usually been generous to nomads. They have tended to leave few or no literary remains and nothing by way of archival material. We are accordingly dependent on the writings of their sedentary neighbours, who viewed them at best as unsophisticated and more often as bestial. Nomads were depicted as lawless and rapacious, constantly in need of restraint; their very strengths – the mobility and speed afforded by travelling light – reinforced these negative reactions.\footnote{The imbalance within the corpus of primary sources long exerted a pronounced effect on the secondary literature, often further primed by nationalistic sentiment, so that conquest by the nomads could be held to have retarded political or cultural development. It is only in the last three decades or so that historians have begun to challenge the stereotype, pointing out that the nomads were no more ‘natural warriors’ than their sedentary neighbours, that they were not driven by the inherent poverty of their lifestyle to plunder those neighbours or extort their wealth by means of threats, and that the representatives of sedentary culture were themselves given to predatory attacks on the pastoralists.} Nomadic groups were by no means monolithic in their attitudes towards settled societies, moreover. The interests of tribal armies and the mass of the herding population might differ; the relationship between the pastoralists and their agrarian neighbours was often symbiotic.\footnote{And lastly, the nomads’ interest in acquiring technical knowledge has been greatly underestimated.} As pastoral nomads who operated on a far grander scale than their precursors, the Mongols have enjoyed the worst press of all, and it is by no means confined to academic scholarship. For the average Westerner today the first assault on the Islamic world, by Chinggis Khan’s Mongols in 1219–24, is just a part of a bigger process that seems to exercise a growing fascination: the rise of a hitherto obscure people, under a charismatic leader, to create the largest continuous land empire in the history of the planet. The details of the conquest and its aftermath can remain relatively blurred behind a skein of admiring or, equally, disparaging epithets to describe ‘Genghis Khan’, perceived as an extraordinarily talented general but an uncultured and bloodthirsty monarch\footnote{At times the conqueror’s notoriety has presented an irresistible temptation to borrow his name for the titles of books that betray only the most tenuous connection, if any, with his career.} (and one whose career, mystifyingly, represents a challenging paradigm to those aspiring to a niche on the far right of the political spectrum). At times the conqueror’s notoriety has presented an irresistible temptation to borrow his name for the titles of books that betray only the most tenuous connection, if any, with his career.\footnote{By comparison with Chinggis Khan, his grandson Hülegü (d. 1265), whose campaigns subjugated a much larger proportion of the Muslim population of south-west Asia, is virtually unknown in Europe, as is the}
state he founded, the Ilkhanate – and this despite the fact that his sack of Baghdad in 1258 brought to an abrupt and violent end the ‘Abbasid Caliphate, of which Baghdad had been the centre (with relatively brief interruptions) for nearly half a millennium. A lecture to the British Academy by a historian of modern Iraq in the wake of the Second Gulf War, tracing regime changes in that country back as far as Hülegü’s invasion and presented as ‘an essay in haute vulgarisation’ may nevertheless have both signalled and promoted a growing awareness.

It is a very different matter in the present-day Dar al-Islam, where by all appearances Hülegü’s operations have eclipsed those of his grandfather. A Syrian government official is quoted as claiming in the 1950s that the Mongol sack of Baghdad had put back by centuries the development of Islamic science and, by implication, its capacity to outstrip that of Western Europe. As Emmanuel Sivan pointed out over thirty years ago, the denunciations of the recently converted Mongols of Ilkhanid Iran by the great Syrian Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) have served since the mid-twentieth century as an inspiration for Muslims implacably opposed to growing secularization or Western influence and encroachment. And when Osama bin Laden contended, in a statement broadcast by Al-Jazeera on 12 November 2002, that ‘Cheney and Powell killed and destroyed in Baghdad’ (during the First Gulf War) ‘more than Hulegu [sic] of the Mongols’, he did not, apparently, deem it necessary to provide his audience with greater detail about this remote episode. Nor was it only Muslims of a radical bent who noticed such parallels. In January 2003 Saddam Hussein likened the imminent second attack on Iraq by the forces of Britain and the United States to the Mongol invasion of the country in 1258 – something of an irony, since an analogy had earlier been drawn between the Mongol conquest of Baghdad and Saddam’s own invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Clearly Hülegü’s campaign against the Caliphate was an event that still resonated in Muslim minds after an interval of more than seven centuries.

Academics, too, from a Near Eastern or Iranian background tend to enter verdicts on the overall legacy of the Mongols to the development of the region that fall far short of favourable. The author of a recent history of Iran is fairly representative of many:

It is difficult to credit the Mongol regime in Persia with much positive achievement … A few notable constructions such as Soltaniyeh and Holagu’s [sic] observatory in Maragheh are hardly compensation for the losses they inflicted on the country. Hundreds of thousands (perhaps millions) were killed; towns were devastated; sedentary agriculture
suffered tremendously from pillage, plunder and heavy taxes. Any brave attempt to find a balance for these disasters under Mongol rule would be reminiscent of Voltaire’s poetical caricature of the pious belief that the earthquake of Lisbon had some beneficial effects such as dogs being able to help themselves to the corpses of the dead.14

This is in my view unduly dismissive of the beneficial consequences of Mongol rule, to which certain Iranian scholars are ready to give some weight.15 But the underlying point still stands: to draw up a balance sheet is a futile and elusive task.16

The assessment quoted above would have been endorsed not long ago by historians in the Western world. J. J. Saunders, for example, wrote of the Mongols as ‘hated alien conquerors, an army of occupation, putting down no roots, and winning no loyalty’, charged them with ‘cold and deliberate genocide’ and imputed to them ‘a blind unreasoning fear and hatred of urban civilisation’.17 Many Western scholars, however, now dissent sharply from such verdicts. True, there is still a readiness to concede that the Mongol conquests were accompanied by large-scale slaughter (although this coexists with a clearer understanding of the strategic impulses behind it).18 Moreover, a number of authors have recently begun to analyse the nature of the very real blow that Sunnī Muslims sustained with the destruction of the Imamate, namely the ’Abbasid Caliphate, and the spiritual malaise to which that event gave rise.19 They have admittedly tended to look more to the Islamic heartlands in Mamlûk Egypt and Syria than to Mongol-ruled Iran and Central Asia. Inevitably too, perhaps, they have focused on the writings of Ibn Taymiyya, himself a fugitive from Mongol-occupied Harrān; although his fulminations were by no means confined to the Mongols and he regarded the inner spiritual crisis that confronted Muslims as a bigger problem than military defeat and subjection.20

Generally speaking, however, if for present-day Muslims Mongol violence in the Near East is still a byword, Western historiography on the Mongol empire over the past half-century has undergone a marked shift of emphasis. In a piece first published in 1968, Professor Bernard Lewis queried whether the mass killing in which the Mongols engaged had the profound economic consequences often attributed to it; he further suggested that Iraq, already in decline, was the only region which suffered long-term effects and that the significance of the demise of the Caliphate has been exaggerated. In pointing to the positive results of the Mongol hegemony, especially in the political sphere, the article was a milestone in anglophone scholarship; though it was impaired by a holistic treatment of nomadic
incursions from the east, so that the Mongols were lumped in with other steppe peoples, such as the eleventh-century Saljuq Turks and the Ottomans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as if they were homogeneous phenomena.\textsuperscript{21}

Since the appearance of Lewis’ article there has been a growing tendency among Western historians to accentuate the more positive repercussions of the Mongols’ rule in the extensive regions of Asia that they conquered.\textsuperscript{22} In 2006 Bert Fragner invited us to adopt a nomadic Mongol vantage point, over against a more traditional discourse which begins from the status of the sedentary societies of China and Iran as the repository of venerable cultures and which privileges their twin role both in suffering from and adapting to alien conquest and in (eventually) ‘taming’ and absorbing/expelling the conquerors.\textsuperscript{23} One symptom of the change is that the image of Mongol governance has mellowed somewhat. Evidence has been advanced for a closer assimilation (in Ilkhanid Iran, at least) between the Mongol ruling cadre and the indigenous aristocracy and official classes.\textsuperscript{24} The khans themselves have undergone a certain measure of rehabilitation. Dr George Lane locates them within a tradition – of seeking knowledge in many different fields – that linked them both with earlier steppe potentates and with Chinese emperors of the Tang dynasty.\textsuperscript{25} David Morgan suggests that the time-honoured assumption that Mongol sovereigns, intent only on warfare, hunting, feasting, drinking and coition, evinced little interest in the tedious responsibilities of administration, which they happily left to Persian or (in China) Inner Asian bureaucrats, can no longer stand.\textsuperscript{26}

On a different front, the Mongol expansion has been seen as ‘the first global event’.\textsuperscript{27} Here the seminal work of Professor Thomas T. Allsen has been especially influential. One of the few scholars engaged in the rapidly expanding field of Mongol history who is able to draw on both Chinese and Islamic sources, he highlights the active role the Mongols played in the promotion of economic and cultural activity: their stimulation of commercial networks covering the entire breadth of Asia (and not just that linking Asia and Catholic Europe, of which we have long known),\textsuperscript{28} and their deliberate fostering of intellectual exchanges, notably between Iran and China, across fields as diverse as medicine, astronomy, geography, agronomy and cuisine.\textsuperscript{29} As demonstrated by an important exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York and the Los Angeles County Museum in 2002–3 (the Los Angeles phase coinciding, unintentionally, with the US-led invasion of Iraq), the cultural cross-fertilization over which the Mongols presided extended even to the visual arts.\textsuperscript{30} Their empire functioned as what S. A. M. Adshead termed ‘the basic information circuit’.\textsuperscript{31}
Timothy May has labelled this phenomenon ‘the Chinggis Exchange’, by analogy with the term ‘Columbus Exchange’ that denotes, in the vocabulary of some historians, the intrusion of Western Europeans into the Americas and its profound consequences. The subtitle chosen by Lane for his Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran is ‘A Persian Renaissance’. Indeed, the attention now given to such intercultural contacts represents, in Morgan’s words, a ‘major historiographical shift’ in the study of the Mongols and their empire. In a recent biography of Chinggis Khan (which appeared, tellingly, in a series entitled ‘Makers of the Muslim World’), Professor Michal Biran incorporates a comprehensive, and by no means totally negative, outline of the overall legacy of the Mongols to the world of Islam.

While broadly sympathetic towards these new emphases, to which I hope I have done full justice, I am concerned equally to avoid minimizing the shock of the Mongol conquest, not least the destruction, whether temporary or longer term, that accompanied the campaigns in the west. The primary sources may well exaggerate – in a great many instances they undoubtedly do exaggerate – the conquerors’ numbers, the casualty figures for the populations that resisted, and the damage inflicted, in particular, on the great urban centres of eastern Iran. This does not, however, mean that the grim impact of successive incursions by infidel nomads, possessed of what was in some respects a superior siege technology, should be played down. Nor can we leave out of the balance either the economically and socially harmful consequences of rapacious and irregular taxation during the early decades of Mongol rule, and perhaps beyond, or the effects of subjugation by an infidel power, for the first time in centuries (in Iran and Iraq), on what might be loosely termed the collective Muslim psyche. In other words, the vantage point of this book is largely that of the subject Muslim rather than the infidel master.

On the other hand, I have also given prominence to the role of Muslim ‘allies’ – client rulers and their forces – in boosting the military capacity of the Mongol war-machine and in facilitating the subjugation or the peaceful submission of their co-religionists. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that at the first appearance of Chinggis Khan and his forces in the Khwārazmshāh’s empire in 1219–20 the Mongol army was by no means made up exclusively of infidels but included large numbers of Muslim troops; and that this characteristic was yet more conspicuous forty years later, when the coalition with which Hülegü attacked the Caliphate comprised an even greater number of Muslim princes drawn from Iran, Iraq and Anatolia. How far, if at all, this often neglected fact mitigated the traumatic experience for the conquered Muslim populations must remain
INTRODUCTION

a moot point. I have devoted a later chapter to the condition of such Muslim client states under Mongol overlordship.

This book goes beyond the era of the unitary empire to cover also, in varying degrees, the separate and practically autonomous khanates into which the Mongol world split in the early 1260s, within just a few years of Hülegü’s destruction of the Caliphate. In two of these successor-states – the Ilkhanate in Iran and Iraq and the khanate of Chaghadai in Central Asia – Muslims from the outset constituted a majority; in the third, the Jochid dominions (known to historians as the Qipchaq khanate or the Golden Horde) in the Pontic-Caspian steppes and western Siberia, they did not, and Islamization took longer. But in each case the Chinggisid rulers and their Mongol following came in time to embrace Islam. China, present-day Mongolia and eastern Central Asia – the territories of the Yuan empire, ruled by the Great Khans (qaghan), where Buddhism triumphed – will enter into consideration only insofar as their much smaller Muslim population and a more limited process of Islamization require notice. In fact, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence relates to the Ilkhanate, since there is a relative dearth of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century source material for the other two westerly Mongol polities; but it is possible, even so, to offer (I trust) sensible conclusions about them also. It may be that at times I over-compensate for the fact that the Jochid lands and (still more) the Ilkhanate have received more comprehensive coverage in the secondary literature than have the Mongol territories in Central Asia. If this be the case, I remain unrepentant.

I have not set out to provide a narrative of events in any of the Mongol khanates, whether the undivided empire or the three successor-states just mentioned. Nor do I deal with the relations between the Mongol world and those parts of the Dar al-Islam that remained resolutely outside it. Diplomatic exchanges and military and ideological confrontation with the Mamlûk empire (inter alia) have been dealt with admirably by Professors Reuven Amitai and Anne Broadbridge;35 I myself have examined contacts with Muslim India.36 My aim here, rather, is to investigate the encounter between the Mongol conquerors and the Muslims (of all social levels) under their rule. With that in view, I am seeking to answer a number of questions. How were the Mongols able to subdue such a vast swathe of Muslim territory within just a few decades? How destructive for the Islamic lands were the campaigns of conquest, and how far was the damage compounded by the subsequent wars between hostile Mongol khanates? In what ways did Mongol domination make itself felt for subordinate Muslim princes, for their Muslim servitors and for their Muslim subjects at the
grass-roots level? In what light did these subjects view their infidel monarchs? How did members of the Chinggisid dynasty, their military commanders and the Mongol rank and file come to adopt Islam? What, if anything, changed as a result? What impact did the Mongol presence have, both in the short term and more enduringly, on the conquered Islamic lands? What were the consequences for the Dar al-Islam of incorporation within a world-empire and, in particular, of more intimate contact with the ancient, highly sophisticated and decidedly non-Muslim culture of China? The answers to these questions, of course, must all too frequently remain merely partial, tentative or speculative.

The first two chapters are introductory in nature. Chapter 1 reviews our principal written sources. They are for the most part the work of Sunnī Muslim authors, but also include two Shīʿīs and a number of eastern Christians who wrote under Mongol domination, as well as a handful of observers from Latin Europe. Here, as at intervals later in the book, I have tried to ask why authors told the story in the manner they did, to locate them in their respective contexts, to ascertain their preoccupations and guiding purposes, and to identify the intended readers (or, in certain cases, reader). It has to be acknowledged that groundwork of this kind is frequently as elusive as it is desirable. While we know a great deal about historians like Juwaynī (who served as Ilkhanid governor of Baghdad) and Rashīd al-Dīn (who was chief minister to the Ilkhans for over two decades), we know of Juwaynī's continuator Waṣṣāf, for instance, only what little he chooses to tell us regarding his life; while the majority of historians writing within the Mongol empire in this period say even less about themselves and remain far more opaque figures. Chapter 2 is designed to provide a vital background survey of the relations, down to the eve of the Mongol attacks, between the Dar al-Islam and the nomads of the Eurasian steppe, mostly peoples who had emerged among the debris of the former empire of the sixth- and seventh-century Türks. A particularly important phase in these relations was the advent, in the second quarter of the twelfth century, of the infidel Qara-Khitai, most probably of Mongolian stock, which would be envisaged by at least one thirteenth-century Muslim observer, and by a modern author, almost as a rehearsal for the more spectacular Mongol intrusion.37

Thereafter, the book falls very loosely into two parts. Chapters 3–6 are concerned with the conquest period, down to c. 1260, whereas the remainder focus essentially on the era of the divided empire beyond that date. Chapter 3 covers the history of Mongol expansion down to 1252, a theme taken up again in chapter 5, which concentrates on the invasion of south-west Asia.
by Hülégü in the 1250s. Chapter 4 studies the complex layers of imperial administration under the qaghans from Ögödei (r. 1229–41) to Möngke (r. 1251–9) and the distribution of appanage lands among the members of Chinggis Khan’s dynasty. Only to a very limited degree did the appanages foreshadow the quasi-independent khanates that would develop after 1260. But this period has all too often been handled as if it were merely a prelude to the more impressive era of Hülégü and the Ilkhanid dynasty he founded. I have tried instead, by highlighting the tensions within the imperial system and among the Chinggisids themselves, to set the scene for the latter sections of chapter 5. These investigate the disruptive nature of Hülégü’s creation of the Ilkhanate, and treat it as an integral stage in the fragmentation of the Mongol empire in the period 1260–2. I have long felt that there is something highly suspect about the ‘official’ version of Hülégü’s emergence as Ilkhan in Iran and Iraq, and in an article published back in 1978 I contended that it represented an act of usurpation. Here a slightly modified form of that argument is advanced on the strength of important new evidence from a recently unearthed and virtually untapped Persian source, the Akbār-i mughūlān attributed to Qutb al-Dīn Shirāzī. Chapter 6 investigates the extent of the devastation inflicted on the Dar al-Islam by the invasions and such recovery as occurred prior to the 1260s, whether as a result of local initiative or at the instigation of Mongol rulers.

The main thrust of chapter 7 is to explore the impact of the conflicts among the successor-states that developed after 1260, and of the turbulent activities of different nomadic groups within such states, upon the agrarian and urban economy of the Islamic world; some attention is also given to the measures of reconstruction that the various Mongol regimes put in place. These upheavals make it difficult to retain the now venerable concept of a Pax Mongolica without qualification; the destruction that Mongol khans visited upon each other’s territories has to be tacked on to any assessment of the conquest period. Yet if the idea of a Pax hardly emerges unscathed from a study of the inter-Mongol struggles of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, we can still legitimately speak of a growing ‘interconnectedness’ between far-distant regions during this period. The Mongol conquests involved the displacement – usually involuntary – of significant numbers of both Muslims and non-Muslims. There is little doubt that as a result of this diaspora, especially that of scholars, much of the Islamic world was brought into a markedly closer relationship with other parts of Eurasia, most obviously China but also Latin Europe. Chapter 8 attempts to outline the symptoms of this process, perceptible (in varying degrees) in the fields
of trade, the visual arts and technical knowledge, while at the same time identifying the limitations of cross-cultural contact in its various spheres.

Chinggis Khan’s great westward expedition was separated by seven or eight decades, and that of Hülegü by four decades or so, from what may be deemed the conversion of any branch of the imperial dynasty, beginning with the Ilkhans. The three chapters that follow each approach the impact of pagan Mongol hegemony from a different vantage point. Chapter 9 deals with the local Muslim potentates who kept their thrones in return for loyal service: it is necessary to stress the uneven spread of imperial authority and the existence of a tranche of ancillary regimes under Mongol overlordship. Particular attention is given to the obligations imposed by the conquerors and the advantages of vassalage. Study of these relations affords an opportunity also to ask whether, and to what degree, elite Muslim women benefited from the more prominent role and higher status of women in traditional Mongol society. Chapter 10 examines the sometimes precarious relationship of the Mongols’ Muslim servitors with infidel khans and military commanders and with their non-Muslim colleagues. In the process, it traces the shifting balance of power between Mongol grandees and ‘Tājik’ civilian officials, and investigates how far, if at all, these very disparate ruling cadres were in the process of integration. The nature of the evidence dictates that the focus of these latter two chapters is largely on the Ilkhanate. The experience of Muslims of all social ranks under infidel Mongol rule – a topic that has been unaccountably neglected – is investigated in chapter 11. Here I have looked particularly at the contexts of taxation, law and religious freedom, and have drawn attention to a variety of repressive measures enacted by the conquerors, notably those enshrined in Mongol law (yasa) and custom (yosun), while taking care to exaggerate neither their scope nor any consistency in their implementation. This chapter also highlights what Muslims viewed as a starkly unwelcome departure from the practice of their pre-Mongol rulers: the establishment of parity between themselves and other confessional groups.

Chapters 12 and 13 explore the Islamization of the Mongols. Muslim writers gave prominence to royal conversions. They naturally saw an event like the acceptance of Islam by the Ilkhan Ghazan (1295) as a watershed, and the acolyte as initiating a definitive shift in the religious orientation of the state, when in reality it appears that convert monarchs trod in the wake of large numbers within their military establishment and that Islamization was a long drawn-out and sometimes fitful process. Chapter 12 focuses on patterns of conversion and conceptual problems, not least elusive questions such as the appeal of Islam to the nomadic Mongols of Western Asia and the
means by which the new faith was conveyed to them. At one level, this chapter relates to the conversion of the ordinary Mongol and (in some degree) of the Mongol aristocracy, where a dearth of evidence inevitably confines us to the realm of surmise. In chapter 13, which opens with an overview of the process within each of the three western khanates, the spotlight is chiefly on the conversions of particular khans for which we possess more specific accounts (even though we know nothing like as much as we should wish). A further aim is to ascertain what changed (and what did not) in the wake of such royal conversions – how far, in particular, the subsequent policies of these rulers were shaped by their new faith – and to reach some conclusions regarding the pace of Islamization.

The Epilogue considers the impact of infidel Mongol rule on the Islamic world in the longer term, down to the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, even in those regions where Chinggisid sovereignty was by then a dead letter. In the sphere of statecraft and ruling institutions, one especially important phase was the era of the Turco-Mongol warlord Temür (i-lang, ‘the lame’; hence ‘Tamerlane’ in European literature), both a self-consciously orthodox Muslim and a champion of Mongol tradition, who attempted to recreate Chinggis Khan’s empire from his power-base in Central Asia between c. 1370 and his death in 1405, but who took care to rule in the name of a Chinggisid shadow-khan. Another phase was the restoration of de facto Chinggisid rule in Transoxiana by the Uzbeks, who ousted Temür’s descendants in the period 1500–7, and also, at approximately the same time, by the Kazakhs in the more northerly steppelands to which they have given their name. It was this resurgence and prolongation of Chinggisid rule that led the editors of the recently published Cambridge History of Inner Asia (covering a period that stretches to as late as the 1880s in certain regions) to subtitle it ‘The Chinggisid Age’. The Mongol legacy, however, was by no means confined to institutions, but included the spread of the Islamic faith to hitherto untouched regions of Asia and the creation, in time, of new ethnicities. The final topic investigated is the relationship between the Mongol conquests and the genesis of the Black Death, through the formation of a single disease zone that embraced the whole of the Eurasian continent, a development for which the Mongols have often, on less solid grounds, been held responsible.

The chronological parameters of this book vary greatly, depending to some extent on the date at which the relevant Chinggisid rulers and their Mongol following officially embraced Islam and hence ceased to be infidels. Whereas I devote little space to Mongol Iran once we pass the reign of the convert Ilkhan Ghazan (in chapters 9–11, for instance), the history of
the Jochids in the western steppes receives longer notice, until well into the fourteenth century, and the attention given to the Chaghadaiids in Central Asia continues to an even later date. But in any case, to limit the scope of the book to the pre-conversion era would have produced a treatment that was inexcusably artificial: pagan practice continued well after conversion, and it is impossible to do justice to the consequences of conquest by pagans with reference only to the era of paganism.

For the same reason, the boundaries of the geographical area covered also necessarily fluctuate, incorporating territories that at different times contained only a minority Muslim population or were ruled by khans who, in whatever degree, had accepted Islam: Qaraqorum in Mongolia, for instance, not merely because it was the administrative centre of the unitary empire but also on the grounds that it contained a resident Muslim community; or the lower Danube basin during the era of the Jochid khan Noghai around the turn of the thirteenth century – decades before the Ottoman conquest – because both Noghai and his son appear to have identified with Islam.

It is also necessary to say a word about geographical and ethnic terminology, where the pitfalls attendant on loose phrasing are legion and I risk offending against canonical usage. I use ‘Iran’ in preference to the term ‘Persia’ often favoured by British and other European historians, but in a wider sense than the area covered by the present-day Islamic Republic. For the purposes of this book, Iran does not merely subsume Azerbaijan but extends as far east as the Amū-daryā (Oxus river) and the Suleiman range, and thus includes modern Turkmenistan and cities like Herat and Ghazna/Ghazni (both today in Afghanistan); ‘Khurāsān’ accordingly denotes an area far larger than the modern Iranian province of that name. ‘Central Asia’ here comprises the territory of four (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan) of the five modern republics that gained their independence following the break-up of the USSR in 1991, and the Chinese province of Xinjiang (Uighur Autonomous Region). ‘Inner Asia’ (sometimes called ‘Central Eurasia’) has a broader meaning and includes not only these regions but also Mongolia and southern Siberia. I have adopted ‘the Eurasian steppe’, lastly, for the grasslands extending from the edge of the Manchurian forest zone to the great rivers that water the Ukraine and beyond as far as the lower Danube.

As to ethnic labels, I have preferred to call the peoples of the eastern Eurasian steppe whom Temüjin united under his rule ‘Mongol’, even though they were more commonly called ‘Tatars’ by their Muslim subjects and by enemies who remained outside the empire. In this book, for the most part,
'Tatar’ has a narrower application. First, and primarily, it denotes the tribe who neighboured the Mongols in their homeland and who were Chinggis Khan’s bitter enemies; and in the second place it is used for the ‘Turkicized’ Mongols of the western steppe and forest regions, such as those of the Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberian and Crimean khanates that split off from the moribund Golden Horde in the fifteenth century. Otherwise, the word ‘Tatar’ is used only in direct quotation from contemporary sources. The noun ‘Turk’ is employed in its usual sense, for instance in chapter 2, to embrace all those who belonged, or claimed to belong, to the same branch of the Altaic group of nations; the corresponding adjective in this context, however, is ‘Turkic’. I have used ‘Turkish’ generically for the related languages the peoples of this branch spoke or, less frequently, for the Ottomans and the inhabitants of modern Turkey, whereas ‘Türk’ refers specifically to the sixth–eighth-century empire, its rulers, its peoples and the traditions that it bequeathed to its steppe successors, the Mongols included. Lastly, the term ‘Tājīk’ is used, as in the primary sources, for people of Persian stock, and does not denote the inhabitants of modern Tajikistan. It is my hope that the reader will not find these distinctions unduly pedantic or – worse – baffling.
In her authoritative study of the Persian province of Fārs during the Mongol era, Professor Denise Aigle draws attention to three problems surrounding the primary sources. Virtually all of them, firstly, emanate from non-Mongolian cultures, since we have little written by Mongols and the material tends to come from either the subject peoples or from rival polities like the Mamlûk empire in Egypt and Syria. Secondly, a large part of what we have represents the writings of men who held office in Mongol Iran (the Ilkhanate) and were consequently very much tied to the regime. And thirdly, there is a marked contrast between the rich historiography for the early decades of the empire and the relative poverty of sources for the era when the Ilkhanate collapsed.¹ To these problems a historian concerned also with Mongol rule in the Islamic world beyond Iran might add another: the heavy preponderance of contemporary sources produced within the Ilkhanate, as against the pronounced dearth of material from the other two westerly Mongol states that became part of the Islamic world, namely the Golden Horde (or, to use alternative terms, the ulus of Jochi or the Qipchaq khanate), based in the Pontic-Caspian steppes, and the Chaghadayid khanate in Central Asia.

After a relatively short section on the Mongolian and Chinese material, I shall divide the sources – most of them in Persian or Arabic – into nine categories: (1) the works of authors writing outside the limits of Mongol sovereignty prior to 1260, and therefore contemporary with the first invasions and the earliest phase of Mongol rule; (2) Islamic sources composed within the empire but prior to the Mongol rulers’ conversion; (3) Islamic sources from within the territories of the Muslim Ilkhanate (deemed to date, for this purpose, from the conversion of Ghazan in 1295), though
reserving a separate section (4) for the local histories written within Ilkhanid Iran and Iraq; (5) non-narrative material from the Ilkhanate; (6) the historiography of the Jochid and Chaghadayid khanates, along with the Timurid sources; (7) sources dating from after the division of the empire (c. 1261) and composed in enemy territory, notably the Mamlūk Sultanate; and, lastly, (8) histories belonging outside the Sunnī Muslim tradition – that is, by Shi’ī and eastern Christian subjects of the Ilkhans – and (9) the writings of Christian visitors to the Mongol territories from Catholic Western Europe.

I should mention at this point sources that have not entered into consideration. I have largely neglected the hagiographical material (but see below, p. 33): histories of the different sufi orders (silsilāt); lives of sufi saints; and collections of their discourses (malfūzāt), all of which present considerable problems for the historian interested primarily in political history and in developments in the religious history of an entire society (rather than the spirituality or organic growth of the sufi order itself). In addition, I have tended not to cite the later general histories in Persian, such as those of Mīr Khwānd (d. 903/1498) and Khwānd-Amīr (d. 942/1535–6), since they are almost wholly dependent on sources that have come down to us from the Mongol period. For the same reason I have made sparing use of relatively late Arabic compilations from the Mamlūk empire, referring very little to al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442), and to the general history, 'Iqd al-jumān, by al-'Aynī (d. 855/1451), and not at all to the history by Ibn al-Furāt (d. 807/1405) or the fifteenth-century biographical dictionaries of Ibn Hājar and Ibn Taghrībirdī.

**Mongolian and other Far Eastern material**

The sole surviving Mongolian source is the epic Mongghol’un niucha tobcha’an or Chinggis Qaghan-u huja’ur, better known as the ‘Secret History of the Mongols’, which includes a good deal of folk tradition (though the main outline is apparently historical). Igor de Rachewiltz has recently advanced fresh arguments in favour of 1229 as the date of the original composition, but it is also generally accepted that the final section, covering Ögödei’s reign, as also certain paragraphs relating to events within Chinggis Khan’s lifetime, were added at a later date – most probably in or soon after 1251–2, following Möngke’s accession (below, p. 98).² On Mongol activities in the Islamic world, however, the ‘Secret History’ has little to offer: it exhibits a far greater interest in events in the Mongolian homeland and in the war in China, dismissing Chinggis Khan’s operations in Western Asia in a comparatively brief space.
The only other Mongolian historical source known to have existed is called the *Altan Debter* (‘Golden Book’) by Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh (below, pp. 26–8), who also describes it as ‘the books of histories (*kutub-i ta’rikh*) that are to be found in the royal treasury (*khazāna-yi ʿāmira*)’. The use of the plural might indicate that we are dealing with something akin to the ‘veritable records’ (Ch. *shilu*; Mo. *tobcha’an*), the annals for each qaghan’s reign, which were maintained in China and which, after the Mongols’ expulsion by the Ming, would be utilized in the creation of the official dynastic history of the Chinggisid qagḥans, the *Yuan shi*. It is clear that Rashīd al-Dīn had access to this Mongol material, most probably through Bolod Chingsang, his Mongol informant. The *Altan Debter* now survives only in Chinese as *Shengwu qinzheng lu* (‘The Deeds of the Holy Warrior’, namely Chinggis Khan), produced between 1263 and 1285.

Chinese sources yield a little more than do those of Mongolian origin. The compilers of the principal annals in the *Yuan shi*, headed by Song Lian and working in haste during the early Ming era, had only scattered material to draw on for the first three chapters, covering the reigns down to Möngke’s death in 1259 (the sole part of the annalistic section translated). But more is to be found in the (untranslated) biographical sections, containing notices on numerous Mongol and Chinese figures. Reports by envoys from Song China to the Mongols in 1221 and 1237 provide information of general importance. But some data on the condition of Transoxiana and neighbouring lands at the time of Chinggis Khan’s expedition are to be found in Li Zhichang’s *Xi you ji* (‘Account of a Journey to the West’), detailing the journey in 1221–4 of the Daoist adept Changchun (Qiu Chuji) from China to the conqueror’s headquarters in the Hindu Kush. This is more valuable than the *Xi you lu* (‘Record of a Journey to the West’) of the sinicized Kitan minister, Yelū Chucai, who accompanied Chinggis Khan and spent the years 1219–24 in Central Asia: its author’s main purpose was a polemical attack on the Daoists, and his descriptions of the territories he saw are sketchy.

**Muslim observers contemporary with the early Mongol invasions:**

Ibn al-Athir, Nasawī, Jūzjānī and others

It will be natural to begin with those of our sources which were contemporary with Chinggis Khan’s invasion and the subsequent Mongol advance under Chormaghun and Baiju. Disregarding for the moment two observers who travelled in regions under attack by Chinggis Khan’s forces, namely the geographer Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī and the savant Ibn al-Labbād, the earliest
source to yield extensive information is *al-Kāmil fi l-taʾrīkh* (‘The Perfection of History’) of ‘Izz al-Dīn Abū l-Hasan ‘Alī al-Jazarī, better known as Ibn al-Athīr (b. 555/1160; d. 630/1233), writing in Mosul (al-Mawṣil). It is clear from his narrative that a number of circumstances made a profound impression on Ibn al-Athīr. One was the precipitous downfall of the Khwārazmshāh ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Tekish, who had accumulated a vast empire only a few years before the Mongols arrived to destroy it. Ibn al-Athīr saw this as an inevitable consequence of Muḥammad’s temerity in challenging the ‘Abbasid Caliphate. He was also struck, as was Yāqūt, by the speed and geographical scale of the Mongols’ operations. Within a strikingly short time, they had emerged from the confines of China, overrun Transoxiana, passed through northern Iran as far as the frontiers of Iraq, and ruined Azerbaijan and Arrān prior to moving into the Qipchaq steppe; other squadrons had campaigned in Kirmān, Sijistān (Sīstān) and the Indian borderlands. The Mongols were able to reduce even a region difficult of access, like Māzandarān, which had defied the early Caliphs for several decades after the conquest of the rest of Iran. For this phenomenal achievement, it seems, an explanation lay to hand: Muḥammad’s elimination of so many princes meant that once he in turn had been overthrown nobody remained to offer the Muslims leadership against the invaders.

On balance, the dominant chord struck by Ibn al-Athīr is one of disaster. Two further circumstances that coloured his judgement were that the Mongol invasions had coincided with the capture of Damietta by the forces of the Fifth Crusade in 616/1219, involving a formidable threat to Muslim Egypt, and that Muslim rulers appeared to be prey to constant dissension, regardless of the menace from either enemy. He was among those who came to believe the rumour (which he ascribed to Persian Muslims) that the Mongols had been summoned by the ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Nāṣir li-dīn Allāh (d. 622/1225) as a weapon in his conflict with the Khwārazmshāh. For Ibn al-Athīr, there was no prince whose aspirations rose ‘above his belly or his private parts’, and appeals to God to send a leader fit to take up the defence of the Islamic world recur later in his narrative. There is just a hint that the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad’s son and effective successor, Jalāl al-Dīn, who inflicted greater harm on the Christian Georgians than any of his predecessors despite the adverse circumstances in which he had to operate, could have been Ibn al-Athīr’s candidate for this role – though the outrages committed by the Khwarazmian forces against Muslims are roundly condemned.

At one point Ibn al-Athīr believed that God had intervened to save the Muslims from the Mongols, just as he had delivered them from the Frankish
crusaders in the Nile delta in 618/1221. He did not live to witness the Mongol attack on the Saljuq Sultanate of Rûm in 640–1/1242–3 or the major campaigns of Hûlegû’s forces in the late 1250s, which culminated in the sack of Baghdad and the overthrow of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate (656/1258). It was possible for Ibn al-Athîr to infer from the pattern of the Mongols’ campaigns during his lifetime that they were intent only on widespread plunder and devastation and – unlike the Franks – did not aim at permanent conquest. Only towards the end of his book does he betray a dawning awareness of his error, for he cites a letter from a Muslim merchant of Rayy who had accompanied the Mongols into Azerbaijan in 627/1229–30 and who warned his co-religionists that the invaders sought far more than loot.

Shihâb al-Dîn Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Khurandizî al-Nasawî (d. 647/1249–50) completed his Sîrat al-Sult.ân Jalâl al-Dîn, an Arabic biography of the last Khwârazmshâh, in 639/1241–2; later in the century, an anonymous author produced a Persian translation (which omits, however, a number of chapters). Having witnessed the final months of the Khwarazmian regime in eastern Iran, from c. 622/1225 Nasawî was in the entourage of the fugitive Jalâl al-Dîn, whom he served as head of the secretariat (kâtib al-inshā’). An earlier work by Nasawî in Persian, the little-used Naﬁhat al-mas.dûr (‘The Coughings of the Consumptive’) dating from 632/1234–5, furnishes an account of his tribulations between Jalâl al-Dîn’s death and his own arrival as a refugee in Mayyâfâriqîn.

Nasawî, who had access to Ibn al-Athîr’s Kâmîl and was bemused by the earlier author’s capacity to obtain high-quality information on lands in the most distant east when domiciled in Mosul, states his determination to relate only such events as he experienced personally or learned of from eyewitnesses. It is not clear that he adheres consistently to this principle. The structure of the Sîrat is highly confusing, moreover, as the author leaps from one geographical location to another, sometimes, it seems, with the aim of recounting events in strict chronological order, whether or not there was any connection between them. Nasawî was profoundly struck both by the collapse of the impressive empire of Muhammad b. Tekish and by the vicissitudes of his son’s career. The work in fact contains less material on the Mongol campaigns than on Jalâl al-Dîn’s tireless, and ultimately fruitless, efforts to carve out a new principality at the expense of his brother and of other Muslim dynasts in western Iran. It is noteworthy that for Nasawî, as for other loyal servitors who appear in the work, the prince was the sole bulwark of Islam against the pagan Mongols. Somewhat less emphasis is placed on the Khwarazmian forces’ own depredations against their fellow
Muslims in Azerbaijan and northern Iraq, which made them a byword for brutality.

The third author contemporary with Chinggis Khan’s onslaught on the Dar al-Islam was Minhâj al-Dîn ‘Uthmân b. Sirâj al-Dîn Jûzjânî, younger than Ibn al-Athîr by an entire generation and writing in c. 658/1260, at a distance of almost forty years from these events and from the relative safety of the independent Delhi Sultanate. Yet as a native of Ghûr who had left for India only in 623/1226, Jûzjânî had the two advantages of direct familiarity with the eastern Islamic lands and personal experience of the invasions. In much the same way, moreover, as Ibn al-Athîr had access to people who had been in Iran during these early Mongol campaigns, so did Jûzjânî, in Delhi, benefit from second-hand information furnished by distinguished Muslim refugees from beyond the Indus.

The stance Jûzjânî took in his Ṭabaqāt-i Nāsîrî (‘Nâsîrî Epochs’, dedicated to the reigning Delhi Sultan, Nâsîr al-Dîn Maḥmûd) was relatively unequivocal. Although he was ready to concede the occasional virtue to Mongol rulers – Chinggis Khan’s justice, for instance, or Ögödei’s clemency – and although, too, he was aware that at least one Mongol prince, Berke in Jochi’s ulus, had embraced Islam, he regularly describes Chinggis Khan and his successors as ‘accursed’ (mal’ûn) and as heading, at the moment of death, to Hell. The invasions themselves are depicted as an unmitigated disaster, the most recent phase in a process of infidel encroachment on the Islamic world that had begun with the Qara-Khitai in the twelfth century. On this second occasion, ‘from the borders of China, Turkistân, Mâ warâ’ al-nahr, Ṭukhâristân, Zâwul[istân], Ghûr, Kâbul, Ghaznayn, Irâq, Ṭabaristân, Arrân, Ādharbâijân, the Jazîra, Anbâr, Sîstân, Makrân, Kîrmân, Fârs, Khûzistân, Dîyâr Bakr and Mawṣîl, as far as the limits of Shâm [Syria] and Rûm’, everything had fallen under the sway of the infidel, and ‘not a trace of the Muslim princes and sultans remained’. This was an overstatement, since even within the lands listed several Muslim princes continued to rule under Mongol overlordship. Yet it enabled Jûzjânî to portray the Delhi Sultanate as the sole surviving bastion of Islam. He appears also to have believed that he was living in the Last Days, heralded inter alia by the advent of the Mongols, and the book takes on at times an apocalyptic tone.

So much, then, for the principal contemporary sources that describe Chinggis Khan’s campaigns in Western Asia. Let us now turn to various lesser figures. The geographer Yâqût al-Ḥamawî (d. 626/1229), who travelled through eastern Iran and Khwârazm in 617–18/1220–1, just prior to the Mongol attack, testifies to the prosperity of these regions at the time.
and relates the subsequent fate of certain cities at second hand. Another of the first Muslim Arabic authors to refer to the Mongol incursion is the savant 'Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādi, also known as Ibn al-Labbād (d. 629/1231–2). The work in question, which is unidentified, has not survived in its original form, but lengthy extracts from an ‘account of the Tatars’ attributed to Ibn al-Labbād are preserved in the Taʿrīkh al-Islām of Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), who also used the works of Ibn al-Athīr and Nasawī for this early period. Ibn al-Labbād’s narrative of the invasion would evidently make its mark on al-Dhahabī, who apostrophizes it as ‘an account to swallow up [all other] accounts, a report to throw [all other] reports in the shade, a tale to cast [all other] tales into oblivion, a calamity that reduces every [other] calamity to insignificance and a disaster that has spread over the earth and filled its length and breadth’. Travelling in northern Syria and Anatolia in the 1220s, Ibn al-Labbād met fugitives, including traders, from whom he gleaned information about the Mongols. Like both Ibn al-Athīr and Yāqūt, therefore, he wrote on the basis of hearsay; and it may be that he indulged in hyperbole to a greater extent than his more famous contemporary in Mosul.

We are fortunate that a source emanating from Ismāʿīlī Assassin circles has become accessible within the last few years. Dīwān-i qā’imiyyāt (‘Poems of the Resurrection’; an allusion to the spiritual resurrection, or Qiyāma, proclaimed at Alamūt in 559/1164) is a collection of qasīda compiled by Hasan Maḥmūdi Kātib, a close associate of Naṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī (on whom see below, p. 40). A number of these poems refer to Chinggis Khan and the ‘Tatars’, and are valuable for revealing the amicable relations that initially existed between Alamūt and the Mongols, although the conqueror is somewhat implausibly made out to be an instrument of the Assassin Master and subject to his authority.

Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd al-Madā‘ini (b. 586/1190; d. 656/1258), who lived in Baghdad and survived the Mongol conquest of the city by just a few months, had incorporated an account of the Mongol irruption in his commentary (sharḥ) on the Nahj al-balāgha, begun in 644/1246 and completed in 649/1251; the last date mentioned is 643/1245. Although much of this is borrowed from Ibn al-Athīr, it is not distinguished by any notable accuracy: for instance, Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd confuses the expedition headed by the Mongol generals Jebe and Sübe’edei from 617/1220 onwards with that commanded by Chormaghun several years later. But for the period after 630/1233 he becomes an important – and seemingly more reliable – source in his own right, of particular value for the fate of Iṣfahān, which resisted the Mongols until 633/1235–6, and for various campaigns in Iraq during the next
The work of a slightly later Baghdādī historian, Ibn al-Sāʾī (d. 674/1276), has not survived for this period, but was used by the author of *al-Hawādith al-jāmīʿa* (pp. 30–1 below).

We come, lastly, to a small group of Arabic sources composed within Syria. Muhammad b. ʿAli (Ibn Nazīf) al-Ḥamawī's *al-Taʾrīkh al-Mansūrī*, which dates from 631/1233–4 and is dedicated to the Ayyubid ruler of Ḥamā, al-Mansūr Muḥammad, contains accounts of Chinggis Khan's assault upon the Khwarazmian empire and the early operations by Chormaghnūn's forces in north-western Iran from 628/1230.38 The first of these narratives combines reasonably accurate detail with confusion regarding proper names (for example, the Mongol conqueror is at one point erroneously called ‘Kushluʾ, i.e. identified with Chinggis Khan's enemy Gūchūlı); but it is independent of Ibn al-ʿAthīr and must represent fairly early information. Otherwise, the Syrian sources simply rely upon Ibn al-ʿAthīr and have no original value for the period before 628/1230–1. At that date it was still possible in Syria to ignore the Mongol advance. Writing in Ḥamā, Ibn Abī l-Damm (d. 642/1244), whose chronicle (extant only in an abridged version) ends in 628/1230–1 and who seems to have skirted round topics that presented too formidable a challenge to his diplomatic skills, felt able to avoid mentioning the Mongols at all in his coverage of the years from 618 onwards (although the reason may be in part that he saw the Franks as a much greater threat, following the recent crusade of the Emperor Frederick II).39

For the two or three decades following Ibn al-ʿAthīr's death, however, we are fortunate to have access to some important sources: a history of Damascus by Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Shāma (b. 599/1203; d. 665/1268), *al-Dhayl ʿalā l-Rawḍatayn* ('Supplement to the Two Gardens'), which continues another work of his (begun, in fact, later) on the age of Saladin;40 a general history, *Mirʿāt al-zamān fī taʾrīkh al-aʿyān* ('The Mirror of the Age in the History of Notable Men'), by the Damascene author Shams al-Dīn Abū l-Muẓaffar Yūsuf b. Qizūgli (b. c. 581/1185; d. 654/1256), commonly called Sibt ('the maternal grandson of') Ibn al-Jawzī;41 and *Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār banī Ayyūb* ('The Dissipator of Cares in the Account of the Ayyubid Line'), a dynastic history completed in Egypt soon after 659/1261 by Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sālim, better known as Ibn Wāṣīl (b. 604/1208; d. 697/1298), a native of Ḥamā.42 The latter two authors supply important information on the Mongol attacks on Iraq, Anatolia and northern Syria, while Ibn Wāṣīl and Abū Shāma are additionally among our principal sources for the short-lived occupation of Syria and Palestine in 658/1260. Both Ibn Wāṣīl and Sibt Ibn al-Jawzī saw Jalāl al-Dīn as a rampart against the Mongols, though they were far more condemning of his operations.
than his client Nasawī had been; and Ibn Wāsil, at least, had the satisfaction of knowing that the Mongol tide to which the last Khwārazmshāh's death exposed Iraq and Syria would eventually be stemmed by the armies of Egypt, first at 'Ayn Jālūt in 658/1260 and then in subsequent victories by the Mamlūk Sultans Baybars and Qalāwūn.43 I include here, lastly, the Kitāb al-majmū' al-mubārak of the Coptic Christian historian al-Makīn Ibn al-'Amīd (d. c. 1272), which ends in 1260 and is indebted to an earlier, probably Muslim source; it provides the odd detail on the Mongol advance omitted by his two more important Muslim contemporaries.

Muslim historians writing under the pagan Ilkhans:
Juwaynī and others

Unlike the other authors named so far, 'Alāʾ al-Dīn ʿĀtā Malik Juwaynī (d. 681/1283) was born after the Mongols' initial onslaught on the lands of Islam, in 623/1226.44 His family were bureaucrats in Khurāsān who had served the Saljuqs and the Khwārazmshāhs in turn; his grandfather had accompanied the Khwārazmshāh on his flight south from Balkh. Juwaynī's father passed into the Mongols' employment, twice visiting the court of the Qaghan Ögödei in the 1230s. He transmitted information about Chinggis Khan's invasion to his son,45 and Juwaynī himself, as an official in the suite of Arghun Aqa, then viceroy of south-west Asia, travelled to the Qaghan Mōngke's headquarters (ordo) and back in 650–1/1252–3, and gathered further material while in Mongolia. It was there, he tells us,46 that he was persuaded to begin the Ta'rīkh-i jahān-gushā ('History of the World-Conqueror'), which is dedicated to Hülegū. The occasional cross-reference to a non-existent chapter suggests that what has reached us was unfinished. Even so, this is, by any standard, the most valuable work composed by a Muslim historian writing in Iran prior to the conversion of the Ilkhans.

Juwaynī, then, was the first Muslim historian of the Mongols to occupy a position in the Mongol administration of Iran. He might decry the low cultural attainments of some of those alongside whom he worked;47 he might regret the passing of the Khwārazmshāhs and deplore the advent of infidel masters; but the fact that he served them inevitably coloured the way he wrote his history. When Juwaynī makes Körgüz, the governor-general of Khurāsān, report to Ögödei that 'the servants of the Qaghan's realm' lived in comfort and luxury,48 we are not obliged to take this quotation by one bureaucrat from another at face value: officials may have many reasons for offering sanguine reports to their sovereigns, among them the vindication of their own activity and a guarantee of their survival in office.
Whereas Ibn al-Athīr had been ambivalent concerning Jalāl al-Dīn, Juwaynī’s partisanship for the last Khwārazmshāh cannot be in doubt (though he is frank regarding the massacres perpetrated by the Khwarazmian forces); and when he took up his pen, the outlook still appeared unremittingly bleak in many ways. Juwaynī alludes to Hülegū’s presence at Tabrīz at the end of Ramadān 657/mid-September 1259 while preparing to invade Syria, and at one point gives the current year as 658/1260. He accordingly finished writing well over twenty months after the overthrow of the ’Abbasid Caliphate. He had been in Hülegū’s entourage during the advance on Baghdad in Dhū l-Qa’dā 655/November–December 1257, and at the time his work was completed he was governing the stricken city on the Mongols’ behalf. Yet Juwaynī ends his history prior to the Baghdad campaign; there is no mention of Baghdad or the Caliph in his account of Möngke’s instructions to Hülegū prior to the expedition. Either Juwaynī simply could not bring himself to write on the subject or he felt unable, as governor, to treat it with the appropriate honesty.

But in some respects the scene had improved dramatically since the Mongols’ first irruption into the lands of Islam; and it was also possible – or in some measure, perhaps, merely advisable – to see them as the instruments of a divinely ordered providence. We shall see in chapter 11 how he subtly portrayed them as quasi-monotheists. For Juwaynī, better informed than Ibn al-Athīr about the Mongols’ conquest of the Qara-Khitai empire, God had sent them to deliver Güchülgū’s Muslim subjects from persecution (though we cannot discount the possibility that this merely echoes the Mongols’ own propaganda). Paradoxically, too, Islam had now spread to regions that it had never penetrated, a development that at one point Juwaynī associates specifically with Ögödei’s reign.

Ögödei’s accession (1229), followed several years later by that of Möngke (1251), had, in Juwaynī’s view, served to demonstrate God’s mercy and beneficence towards the people of Islam. Nations are represented as hearing of Ögödei’s mild reputation and seeking to submit to his rule. A series of anecdotes is designed to illustrate what God had implanted in his nature not merely by way of generosity, justice and clemency but also by way of the teachings of the true faith. Möngke, as the reigning qaghan under whom Juwaynī wrote and whose representatives he served, had to be painted in still more glowing terms – as ‘the bearer of the blessings of peace and security (māda-yi ni’mat-i amān-u amān)’ and one through whose justice the whole of Creation had recovered and bloomed afresh. For suppressing and punishing an alleged conspiracy by the ruler (iduq-qut) of the Uighurs to extirpate the Muslims of Beshbaligh, Möngke is at one point described as pādishāh-i ghāzī (‘holy warrior monarch’).
In this respect a yet more serviceable instrument lay to hand. Whatever he thought of the Mongols’ sack of Baghdad and their murder of the last ’Abbasid Caliph and his family, one circumstance at least could ensure that Juwaynî viewed the westward campaign of the Qaghan’s brother Hülegû as providential: the destruction of the strongholds of the Ismâ’îlî Assassins in northern Iran. This was ‘the balm of Muslim wounds and the cure to the disorders of the Faith’, and travellers now called down blessings on the monarch who had annihilated the sect.60 Juwaynî uses the term jihād, ‘holy war’, to describe these operations by a pagan Mongol prince at the head of an army that was only partly made up of Sunnî Muslim contingents;61 and the overthrow of the hated Ismâ’îlîs, a task that had defied the mighty Saljuq Sultan a century and a half earlier, is at one point portrayed, tout court, as the work of ‘the swordsmen of the faith (shamshir-zanân-i ahl-ahmad)’.62 Professor Carole Hillenbrand suggests that the Saljuqid efforts to destroy the Ismâ’îlîs are here deliberately overstated in order to glorify the Mongol achievement.63 But through this victory God’s hidden purpose in raising up Chinggis Khan had now at last, for Juwaynî, been manifested.64

Juwaynî’s handling of Hülegû’s expedition, moreover, differs greatly in tone from his account of the operations of Chinggis Khan and his generals. His brief allusion to Hülegû’s penchant for restoring what lay in ruins65 is symptomatic. Juwaynî took care to record only such of Hülegû’s activities as occurred in regions that had been under Mongol rule for some decades – apart, of course, from the Assassin territories. He spares us any account of the prince’s later campaigns that for the first time violently subjugated orthodox Muslim territories in Iraq and Syria: to detail those would have required Juwaynî to paint a landscape far more evocative of the activities of Chinggis Khan’s forces in Iran in the previous generation.

The period of over four decades that separates the works of Juwaynî and Rashîd al-Dîn has been termed a ‘historiographical void’.66 In his Tasliyat al-ikhwân (‘The Consolation of the Brethren’) Juwaynî himself described the tribulations that he and his brother, the finance minister (sâhib-dîwân) Shams al-Dîn, suffered in the period 1281–3; a supplement found in only one manuscript carries the narrative down into the reign of Tegüder Aḥmad.67 Otherwise, until recently we possessed only the account of the Mongol capture of Baghdad and the destruction of the Caliphate furnished by Zahîr al-Dîn ’Alî b. Muḥammad Ibn al-Kâzarûnî (b. 611/1214; d. 697/1298) at the very end of his skeletal history (in Arabic) of the ’Abbasid dynasty, Mukhtasår al-ta’rîkh (‘Epitome of History’), and two brief general histories, written respectively by the Qadi Nâṣîr al-Dîn ’Abd-Allâh Bayḍâwî in c. 674/1275 and by Negübei (Nîkpây) b. Mas’ûd at some
point in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century. Of these, Baydāwī’s *Nizām al-tawārīkh* (‘The Classification of Histories’) was by far the more widely read, to judge from the number of extant manuscripts. Described by Edward G. Browne as ‘a dull and jejune little book’, the standard recension tells us hardly anything of which we do not learn more from Rashīd al-Dīn. But Professor Charles Melville has identified a second recension, composed following Ghazan’s accession in 694/1295 and including some material not found elsewhere. As Melville indicates, the value of Baydāwī’s work lies primarily in the fact that it reveals how attempts were being made at an early stage to reconcile the Mongol regime with the traditions of Persian culture and what late thirteenth-century educated Persian Muslims knew about the first years of the Ilkhanate. It is noteworthy that this was the only historical work of the Mongol era of which Abū l-Majd Muḥammad Tabrīzī included an epitome in his compendium *Ṣafīna-yi Tabrīz* (early 1320s).

The void has now been filled, in some measure, by *Akhbār-i mughūlān dar anbāna-yi Qutb* (‘The Account of the Mongols in Qutb’s Portmanteau’), an anonymous chronicle discovered at Qum, in a manuscript of an anthology (*majmū’a*) made by the philosopher and astronomer Qutb al-Dīn Mahmūd b. Mas’ūd Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311), and published in 2009. The author of this chronicle, which was begun in 680/1281–2 and ranges over events from the first appearance of the Mongols down to the Ilkhan Arghun’s enthronement in 683/1284, is unknown. None of the other pieces in the *majmū’a* is Shīrāzī’s own work, and he may have obtained the chronicle from one of the many scholars he met while working in the observatory at Marāgha. It reads more like a collection of notes than a connected history: there are gaps, sometimes extending over several years; and the discursive style renders the chronology at times elusive. The manuscript once belonged to Rashīd al-Dīn, who recounts at least one episode (the treason of Jalāl al-Dīn, son of the caliph’s ‘Lesser Dawātdār’, in 662/1264) in a manner strongly reminiscent of the *Akhbār*. As Dr George Lane has signalled, this short work is of great value, offering a good deal of information not supplied by either Juwaynī or (curiously enough) Rashīd al-Dīn on the reigns of the Ilkhans Hülegü and Abagha (for example, the armaments that accompanied Hülegü to Iran and the grounds for the conflict between Hülegü and his Jochid cousins). It is interesting that the *Ta’rīkh-i alfī*, a voluminous (and otherwise not unduly valuable) compilation which was produced in Mughal India by a series of authors headed by Ahmad b. Naṣr-Allāh Daybulī Ṭattawī (d. 996/1588), contains a passage that strongly resembles one found in the *Akhbār*. Possibly it came from a fuller text or another, as yet unidentifiable common source.
Muslim writers active in Iran following the conversion of the Ilkhanids

This section will notice only those authors who wrote within the Ilkhanid period – that is, down to c. 1350. Chief among them is the polymath Rashid al-Din Faḍl-Allāh Hamadānī (d. 718/1318), who belonged to a Jewish family of physicians, and probably converted to Islam in the early 1290s, while serving as physician and ba’urchi (cook, steward) to the Ilkhan Gaikhatu (r. 690–94/1291–95). Rashid al-Din subsequently rose to be chief minister to the Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 694–703/1295–1304) and Öljeitü (r. 703–16/1304–16). A formidable number of writings that bear his name (though in all likelihood produced by teams of scholars under his direction) are listed in the Jāmiʿ-i taṣānīf-i Rashīdī (the title given, in one manuscript, to his collected philosophical-theological works). Here attention will be confined to his great history, Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh (‘Collection of Chronicles’); his theological oeuvre will be mentioned in chapter 13; his works concerned with other subjects, such as medicine or agronomy, in chapter 8. That this vast output was intended to stand the test of time is clear from Rashīd al-Dīn’s instructions, in appendices to the endowment deed (waqf-nāma) drawn up for his foundation at Tabrīz, that a copy of certain of these writings was to be produced annually in both Persian and Arabic. The Persian text of the Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh, his best-known work, can be reconstituted from the numerous surviving manuscripts; but regrettably only fragments of the Arabic version are still extant.

Like Juwaynī’s work, Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh can be termed ‘official history’ – still more so, in fact, because commissioned by Ghazan himself (though it appears that some modifications were made later regarding Ghazan’s early career and his conversion to Islam, and were included in a version presented to his successor Öljeitü: this text is represented by a few manuscripts, notably BN supplément persan 1113). The section on Ghazan even incorporates the texts of many of his decrees. Here again it is incumbent on us to be wary of the bureaucrat’s confidence in the efficacy of central diktat. Rashid al-Din claims that prior to Ghazan the Ilkhanate was groaning in travail, and that order, justice and prosperity were reintroduced only through the administrative reforms and legislative enactments of his master – activity, of course, of which Rashid al-Din was doubtless the true originator and for which, equally, he is our only source. Even had there been such great need of reform – and even had Ghazan himself been genuinely as committed to that task – as Rashid al-Din suggests, there still remains room for doubt as to its ultimate effectiveness.
Rashīd al-Dīn's background differed markedly from Juwaynī's. If Juwaynī offers the prime example of a traditionally minded Muslim author whose response to the Mongol conquests was muted by his official status, Rashīd al-Dīn represents, by contrast, another type of Mongol servitor, the parvenu – in this case, the recently converted Jew whose position hinged entirely on the favour of his imperial masters. And as a convert he was under pressure to display authentic Muslim credentials in the face of rivals who envied, suspected and traduced him. Some at least of his adulation of the Ilkhans Ghazan and Öljeitū for becoming Muslims was surely directed to that end.

There are important differences between these two major sources for the history of the Mongols, not least in scope and perspective. We shall examine the latter contrast in chapter 13. In terms of its geographical reach, Rashīd al-Dīn's was a far more comprehensive work than the Ta'rīkh-i jahān-gushā. In the first place, he sought to produce a more accurate history of the Mongols themselves and of the descendants of Chinggis Khan, and one more in line with the Mongols' own traditions than the history written by his predecessors (chiefly, we must assume, Juwaynī). The first part, known as the Ta'rīkh-i mubārak-i Ghāzānī, is divided into three sections: on the Turkish and Mongol tribes; on Chinggis Khan's forebears, the conqueror's own career and the history of the qaghans down to the current sovereign, Temūr (d. 1307); and on Hülegū and his Ilkhanid successors. Rashīd al-Dīn was indebted to the oral testimony of Mongol informants, notably his sovereign, Ghazan, and Bolod Chingsang (d. 713/1313), the qaghan's resident ambassador at the Ilkhanid court and an expert on Mongol tradition. His written sources included not only the works of Ibn al-Athīr and Juwaynī but also – thanks, in all likelihood, to Bolod – the now lost Altan Debter. Borrowings are clearly in evidence when Rashīd al-Dīn recounts the Mongol operations against the Khwarazmian empire in terms evocative of the Shengwu. True, the material is simply incorporated alongside passages taken from Ibn al-Athīr and Juwaynī, with no attempt at critical evaluation or the resolution of conflicting testimony. It provides us, nevertheless, with the closest approach we have to a Mongol viewpoint for events after the 'Secret History' ends in c. 1240.

But beyond the history of the Turks and Mongols, which takes up over half the work and is among its most original sections, Rashīd al-Dīn, at the prompting of Ghazan's successor Öljeitū, wrote a second part, incorporating the histories of other peoples, both Muslim and non-Muslim. In the Ta'rīkh-i mubārak-i Ghāzānī he mentions in passing a continuation (dhayl) containing a separate and fuller treatment of the Oghuz, another on the Uighurs and
one on China. Of these, the histories of the Oghuz and of China have survived in Part II, together with sections on earlier Muslim dynasties in Iran and on the histories of India, the Jews and the Franks and Armenians. It is because of this panoramic vision that his work has been termed ‘a vast historical encyclopaedia, such as no single people, either in Asia or in Europe, possessed in the Middle Ages’. The breadth of his interests is reflected in the range of his informants, who included a Buddhist monk from Kashmir and possibly the Frank Isolo, a Pisan in Ghazan’s service.

In 705/1305–6 Rashīd al-Dīn supplemented the Ta’rīkh-i mubārak-i Ghāzānī with a genealogical work, Shu’ab-i panjgāna (‘The Fivefold Branches’), that included the Chinggisids. Although this in large measure duplicates the genealogical sections within the main work, it has two advantages: Chinggisid proper names are frequently given in the Uighur as well as in the Arabic-Persian script, thus enabling us to identify the exact spelling; and additional or variant details are also introduced, regarding for example Mongol commanders. It can therefore be regarded as of primary significance.

Rashīd al-Dīn’s history of the Ilkhan Öljeitū has not come down to us. But the reign was covered by other contemporary authors. Rawdat ʻalī l-albāb fi ma’rifat al-tawārīkh wa l-ansāb (‘The Garden of the Intellects in the Knowledge of Histories and Generations’; usually known simply as Ta’rīkh-i Banākati), completed by Fakhr al-Dīn Abū Sulaymān Dā’ūd Banākati in 717/1317, is in large measure an abridgement of the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh, though brought down to the first year of the reign of Abū Sa’īd and hence including original material on Öljeitū; it contains, moreover, some data for the period prior to 703/1303 not found in the earlier work. A richer source, devoted specifically to this one reign, is Ta’rīkh-i Uljāītū by Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-Qāsim ʻAbd-Allâh Qāshānī, which also goes down to 717/1317. The arrangement is annalistic, and the detailed dates, which often include the corresponding date in the Turco-Mongol twelve-year Animal Cycle, point to some form of court diary. The single manuscript that survives from the fourteenth century indicates a carelessly constructed piece in which the same episode is occasionally recounted twice, though one replete with details that are not found elsewhere. Qāshānī’s assertion that he was the real author of the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh has generally evoked incredulity on account of the pronounced difference in style between the two histories. On the evidence of a surviving section of Qāshānī’s own general history, Zubdat al-tawārīkh, however, the late Alexander Morton showed that the claim most probably applies to sections of the second part of Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh and not to the Mongol history in the first.
Just a few years before the appearance of Rashid al-Din’s great work, Shihab al-Din ‘Abd-Allah b. Izz al-Din Fadl-Allah al-Shirazi, better known by the sobriquet Wassaf al-Hadrat (‘The Court Panegyrist’), embarked on a history of the Mongols, and of the Ilkhans in particular, Tajziyat al-amsar wa-tazjiyat al-a’sar (‘The Apportionment of Countries and the Passing of Epochs’), designed as a sequel to Juwayni’s history and commencing in 655/1257 (it should be noted that Wassaf unaccountably dates Hulegu’s campaign against Baghdad in 654–5/1256–7). The first volume was begun in 698/1298–9, and the preface was written in late Shawal 699/mid-May 1300; the third volume was presented to the Ilkhan Ghazan under the aegis of Wassaf’s fellow historian, the chief minister Rashid al-Din, in 702/1303; and the fourth, on which Wassaf was working in 706/1306–7, was submitted to an allegedly uncomprehending Oljeitu in 712/1312. A fifth and final volume did not appear until c. 728/1327–8.

Wassaf’s bombastic prolixity, carrying Juwayni’s stylistic excesses to even greater extremes, is all the more regrettable, given the scope of his work, which not only covers Ilkhanid history but also notices events in Central Asia and even in Yuan China under Qubilai’s grandson, the Qaghan Temur (1294–1307), and his successor. As a functionary in the fiscal administration of Fars who resided for the most part in his native Shiraz, moreover, his perspective is as much that of a local historian of southern Iran and the islands; his pride in the region is manifest. Yet he visited Baghdad in 696/1296–7, and gleaned information about the Mongol conquest of the city. Although his work can be viewed in some degree as ‘official’ history, not least because sections of it were presented to two successive Ilkhans, this taxonomy becomes somewhat meaningless, given his evident sympathy for the Ogodeyid khan Qaidu, an enemy of the Yuan regime and the Ilkhanate.

The 1330s saw the appearance of a clutch of histories dedicated to Rashid al-Din’s son Ghiyath al-Din Muhammed (d. 736/1336), wazir to the Ilkhan Abu Sa’id (716–36/1316–35). In 733/1332–3 Muhammed b. ‘Ali Shabankara’i completed a general history, the Majma’ al-ansab fi l-tawarih (‘A Collection of Genealogies in the Histories’). But the work was destroyed when the wazir’s residence was sacked three years later, and Shabankara’i had to produce a new recension in 738/1337 (a third version, presented to the Chobanid ruler of Azerbaijan and unpublished, dates from 743/1343). Shabankara’i’s vantage point, like Wassaf’s, is Fars and the south.

In 730/1329–30, only a year or two after Wassaf completed the Tajziyat, Hamd-Allah Mustawfi Qazwini produced his Ta’rikh-i guzida (‘Choice History’), a general survey of Islamic history dependent in part on Ibn al-Athir, Juwayni and Rashid al-Din for the Mongol period, but also
furnishing information not available elsewhere. It was an abridged version of the versified history, *Zafar-nāma* (‘The Book of Triumphs’), which he was to complete in 735/1334–5 after fifteen years’ labour. Modelled on Firdawsī’s eleventh-century *Shāh-nāma*, *Zafar-nāma* presents some material not found in the *Tārīkh-i guzīda* (including, unfortunately, lengthy passages of homespun wisdom regarding the mutability of fate, the futile nature of wealth and power, and so on). Ḥamd-Allāh claims to have gleaned his information from Persian (*tāzik*) and Mongol officers (*sarwārān*), specifying at one point that he was indebted for details of Hülegū’s activities to a certain Buqa, son of *Yula Temūr*, a Naiman officer whose family was closely associated with the town of Qazwīn and who was well versed in the history of the ‘Turks’. But for the period down to 1303 it is clear that Ḥamd-Allāh was primarily indebted to Rashīd al-Dīn; and indeed he claims that his task was to put the *Jāmi’-i al-tawārīkh* into verse. The *Zafar-nāma* would serve as a source for the *Dhayl-i Jāmi’-i al-tawārīkh*, a continuation of Rashīd al-Dīn’s history of the Mongols by the Timurid historian Ḥāfiz-i Abrū (below, p. 35), for the period after 703/1304 and especially for Abū Sa’īd’s reign. Like Waṣṣāf, Ḥamd-Allāh was a fiscal official, though in the northern town of Qazwīn, and his expertise also enabled him to insert valuable data on economic and administrative affairs into the geographical work, *Nuzhat al-qulūb* (‘The Hearts’ Delight’), which he finished in or soon after 741/1340; some of this material bears directly on the impact of the Mongol conquests and of Mongol rule.

**Local histories from the Ilkhanid territories**

It should be pointed out that the term ‘local history’ does not carry all the connotations that the phrase does in the context of the European Middle Ages or even in that of the Arabic local historical tradition of the pre-Mongol era. In other words, we do not have accounts written, say, by members of urban patriciates or surveys centred, for instance, on biographies of local scholars or other notables, a genre that had proliferated in the earlier period. In much the same way as a number of the Ilkhanid histories described above, like Rashīd al-Dīn’s *Jāmi’-i al-tawārīkh* and Waṣṣāf’s *Tajziyat al-amṣār*, the works cited in this section were produced at and for royal or princely courts, namely those of client dynasties within the Ilkhan’s dominions. The preoccupation is still dynastic; it is simply that the vantage point is regional as opposed to imperial.

It is now widely believed that *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi’a* (‘Collected Events’) – a history of Iraq down to 700/1300–1 and the only such history
written in the Ilkhanate in Arabic by a Sunnī Muslim – is not the work that Ibn al-Fuwaṭī mentions as his own in his biographical dictionary (below, p. 32) and which he claims had been commissioned by ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ’Aṭā Malik Juwaynī.101 Whoever he was, the author belonged in the tradition of the Baghdad school of historical writing, and for the period down to the Mongol capture of the city he was in part indebted to Ibn al-Kāzarūnī’s Mukhtasār al-ta’rīkh (p. 24 above); though he displays a less sure grasp of dates for events at some distance from Iraq (placing the Chaghadayid invasion of Khurāsān, for instance, in 665/1266–7 rather than 668/1270) than had his predecessors. To quote the most recent commentator on the work, ‘it cannot really be situated on either side’ of the Arabic-Mamlûk/Persian-Mongol divide.102 Although the author clearly regarded the destruction of the Caliphate as a cataclysmic blow, he regularly calls the infidel Hülegū ‘the Sultan’, presumably without intending any irony.

Anatolia (Rūm) produced three histories, of which the first, Ibn Bībī’s al-Awāmir al-‘alā’iyya fī l-umār al-‘alā’iyya (‘The Loftiest Imperatives Concerning the Most Exalted Matters’), is an in-house history of the Saljuq Sultans down to 679/1280; there is also an abridgement, Mukhtasār-i Saljūq-nāma. In 723/1323, Karīm al-Dīn Āqsarā’ī produced a general history, Musāmarat al-akhbār wa-musāyarat al-akhyār (‘Nocturnal Narratives and Keeping Up with the Good’), of which the fourth and final section is devoted to the era of the Mongol khans and their Saljuqid contemporaries. The third of these sources is the relatively brief Tārīkh-i āl-i Saljūq, completed in or soon after 765/1363 but beginning in 675/1277 and written by someone who was active as early as c. 1290.103

At the other end of the Ilkhanate, Sayf b. Muḥammad b. Ya’qūb al-Harawī (commonly known as Sayfī), whose Tārīkh-nāma-yi Harāt (‘Historical Account of Herat’) dates from c. 722/1322, provides a wealth of data on a region not otherwise strongly represented in the Mongol period. Although this can claim to be the most substantial and informative of the local histories of Iran, Sayfī, who made extensive use of Rashīd al-Dīn’s work, is vague regarding his other sources, telling us, for instance, that he gleaned his information on Chinggis Khan’s campaigns from old men who had in turn heard it from eyewitnesses.104 Among other works that furnish useful data are the Tārīkh-i Sīstān, completed in c. 726/1326 (from which point we are dependent on the Iḥyā’ al-mulūk, ‘The Recollection of Kings’, dating from 1028/1619, by Shāh Ḥusayn, a member of the ruling house);105 two histories of the Qutlughkhanid dynasty in Kirmān (623–703/1226–1304), the anonymous Tārīkh-i shāhī-yi Qarākhitā’iyyān (‘The Royal History of the Qara-Khitai [rulers]’; early 1290s) and the Simt al-‘ulā lī l-ḥadrat al-‘ulyā (‘The
Necklace of Eminence for the Exalted Court’; 715/1315–16) of Nāşîr al-Dīn Munshī, chief scribe in the Kirmān writing office (diwān al-rasā’il wa l-inshā’);106 the Shīrāz-nāma (‘The Story of Shīrāz’), a history of Fārs by Ibn Zarkūb (d. 744/1343–4); for Yazd, two fifteenth-century compositions, Ja’far b. Muhammad Ja’fārī’s Ta’rīkh-i Yazd and Ahmad b. Ḫūsayn b. ‘Alī Kātīb’s Ta’rīkh-i jadid-i Yazd (‘A New History of Yazd’);107 and a few histories devoted to the various Caspian provinces, notably Awliyā’ Allāh Āmulī’s Ta’rīkh-i Rūyān (764/1362–3) and the fifteenth-century Ta’rīkh-i ʿTabaristān-u Rūyān-u Māzandarān by Sayyid Zahir al-Dīn Mar’ashi. In addition, the general histories composed by authors resident in southern Iran are of great value for local affairs: Waṣṣāf’s work provides much information on Fārs, Kirmān, Luristān and neighbouring regions, while Shabānkārā’ī’s Majma’ al-ansāb contains a section on the local dynasty of Shabānkāra.

Non-narrative sources from the Ilkhanate

The sources composed under the Ilkhans, plentiful as they are, belong almost exclusively to the narrative genre. The only general biographical dictionary that survives from Mongol Iran is Talkhīṣ Maḥma’ al-ādāb fi mu’jam al-alqāb (‘Abridgement of The Collection of Belles-Lettres in the Lexicon [Arranged by] Honorifics’) by Kamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Razzāq Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (d. 723/1323). Until 679/1280–1 he was librarian of the observatory founded at Marāgha by Hūlegū’s astronomer and minister, Naṣīr al-Dīn Tūsī, and thereafter he lived in Baghdad. The value of this work for the Mongol era has recently been flagged up by Professor Devin DeWeese.

Even in its abridged form, the dictionary has regrettably not survived in its entirety. Possibly it was never completed, since numerous entries amount to just a name or little more than that, and some individuals are allotted two entries – and even, in the case of Kamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (the close confidant of the Ilkhan Tegūder ʿĀḥmad), three entries.108 From the extant portion (from ‘izz to muwaffaq), the Talkhīṣ nevertheless appears to be a remarkable work inasmuch as, unlike earlier Muslim biographical dictionaries, it does not confine its scope to Muslims but includes notices on Christian and Jewish dignitaries and even on the pagan Mongols Chinggis Khan and Hūlegū.109 Narrower in scope is the Nasā’īm al-āshār min laṭā’īm al-akhbār (‘The Fragrances of Enchantment among the Perfume-Boxes of Histories’), a useful collection of biographies of Persian wazirs, completed in 725/1325 by the above-mentioned Naṣīr al-Dīn Munshī Kirmānī. Otherwise, for biographical dictionaries we are dependent on those composed within the Mamlūk empire (see below).
Apart from a brief treatise on finance (dating, probably, from the early 1260s) by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī,\textsuperscript{110} two guides to Ilkhanid administration have come down to us: *Saʿādat-nāma* (*Auspicious Book*) of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Falākī Tabrīzī, an accounting manual which dates from Öljeitü’s reign (1304–16),\textsuperscript{111} and *Dastūr al-kātib fi taʿyīn al-maṣāḥib* (*A Handbook for the Scribe on the Assignment of Ranks*) by Muḥammad b. Hindū Shāh Nakhchīwānī, finished under the Jalayirid Sultan Shaykh Uways in Iraq after 1360 but begun before the end of the Ilkhanate and describing institutions of that earlier period. There is little by way of correspondence on the part of Ilkhanid statesmen, and the most prominent candidates, of whom two produced the most important narrative histories, disappoint us. Professor Jürgen Paul found virtually no information about contemporary events in the letters of Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī and his brother ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn, the historian and governor of Baghdad,\textsuperscript{112} while Alexander Morton demonstrated, conclusively in my view, that Rashīd al-Dīn’s correspondence (*mukātibāt*), long regarded as a valuable resource but containing some decidedly suspect letters, is a fifteenth-century fabrication.\textsuperscript{113}

The contribution of hagiographical sources to social and, to a lesser extent, economic history is undeniable. I have made limited use of the *Ṣafwat al-ṣafā* (*The Purest of the Pure*) by Tawakkulī Ibn Bazzāz Ardabīlī (written in c. 1358), a collection of anecdotes concerning the life of Shaykh Ṣāfī al-Dīn Ardabīlī (d. 735/1334), the ancestor of the Safawid Shahs. The accent on miraculous activity and the general lack of chronological data, so characteristic of the genre, render the work problematic. But, as has been pointed out, its value is enhanced by the fact that it is a compilation of (near-contemporary) testimonies rather than just a literary composition.\textsuperscript{114} And mention should be made, lastly, of the writings of ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla Simnānī (d. 734/1334), which, though concerned with spiritual matters, refer to his own experiences prior to his withdrawal from Arghun’s service and throw a welcome light on the religious climate at the court of a pagan Ilkhan.\textsuperscript{115}

**Jochid, Chaghadayid and Timurid sources**

As far as we know, the ulus of Jochi produced no historians of its own during the thirteenth–fifteenth centuries, and events in the khanate can only with difficulty be reconstructed with recourse to a variety of external sources: the chronicles of the client Rus’ principalities and (at least for the period down to c. 1270) of Armenia; the *oeuvre* of Ilkhanid historians; and, above all, histories composed in the Near Eastern territories of the Golden
Horde’s Mamlûk allies (see pp. 36–9). Apart from the early sixteenth-century *Tawārīkh-i guzīda-yi nuṣrat-nāma*, which amplifies the genealogies of Jochi’s descendants found in the *Mu’izz al-ansâb* (see below, p. 35), the later historical works that have come down to us from the Golden Horde territories after 1500 appear to be based exclusively on oral tradition. This is not to deny their value. Professor Uli Schamiloglu has highlighted the information to be gleaned from these sources on the administrative system of the Golden Horde, for instance, while DeWeese has argued forcefully that the accounts of the conversions of the khans Berke and Özbeg in the *Ta‘rīkh-i Dūst Sulṭān* of Ötemish Ḥājjī, dating from the 1550s, afford an insight into how the Islamization process was recalled some generations later.

Although only a very incomplete account of its history can be assembled without recourse to the Chinese material from the Yuan empire and to indigenous documentation in Mongolian, Chaghadai’s ulus was slightly better served than that of Jochi in terms of Muslim sources. We are fortunate that Jamāl al-Qarshī, having completed his Persian-Arabic dictionary, *al-Šūrâh min al-Šihâh*, in 681/1282, appended to it a historical supplement (*mulḥaqāt*) that carries Central Asian history down through the Mongol period to the accession of Qaidu’s son Chapar in 702/1303. The author, who was born at Almaligh in 628/1230–1, spent much of his early life at the court of the local client dynasty. After being obliged to leave the town in 662/1264, he travelled extensively in western Turkestan, but was based at Kāshghar, where he was evidently close to the headquarters of the line of administrators founded by Mas‘ūd Beg; he also attended Qaidu’s court on several occasions. He owed his *nisba* (from Tu. *qarshi*, ‘palace’) to his proximity to one or the other centre of power. Despite these illustrious connections, however, the *Mulḥaqāt bi l-Šūrâh* is less detailed than we might wish, and we remain heavily indebted to the material on Qaidu and his Chaghadayid confederates that is provided by the Ilkhanid historians, Rashīd al-Dīn, Waṣṣāf and Qāshānī.

After Jamāl al-Qarshī the Chaghadayid territories did not produce another indigenous historian for 250 years. Some details of the fourteenth-century history of the ulus can be gleaned from the historical works composed in Iran under the Timurids, the dynasty founded by Temür-i *lāng* (‘the Lame’; hence ‘Tamerlane’; d. 807/1405), a member of the Turco-Mongol tribe of the Barlās (Barulas) in Transoxiana. The most notable are the *Zafār-nāma* of Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī (806/1404); the *Zafār-nāma* of Sharaf al-Dīn Ṭabāth ibn Ṭabāth (828/1424–5), to which was added subsequently a prologue (*muqaddima*) on the history of the Mongols prior to Temür; and
the *Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Mu’īnī* of Mu’īn al-Dīn Naṭanẓū (817/1414). Mention should also be made of the *Mu’īzz al-ansāb* (‘Homage to Genealogies’) composed in Iran in 830/1426–7 by an unknown author who reproduced Rashīd al-Dīn’s *Shu’ab-i panjgāna* (though with some modifications and without the forms in Uighur script), continued it down to his own era, and added an extensive section on Temūr, his dynasty and their military officers; he possibly also used a slightly earlier genealogical work by Husayn b. ‘Alī Shāh, which has survived in a unique manuscript.

Although the account of the Chaghadayid khans in the *Shajarat al-ātrāk* (‘Tree of the Turks’) – an abridgement of the lost *Tārīkh-i arba’ā ulūs-i chingīzī* (‘History of the Four Chinggisid Uluses’) attributed to Temūr’s grandson Ulugh Beg (d. 853/1449) – largely follows Yazdī’s *muqaddima*, it adds the odd detail. The most prolific Timurid author was Shihāb al-Dīn ’Abd-Allāh b. Lutf-Allāh al-Khwāfī, known as Hāfiz-i Abrū (d. 833/1430), whose *oeuvre* included not only the above-mentioned *Dhayl-i Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh* but also a reworking of Shāmī’s *Zafar-nāma*, a general history, *Zubdat al-tawārīkh* (‘The Cream of Histories’), and a geography that is especially rich on the history of Khurāsān.

The works of Shāmī, Yazdī and Naṭanẓū must be used circumspectly. The chronology supplied by the first two authors for the Chaghadayid khans after c. 1309 is faulty, the regnal dates being approximately seven years too early. Naṭanẓū’s account of the Jochids and Chaghadayids, apparently based on oral tradition, is skeletal and somewhat superficial; his chronology is even less reliable, and the khans’ genealogy here bears little relation to that found in Yazdī’s work or in the *Mu’īzz al-ansāb*. It should be emphasized, lastly, that both Shāmī and Yazdī (the latter in particular) present a distorted version of Chaghadayid history that ascribes a quite unrealistic influence and authority to Temūr’s forebears, beginning with the thirteenth-century noyan Qarachar of the Barulas (below, pp. 386–7).

While the western half of the Chaghadayid ulus was from 771/1370 under the rule of Temūr and his descendants, the eastern khanate – the region that came to be known as ‘Mughalīstān’ – retained its autonomy. In 952/1546 Mīrzā Haydar Dughlāt, a member of a Turco-Mongol family that had governed Kāshghar, Āqsū and neighbouring cities since the late fourteenth century and was closely linked to the eastern Chaghadayid khans, finished his *Tārīkh-i Rashidi*, which he dedicated to the reigning khan, Sultān ’Abd al-Rashid. Clearly one of his chief purposes was to glorify his own dynasty and to project its currently exalted standing back into an earlier epoch, much as Timurid historians had done for Temūr’s forebears. Apart from Yazdī’s *Zafar-nāma*, from which he borrows lengthy passages
on Temür’s campaigns in Mughalistān, Ḥaydar relied upon oral sources. He begins with the accession of the khan Tughluq Temür in 748/1347 and furnishes a useful account of that ruler’s conversion to Islam. But for these early decades he is otherwise remarkably uninformative. This is due only in part to the Chaghādaryid Mongols’ allegedly profound ignorance of their past; Ḥaydar also had no desire to commemorate the deeds of khans who were not Muslims.128 As a result, the history of the ulus between c. 1340 and the mid-fifteenth century lies in a darkness relieved only fitfully by details from the works of Timurid authors.

Authors writing after c. 1265 in the dominions of the Mongols’ enemies

The Mamlūk empire in Egypt and Syria – the Ilkhan’s principal rival – generated an impressive volume of historical writing.129 There are, firstly, biographies of individual Mamlūk Sultans, notably two lives of al-Ẓāhir Baybars: al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī sīrat al-malik al-Ẓāhir (‘The Blossoming Garden concerning the Life of al-Malik al-Ẓāhir’), by the secretary of his chancery (kāṭīb al-inshā‘), Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Abd al-Ẓāhir (d. 692/1292); and the incomplete Tārīkh al-malik al-Ẓāhir by a Syrian, ‘Īzz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Ibn Shaddād (b. 613/1217; d. 684/1285);130 and two lives of al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn: Ibn ‘Abd al-Ẓāhir’s Tāshrīf al-a‘yām wa l-‘usūr fī sīrat al-malik al-Manṣūr (‘The Glorious Days and Epochs in the Life of al-Malik al-Manṣūr’); and al-Fadl al-ma‘thūr min sīrat al-sultān al-malik al-Manṣūr (‘The Best to be Transmitted from the Life of Sultan al-Malik al-Manṣūr’) by his nephew Naṣīr al-Dīn Shāfi‘ b. ‘Alī al-‘Asqalānī (d. 730/1330).131 Since all these authors were in the Sultans’ service and Ibn ‘Abd al-Ẓāhir at least wrote his Rawḍ at Baybars’ request, their works should be regarded as ‘official’ history, somewhat parallel with that of Rashīd al-Dīn. They reflect the vantage point of rulers who, possessing as they did in Cairo from 660/1262 a serviceable ‘Abbasid Caliph, articulated their own universalist claims in opposition to those of the Mongols.

The Mamlūk dominions also produced a number of important chronicles, whose interrelationship is a complex matter. Of those that emanate from Egypt, two were the work of Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Manṣūrī al-Dawādār (d. 725/1325), a mamluk commander who rose to be briefly deputy (nā‘ib al-saltāna) to Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn: the more voluminous Zubdat al-fikra fī tārīkh al-hijra (‘Choice Thoughts on Hijrī History’), of which the extant portion ends in 709/1309–10; and an abridged version, Tuḥfat al-mulūkīyya fī l-dawlat al-turkīyya (‘The Gift for Kings concerning the Dynasty of the Turks’), which goes down to
MEDIEVAL AUTHORS ON THE MONGOLS

711/1311–12 and includes data not found in the longer work. Baybars al-Manṣūrī clearly harboured a particular interest in the Sultanate’s foreign relations, and Zubda incorporates valuable material on Saljuqīd Rûm and on the Golden Horde.132 Abû Bakr b. ’Abd-Allâh b. Aybak Ibn al-Dawâdârī, himself the son of another mamlûk officer, composed his lengthy Kanz al-durar wa-jâmi’ al-ghurar (“The Treasury of Pearls and the Choicest Hoard”) in or just after 735/1334–5.133 Al-Nahj al-sadîd wa l-durr al-farîd fî mâ ba’d ta’rikh Ibn al-’Amîd (“The Correct Path and Peerless Achievement in the Sequel to the History of Ibn al-’Amîd’) by the Coptic Christian historian, al-Mufaḍḍal Ibn Abî l-Faḍâ’il, completed in 759/1358, was designed as a sequel to the work of his uncle al-Mâkin (see p. 22). He appears to have used al-Nuwayrî (p. 38 below) and frequently cites the Zubda in addition to the two biographies of al-Żâhir Baybars; but he takes the narrative down to c. 1341 and further inserts details not found elsewhere for the earlier decades.134

Important historical works were also produced in the Mamlûk province of Syria. Abû Shâma survived the imposition of Mamlûk rule by only a few years; but his history was continued, some decades later, by al-Muqtafâ (“The Sequel”) of his fellow Damascene, ’Alam al-Dîn al-Qâsim al-Bîrzâlî (d. 739/1339), whose interests extended beyond the city and who includes useful material on the Ilkhanate. But for our purposes the three most valuable Syrian sources are al-Dhayl Mir’ât al-zamân, a continuation of Sibt Ibn al-Jawzî’s work by Quṭb al-Dîn Mûsâ al-Yûnînî (b. 640/1242; d. 726/1326); Hawâdith al-zamân wa-anbâ’uhâ wa-wafayât al-akâbir wa l-ayyân min abnâ’îhi (“The Events and Reports of the Era and the Obituaries of the Great and Notable among its Sons’) by Shams al-Dîn Muḥammad b. Ibrâhîm al-Jazarî (b. 658/1260; d. 739/1338); and the voluminous Ta’rikh al-Islâm of Shams al-Dîn Abû ’Abd-Allâh Muḥammad al-Dhahabî (d. 748/1348), which we have already encountered (p. 20).135 All three works include under each year not merely significant events but also death notices, as al-Jazarî’s title makes explicit. Al-Dhahabî also produced a shorter work, Duwal al-Islâm (“Islamic Regimes’). Al-Mukhtasâr fî akhbâr al-bashar (“The Abridged History of Humanity”), written by the penultimate Ayyubid Sultan of Ḥâmâ, al-Mu’ayyad Abû l-Fidâ Ismâ’îl b. ’Alî (usually known simply as Abû l-Fidâ, d. 732/1331), has been cited more frequently, perhaps, than it deserves. For the period prior to 659/1261 it is dependent on the Mufarrij of Ibn Wâṣîl, who had been one of Abû l-Fidâ’s teachers, and has no original value; though for his own lifetime the author supplies some useful material. Two briefer histories, dating from the mid-fourteenth century, were collected and edited by K.V. Zetterstéen in 1919. One of these,
an anonymous work attributed to 'Author Z', includes an eyewitness account of the public acceptance of Islam by the Ilkhan Ghazan in 1295 which is for the most part identical to that furnished by al-Jazari.

Various geographical works contain substantial historical information. Al-ʿAʾlāq al-khaṭṭira fī dhikr umarāʾ al-Shām wa l-Jazīra ('The Most Precious Valuables in the Account of the Amirs of Syria and the Jazīra') by ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād (d. 684/1285), mentioned above as one of Baybars’ biographers, is a topographical-historical dictionary, arranged first by region and then in alphabetical order of place name, which frequently includes details not found elsewhere regarding Mongol military operations.136 A later geography, the Nukhbāt al-dahr fī ājāʾib al-barr wa l-bahr ('Select Passages of the Age regarding the Marvels of Land and Sea') of Shams al-Dīn al-Dimashqī (d. 727/1327), tends to regurgitate data from earlier Muslim geographers, but nevertheless offers some original information for the Mongol-Mamlūk era.137

The value of the authors listed so far lies principally in supplementing or modifying the accounts produced within the Mongol dominions: they tell us about Mongol campaigns and about diplomatic contacts, and sometimes they provide a more detailed narrative of events within Mongol Asia. But two voluminous works from the Mamlūk empire are noteworthy for their own discrete and connected surveys of Mongol affairs. One is the encyclopaedia Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab ('The Ultimate Aspiration in the Scribal Arts') of Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī (d. 733/1333), a clerk in the Mamlūk administration who had opportunities for first-hand contact with Mongols and who included a section on the Mongol world in the historical part of the work.138 The other is the encyclopaedia of Shihāb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Fāḍl-Allāh al-ʿUmārī (b. 700/1301; d. 749/1349), Masālik al-absār fī mamālik al-ʾamsār ('The Paths of Observation among the Civilized Regions'),139 which devotes an even more substantial section to the Mongols (and scattered references to them elsewhere). Al-ʿUmārī made considerable use of Juwaynī’s work. But as the head of the Mamlūk Sultan’s correspondence office (dīwān al-inshāʾ), he was exceptionally well-placed to acquire intelligence about far-flung regions that were in diplomatic contact with his master, including Muslim India and the Mongol lands. In his introduction to the Mongol empire, and his four chapters on the principal Mongol khanates, al-ʿUmārī frequently drew on information from merchants as well as envoys. Not his least valuable characteristic, however, is that he reflects the perspective on Mongol history of the Sultans’ allies, the Mongols of the Golden Horde, which differed markedly from that of the Ilkhans and which we should otherwise have lacked.
Information concerning one or two figures active in Mongol Iran can be found also in the biographical dictionaries produced in the Sultanate, notably the *Wafayāt al-a'yān* (‘Obituaries of the Great’) by Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) and its continuation, *Tālī kitāb Wafayāt al-a’yān*, by the Christian author Ibn al-Šuqā’ī (d. 726/1326). Rather more Mongol entries, however, appear in the vast biographical dictionary of Khalīl b. Aybak al-Šafādī (d. 764/1363), *al-Wāfī bi l-wafayāt* (‘The Entirety of Obituaries’), and the same author’s shorter *A’yān al-’asr* (‘The Notables of the Era’, confined to figures who died within his own century): some were based on the *Masālik* of his friend al-’Umari, although al-Šafādī also utilized the obituaries in al-Dhahabi’s *Ta’rikh al-Islām* and other, unknown sources. Like the work of Ibn al-Fuwatī (p. 32 above), al-Šafādī’s two dictionaries not only include Mongol khans who had embraced Islam – Ghazan, the Chaghadayid khan Tarmashirin and the Jochid khan Özbeg, for instance – but also list infidels: Chinggis Khan, Hülegü, Qubilai and Özbeg’s predecessor Toqto’a, and Mongol military officers like Qutlugh Shāh.140 *Al-Wāfī* would in turn be the basic source for the (more frequently quoted) fifteenth-century biographical dictionaries of Ibn Hājar al-’Asqalānī and Ibn Taghrībirdī.

It is necessary to say a few words about Indo-Muslim historians. The Muslim authors who recorded events within the independent Delhi Sultanate regrettably fall short of contemporary Mamlūk historians in various respects. After Jūzjānī’s work there are, apart from the historical poems (*mathnawīs*) of Amīr Khusraw (d. 725/1325), no surviving narrative sources prior to the *Ta’rikh-i Fīrūzshāhī* of Dīyā’ al-Dīn Baranī (758/1357), and the slightly earlier *Futūh al-salātīn* (‘Victories of Sultans’) of ‘Abd al-Malik ’Isāmī, written around 1350 in the breakaway Deccan Sultanate; both sources have been used for this book, although their treatment of Mongol invasions is relatively limited. ’Isāmī’s work, in verse and modelled on Firdawsī’s eleventh-century *Shāh-nāma* (‘The Book of Kings’), approximates more closely to a conventional (if at times cursory) history. Baranī’s, although ostensibly designed as a continuation of Jūzjānī’s *Ṭabaqāt*, is a far more abstract work, which attempts to use the sultans’ reigns as the vehicle for a philosophy of Islamic history.141

This section would be incomplete without the most celebrated Arab Muslim traveller of the Middle Ages. Shams al-Dīn Abū ‘Abd-Allah Muḥammad b. ‘Abd-Allah al-Lawātī al-Ṭanji, better known as Ibn Baṭṭūta, left his home town of Ṭanja (Tangier) in 725/1325 and visited a large part of the Mongol world, namely the territories of the Ilkhanate, the Golden Horde and the Chaghadayid khanate, before proceeding to the Indian subcontinent, where he stayed for some years. His account of his travels,
The Mongols and the Islamic World

*Tuhfat al-nuzzār fī gharā’ib al-āmsār* (‘Gifts to Onlookers regarding the Marvels of the Civilized Regions’), completed in 757/1356, greatly enriches our knowledge of conditions in the two northerly Mongol khanates. But the work is problematic. His aim – or the vicarious aim of Ibn Juzayy, to whom, on the orders of the Sultan of Morocco, Ibn Battūta dictated his account following his return home – was to visit every region of the world where Islam had penetrated. This led to a skewing of the narrative, with the result that the chronology is at times internally inconsistent and the authenticity of some of the journeys is deeply suspect. It is now certain that Ibn Battūta’s journey to Bulghār is spurious and that the itinerary from the Volga to Constantinople, of which the stages are puzzlingly vague, includes both authentic information (as on the semi-legendary dervish Sārī Saltūq) and material that is purely fanciful. The section on Yuan China, too, contains material that simply does not harmonize with the reality at the time of his alleged stay. On the other hand, even the suspect portions of the narrative incorporate details that ring true. *Tuhfat al-nuzzār* will be used here only in those contexts where we have no reason to doubt its author’s veracity.

**Historians writing in the Ilkhanid realm but outside the Sunnī Islamic tradition**

Among historians who represent minority communities within the Ilkhanid empire, one group comprises two Shi‘i authors, of whom the more famous is the astronomer Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (b. 597/1201; d. 672/1274). Exchanging the service of the Ismā‘īlī Assassins for that of Hülegū in 653/1255, he witnessed the destruction of the Caliphate, of which he later wrote a short account, *Kayfīyyat-i wāqi‘a-yi Baghdaḍ* (‘The Particulars of the Fall of Baghdad’). This is found appended to some manuscripts of Juwaynī’s *Ta‘rīkh-i jahān-gushā*, was also incorporated in the history drafted by Negūbei b. Mas‘ūd, and can be seen in turn to have served as a source for both the *Mukhtasār* of Ibn al-‘Ibrī (Bar Hebraeus; below) and Rashīd al-Dīn. In terms that recall Juwaynī’s Möngke, Ṭūsī’s Hülegū is described, at the very beginning of the account, as ‘the bearer of security and tranquillity (*māda-yi amn-u amān*)’. This was far from being merely conventional sycophancy; for Shi‘is, the end of the hated Caliphate was a matter for rejoicing. During the advance on Baghdad, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Ṭūsī had encouraged Hülegū with a forthright assurance that no dire consequences would follow the capture of the city.

The other Shi‘i writer is Ṣafī al-Dīn Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. Ṭabāṭabā, known as Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, who dedicated his *Kitāb al-Fakhrī* to the
Ilkhanid governor of Mosul, Fakhr al-Dīn ‘Īsā, in 701/1302. For our purposes, the chief interest of this work, which is mostly concerned with the history of the Caliphate down to 656/1258, is its meagre anecdotal material on the Mongol epoch. On several occasions the author expresses opinions about the conquerors, and about the ‘Abbasid regime prior to its fall, that are balanced and judicious. It has been suggested that even as a Shī‘ī he regretted the passing of the old order. But he was clearly not without sympathy for the Ilkhans: it is he who tells us that following the capture of Baghdad, Hūlegū summoned the ‘ulamā and asked them for a ruling whether a just infidel king was preferable to an unjust Muslim Sultan.

We gain a different perspective from the second group, namely Christian writers. The Jacobite (Monophysite) Christian prelate Gregorius Abū l-Faraj, better known as Bar Hebraeus or (to employ the Arabic form) Ibn al-‘Ibrī (b. 1225–6; d. 1286), was metropolitan of Aleppo in 1260, when he was briefly taken prisoner by the Mongols. Four years later he received from Hūlegū a pukdānā (‘patent’, i.e. a yarlīgh) for the office of Maphrian of the East. Master of a repertoire that embraced, *inter alia*, theology and spirituality, dialectics, physics and astronomy, Bar Hebraeus composed two historical works, one in Syriac and the other in Arabic. The Syriac *Maktbānūt zabnē*, which was continued down to 1296 by his brother Bar Šawma, is in two parts. The first (usually termed the ‘Chronography’) is a world history from the Creation, though far less ambitious in its geographical scope than that of Rashīd al-Dīn. Bar Hebraeus made extensive use of Juwaynī’s history, albeit with some significant alterations; but he also recounts as an eyewitness a good many events that are not mentioned elsewhere. The second part, the *Chronicon ecclesiasticum*, is primarily a history of the Jacobite Church but includes the occasional detail relevant to the history of the Mongol regime.

In his Syriac work, Bar Hebraeus provides an insight into one aspect of the early Mongol period – the reaction of a community that had been delivered from the restrictions of Muslim sovereignty and in some measure emancipated. He notices how the Mongols spared the Christian population during the massacre in Baghdad; and he mourns the death of Hūlegū and his chief wife, Doquz Khatun, calling them ‘two great lights, who made the Christian religion triumphant’. Yet although his career coincided with what might have appeared a golden age for eastern Christians, Bar Hebraeus does not conceal episodes in which the Christians suffered under Mongol rule. His continuator, Bar Šawma, is still less sanguine. Whereas Juwaynī had complained that the Mongols used to hold Muslims in high regard but
did so no longer, Bar Şawma makes exactly the same observation about their attitude towards Christians, on the grounds that the Mongols had all converted to Islam (a reference to the recent conversion of the Ilkhan Ghazan in 1295).\textsuperscript{155}

Bar Hebraeus’ other historical work, the *Mukhtarār tārīkh al-duwal* (‘The Abridgement of the History of States’), has a different slant. Since Bar Şawma describes this as an uncompleted rendering into Arabic of the *Chronography*, begun by his brother not long before his death at the request of the Muslim community in Marāgha (the *Mukhtarār* goes down only as far as 1284),\textsuperscript{156} it was long taken to be a mere Arabic abridgement of the Syriac world history. But it has been demonstrated that the *Mukhtarār* not only lacks some of the detail in the *Chronography* but also includes material omitted from it – for instance, a version of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s account of the fall of Baghdad.\textsuperscript{157} Where the *Chronography*, moreover, was a Christian history modelled on that of Michael the Syrian (d. 1199), the *Mukhtarār* is addressed to a Muslim readership and, in terms of literary style and coverage, fits squarely into the traditional genre of Islamic historiography.\textsuperscript{158}

A still more vivid image of shifting Christian fortunes in the early Ilkhanid decades than that furnished by Bar Hebraeus’ Syriac history is to be gained from *Tashʾītā d-mār Yahballāhā qāṭōlikā d-madnhā wad-rabban Šāwma sāʾūrā gawānāyā* (‘The History of Mar Yahballāhā, Catholicos of the East, and of Rabban Šawma, Visitor-General’). A Syriac biography of the Nestorian Catholicos, Mar Yahballāhā III (d. 1317), who arrived in Iran from the Qaghan Qubilai’s dominions in 1281 together with his friend and mentor, Rabban Šawma (d. 1294), it incorporates an abridged version of Šawma’s own account (in Persian and now lost) of his journey to Western Europe in 1287–8 as ambassador for the Ilkhan Arghun. For our purposes, *Tashʾītā* is most useful when describing the privileged position of the churches under the pagan Ilkhans and their tribulations at the hands of their Muslim fellow citizens both before and after the conversion. It has recently been suggested that the author may have been Yahballāhā’s successor, Mar Timotheos II, one-time metropolitan of Irbil, and that he was attempting an apologia for Yahballāhā, whose policies had manifestly borne no fruit.\textsuperscript{159}

The Georgian Chronicle (*Kʾartʾlis tsʾchovreba*), a compilation of texts drafted by a series of anonymous annalists and assembled in the early eighteenth century, contains some information useful for our purposes. But Armenian historians make up a far more important group.\textsuperscript{160} Greater Armenia, much of which had been subject to the Georgian kingdom but which passed under Mongol overlordship in 1236–9, produced three
historians: Kirakos Ganjakets’i (originating, that is, from the Muslim town of Ganja in Arrān), who completed the first part of his work in 1241 but continued writing until not long before his death in 1272; Vardan Arevelts’i (d. c. 1270); and Grigor Aknerts’i, writing in c. 1313. The first two of these authors provide a sober and measured account of events; Grigor’s material is at times somewhat fanciful. A more tendentious view is presented by Step’anos Orbelian (d. 1304), from the ruling family of Siounia (Siwnik), who tends to exaggerate the Mongol rulers’ Christian sympathies and to magnify the influence of his own father and kinsmen with the Ilkhans. Various sets of annals were produced within the kingdom of Lesser Armenia, or Cilicia, whose monarch, Het’um I (1226–70), was tributary to the Mongols and visited Möngke’s court in 1254. One of these chronicles goes under the name of the king’s brother, the Constable Smbat (d. 1269), who had himself conveyed Het’um’s submission to the Qaghan Güyüg in 1246.

King Het’um’s nephew and namesake, usually known as Hayton of Gorighos, was an exile from Lesser Armenia who had become a canon in the Premonstratensian Order and might therefore seem to belong in a different category. Having arrived in Western Europe on a mission from the kingdom of Cyprus, he was asked by Pope Clement V to draft a treatise outlining the best course for a future crusade against the Mamlūks. Hayton’s La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d’Orient (‘The Flower of the Histories of the East’), completed in 1307 (a Latin version appeared later that year), includes a survey of the history of the Mongol khanates. At first sight, Hayton’s credentials appear unimpeachable. He tells us that for the period from Chinggis Khan until Möngke’s accession he has used ‘Tartar’ histories; from Möngke down to Hülegü’s death Hayton is reliant on what he has heard from his uncle, Het’um I; and from Abagha’s accession he is writing from his own experience; at an earlier juncture he mentions having personally taken part in the invasion of Syria by Ilkhanid forces in 1303. Yet the work is deeply flawed. In the first place, some of the material is wrong and some simply myth. Like Step’anos Orbelian, Hayton engages in literary nepotism, giving a greatly inflated account of the privileges that Möngke had conferred on King Het’um in 1254. But he also purveys a tendentious version of Mongol history, glossing over Ghazan’s recent conversion to Islam. This is because La Flor des Estoires was a work of propaganda, designed to bring about the military alliance between the Mongols of Iran and the Latin West that Hayton saw as the sole hope for his beleaguered homeland. In other words, he was an Armenian noble first and foremost; the crusade theorist and historian took second place.
Christian European observers

The final corpus of material to be surveyed here is the work of Christians from Latin Europe. The *Devisament du monde* (‘The Different Parts of the World’) associated with the celebrated Marco Polo, member of a Venetian merchant family, is a problematic source. Polo accompanied his father and uncle on their second journey to the Far East and was himself in Qubilai’s service from c. 1274 until 1290. The book is not a travel account, however, like those mentioned in the next paragraph, but a survey of the known world; it is therefore not always clear when it is retailing personal experience and when it relies on hearsay. The manuscript tradition, moreover, is extremely complicated. It has been argued that Polo travelled no further east than the Pontic steppe and hence was never in China, though this view has now been totally discredited. Some useful observations can nevertheless be gleaned from the *Devisament*. I have tried to confine myself to information found in what is probably the earliest text, dating from the first years of the fourteenth century, represented by the Paris ms. fr. 1116 and recently edited by Philippe Ménard.

More important are the members of the newly founded Mendicant Orders of Friars, the Franciscans and Dominicans, visiting the Mongol dominions either as accredited diplomatic envoys or as missionaries (or as both) in the years 1245–55. Of the three embassies that Pope Innocent IV despatched in 1245, one, led by the Dominican Ascelin, travelled to the Near East and met with the Mongol general Baiju in Greater Armenia in 1247. Although the *Historia Tartarorum* written by one of its members, Simon de Saint-Quentin, is lost, the lengthy excerpts preserved in the *Speculum historiale* of a fellow Dominican, Vincent de Beauvais (c. 1253), include precious material on Mongol dealings with the Saljuq Sultanate of Rûm that is unavailable elsewhere. The Franciscan John of Plano Carpini (Giovanni del Pian di Carpine), who headed another embassy, by way of the Pontic steppe to the Qaghan Güyük’s court in Mongolia (1245–7), has left us one of the most important Western sources on the empire in his *Ystoria Mongalorum*. A fellow Franciscan, who calls himself ‘C. de Bridia’ and who composed a *Hystoria Tartarorum* (1247), commonly known as the ‘Tartar Relation’, may have been one of Carpini’s companions who remained at a Mongol encampment in the western steppe. The *Itinerarium* of a third Franciscan, William of Rubruck, who visited Mongolia in a missionary capacity, again by the northerly route across the steppe (1253–5), is a highly detailed and vivid account of his experiences, addressed to the French King Louis IX.
Over the next century, further groups of Mendicants travelled within the Mongol dominions. Although some served as papal ambassadors – notably the Franciscan Giovanni di Marignolli, who headed an embassy from Pope Benedict XII to the last Yuan Emperor Toghon Temür (reigned as Shundi) in the years 1338–45 – the majority went in search of a harvest of souls. They included the Dominican Riccoldo da Montecroce, who was active in the Near East in the 1290s. Among his works are a Liber peregrinationis (‘Book of Pilgrimage’), which furnishes a description of the Ilkhanate at this time, and five Epistolae ad ecclesiam triumphantem (‘Letters to the Church Victorious’), produced in reaction to the loss of Acre (1291). To underpin the Friars’ proselytizing activity, the papacy in the early fourteenth century created two vast archiepiscopal sees, centred respectively on the qaghan’s capital Khanbaligh (Dadu, formerly Zhongdu and close to the site of modern Beijing) and on Sultāniyya, in north-western Iran and one of the residences of the Ilkhan Öljeitü. The second Archbishop of Sultāniyya, the Dominican Guillaume Adam, composed Tractatus quomodo Sarraceni sunt expugnandi (‘How to Defeat the Saracens’) in 1318. Primarily a crusade treatise, it furnishes a good deal of information on the contemporary Ilkhanate, which Guillaume saw as a potential ally for the Latin West. Letters written by Franciscans, lastly, supply us with useful material on the obstacles to their Order’s missionary efforts in two of the Mongol polities that were undergoing the process of Islamization: the Golden Horde in the 1320s and the Chaghadayid khanate in the years 1338–40.

Christian authors, and particularly those who wrote when Islam was making great strides within the Mongols’ ranks, frequently betray an animus against Muslims and their religion. Yet the light that such authors – and this applies especially to Carpini and Rubruck – throw on Mongol beliefs and customs makes them an indispensable supplement to the material found in Muslim sources. They help us to stitch together, as it were, the canvas on which the histoire événementielle of the Persian and Arabic sources is embroidered.
Early contacts with the Inner Asian steppe

When Mongol forces headed by Chinggis Khan first invaded Islamic territory in 616/1219, Muslims had been in contact for five centuries or more with the peoples of the great steppe belt that extends from Manchuria to Hungary and those of the forest zones of Siberia further north. The steppe lands, ranging from sandy or gravel-like terrain in the east to the lush prairies watered by the great rivers of the Ukraine in the west, were home to pastoral nomads – herders of oxen, sheep, goats, camels and especially horses – who had no fixed abode but moved between upland pastures in the summer and river valleys in the winter. By the time the armies of the Caliphs traversed the Caucasus range in the mid-seventh century and first crossed the Oxus (Jayḥūn; Amū-daryā) into Transoxiana (Mā warāʾ al-nahr) in the early eighth century, the nomads with whom they clashed were largely of Turkic stock; until c. 650 they had formed part of the Western Türk Qaghanate, extending from the Pontic steppe into Central Asia. North of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, the principal power was the state of the Khazars (c. 625–965), whose qaghans adopted Judaism as their faith at some point before 850 and who effectively barred Muslim expansion in this direction. But on the other front the Caliph’s forces made significant advances from the outset. The incorporation of Transoxiana within the Islamic world was guaranteed by the fragmentary character of Türk power in this region and by the Muslims’ victory over a Tang Chinese army near Talas (Țarăz; modern Dzhambul) in 751.1

Yet the explosive eastward advance of Muslim armies soon lost its momentum. Steppe polities such as that of the Qarluq – the tribal grouping...
which in 766 occupied the former capital of the Western Türks, Sūyāb on the Chu river, and whose ruler assumed the imperial title of qaghan in 8402 – were resilient antagonists. Towns like Isfījāb, Shāsh (later Tashkent), Talas itself and Sawrān, on the middle Sīr-daryā (the Jaxartes river), were still little more than border outposts of the Islamic world in the early tenth century. By that date Islamic political unity was a thing of the past, and the long-lived ʿAbbasid Caliphate (132–656/750–1258) exercised from Baghdad only a nominal hegemony over its provinces. There the Caliph was represented by autonomous dynasties on whose rulers he conferred the rank of amīr (‘commander’, ‘governor’), sonorous honorifics and patents of authority, in return for naming him on their coinage (sikka) and in the sermon (khujba) preached at the public Friday prayer. Among these dynasties, the Iranian Samanids (204–395/819–1005) governed Khurāsān and Transoxiana from their capital at Bukhārā and deployed holy war (ghazā, jihād) against their infidel Turkic neighbours as a means to buttress their legitimacy. It was under the Samanid umbrella, from the last years of the ninth century, that Muslim colonies were established within pagan territory and the advance of Muslim power in the region resumed in earnest.3

To the north and east of the Samanid dominions, the infidel world, or Dār al-Ḥarb (the ‘war-zone’, with which Muslims could have no lasting truce), extended for a vast distance. Until the first half of the eleventh century the north-western steppe and much of the forest zone of western Siberia were dominated by the Kimek, a considerable grouping of nomadic peoples. They had become semi-sedentarized, practising agriculture while maintaining their pattern of annual migrations, but Islam had made no progress among them.4 Similarly, the various steppe peoples who took over the lands of the Khazar qaghanate after its collapse in 965 were barely touched by Islam (with the exception of a section of the Oghuz, who will be dealt with below). The one oasis in this wilderness of paganism was the Bulgar state on the middle Volga, where a semi-nomadic Turkic ruling class held sway over a predominantly Finno-Ugric, forest-dwelling population. Hitherto subject to the Khazar Qaghan, the Bulgars (long separated from their kinsfolk who had migrated beyond the Danube) accepted Islam before the year 310/922, when a caliphal embassy travelled by invitation to their ruler’s encampment and one of its members, Ibn Faḍīlān, wrote a lengthy report on them and other peoples of this northerly region. By the end of that century their newly founded urban centre at Bulghār had become the principal conduit for the products of the northern forests to Khwārazm, Transoxiana and the Middle East.5 Islam took firm hold here. In Marwazi’s early twelfth-century account, the Volga Bulgars already enjoyed a reputation for making holy war upon
their pagan neighbours. The Franciscan Friar William of Rubruck, who passed through the steppes en route to Mongolia in 1253–4, could describe them, in somewhat jaundiced tones, as ‘the worst sort of Saracens’ who ‘adhere more strictly to the religion of Mahomet than any of the others’.

The tracts to the east, by contrast, offered fertile ground for Islam’s competitors. In Mongolia the dominant power was the empire of the Uighurs (known to Muslim geographers under the alternative Turkish designation of Toquz Oghuz, the ‘Nine Oghuz’), who in 762 embraced Manichaeism as their state religion. After the overthrow of the Uighur state in 840, Uighur princes migrated south-westward to found new principalities centred on Qocho/Beshbaligh and Ganzhou. It was to Buddhism, not to Islam, that Manichaeism eventually yielded ground among the semi-sedentarized Uighurs of Beshbaligh. Buddhism, a faith that Muslims tended to equate with idolatry \textit{par excellence}, had forfeited its strong foothold in Tang China around the mid-ninth century; but it emerged, nevertheless, as Islam’s principal rival in Central Asia.

Christianity, too, was on the rise in these easterly regions. The Greek Orthodox (‘Melkite’) Church does not appear to have made noteworthy progress beyond Khwārazm, although there was a Melkite element in Samarqand in the thirteenth century; and it is uncertain how long the Monophysite (Jacobite; West Syrian) community had existed that is mentioned in the Cherchen region in the latter years of that century by Marco Polo. It was the Christians of the Nestorian Church (or, as its adherents called it, the Church of the East) who had long been preponderant, whether in Turkestan or in northern China. A Nestorian metropolitanate for the Turkic peoples had been created in the late eighth century, and the ensuing decades, especially thanks to the programme of evangelization launched by the Catholicos Timotheos I (d. 823), witnessed the emergence of new ecclesiastical provinces centred on Kāshghar and Almaligh; it is not unlikely that these initiatives reflect the conversion of the Qarluq ruler and significant numbers of his people. In this fashion Christianity spread into the eastern steppe and beyond. Marwazi describes the Qūn tribe as Nestorians; so too were the numerous Turks who entered the Semirech´e just prior to 1046 and who have been identified with the Naiman tribe. The Jacobite Christian prelate Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286), writing in Ilkhanid Iraq, preserves a report from c. 1007 that an entire Turkic tribe had recently embraced Christianity. It has been plausibly argued that the equation of this grouping with the Kereyit of western Mongolia (whose khans were certainly Nestorian in the twelfth century) is his own interpolation. The Naiman (below, p. 55), albeit not exclusively Christian by 1200, are equally likely candidates.
The entry of the steppe peoples into the Dar al-Islam

The Samanids dutifully forwarded to the Caliph a regular quota of Turkic youths (ghilmān, sing. ghulām; the term used more frequently by the thirteenth century is mamālik, sing. mamlūk) enslaved in the frequent skirmishing along the frontier, to be reared as Muslims, to be trained in military skills and to serve as his palace guards. They and other provincial Muslim dynasts followed the Caliph's example in maintaining bands of Turkic ghulams (slave-soldiers), and from the ninth century Turkic officers were founding dynasties in their own right, as did the Ghaznawids or Yaminids (352–582/963–1186), who took over parts of eastern Iran and present-day Afghanistan from their former Samanid masters. Yet even in the tenth century Turks did not enter the Islamic world exclusively as slaves, since already regiments of free nomadic Turks who had accepted Islam were serving the Samanid amirs as auxiliaries.

Within a short time, moreover, the regions immediately to the east of the Samanid amirate would be brought into the fold not so much by force of arms as through the peaceful conversion of their rulers. Arabic geographical literature of the late tenth century reveals Muslims in significant numbers among the Qarluq and the Oghuz (Ghuzz) peoples; Muslim Oghuz tribesmen appear to have been designated in this literature as 'Türkmen' (Turcoman), although the term was not confined to Oghuz alone. But it was with the conversion of the so-called Qarakhanid dynasty (c. 840–1213), whose roots have been located among the Qarluq, that Islamization gathered momentum. The precise agency remains unclear, though increasingly close contacts with the Samanid state and its often dissident subordinates must have played a part. The idea that Islam was mediated through wandering sufis during this period is purely conjectural, however, resting on no firm basis. Such plausible evidence as we have regarding the conversion of the Qarakhanid ruler Satuq Bughra Khan (c. 955–60) points to the influence, rather, of a Muslim jurist (faqīh) or merchant. The testimony of Ibn Faḍlān suggests that an important motive in the acceptance of Islam by the Turkic peoples in general was a desire to cultivate links with Muslim traders, who enjoyed no little prestige among the nomads.

It was at this juncture that the sedentary regions of the eastern Islamic world began to experience immigration en masse by newly converted Turkic nomads from the steppelands, beginning with the forces of the Qarakhanids and continuing with the Saljuq advance in the early decades of the eleventh century. The Qarakhanids swept aside the Samanid amirate and occupied
Transoxiana in 389/999, thereby permanently ending (as it transpired) the interlude of Iranian rule in the region. The Saljuqs, who originated among the Oghuz to the north of the Sir-daryā, had embraced Islam around 1000. At the head of considerable numbers of their fellow tribesmen, they migrated into Khurāsān with the permission of the Ghaznawid amir. But when a growing sense of insecurity prompted him to attack them, the amir suffered a decisive reverse at Dandānaqān (431/1040). As a result, the Ghaznawid dominions in eastern Iran passed into the hands of the Saljuqs, who went on to found a vast empire that embraced Iran, Iraq and Anatolia.25 In 448/1055 the Saljuq leader entered Baghdad, took the Caliph under his protection and was rewarded with the exalted title of Sultan. Both ruling dynasties – the Qarakhanids and the Saljuqs – and at least the great majority of the rank-and-file nomads were recent converts to Islam. This ensured the Qarakhanids a welcome from the Muslim literati ('ulamā; sing. 'ālim) in Samanid Transoxiana, and could also be viewed as mitigating, in some degree, the depredations committed in particular by the Saljuqs’ Oghuz/Türkmen followers in the Iranian lands.

While the Saljuqs’ military operations advanced Islam’s borders in south-western Asia, where much of Anatolia was wrested from the Byzantine empire through the victory at Manzikert (463/1071), the Qarakhanids waged holy war against their infidel neighbours in the east, extending Muslim rule to Khotan, which they had reduced by 397/1007, and as far as the vicinity of the Yulduz river and beyond the Ili, to embrace Qayaligh.26 During the eleventh century, Islam was represented even in Kucha, in the eastern Tarim valley, whose Muslim ruler was a Qarakhanid client.27 The assumption by the dynasty’s principal rulers of grandiose titles like Ṭamghāch Khan (‘Khan of China’) and – by grace of the ’Abbasid Caliph – malik al-mashriq wa l-Ṣīn (‘King of the East and China’).28 attests to the extension of Muslim horizons brought about by both conversion and jihād.

Under Qarakhanid rule, the towns of Kāshghar and Balāsāghūn (on the Chu river, not far from the older settlement of Sūyāb and close to the site of the modern town of Burana, south of Tokmak), which lay adjacent to the khans’ chief residences, became an integral part of the Dar al-Islam. By the twelfth–early thirteenth centuries Muslim religious and legal scholarship flourished in Balāsāghūn, in Khotan and in the towns of Farghāna.29 Jamāl al-Qarshi, writing in Turkestan in 702/1303, would recall meeting in his youth numerous shaykhs and members of the ’ālim class from Balāsāghūn;30 two and a half centuries later, when the city had long disappeared and its very location was uncertain, Mīrzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt would be impressed by
The number of scholars al-Qarshī had mentioned from this one centre alone.\textsuperscript{31}

The Saljuqs went further than the Qarakhanids in their adaptation to Islamic and Iranian institutions. Under the influence of their Persian ministers, they presided over a court characterized by Persian culture and assumed the trappings and idioms of Persian kingship; and although the senior branch of the dynasty, the ‘Great Saljuq’ Sultans, display conventionally Muslim personal names, from c. 1200 their junior kinsmen, ruling in Anatolia (Rûm), took to borrowing names (Kaykhusraw, Kayqubâd) from the antique Iranian past. Unlike their Qarakhanid neighbours to the north, moreover, the Great Saljuq sovereigns grew increasingly estranged from their mass tribal followers, relying in good measure on Türkic mamluk troops as an instrument of more despotic rule. As had occurred under the ‘Abbasid Caliphs, Türkic slave commanders were frequently promoted to provincial governorships which, with the eventual fragmentation and decline of Saljuq imperial authority, they were able to turn into hereditary possessions. Examples are the Eldegüzids in Arrān, Azerbaijan and neighbouring regions of north-western Iran (c. 540–622/c. 1145–1225) and the dynasty known as the Khwârazmshâhs (490–628/1097–1231), whose dominions, from their original nucleus on the lower Oxus, would grow to embrace much of Iran by the early thirteenth century.

The image of the Turk in Muslim literature

Muslim geographers had been writing about the regions to the north and north-east of the Islamic oecumene since the ninth century, when Ibn Khurradâdhbih, drawing on his experience as director of the caliphal postal system \textit{(barīd)}, described the peoples of the steppe and forest regions in a work that served as a model for his successors – notably the tenth-century geographers al-Masʿûdî, Ibn Ḥawqal, al-Iṣṭakhrî and al-Muqaddasî. There are admittedly gaps in the knowledge of Muslim authors. The \textit{littérature} al-Thaʿālibî (d. 429/1038), for instance, writing an account of the Uighurs’ conversion to Manichaicism, mistook their new faith for Buddhism, as would Juwaynî two centuries later.\textsuperscript{32} By Juwaynî’s era, at least, the Uighurs of Beshbalîgh had indeed switched their allegiance from Manichaicism to Buddhism; though in any case we should not ignore the propensity of either faith to infiltrate its rival.\textsuperscript{33}

Yet on the whole Muslim commentators display an impressive awareness of the ancestral customs and traditions of the peoples of Inner Asia, even those situated at a considerable distance. Of the Qirghiz (Kirghiz), at that time
a forest-dwelling people in the upper Yenisei region, al-Thaˈalibī observed that some worshipped idols, others the sun. They practised divination by examining the cracks that formed in the shoulder-blades of sheep when burned, an operation later witnessed by Rubruck at the Mongol qaghan’s court (1254). They buried a dead man with his (live) slaves and servants who might thus accompany him to the next world. Many practices fell within the purview of the specialist who today would be termed a shaman (Tu. qam) and whose function was to enlist the favour of otherwise hostile spirits and to wield some kind of mastery over the forces of nature. More will be said about shamanistic practices in chapter 11.

For Muslim writers of the ninth–tenth centuries, the infidel Turks of Inner Asia became in some respects a stereotype: dwelling in tents and shunning fixed domiciles, living off game and the milk and meat of their mares, and enamoured of warfare, in which they excelled. In the eyes of some, they were the Islamic world’s most energetic enemies. Incomparable archers and proverbially inseparable from their mounts, they partook of the characteristics associated in Classical Greece with the Scythians, in the Roman empire with the Huns, in Byzantium with the Avars and in China with the Xiongnu and their steppe successors. ‘Turk’ in fact was often used as a generic term for all the inhabitants of the steppe, whether they were of Turkic or Mongoloid stock and language, and on occasions was even applied to the Hungarians and the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe. Thus the great Arabic-Turkish lexicon (c. 469/1077) of Maḥmūd al-Kāshghārī labelled the Kitan (Khiṭā) as Turks; Ibn al-Āthīr classed among the Turks both the Kitan and the Tatars; and Marwāzī saw the Rusʾ as Turks. Both Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, in the 1260s, and Rashīd al-Dīn, at the dawn of the fourteenth century, would describe the Mongols as originally a branch of the Turkic peoples.

The estimable qualities of the Turk developed into a distinctive topos in Arabic literature. Among its most celebrated exponents was al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868–9). In addition to possessing military skills, he wrote, the Turk was hardy and resilient, courageous if also duplicitous; yet once converted to Islam, he proved a steadfast practitioner and defender of his new faith. Praise of this nature would be lavished especially on Turkic youths who entered the Islamic world as ghulams/mamluks. Already in the early eleventh century al-Thaˈalibī could cite a proverbial saying that likened the Turks to pearls, never revealed in their full splendour until removed from their homes. This adage evidently enjoyed a long currency, since it is reproduced in slightly different form by Fakhr-i Mudabbir (c. 602/1206), writing for a ghulam ruler in Lahore almost on the eve of the Mongol invasion:
The Turk is like a pearl that lies in the oyster in the sea. For as long as it is in its habitat, it is devoid of power and worth; but when it leaves the oyster and the sea, it acquires value and becomes precious, decorating the crown of kings and adorning the neck and ears of brides.41

The Turks of Central Asia found a niche also in epic literature, with the composition by the early eleventh-century author Firdawšī of the *Shāh-nāma*, which was to become the Iranian national epic. Scholars have known for many decades that the people of Tūrān, who under their ruler Afrāsiyāb play such a prominent role in the *Shāh-nāma* as the time-honoured antagonists of Iran, cannot possibly have been the Turks of Firdawšī’s own day but were in fact the previous Indo-European inhabitants of the region.42 Yet the Turanian peoples were rapidly identified with the current occupants of the Central Asian steppes, to the extent that Turkic potentates such as the Qarakhanid sovereigns were seen as the lineal descendants of Afrāsiyāb. By a still more incongruous development, the Qarakhanids themselves, newly entered into Islam and in the process of adopting Persian court culture, asserted the distinctively Turkic character of the dynasty by appropriating Afrāsiyāb as their forebear. Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī, who may have been a Qarakhanid prince, identified Afrāsiyāb with the Turkic folk hero Alp Tonga, and the theme of descent from Afrāsiyāb was taken up in the next century by Qarakhanid court poets such as Sūzanī Samarqandi.43 We shall see (p. 326) that the Afrāsiyāb myth was embraced by the Persian servitors of the Mongol Ilkhans of Iran, though with a different purpose.

The Turks had another, more sinister role to fulfil than that reserved for them in Firdawšī’s epic. Beyond the vast territory that they occupied to the north and east of the Dar al-Islam lay only Yājūj and Mājūj (Gog and Magog), who would overrun the world at the end of time. Their irruption (*khurūj*) into the settled lands was meanwhile blocked solely by the wall or barrier allegedly erected for that purpose by Alexander the Great (known to Muslims as Dhū l-Qarnayn), whose intervention is referred to in the Qurʾān.44 These remote tracts were still largely *terra incognita* in the early thirteenth century, though from time to time travellers described journeys that had taken them as far as the Wall of Yājūj and Mājūj. Thus in the ninth century Ibn Khurradādhbih had transmitted a report by the caliphal envoy Sallām, allegedly sent to discover the whereabouts of Dhū l-Qarnayn’s barrier; he had possibly travelled as far as the defensive walls of northern China.45 Jūzjānī cites one author who proposed that the Turks were the vanguard (*muqaddima*) of Yājūj and Mājūj.46 Some even identified the
The Mongols and the Islamic World

Turks themselves with the races enclosed by Dhū l-Qarnayn. Jūzjānī appears to have equated them, since for him ‘many books’ specified the first indication of the end of time as the irruption of the Turks. For others, who distinguished between them, the Turk could still seem a menacing entity, if not quite on the level of Yājūj and Mājūj. In the 1070s Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī related a tradition (ḥadīth) of the Prophet that when God was angry with Muslims he launched the Turks against them; over a century earlier, Arab geographers had transmitted another, in which Muḥammad cautioned his followers against provoking the Turks. By the time Juwaynī repeated this warning, such traditions had assumed a much greater immediacy. For whereas the invading Turkic groups who established Saljuq rule in Khurāsān, western Iran and Iraq were already Muslims of two generations’ standing, the Muslim populations of Central Asia in the twelfth century, and those still further afield in the thirteenth century, were called upon to endure conquest by unbelievers.

Upheavals in the western steppes: the advent of the Qipchaq-Qangli

The original impulses behind the tribal displacements that brought successive groups of nomads en masse into the sedentary Dar al-Islam are to be sought in events far beyond its frontiers. In the first half of the eleventh century the latter stages of a process known to historians as the ‘Qūn migration’ sent shock waves not merely around the eastern Islamic world but further afield still, into the Pontic steppe and the forest territories of the Rus’. Our knowledge of these movements comes primarily from Marwazī, who is unusual in sketching a series of migrations, rather than purveying the static image so common among earlier Muslim geographical writings. Yet such details as Marwazī furnishes are meagre, are open to a variety of interpretations and raise more problems than they resolve. What is virtually certain is that, as a result of various tribal upheavals in the Far East, a large-scale and loosely tied confederacy of Turkic peoples, whom the Muslims called the Qipchaq, took over the collapsing Kimek union. Dislodging the more northerly groups of the Oghuz, the newcomers established themselves in the region stretching from the lower Sir-daryā to the Dnieper, where they became known to the Rus’ as the Polovtsy and to the Byzantines as the Cumans. Their precise relationship with the Qangli, who emerged as the masters of the eastern portion of these tracts (between the Sir-daryā and the Ural river), is unclear; but the entire territory came to be known as the ‘Qipchaq steppe’ (dasht-i Qipchāq), a term still current in the Mongol era. A movement probably linked with the ‘Qūn migration’ was the advance
in the 1040s of the Turkic people who are known to history by the Mongolian form of their name, Naiman (‘eight’), as far as the western slopes of the Altai and the basin of the upper Irtysh. And at a subsequent date that may have been as late as the 1120s, another tribal grouping, the Ölberli, which had originated in the eastern steppes and possibly included proto-Mongol elements, established itself in the Volga-Ural mesopotamia, where it would play a prominent role among the eastern Qipchaq-Qangli.

These migrations in Eastern and Central Asia during the eleventh and twelfth centuries are imperfectly understood and – given the limitations of the source material – will doubtless remain so. They must have been linked with two quite distinct developments, both of which involved peoples of non-Turkic stock and began in the decades following the end of the Tang dynasty in China (907). The more recent was the rise of the Tangut, a people viewed by the Chinese as related to the Tibetans but probably incorporating other elements (including Turks); their empire, known to the Chinese as Xi Xia (982–1227), suppressed the Uighur principality at Ganzhou in 1028. But the tribal movements that Marwazi describes were also linked, in all probability, to a more protracted process, namely the changing fortunes of the Kitan, a powerful nomadic people from Manchuria who themselves seemingly spoke a form of Mongolian; at any rate, Rashid al-Din would comment on the close similarity of the Qara-Khitai (below) to the Mongols in language, appearance and customs (lughat-u shakl-u ādat). The Kitan subjugated present-day Mongolia and part of northern China, reigning there under the dynastic name of Liao (907–1125). When their name reached the Islamic world, it became synonymous, under the arabicized forms Qitā/Khitā/Khiṭā, with northern China (for Latin Europeans, it would be distorted as ‘Cathay’ and come to denote the entire country, as in Russian ‘Kitai’ still does). Marwazi expressly ascribes the origins of the ‘Qūn migration’ to fear of the khan of the ‘Qitā’; and the westward movement of the Ölberli so many decades later may well have coincided with the death throes of the Liao regime.

The Qara-Khitai and their Muslim neighbours

For all their renown in Western Asia, the Liao entertained only fitful diplomatic relations with eastern Muslim rulers, and the Islamic world knew the Kitans primarily as a source of valued items of trade. Events early in the following century, however, would bring the Kitans much closer to the Dar al-Islam. In 1125 the Liao regime was overthrown by the Jurchen, a Tungusic people speaking a language closely related to modern Manchu,
who had appropriated its Mongolian and Chinese territories and henceforth governed as the Jin dynasty (1115–1234). Fugitive Kitan elements led by a scion of the defunct imperial family, Yelü Dashi, fled west and carved out a new empire in Central Asia. This empire (c. 1124–1218) was known in China as the Xi Liao (‘Western Liao’); the form Qarā-Khitāi, under which it appears in Muslim sources, apparently means ‘Liao Kitan’ and is not derived, as once thought, from Turkish qara (‘black’). Its sovereign, who combined Chinese imperial styles with the Inner Asian title of Gür-khan (‘universal khan’), levied tribute, for example, on the semi-sedentarized Uighur polity with its two capitals at Beshbaligh and Qocho, on the Qarluq pastoralists in the Semirech’e and on the Muslims of agrarian and urban Transoxiana. The Saljuq Sultan Sanjar, moving to the assistance of the Qarakhanid ruler of Samarqand, suffered a decisive defeat on the nearby Qatwān steppe (536/1141). The various Qarakhanid rulers, who had earlier been reduced to client status by the Saljuq Sultans, were obliged to acknowledge the overlordship of the Qara-Khitai; one of their principal cities, Balāsāghūn, became the Gür-khan’s residence. The Khwārazmshāhs, hitherto Saljuq appointees, likewise recognized the Gür-khan’s authority.

The creation of the Qara-Khitai empire also had an indirect impact on the balance of power in the eastern Islamic lands, since it dislodged other nomadic groups from their territories in and beyond Transoxiana, notably the large numbers of Oghuz/Türkmen who poured into Khurāsān in the 1140s. Endeavouring to check them, Sanjar was defeated and captured near Merv in 549/1153; he died of grief not long after his release. Saljuq imperial power in eastern Iran was now swept away, as Sanjar’s former officers and Oghuz leaders parcelled out much of Khurāsān among themselves. This vacuum would ultimately be filled by two dynasties, the Ghurids (or Shansabanids) and the Gür-khan’s vassals, the Khwārazmshāhs.

The Ghurids, who began as rulers of the mountainous area east of Herat, were of Iranian stock. They first extended their power north-eastwards into the regions of Shughnān and Ṭukhāristān; but in 571/1175–6 they took Herat, and in 582/1186 their conquest of the last Ghaznawid bastion at Lahore heralded a series of lucrative forays into the western Punjab. The booty gained at the expense of various Hindu states fuelled the Ghurid Sultans’ efforts to bring Khurāsān under their control. Here they engaged in a protracted duel with the Khwārazmshāh Tekish (r. 567–96/1172–1200) and his son and successor ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad (r. 596–617/1200–20). The Ghurids received encouragement from the ’Abbasid Caliph al-Nāṣir li-din Allāh (r. 575–622/1180–1225), at whose instigation Tekish had extinguished Saljuq rule in northern Iran (590/1194) but who now saw the
Khwārazmshāh as an even greater menace. The Ghurid Sultan Mu’izz al-Dīn mounted an invasion of Khwārazm in 601/1204, only to be defeated by ’Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad and timely reinforcements from the Qara-Khitai. Mu’izz al-Dīn’s murder in 602/1206 led to the rapid decline of his dynasty, and enabled the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad to conquer the remaining Ghurid territories west of the Indus river (611–12/1215–16). These triumphs caused Muḥammad to overreach himself. He had already thrown off Qara-Khitai overlordship in c. 607/1210–11 and annexed the various Qarakhanid principalities, moving his main residence to Samarqand. Now, incensed by the Caliph’s favour towards the Ghurids, he declared al-Ḥāṣir deposed, proclaimed as Caliph a sayyid (a descendant of ’Alī) and mounted an abortive advance on Baghdad (614/1217–18). Jūzjānī alleges that he even contemplated an expedition against China. But within a few years his own empire would be overwhelmed by the Mongols.

The Gür-khans and their Muslim subjects

To Jūzjānī, writing over a century after the advent of the Qara-Khitai, their arrival represented ‘the first irruption of the Turks (awwal khurūj-i turk)’; he treats it almost as presaging the Mongol onslaught of his own day. For in contrast with many of the Turkic dynasties that now paid them tribute, and despite the fact that the majority of their subjects were Muslims, the ruling elite of the Qara-Khitai did not embrace Islam. Professor Biran has persuasively attributed this fact to their residual Chinese orientation and to their abiding aspiration – at least during the early decades of the empire – of recovering some of the erstwhile Kitan-Liao dominions further east. We might add that the subject elements within the Gür-khan’s empire were far from exclusively Muslim, since it included, for example, the Uighur principality of Beshbaligh. Rather than adopting Muslim norms, the administrative structure of the Qara-Khitai empire was an amalgam of Kitan and Chinese traditions; its coins, for instance, were patterned on those of China. Yet, infidels though the Qara-Khitai were, their overlordship initially imposed upon their Muslim subjects relatively light burdens. Ibn al-Athīr claims at one point that following their capture of a city its populace experienced no change and, at another, attributes to the headman (ra’īs) of Bukhārā the statement that the invaders did not plunder or conduct massacres. The Gür-khans kept the administration of their core territories distinct from that of the lands of their client princes. Their troops were not stationed regularly outside the core territories; the commissioner or
‘resident’ (Ar.-Pers. shīḥna), deputed by the Gūr-khan to supervise each of the client rulers, was usually a member of the same religious/cultural group and appears to have made no stringent demands (while Khwārazm was not required to accept such a commissioner at all). Biran accordingly suggests that the Muslim inhabitants of Central Asia might not even have noticed their subjection to infidel rule. Muslim culture was by no means endangered, continuing to flourish in Transoxiana and Turkestan as it had done under the Qarakhanids.

Nor did the Muslim ‘religious class’ as a whole suffer under the new regime. Niẓāmī-yi ‘Arūḍī-yi Samarqandī, Ibn al-Athīr and Jūzjānī, all writing independently of one another, testify to the just government of the Qara-Khitai during the early decades. Ibn al-Athīr speaks of the first Gūrkhan’s prohibition of oppression by his men. Jūzjānī concedes that the early sovereigns governed fairly, showed favour towards Muslims and treated the ‘ulama with respect. It is true that following his victory at Qatwān, Dashi put to death the imam Ḥūsām al-Dīn in Bukhārā. Two sources reveal that this obscure episode was no simple case of infidel oppression of Muslim clergy. In one of his anecdotes written soon after the middle of the twelfth century, Niẓāmī-yi ‘Arūḍī tells us that the Gūr-khan attached his nominee as the secular governor of Bukhārā to a leading representative of the ‘ulama, the imam Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, with instructions to heed the latter’s advice at all times. Ibn al-Athīr, who briefly mentions Ḥūsām al-Dīn’s execution and describes him merely as a Ḥanafī jurist, calls him Ḥūsām al-Dīn ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Māza al-Bukhārī, thereby revealing that he was in fact a member of the Āl-i Burhān, the local dynasty that monopolized the rank of shaykh al-islām or sādr of Bukhārā, and that he was, more importantly, Aḥmad’s brother. This may indicate either that his death was unintended or that it arose from some conflict within the family, in which Aḥmad was able to win out with infidel help. In any event, the trust reposed in this local line of Muslim grandees by the new regime bespeaks a real continuity with the era of untrammelled Qarakhanid sovereignty. By the early thirteenth century the Sadr-i Jahān, as the head of the dynasty was known, was personally responsible for conveying the annual tribute from Bukhārā to the Gūr-khan. Jūzjānī even cites a report that the last Gūr-khan of Dashi’s dynasty had secretly become a Muslim, but does not vouch for its veracity. This apparent partisanship by the Gūr-khans is only an incomplete reflection of the religious pluralism of a steppe nomadic power presiding over a religiously diverse empire. Like their mass following, they most probably practised Buddhism mixed with the shamanism of their Kitan forebears (though
for Ibn al-Athir, a prey to the confusion we encountered apropos of the Uighurs, the first Gür-khan was a Manichaean). But they honoured holy men of all religious confessions, including Nestorian Christianity and Buddhism as well as Islam, and granted them privileges in return for their prayers on the dynasty’s behalf. It was only with the rejection of his authority over some of the eastern tribes, such as the Naiman, in the 1170s (and hence a marked loss of tribute) that the Gür-khan began making heavier demands upon his Muslim subjects. Following the rise of the Mongols in the Far East, the arrival of Naiman refugees and the seizure of the sovereignty in c. 1211 by their leader Güchülg, the Qara-Khitai regime would deteriorate still further, taking punitive measures against Muslim divines and thereby alienating Muslim opinion. But these were relatively late developments.

However mild their regime in the first decades, the advent of the Qara-Khitai could be seen, on balance, as administering a major blow to the integrity of the Islamic world. Extensive territories that had hitherto formed part of the Dar al-Islam had now passed under infidel sovereignty – in the case of Transoxiana, for the first time in over four centuries. When the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad b. Tekish took Tirmidh from the Ghurids in 603/1206–7 and dutifully surrendered it to his Qara-Khitai overlords, he incurred, says Ibn al-Athir, a good deal of criticism and obloquy. The historian himself felt obliged to defend Muḥammad by suggesting that in view of his later revolt against the Qara-Khitai his conduct regarding Tirmidh might have been merely a stratagem. The Khwārazmshāh’s repudiation of the infidel yoke would be hailed with enthusiasm, earning him the styles of ‘Sultan Sanjar’ and ‘the Second Alexander’ (Iskandar-i thānī). It remains an incontrovertible fact, however, that in his struggle with the Ghurids he had found the Gür-khan’s overlordship and Qara-Khitai reinforcements highly convenient.

Subsequent events cast Muḥammad’s belated defiance of the Qara-Khitai in a different light. Ibn al-Labbād and Ibn Wāṣil saw the Qara-Khitai as a barrier (sadd) opened by the Khwārazmshāh; for Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, they had been his defence (wiqāya). Juwaynī observes that the Khwārazmshāh had facilitated the Mongol conquest by undermining the Gür-khan’s power and removing the other rulers in Chinggis Khan’s path. The theme became the stuff of anecdotes. Muḥammad’s father Tekish, on his deathbed, had allegedly warned his sons never to quarrel with the Qara-Khitai, likening them to ‘a wall behind which lay terrible foes’. According to Juwaynī, his cousin, at the time of the Khwarazmian victory over the Qara-Khitai, heard the latter described as ‘the Wall of Dhū l-Qarnayn’ between the Muslims
and a people ‘stubborn in their vengeance and fury and exceeding Yâjûj and Mâjûj’ in number. The same author later even has Muḥammad’s son Jalāl al-Dīn call himself the Wall of Dhū l-Qarnayn in a letter alerting the princes of Mesopotamia and northern Syria to the arrival of fresh Mongol forces in 1229; and according to Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, the Ayyubid prince al-Ashraf Mūsā regarded Jalāl al-Dīn in this light after his elimination in 1231. Clearly, for authors writing in the wake of the wholesale destruction of the Khwarazmian empire by a pagan power, Muḥammad’s role in the downfall of the Qara-Khitai was a sensitive topic.

The Qipchaq-Qangli and the Khwārazmshāhs

Following the conversion of ‘ten thousand tents of Turks’ in 435/1043, claimed Ibn al-Athīr, there remained only the Tatars and the ‘Khiṭā’ who had not embraced Islam. This was a palpable exaggeration, since the Turkic homelands to the north and east of Qarakhanid territory remained obstinately outside the pale of Islam. For if the Qara-Khitai were the most conspicuous non-Muslim power confronting the Khwarazmian state at the dawn of the thirteenth century, they were not the only infidel presence on its steppe frontier. The vast grasslands lying immediately north of the Sir-daryā formed part of the grazing-grounds of the nomadic Qipchaq-Qangli, whom we have already encountered (p. 54 above) and whose frontier with the Islamic world, according to Maḥmūd al-Kāshgharī (c. 1077), lay around the town of Kenjek, some miles east of Talas. These territories were still regarded as a separate country, distinct from that of the Bisermini (beserman < musulmān, ‘Muslim’), in the 1240s, when papal envoys first travelled to the Mongol imperial court.

The political framework of the Qipchaq-Qangli confederacy was a loose one, and the relations between the several groups and their Muslim neighbours – like those of their confrères further west with the Christian Rus’, Hungarians and Georgians – oscillated between plundering raids, marriage alliances and military service as auxiliaries. During the twelfth century the Khwārazmshāhs launched frequent attacks upon them from bases such as Jand on the lower Sir-daryā. Among their constituent tribes was the Oran (whom Fakhr-i Mudabbir lists as a component of the Qipchaq). An Oran chieftain, Alp Qara, submitted to the Khwārazmshāh Tekish in 578/1182, and shortly afterwards his son Qiran was linked with the Khwarazmian royal dynasty by marriage. It was on this occasion that Tekish wedded the Oran princess who allegedly bore him the future Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad and who is known to posterity as Terken Khatun (a title borne
by the chief wife of more than one Khwārazmshāh). The alliance, of which we learn most from the head of Tekish’s secretariat (diwān al-inshā’), brought large numbers of Qipchaq into his service. Juwaynī confirms that Oran tribesmen served Tekish as a’jamīs (‘aliens’), and Terken Khatun’s numerous kinsmen would occupy high military and administrative office during Muḥammad’s reign, when she had her own establishment in Khwārazm and ruled there in virtual autonomy. Qipchaq troops played a significant role in Muḥammad’s conquest of the Ghurid territories and his operations against other rulers. An allusion to the ‘sons of Yūghūrs’ among the followers of Alp Qara points to the close links between the Oran and the forest peoples of western Siberia, the fur-trading Yūrā (Yughra) of classical Muslim geographers. The rapacious and brutal conduct of the Khwarazmian auxiliaries, among whom the ‘Yughūrs’ at least were almost certainly not Muslim converts, contributed greatly to the image of Khwarazmian tyranny right down to the 1240s.

We cannot be certain that Qadir- (or Qayir-) Buqu Khan, against whom Tekish headed a disastrous campaign beyond Sighnāq and Jand in the late winter of 591/1194–5, is identical with Terken Khatun’s father. But his subjects too belonged to the Oran, and the clash may have underlain Tekish’s severely strained relations with Terken Khatun that Jūzjānī ascribes purely to the Khwārazmshāh’s liaison with a slave girl. Unable to trust the Oran in his army, who on one occasion deserted him at a critical juncture, Tekish was reduced to supporting Qadir-Buqu’s nephew Alp Direk, against his uncle. Qadir-Buqu was overthrown and captured, only to be released almost at once and, as a client prince bound by solemn undertakings, despatched with a large force against his nephew. Alp Direk was in turn defeated. Such was the political reality behind the last element in the title ‘Sultan of Iraq, Khurāsān and Turkistān’ that Tekish received from the ’Abbasid Caliph al-Nāṣir around the same time. His son and successor Muḥammad later had to deal with disaffection by Qadir-Buqu Khan’s people that coincided with his victorious campaign against the Qara-Khitai in c. 607/1210. It is not inconceivable that this episode, of which we know nothing further, lay at the root of Muḥammad’s difficulties with his mother and with the Oran/Qangli elements among his forces at the height of the Mongol invasion.

The ethnic labels employed by our sources are fluid. Nasawī calls Terken Khatun’s people the Baya’ut (a tribe of which part had migrated west while the remainder were still domiciled in Mongolia when Temüjin, the future Chinggis Khan, rose to power) and classes them as a branch of the Yemek; and in similar vein Jūzjānī appears to equate the Ölberli with the Yemek.
This is a variant form of Kimek, a major tribal grouping which, as we saw, had occupied much of the north-western Asiatic steppe and adjacent forest areas down to the eleventh century, when it had disintegrated under pressure from the advancing Qipchaq in the course of the ‘Qūn migration’ and had largely passed under Qipchaq leadership. The term Yemek seems to have had a still wider application, since Jūzjānī, when recounting the appearance in the western steppes of Chinggis Khan’s fleeing Merkit enemies, calls their leader ‘Qadir Khan, son of Toqtoqan [Toqto’a] the Yemek.’

The rise of the Mongols in the eastern steppes

Another, even broader, designation employed by Muslim authors for the infidel nomads of the eastern steppes was ‘Tatar’. In the mid-eleventh century the account of the Turkic peoples furnished by Gardīzī had included a folktale that (inaccurately) made the Kimek a branch of the Tatars. In its narrowest sense this was the name of a quite distinct tribe in Mongolia, which in the latter half of the twelfth century was used by the Jurchen-Jin dynasty as an instrument of indirect control over the steppe and which would be conquered and virtually annihilated in 1202 by Temüjin. Rashīd al-Dīn makes tantalizing allusions to an earlier epoch in which the Tatars, seemingly, had dominated the eastern steppes and the great majority of Turkic peoples had adopted their name, much as in his own day they had assumed the name ‘Mongol’. He explains on these historical grounds the readiness of other nations to identify Chinggis Khan’s Mongols as Tatars; and the explanation has been adopted by at least one modern author. ‘Tatar’ (subsequently corrupted to ‘Tartar’ in the Christian West) would be the name by which the Mongols were most commonly known in the Islamic world.

Like the diverse tribal movements that had constituted the ‘Qūn migration’, the process whereby peoples of Turkic and possibly also Tungusic ethnicity came together with those of Mongol origin in the centuries prior to Temüjin’s birth, to form a recognizably ‘Mongol nation’, is almost totally hidden from us. We are more fortunate, however, with regard to the displacements engendered by the rise of Temüjin and his assertion of Mongol paramountcy in the eastern Asiatic steppe. These profound political changes have recently been linked to climatic developments in Mongolia: several years of drought in the 1180s, occasioning acute conflict among the nomadic tribes and the collapse of the existing order; and a prolonged period of warm and unusually wet weather from 1211 to 1225, increasing the productivity of the grasslands and making possible a greatly
enhanced concentration of military resources. Whatever the case, the emergence of the empire is detailed for us not only by the Muslim authors Juwaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn but also by our sole extant Mongolian source, the Mongghol‘un niucha tobcha’an, the ‘Secret History of the Mongols’.

In the latter decades of the twelfth century, the Mongols were merely one minor people among those inhabiting the region that now bears their name. They may have established a stronger polity towards the middle of the century, but it was short-lived. By the time of Temüjin’s birth (the most likely date is 1162) they were politically fragmented; and indeed their weakness and poverty at this stage would still be a byword during the imperial epoch. The dominant regional powers were the Tatars, centred on the Buyur Nor and the Kūlün Nor, in eastern Mongolia, and closely allied with the empire of the Jurchen-Jin; the Merkit, a mainly forest-dwelling people to the south-east of Lake Baikal; the Önggüt, centred on the present-day Ordos region; the Kereyit (Kerait), who inhabited the valleys of the Orqon and the Tula rivers; and the Naiman, whose lands lay in the upper Irtysh basin and on the slopes of the Altai mountains. The political sophistication and cohesion of these groups varied. Whereas the Tatars and the Merkit were relatively loosely organized, the Önggüt, the Kereyit and the Naiman possessed some kind of hierarchy and administrative structure, headed by a dynasty of hereditary khans.

Following the murder of his father Yesügei by the Tatars in c. 1170, Temüjin (then aged about nine), his mother and his siblings were abandoned by their kinsfolk and obliged to exchange the pastoralist lifestyle for that of forest-dwellers. The young man’s fortunes improved only when he accumulated a loyal following of sworn ‘companions’ (nököd, sing. nökör), of heterogeneous tribal origins, and attached himself to his father’s old friend and blood-brother (anda), Toghril (Tooril), khan of the Kereyit. With Toghril’s aid he defeated or won over his relatives and attained some kind of leadership over the Mongols. The two allies then induced the Jin government to abandon the Tatars, whom they subsequently crushed; Temüjin avenged his father by presiding over the slaughter of nearly all of the tribe’s adult males. Toghril received from the Jin the title of prince (Ch. wang; hence the style ‘Ong Khan’ by which he is often known); Temüjin, the lesser title of ja’ut-quri.

But although their alliance had become so close that Toghril had recognized Temüjin as his successor, thereby disinheriting his own son Senggüm, the two men fell out, and in the ensuing hostilities Temüjin vanquished the Kereyit in turn (1203). Toghril was killed while fleeing through Naiman territory, and his sons were dispersed. The Mongol leader
next turned first against a section of the Naiman (1204) and then against the Merkit. After the majority of both tribes had been incorporated into the nascent Mongol empire, an assembly (quriltai) of tribal leaders in 1206 proclaimed Temüjin sovereign, in the words of the ‘Secret History’, over ‘the people of the felt-walled tents’, with the Mongolian title Chinggis Khan. The title probably meant ‘Hard/Severe Khan’, and not ‘World Ruler’ as was once thought, and would thus correspond semantically to the Turkish title Qadir Khan found among the Qarakhanids and other steppe groups.

There is little doubt, however, that the new emperor was already claiming some kind of hegemony over the nomadic peoples as a whole and reviving the Turkic imperial tradition that had lain in abeyance in the eastern steppe since the collapse of the Uighur empire in 840. An important component of this tradition was the notion of ‘good fortune’ (Tu. qut; Mo. suu) vouchsafed by the sky (tenggeri, often misleadingly rendered as ‘Heaven’) and conferred upon a charismatic clan that had the sole right to rule. The base camp that Chinggis Khan selected for his great westward campaign in 1218 was the district in the Orqon valley later centred on the town of Qaraqorum, which was close both to the ötügen-yish or ‘sacred centre’ of the sixth–seventh-century Turks and to Qara Balghasun, the residence of the eighth–ninth-century Uighur qaghas. The European missionary William of Rubruck (1255) confirms that the Mongols regarded it as ‘royal’.

The yeke monghol ulus (‘Great Mongol State’) created by Chinggis Khan represents an advance on the polities forged by his precursors, in ideological as well as in administrative terms (the latter theme will receive closer examination in chapter 4). Whereas the imperial ideology of the steppe had previously been confined to rule only over nomadic populations, the Mongols would come to articulate the claim that Tenggeri had bestowed upon the Chinggisids sovereignty over the entire world. Chinggis Khan’s empire was also to prove more cohesive than its predecessors. At its heart was his household and personal guard (keshig), which according to the ‘Secret History’ he created in 1204, on the eve of the campaign against the Naiman, and increased two years later to 10,000 men. The keshig, whose members were tasked not merely with their master’s security and his personal and household needs but with administrative responsibilities, was quite simply the nucleus of the imperial government. It comprised Chinggis Khan’s own nököd – déracinés whose promotion rested not on birth or status within their tribe but on ability and whose primary loyalty was to himself and the dynasty he founded – and the
sons or younger kinsmen of his officers and of tribal leaders (for whose loyalty they might serve as hostages).

While retaining the decimal system of military organization found in previous Inner Asian polities, Chinggis Khan took care to disperse those tribes that were politically the most advanced, and which had offered the most strenuous resistance, among new decimal units commanded by men from other tribes, who had acquired their experience and training in his *keshig*.\footnote{121} He further centralized the distribution of booty, so that a significant portion went to the rank and file instead of clan elders, and thereby held out the promise of enhanced social mobility.\footnote{122} By these means he checked the centrifugal forces that had come into play during the decline of earlier nomadic empires, whereby existing tribal groups simply broke away and asserted their autonomy. It is noteworthy that when the Mongol empire fragmented after two generations it was along dynastic/geopolitical, not tribal, lines and that Chinggisids continued to reign unchallenged over the successor-states, in every case until at least the mid-fourteenth century and in some regions (such as Transoxiana, with intervals, Kazakhstan and the Crimea) as late as the eighteenth century. Even when effective power was appropriated by Turco-Mongol amirs from the mid-fourteenth century, it was due not to any hierarchical position in their tribe but to their role within the Chinggisid state;\footnote{123} and they still felt it incumbent upon them to maintain a puppet Chinggisid khan, as for instance would Temür in late fourteenth-century Chaghadayid Transoxiana or Edigü in the early fifteenth-century Golden Horde (below, pp. 384–8).

The Mongols were ready to borrow, and to learn from, their enemies and their subjects. The Kereyit military included a ‘centre’ (Tu.-Mo. *qol*), a guard unit made up of elements recruited (and detached) from their own tribes, whose allegiance was focused on the khan; it provided not merely the inspiration for Chinggis Khan’s own *keshig* but its core.\footnote{124} The Naiman khan had a rudimentary secretariat that issued documents in the Uighur script, authenticating them with a seal: its head, the Uighur *Tatar Tonga* (Ch. *Tata Tonga*), whose responsibilities included the management of taxation, would pass into Chinggis Khan’s service after 1204 and teach the conqueror’s sons the Uighur script.\footnote{125} This marked the birth of the Mongol imperial chancery, two years before the recognition of the conqueror’s paramount status. The ultimatums issued to foreign powers under Chinggis Khan’s successors were in Mongolian but contained a preamble, significantly, in Turkish.\footnote{126}

The campaigns in the eastern steppes had brought under Mongol rule a great many peoples; but important elements of two of them – the Merkit
and the Naiman – were dislodged and fled westwards in the wake of Temüjin’s decisive victory over the Naiman Tayang Khan in 1204.\textsuperscript{127} At first both Toqto’a Beki, the ruler of the Merkit, together with his sons, and Tayang Khan’s son, Güchülüg, took refuge with Tayang’s brother Buyuruq Khan on the Black Irtysch. Here fresh Mongol operations in 1208–9 ended in the defeat and death of Buyuruq Khan and not long afterwards of Toqto’a Beki.

Chinggis Khan’s victories attracted supporters within the empire of the Qara-Khitai who had become increasingly alienated by its exactions. The most important of them, Barchuq, the iduq-qut of the Uighurs of Beshbaligh, sent him a message of submission and killed the Qara-Khitai representative at his court. When Toqto’a Beki’s sons sought asylum in Barchuq’s territory, he repulsed them, possibly with Mongol aid, and they fled to join the Qipchaq-Qangli, pursued by Chinggis Khan’s commanders (noyad; sing. noyan) Jebe and Sübe’edei. As a reward for these services, the iduq-qut was recognized as Chinggis Khan’s ‘fifth son’ and given a Mongol princess in marriage.\textsuperscript{128} Around the same time, the Mongol conqueror acquired his first Muslim vassals. Qilich Qara – described as ‘sultan’ of Kūsān (Kūcha) and presumably therefore a Muslim prince of Uighur extraction – had rendered Chinggis Khan a useful service by killing the fugitive Kereyit prince Senggüm, and marked his submission to the conqueror by sending him Senggüm’s wife and children.\textsuperscript{129} Ismā’il, the Qara-Khitai basqaq of Kāsān, surrendered his city to Jebe and would subsequently take part in the capture of Güchülüg.\textsuperscript{130} The two most valuable Muslim adherents, however, were Arslan Khan of the Qarluq, who signalled his revolt, as the iduq-qut had done, by killing the Gür-khan’s resident (shīḥna), and Buzar (or Ozar), the parvenu ruler of Almaligh.\textsuperscript{131}

Güchülüg, after briefly seeking shelter with Arslan Khan, took refuge at the Gür-khan’s court. Many of his Naiman followers had dispersed into the regions of Emil, Qayaligh and Beshbaligh, and rejoined him only after his fortunes revived within the Qara-Khitai empire, thereby enabling him to usurp its throne.\textsuperscript{132} On the heels of the fleeing Merkit princes, Jebe and Sübe’edei penetrated Qangli territory, where in 1209 (or early in 1210) the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad b. Tekish had recently repulsed an influx of Merkit intruders, pursuing them, according to Jūzjānī, far to the north where the sun did not set.\textsuperscript{133} He now fought an inconclusive engagement with Chinggis Khan’s commanders soon after they had annihilated the principal Merkit force on the Chu river.\textsuperscript{134}

In this fashion, upheavals in the eastern steppes stimulated a fresh wave of migrations and major shifts in the regional balance of power,
and the pressing need to eliminate bands of fugitives as a potential danger drew Chinggis Khan and his forces into western regions already destabilized by the passage of his enemies. At this time the Mongols and their nomadic prey alike would have appeared to the Islamic world merely as different contingents of ‘Tatars’, a perception still visible a generation or more later in the terminology of Muslim authors writing as outsiders, beyond the bounds of the Mongol oecumene. Jūzjānī refers to the Merkit leader as a Tatar at one point;135 and he, Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Naẓīf al-Ḥamawī and Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd all similarly label the Naiman Güchülüg and his followers as Tatars.136

**Cultural dissonances**

Life in the steppe by no means rendered the pastoralists unmindful of the attractions of the agrarian and urban worlds. They lacked access to metals in adequate quantities to enable them to manufacture arms and required other products – including luxury goods – that only sedentary societies produced. The Chinese authorities were usually careful to restrict trade with the nomads in vital commodities and, often ineffectively, to interdict traffic in war materials.137 Nomadic peoples in turn had learned to exploit their location athwart the major trade routes that crossed the steppes and to furnish protection for merchants in exchange for a share of the profits. As we have noticed, they were ready to borrow the technologies developed within more sophisticated societies, such as the literate skills of the Uighurs. Some of their leaders had personally experienced life within such polities: Toghril/Ong Khan of the Kereyit had spent a year in exile in the Qara-Khitai empire, while the young Temüjin himself possibly passed ten years as a prisoner among the Jurchen-Jin.138

This is not to say, however, that the Inner Asian peoples brought under Chinggis Khan’s authority were ready to embrace the urban or agrarian existence. Pastoralists had long been wary of the seductive lure of sedentary civilization that threatened to sap the roots of their military vigour. An early eighth-century Türk qaghan had been dissuaded from building cities on precisely those grounds, and as recently as the 1070s Maḥmūd al-Kāshghārī had quoted a Turkish proverb that warned against adopting the way of life of the Persians (that is, presumably, the sedentary life).139 Nor did the pastoralist and the forest-dweller necessarily have much in common. Writing some decades after the Mongol conquest, Rashid al-Dīn describes how the ‘Forest’ Uriyangqat, who clothed themselves in animal skins and lived by hunting mountain oxen, mountain rams and
antelopes, looked askance at sedentary folk, imagining their lifestyle to be a torment, but equally despised sheep-rearers.\textsuperscript{140} It has been proposed that we should see attitudes of this kind – sometimes transmitted, of course, through representatives of sedentary culture – as evidence of an ideological stance rather than symptomatic of everyday behaviour.\textsuperscript{141} But fear of abandoning the tradition of the steppe, and abhorrence of acculturation to the lifestyle of the settled peoples, are themes that we shall encounter again in this book.

* * *

By the eve of the first Mongol attacks, then, the eastern Islamic world had grown accustomed to playing off steppe nomads against one another; it had witnessed the influx – whether en masse, as conquerors, or as auxiliaries – of newly Islamized nomads; for the past eight decades or so, it had been adjusting, in some degree, to the subjection of Muslim territory by a major infidel steppe power. Yet not even experience of the Qara-Khitai – the heirs of a dynasty that had ruled parts of northern China for over two centuries and had in large measure absorbed Chinese culture – had prepared the sedentary Muslim societies of Transoxiana, Khwārazm, Iran and present-day Afghanistan for the advent of Chinggis Khan’s Mongols. It is certainly true that, in marked contrast with the Christian peoples of Europe (who were reduced to explaining the Mongol invasion almost entirely in terms derived from their Scriptures, from venerable but unreliable works of the early Christian centuries or from apocalyptic prediction),\textsuperscript{142} Muslims had at least some hazy awareness of the tracts from which the Mongols had emerged. A sprinkle of long-distance traders over the centuries had left the Dar al-Islam to visit the more easterly regions of Asia. According to Juwaynī (who probably exaggerates the number), Chinggis Khan, his sons and his noyans were able to assemble in Mongolia some 450 Muslims for the ill-fated trading mission that was snuffed out by the Khwārazmshāh’s governor at Uṯrār.\textsuperscript{143} Contemporary Muslim observers, even if they resorted to apocalyptic prophecy, accordingly knew enough to accommodate the newcomers within a more or less realistic geographical and ethnographic framework. Many were content to label the Mongols simply as ‘Turks’,\textsuperscript{144} much as Jūzjānī did the Qara-Khitai. For Ibn al-Athīr, the Tatars were ‘a numerous variety of the Turks’.\textsuperscript{145} In the case of the Mongols the equation drew support from the fact that so many of the steppe nomads rolled up in Chinggis Khan’s war-machine were of Turkic stock. One of the earliest writers within the Dar al-Islam to mention the Mongol assault on Western Asia – a Coptic Christian chronicler in Egypt – takes a different view, however, calling their
leader the ‘king of China (malik al-Ṣīn)’ and including in his armies the ‘Qiṭā’ as well as the Qipchaq\textsuperscript{146} (whether ‘Qiṭā’ here denoted Chinese or, as is more likely, [Qara-] Khitai is uncertain). But perceptions of this kind, situating an unknown and fearsome race within a comfortingly familiar context, would not render the initial impact of Chinggis Khan’s invasion any less cataclysmic.
1. Asia on the eve of Chinggis Khan's expedition to the west
Following the reduction of the nomadic tribes of the eastern steppe, Chinggis Khan’s primary objective was the Jurchen-Jin empire in northern China. It has been suggested that his aim was to obtain favourable trading conditions with the empire and that he was compelled to resort to warfare through Jin intransigence. But we should not forget that in the mid-twelfth century the Jin emperor had been hostile to the Mongols and responsible for subjecting at least one captured Mongol chieftain, a kinsman of Chinggis Khan, to a humiliating and gruesome death. Rashid al-Dīn expressly mentions his desire for vengeance on the Jin for that offence; and this is what we should have expected, given the prominent role played by vengeance in Mongolian society and the treatment Chinggis Khan had meted out to the Tatars for having killed his father.

At first, the war against the Jurchen-Jin, which would end only with the elimination of the last vestiges of the Jin state in 1234, seven years after Chinggis Khan’s death, went well. Reports of the fall in 1215 of the empire’s capital, Zhongdu (close to the modern site of Beijing), even reached Western Asia. Envoys from the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad b. Tekish, who visited the city on a reconnaissance mission, reported that the terrain outside was greasy with human fat and marked by vast heaps of bones; one pile close to the walls of the citadel indicated where young women had leapt from the battlements to avoid falling into Mongol hands. Such at any rate is the testimony of Jūzjānī, who cites directly one of the Khwarazmian ambassadors. According to a contemporary witness, many of the Khwārazmshāh’s Muslim subjects, already intimidated by rumours of the rise of the Mongols and of their conquests, had abandoned their homes in flight during the two years preceding the invasion of Transoxiana. There is no doubt that the eastern
Islamic world was well informed regarding the progress of the formidable new power that had arisen beyond its borders.

**The grounds for the conflict with the Khwārazmshāh**

Chinggis Khan's assault upon the Islamic world is open to a variety of explanations, and even our primary sources are not unanimous. The immediate cause of the conflict, as sources more or less contemporary with the cataclysm make clear, was the massacre at Uṭrār of a group of merchant-envoys who had arrived from Mongol territory. Terken Khatun's nephew Inalchuq, entitled Ghayir (or Qadir) Khan, who governed Uṭrār on Muḥammad's behalf, reported that the envoys' purpose was espionage and that they were spreading alarming rumours about Mongol power. So runs the fullest account, furnished by Nasawī. This explanation had the merit of casting some of the blame on the hated Oran/Qangli elements in the Khwārazmshāh's service. The main sources agree that Inalchuq was motivated by greed for the convoy's rich merchandise, and that the Khwārazmshāh sanctioned, either in advance or retrospectively, the outrage that followed. They further indicate that Muḥammad put to death at least one of the envoys who brought Chinggis Khan's demand for reparation. As subsequent events confirmed, the Mongols were extremely sensitive to the treatment of their ambassadors, and the Franciscan Carpini reports that they never made peace with any people who had killed their envoys but would exact vengeance on them. The requirement of vengeance goes some way to explain the conduct of Chinggis Khan's seven-year campaign into Western Asia.

I. P. Petrushevsky challenged this representation of events, and the ascription of blame to Inalchuq, on the strength of a fresh investigation of the available source material. As he pointed out, the Mongols are known to have used envoys both for espionage and to spread disinformation and sow panic among their enemies. According to Juwaynī's account, moreover, the merchants concerned, totalling 450 Muslims, were dependants of Chinggis Khan's sons and noyans, selected personally for the mission. (Juwaynī, incidentally, makes no mention of the charge of espionage.) In Petrushevsky's view, responsibility for the outbreak of war rests ultimately with Chinggis Khan. One might add, nevertheless, that the use of traders as spies has been commonplace throughout history, and indeed Jūzjānī (citing an eyewitness and scarcely guilty of partiality towards the Mongols) has Muḥammad himself take the initiative by despatching a trading mission whose purpose was to report on the Mongols' strength (above, p. 71). It is unclear whether this is to be identified with the relatively small group of traders who in
Juwaynī’s version set out from the Khwarazmian empire for Mongolia of their own volition and thereby prompted Chinggis Khan’s commercial mission to the Khwārazmshāh.  

The threat to commerce was no less important, however, than espionage. War with Muḥammad would doubtless have arisen, in any case, as a consequence of his closure of the trade routes between his own dominions and the lands to the east (apparently in the wake of the conflict with Güchüülük) – as so often, in relations with the nomads, a belligerent act in itself.  

Juwaynī’s description of the trading mission that had prompted Chinggis Khan’s first embassy to Muḥammad gives prominence to luxury fabrics; and both Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn Naẓīf specifically mention the Khwārazmshāh’s withholding of textiles, which were in great demand by the Mongols. Over the centuries, the eastern nomads had customarily engaged in hostilities with China in order to secure improved trading conditions. Chinggis Khan’s concern to promote trade is evident from the safe conduct and armed protection he offered to merchants who visited his dominions. And when the ‘Secret History’ makes him speak of the severance of his ‘golden halter’ (altan arqamji) on hearing of the murder of his envoys, the phrase is less probably a metaphor for universal sovereignty than an allusion to a precious commerce. The distorted account known as the Relatio de Davide rege (‘The Account of King David’), which in 1221 reached the Fifth Crusade in Egypt, indicates that the Mongol advance followed the ‘Silk Road’. In light of this, the fate of the merchant-envoys, and then of the embassy sent to demand satisfaction, simply hastened the clash.  

We should also not forget the context of these events. For Jamāl al-Qarshī (c. 702/1303), what had originally prompted the conqueror’s westward advance was the attack on a client, Buzar, the ruler of Almaligh, by his old enemy, the Naiman prince Güchüülük, who had seized the throne of the Qara-Khitai empire; no allusion is made to provocation by the Khwārazmshāh. We might perhaps have expected this author to play up the centrality of Almaligh, his own home. Yet he reminds us that Güchüülük’s activities had claimed Chinggis Khan’s attention and had brought Mongol power to the very borders of Muḥammad’s dominions. No less significant is the casus belli mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn, namely the Khwārazmshāh’s seizure, following Güchüülük’s elimination by the Mongols, of virtually all the territory in Turkestan that Güchüülük had held.  

Some contemporaries believed that the Mongols had been summoned against Muḥammad by his bitter enemy, the ’Abbasid Caliph al-Nāṣir li-dīn Allāh (d. 622/1225). If, as Ibn al-Athīr asserts, these reports emanated from Persian Muslims, we might well dismiss them as Khwarazmian propaganda
and see them as akin to the accusation, two decades later in Christian Europe, that the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II had recruited the Mongols in his struggle with the Pope. In much the same way, rumour had charged Muḥammad’s ancestor, the Khwārazmshāh Atsiz, with summoning the Qara-Khitai against the Saljuq Sultan. Ibn al-Athīr himself, who at one point was too embarrassed to repeat the charge against al-Nāṣir, nevertheless appears to have given it some credence; so too did authors writing in the Near East a generation later. One of the Caliph’s allies, Jalāl al-Dīn Hasan, Master of the Niẓārī ʿIsmāʾīlīs (better known as the Assassins) of Alamūt, was also rumoured to have sent word to the Mongols prior to their invasion of the Islamic world and was allegedly the first ruler south of the Oxus to offer his submission (see further p. 91 below). We know that al-Nāṣir had incited the Ghurids against both Tekish and Muḥammad. If we can trust the Relatio de Davide, he may even have employed the Nestorian Catholicos Yahballāhā II as an intermediary in corresponding with the Qara-Khitai during the brief reign of the one-time Christian Güchülg, and the Khwārazmshāh Jalāl al-Dīn later claimed to have found letters from al-Nāṣir to the ‘Khitā’ (i.e. most probably the Qara-Khitai). Modern authors are divided on the question. Yet it must be said that the Caliph’s readiness to contact the Gür-khan renders it more likely that he had made overtures to the pagan Mongols.

A separate issue is the problem of Chinggis Khan’s aims at such a relatively early stage. As we have seen (p. 64), he already had imperial pretensions at the time of the quriltai of 1206. In time the Mongols came to view the entire world as their possession by virtue of a mandate conferred on the venerable conqueror by Tenggeri. This ideology would find expression in the ultimatums they addressed to independent powers, of which the earliest that have survived were brought back to Latin Europe in 1237 by the Hungarian Dominican Friar Julian and in 1247 by the envoys of Pope Innocent IV. For that reason, Barthold suggested that conflict between the Mongol sovereign and the Khwārazmshāh would have arisen sooner or later in any case, even without the Uṭrār incident. Now it is true that the ‘Secret History’ (which alone provides us with a directly Mongolian vantage point) speaks of Tenggeri increasing the young Temüjin’s power and granting him rulership over ‘the ulus’. But the context is leadership of the steppe nomads (described at another juncture as ‘the people of the felt-walled tents’: see p. 64); nothing is implied regarding dominion over the world at large. The eighth-century Türks had likewise embraced the idea of a sovereignty confined to the nomadic oecumene, which fell short of the political philosophy eventually embraced by the Mongols, although this
earlier imperial tradition would doubtless have been transmitted to them by their Uighur advisers. In Nasawī’s account, admittedly, Chinggis Khan offends Muḥammad by assuring him of an affection as great as he feels for ‘the dearest of his sons’; but we should perhaps read no more into this than an assumption of superiority on the part of the Mongol conqueror.

More importantly for our purposes, according to Juwaynī the Mongol commanders Jebe and Sübe’edei, appearing before Nīshāpūr in 617/1220, issued its representatives with a copy of an edict (yarligh) of Chinggis Khan, in which he claimed to have been given dominion over ‘all the face of the earth from the going up of the sun to its going down’ – a phrase that unmistakably evokes the later Mongol ultimatums. Although Juwaynī (writing, it must be recalled, as late as 658/1260) is possibly here reading back into the seven-year campaign a more recent protocol, the anachronism could well be only a marginal one. There may indeed be some truth in Friar Julian’s statement that Chinggis Khan had first conceived of reducing the world in the wake of overthrowing the Khwārazmshāh – that is, when Muḥammad precipitately abandoned Transoxiana to its fate and neglected even to make a stand at the Oxus – or, in other words, that the Mongols, as David Morgan puts it, ‘came round to the idea when they found that they were, in fact, conquering the world’. The conquerors’ actions immediately following the reduction of Transoxiana hardly indicate that they saw their presence there as temporary. The ‘Secret History’ says that Chinggis Khan appointed governors for several towns (below, p. 108) and recruited two Muslim Turks, Maḥmūd Yalavach (Tu. yalavach, ‘ambassador’), here called Maḥmūd Qurumshi (‘the Khwarazmian’), and his son Masʿūd, with a view to learning about ‘the laws and customs of cities’. The Mongols even settled Chinese craftsmen in Samarqand.

An envoy from Song China who visited the Mongols in 1237 tells us that Chinggis Khan had deliberately postponed further campaigns against the Qipchaq until the Jurchen-Jin should have been overthrown. If correct, this would lend added support to the possibility that the conqueror himself had formed the ambition of reducing territory beyond the steppe. But whatever the truth, it is far from certain that the original decision to attack the Khwarazmian empire was inspired by a programme of world-conquest in fulfilment of Heaven’s mandate.

The Mongol campaigns in the eastern Islamic lands, 616–21/1219–24

Our four principal sources all yield detailed accounts of the Mongol conquests in Western Asia. Jūzjānī, an eyewitness of the Mongol reduction
of his homeland, Ghūr, naturally has most to say concerning the Mongol operations there and in adjacent regions of present-day Afghanistan; Nasawī is especially detailed on events in Khurāsān; and Ibn al-Athīr – his sources, as so often, unknown to us – provides a broad-based narrative. But it is Juwaynī, writing at a distance of almost four decades, who furnishes what appears to be the fullest survey of Chinggis Khan’s invasion of the Khwarazmian empire and in particular of the movements of the different Mongol armies. Juwaynī is accordingly (despite certain chronological and other confusions, and omissions such as a promised chapter on the fall of Herat) the best informed of all our principal sources.

It was necessary first of all to remove Gūchūlūg. A force under Chinggis Khan’s general Jebe, assisted by the Uighur iduq-qut, was deputed to hunt down the Naiman prince, who fled but was overtaken and killed in the Sariq Köl region of the Pamirs. The remnants of the Qara-Khitai empire – which within a few years had lost its western subordinate, the Khwārazmshāh, and its more easterly clients, the Uighurs and the Qarluq – fell to the Mongols with relative ease. Then, from a base on the Irtysh, where he had spent the summer of 616/1219, Chinggis Khan, accompanied by his four sons by his chief wife, moved against his rival of more recent standing.

Possibly unnerved by an earlier clash between his forces and those of Chinggis Khan (p. 66) and further cautioned by astrological predictions against an encounter with the invaders, the Khwārazmshāh opted not to meet the Mongols in the field. Instead, he divided the bulk of his forces as garrisons throughout the towns of Transoxiana and retired south of the Oxus; subsequently, when crossing the river, he abandoned the remainder of his army, dispersing the troops, in Juwaynī’s words, ‘throughout the fortresses and the provinces (qilā’-u biqā’).’ The policy was vehemently attacked by Muḥammad’s son Jalāl al-Dīn, would be condemned by Nasawī and has been criticized by historians down the ages. Conceivably the Khwārazmshāh feared that a pitched battle would deliver victory to the Mongols, and saw them as mere nomads who lacked the technology and the skills required for extensive siege warfare (see below, pp. 88–9), so that his tactics would oblige them to retire in frustration. But other considerations undoubtedly underlay his decision.

Muḥammad evidently distrusted his Oran/Qangli subordinates and their troops, who made up the majority of his armed forces and whom he suspected of partiality towards his mother Terken Khatun; around the time of his departure from Balkh, he would learn that they were conspiring to assassinate him. He may also have suspected these volatile elements of favouring the Mongols: Turkish garrison troops in Samarkand would
shortly surrender to the invaders in the (as it transpired, erroneous) belief that their lives would be spared because they were of the same race.41 Three years or so later, we find the Mongols appealing to a common steppe ethnicity in order to detach Qipchaq nomads from other enemies further west,42 and they may well have used this tactic previously. However impressive it appears on the map, moreover, Muḥammad’s empire was in reality a brittle edifice, comprising territories which, apart from Khwārazm, had been accumulated only recently. Transoxiana had been annexed within the past ten years; Ghūr and the rest of Afghanistan, within the past six. Relations between the Turks and the Tājiks were tense. The latter included Ghūrī officers and troops who until ten years previously had served Muḥammad’s Ghurid enemies in Khurāsān and present-day Afghanistan and upon whom the Khwārazmshāh could place as little reliance as on the Qangli. When the Qangli Yamīn (or Amīn) Malik was endeavouring to muster resistance to the Mongols in Afghanistan on behalf of Muḥammad’s son Jalāl al-Dīn in 618/1221, the governor of Ghazna would tell him: ‘We are Ghūrīs and you are Turks; we cannot live together.’43 Muḥammad’s acrimonious relations with the Caliph, and his bid in 614/1217–18 to supplant al-Nāṣir, which aroused opposition in Khurāsān, had further undermined his standing in the eyes of the Sunnī religious establishment within his dominions – and hence his capacity to appeal for support in a holy war against the infidel.44

Resistance to the Mongols varied considerably from one location to another; and we shall examine that resistance, and its consequences, in chapter 6. For the moment it should be noted that the Khwārazmshāh’s decision to distribute his forces among the towns of Transoxiana and Khurāsān was not merely fatal because it rendered the empire acephalous or because the Mongols were spared the necessity of a pitched battle and were able to pick off the urban centres one by one. It is of course arguable that Chinggis Khan’s army might have emerged victorious from a field encounter and that the urban populations would have been bereft of protection. In comparison with what did transpire, however, that outcome would have been beneficial, since the towns would then have been compelled to surrender without a struggle; whereas Muḥammad’s strategy of concentrating troops in large garrisons tended to encourage more strenuous and protracted defiance and thereby to exacerbate the wrath of the invaders.

The Mongol attack on the Khwarazmian empire was four-pronged. On arriving at Uṭrār, Chinggis Khan himself, accompanied by his youngest son Tolui, moved on the heart of Muḥammad’s possessions in Transoxiana. He left his two middle sons, Chaghadai and Ögödei, to prosecute the siege of Uṭrār while sending the eldest, Jochi, to deal with the towns on the lower
Sir-daryā and despatching upstream another force of 5,000 men to capture Khujand and Fanākat (Banākat). Uṭrār, deserted by the reinforcements that Muḥammad had sent to its assistance, fell after a prolonged investment and Inalchuq, who had defied the attackers until the very end, was captured alive. From Uṭrār Chaghadai and Ögödei rejoined their father at Samarqand, taking with them Inalchuq, who was there executed by the gruesome method of having molten metal poured into his eyes, ears and mouth. Jochi, who had meanwhile occupied Sighnāq, Üzkand, Barchinlīkhkent and Jand, withdrew into the Qara-Qum steppe, possibly to prevent the Oran/Qangli from providing reinforcements for the Khwārazmshāh or a refuge for fleeing Khwarazmian troops.

Learning at Uṭrār of the strength of the defences of Samarqand, Chinggis Khan had instead headed for Bukhārā, where he arrived at the beginning of 617/1220. The city surrendered, possibly because its walls, as Ibn Naẓīf was told, were dilapidated; but the citadel held out and was eventually taken by an assault in which the citizens had been obliged to participate. The Mongol sovereign then moved to Samarqand, accompanied by a numerous levy from Bukhārā, to be employed as arrow-fodder. After the failure of a foolhardy sortie, apparently by the citizens, Samarqand capitulated at the instigation of the clergy. Some of the troops had broken through to safety, but the garrison of the citadel held out for a time, only to be massacred following their surrender. According to Jūzjānī, Samarqand was taken on 10 Muḥarram/17 March.

Initially Chinggis Khan, who at Uṭrār had learned of Muḥammad's strained relations with his mother, affected good will towards Terken Khatun in Khwārazm itself, sending an embassy with the reassuring message that his quarrel was only with her son and offering peace. But given her reliance upon Qangli tribesmen, whom the Mongols would now have seen as enemies, this profession was surely hollow; and Terken Khatun was sufficiently unconvinced by his overtures to abandon Khwārazm in flight for Māzandarān (although Juwaynī claims that she was responding to orders issued by Muḥammad as he crossed the Oxus). Chinggis Khan thereupon despatched Chaghadai and Ögödei against Gurgānj, ordering Jochi to send troops from Jand to assist in the attack. In contrast with the populace of Samarqand the inhabitants, according to Ibn al-Athīr, mounted a ferocious resistance, so that the Mongols were able to take the city only by dint of hand-to-hand fighting in every street. Chaghadai and Ögödei then rejoined their father.

Following the capture of Samarqand, Chinggis Khan spent the spring and summer in Transoxiana. Prior to the advent of the cold season, he
presided over the storming of Tirmidh and then moved east to winter, apparently, in present-day Tajikistan; from here contingents were sent to reduce Badakhshān. Towards the end of the winter of 1220–1 he crossed the Oxus and received the surrender of Balkh. At Ṭāliqān, where the citadel, known as Naṣr-Kūh, held out vigorously, news reached him of the defeat of the Mongol general Tekechük by Muḥammad’s son Jalāl al-Dīn (below, p. 80). Chinggis Khan thereupon left his officers to maintain the siege and himself moved to Ghazna. From this juncture he was distracted by the need to deal with Jalāl al-Dīn and played no further part in the Mongol subjugation of Khurāsān. That task was executed by two of his generals and by his youngest son Tolui.

Already, at Samarqand, Chinggis Khan had learned of the Khwārazmshāh’s flight from Balkh towards Nīshāpūr and had despatched in pursuit a body of 20,000 or 30,000 horse under his commanders Jebe and Sübe’edei, who crossed the Oxus, according to Jūzjānī, in Rabī’ I 617/May–June 1220.53 From Balkh, several months later, the conqueror also despatched his son Tolui into Khurāsān. That both the division headed by Jebe and Sübe’edei and the larger force under Tolui had been levied proportionately from the entire Mongol army in Western Asia, in the latter case on the basis of one man in ten,54 may indicate the importance Chinggis Khan attached to the reduction of Muḥammad’s extensive territories south of the Oxus. At this stage he could not perhaps have foreseen that the Khwarazmian regime here, as in Transoxiana, would rapidly collapse.

Receiving the submission of Balkh, Sarakhs and Nīshāpūr, Jebe and Sübe’edei divided their forces, Jebe moving on Māzandarān and his colleague towards Jām and Ṭūs.55 The Mongols secured Terken Khatun, her grandchildren and members of Muḥammad’s harem, who had taken refuge in a fortress in Māzandarān. Terken Khatun was sent as a prisoner to Chinggis Khan at Ṭāliqān, whence she was despatched to Mongolia; Juwaynī would learn that she had died at Qaraqorum in 630/1232–3.56 But the two generals, who appear to have rejoined forces at Rayy, never caught up with their chief quarry; the Khwārazmshāh’s experiences had severely impaired his health, and he died on an island off the Caspian coast, probably at the beginning of October 1220. Unaware of this, they continued to push westwards, by way of Zanjān and Qazwīn, according to Ibn al-Athīr.57 They obtained the submission of the Eldegüzid atabeg of Azerbaijan, although one of his towns, Marāgha, was sacked. From here Mongol detachments penetrated northern Iraq, briefly threatening Irbil and provoking a short-lived coalition on the part of its ruler Muẓaffar al-Dīn Kökbüri, Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, atabeg of Mosul, and the Caliph al-Nāṣir.58 After defeating the army
of the Christian kingdom of Georgia and ravaging its territory, Jebe and Sübe'dedei made their way through Müghān and Shīrwān and crossed the Caucasus. They crushed the Alans (the Ossetes, known to the Muslims as the Ās), and entered the Pontic steppe, where they defeated a body of Qipchaq and their Rus’ allies on the river Kalka (1223), before heading east to rejoin Chinggis Khan on his homeward march.

Tolui’s operations were apparently designed to consolidate the achievements of the two generals in the course of their rapid passage through Khurāsān. Sending detachments of his army against numerous towns in north-western Khurāsān, listed by Juwaynī as Abīward, Nasā, Yazīr, Ṭūs, Jājarm, Juwayn, Bayhaq, Khwāf, Sanjān (Sangān) and Zūrābād, Tolui himself took in succession Merv, Nīshāpūr and Herat. Nīshāpūr had furnished provisions for the vanguard of Jebe and Sübe’dedei and shortly afterwards, on 1 Rabī’ II 617/5 June 1220, for Jebe and his main force; the general left orders for the garrison to dismantle the walls. Misled, however, by false rumours of Khwarazmian victories further west, they repeatedly failed to comply. Tolui’s vanguard under Chinggis Khan’s son-in-law Toghachar reached Nīshāpūr in mid-Ramaḍān 617/November 1220. But the Mongol army retired when Toghachar was killed by an arrow from the battlements two days later; and it was not until the spring of 618/1221 that Tolui was able to turn his attention to Nīshāpūr, arriving unexpectedly and intimidating the defenders by the size of his forces. A request for quarter was rejected, and despite fierce resistance a breach was made in the city walls on 14 Ṣafar/9 April; Nīshāpūr fell on the following day, and its population was massacred. Having reduced Herat, Tolui rejoined his father in time to assist in the capture of Ṭāliqān.

In the meantime, Chinggis Khan had concentrated his attention on Jalāl al-Dīn. The prince had been warmly welcomed at Ghazna, the centre of his own appanage comprising the former Ghurid territories, and had swiftly established his power-base there, attracting to his banner some 60,000 Ghūris, Türkmen and Khalaj tribesmen. He was thereby able to defeat not only an advance force under Tekechük and Molghor, but a larger army commanded by Chinggis Khan’s adopted son, Shigi Qutuqu, at Parwān. Stung, presumably, by these first – and, as it transpired, last – reverses at Khwarazmian hands, the conqueror moved from Ṭāliqān in the direction of Ghazna. En route his forces paused to take Bāmiyān, where his favourite grandson Mőetügen perished during the siege. Chinggis Khan caught up with Jalāl al-Dīn on the banks of the Indus. In a hard-fought engagement that Nasawī dates 8 Shawwāl 618/24 November 1221, the Khwarazmian forces were annihilated, but Jalāl al-Dīn escaped by swimming across
the river. He would spend a total of three years in India before returning to Iran.61

After wintering in the Kurramān region, Chinggis Khan contemplated a homeward journey by way of the Himalayan foothills and Assam, according to Juwaynī, but abandoned the plan in view of the absence of a road. He therefore retraced his steps to Peshawar and from there passed the summer of 619/1222 in the mountains of Baghlān, recrossing the Oxus at the onset of autumn. Having spent the next winter in the neighbourhood of Samarqand, in the following spring he held a quriltai by the banks of the Sir-daryā, which was attended by his sons, including Jochi, who died not long afterwards. The conqueror passed the summer in the steppes of Qulan-bashi (the plain between the basins of the Aris and Talas rivers) before setting out on the final stages of his return; he reached his Mongolian homeland in the spring of 621/1224. The next few years were taken up with punishing the Tangut (Xi Xia), whose ruler had declined to furnish troops for the western campaigns; though in the event Chinggis Khan died in Ramaḍān 624/August 1227, just a few weeks before the Tangut state was annihilated. There followed an interregnum of two years before a quriltai in the Mongolian homeland, attended by members of the imperial dynasty and their principal officials and military commanders, decided on the succession of his third son, Ögödei (r. 1229–41). Ögödei assumed, not the Mongolian title ‘khan’ borne by his father (and by his brothers), but the imperial Turkish title of qaghan (qa’an), doubtless owing to the strong influence of Uighur advisers in the administration and also reflecting the preponderance of Turks among the empire’s nomadic elite and its military forces.62 For Igor de Rachewiltz, this marks ‘the beginning of the real transformation of a tribal federation … into a conquering state’ and the campaigns that Ögödei launched entitle him to be regarded as ‘the true founder of the empire.’63

**Mongol operations in Western Asia during the period 1229–52**

After three turbulent years in the western Punjab, Jalāl al-Dīn had left a contingent of troops to guard his conquests there and returned to Iran by way of the Makrān desert and Kirmān. He rallied old servitors of his dynasty and their forces and soon manifested the design of recreating his father’s empire (in western Iran, at least), though less at any cost to the Mongols than at the expense of the Christian Georgians and of fellow Muslim dynasts. The latter included his own half-brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn Pir Shāh and the Eldegüzids, whose rule in Azerbaijan and Arrān he terminated in
622/1225 (but see below, pp. 244, 249) without substituting for it anything durable; his confrontations with the Saljuqs of Rûm and the Ayyubids were less successful. His only positive action against the Mongols was an inconclusive engagement outside Iṣfahān in 625/1228 that nevertheless caused the enemy to raise the siege.64

Not until the quriltai of 1229 that enthroned Ögödei as emperor was it decided to despatch fresh troops from Mongolia to deal with the Khwarazmians. It is at this point that we first hear of the forces termed tamma – that is, garrison troops whose function was to take up residence in a frontier region.65 They were sometimes made up of groups from different ethnicities: az nasl-i digar, to use Rashīd al-Dīn’s phrase, like the corps he describes that comprised Uighurs, Qarluq, Türkmen and men from Kāshghar and Kûcha.66 The tammachi who arrived in western Iran were commanded by the general Chormaghun. A further contingent under Mônggedü, taking up position in the Qunduz-Baghlân region in what is now northern Afghanistan, would conduct operations in the Indian borderlands; though in the event the short-lived principality established in the western Punjab by Jalâl al-Dīn would be eliminated by the army of the Delhi Sultan Shams al-Dīn Ilutmish.67

Chormaghun was given overall command of all Mongol forces in southwestern Asia. En route through Iran, he appears to have headed an abortive invasion of Sīstān in 627/1230 and to have spent some time reducing some of the strongpoints in Khurāsān,68 a task continued by his lieutenant Chin Temür (pp. 108–9). His primary task was to eliminate Khwarazmian resistance. In Khurāsān, two of Jalâl al-Dīn’s former lieutenants, Qaracha and Yaghan Sonqur, were defeated by the Mongols under the deputy governor of the province, Kül Bolod, and forced to take refuge in the citadel of Sīstān; pursued by the general Dayir Noyan, they would presumably perish when he took the fortress in 632/1235.69 Chormaghun’s forces also seem to have occupied Rayy and Hamadān before advancing into Azerbaijan against Jalâl al-Dīn himself.70 Obliged to retreat before the Mongols, the last Khwārazmshâh was killed by a Kurdish brigand in 628/1231, and for the next fourteen years or so the body of some 15,000 Khwarazmian Qipchaq horsemen who had followed him carved out a base in the Jazīra (Mesopotamia) and hired themselves out to the highest bidder among the Muslim princes of the region. Following Jalâl al-Dīn’s elimination, all the cities of Azerbaijan yielded to the Mongols.71 Chormaghun established his headquarters in Azerbaijan, reducing to submission Greater Armenia (1236) and the Georgian kingdom (1238–9). His own military operations seem to have been largely confined to north-western Iran and the Transcaucasus region. He launched a series of
attacks against Iṣfahān in 627/1229–30 and reinforced the army that finally took the city in 633/1235–6.\(^72\) In 637/1239–40 caliphal envoys found him near Qazwīn.\(^73\)

Southern Iran also proved ready to acknowledge the Qaghan’s suzerainty. The Qara-Khitai amir Baraq Ḥājīb, whom Jalāl al-Dīn’s half-brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn Pīr Shāh had installed as his deputy in Kirmān, and the Salghurid atabeg of Fārs, eager to preserve his territories from the ordeals experienced by those of the Khwārazmshāh, both sent high-ranking representatives to Ögödei’s court and obtained confirmation of their title to rule.\(^74\) Since envoys from both kingdoms and from Luristān attended Gıyūg’s enthronement in 1246, and since the respective commissions granted to Arghun Aqa by Gıyūg, and by Möngke six years later, would include all three regions, it seems the Mongols regarded them as already part of the empire.\(^75\)

With the establishment of some degree of control over Iran, Mongol squadrons began to harass the towns of Iraq, which had escaped the earlier attentions of Jebe and Sübe’edei. Irbil had already been menaced in 633/1235–6. When the noyan Chaghadai ‘the Lesser’ took the city on 27 Shawwāl 634/23 June 1237, the citadel held out and was relieved by a caliphal army in Dhū l-Ḥijja/July–August.\(^76\) The Caliph al-Mustanṣir endeavoured to muster opposition to the Mongols. As Baghdad was itself threatened in Rajab 635/February 1238, he appealed to Muslim rulers for assistance. In the event, only troops from the Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt, al-Ḫāmil, numbering fewer than 2,000, reached Baghdad, and the caliphal forces suffered a signal defeat on 3 Dhū l-Qa’dā/17 June.\(^77\) The ‘Abbasid army may have been successful on other occasions. Visiting Baghdad over sixty years later, Waṣṣāf would hear how al-Mustanṣir had inflicted a reverse on Chormaghun’s troops outside the city walls; though the tale is suspect, since the Caliph is said to have had at his disposal 120,000 men.\(^78\) Whatever the case, there was a belief within the Mongol high command in 1255, on the eve of Hülegü’s attack, that the caliphal army was enormous (below, p. 128).

In 639/1241 Chormaghun fell victim to some kind of paralytic disease, and was replaced by his second-in-command, Baiju.\(^79\) Apart from an interval from 1247 to 1251, when he was subordinated to Eljigidei (see p. 121), the new commander would remain in charge of operations in south-west Asia until Hülegü’s arrival in 1257. During the protracted interregnum between Ögödei’s death in Jumādā II 639/December 1241 and the accession of his eldest son Gıyūg in 1246, Baiju displayed considerable energy. In 640/1242 he advanced into Anatolia, taking Erzurum (Arzan al-Rūm), Arzinjān (Erzincan) and Sivas, and inflicting a decisive reverse on the Saljuq Sultan,
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw II, at Kösedagh on 6 Muḥarram 641/26 June 1243. The Sultanate, hitherto one of the great powers of the region, was reduced to client status and subjected to a heavy tribute. Syria had hitherto been exempt from Mongol incursions. But in the summer of 642/1244 a division under the general Yasaʿur thrust into northern Syria, dislodging the Khwarazmian freebooters, who fled south into Palestine to enter the service of the Egyptian Sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb, sacking Christian Jerusalem and taking up their quarters in the vicinity of Damascus. Yasaʿur appears to have secured the submission of the Ayyubid rulers of Aleppo, Ḍīmṣ and Damascus, who henceforward all rendered tribute to the Mongols. An uncle of the Sultan of Aleppo and a brother of the ruler of Mosul were shortly afterwards to be found at Güyüg’s court, since they accompanied the Mongol administrator Arghun Aqa back from there as far as Baiju’s headquarters in 1247. Western European observers believed that by 1246 Mongol authority already extended two days’ journey beyond Antioch.

Towards the end of 641/1243–4 Mongol forces had invested Mayyāfārīqīn. Its Ayyubid prince, Shihāb al-Dīn Ghāzī, who three years earlier had procrastinated in response to an ultimatum and had merely sent gifts, took flight; but the attackers were bought off by his deputy. In 642/1244 they occupied Ghāzī’s stronghold of Akhlāṭ, and in the same year Mongol forces seized Harrān and al-Ruhā (Edessa) and obtained the peaceful submission of Mārdīn. On Baiju resuming the siege of Mayyāfārīqīn in 650/1252, its ruler, al-Kāmil Muḥammad b. Ghāzī, secured a reprieve by undertaking the journey to the court of the new Qaghan, Möngke. Since he met there the sons of the Artuqid ruler of Mārdīn and of Badr al-Dīn Luʿluʾ, the prince of Mosul, the Qaghan’s encampment had now hosted the principal Muslim rulers of Syria and Mesopotamia or their close representatives. The Mongols even gained reinforcements from an unlikely quarter, when the ambitions of the turbulent Khwarazmian forces in Syria and Palestine led to their defeat by the combined armies of Ḍīmṣ and Aleppo in 644/1246 and one contingent of the survivors, under Küshlü Khan, fled to Mesopotamia to enter the service of their old enemy.

Yet despite these successes neither Chormaghun nor Baiju had made significant progress against the ‘ʿAbbasid Caliph. An abortive attack on Baghdad by Chaghadai ‘the Lesser’ in Rabiʿ II 643/September 1245 enabled Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd to conclude his history on a note of triumph and thanksgiving. Within a few years envoys from Baghdad travelled to Mongolia and brought back a Mongol embassy; the papal ambassador Carpini, who saw the party at Güyüg’s court, believed that the Caliph paid the Mongols a regular tribute. But the general impression left by our sources is that the
Mongol advance had stalled. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, when Hülegü arrived in western Persia in 653/1255, he had a stormy interview with Baiju, upbraiding him for his failure to prosecute the war against the Caliph with sufficient energy; though he accepted the general’s excuses.90

This period also witnessed the elimination of another Muslim state hundreds of miles to the north. As Jebe and Sübe’edei had passed through the territory of the Bulghār qaghanate on their way to rejoin Chinggis Khan, they had been caught in a series of ambushes by the Bulghār troops and had suffered a humiliating defeat.91 Forces sent to this region in 1229 achieved little by way of reprisal; and following a fresh quriltai in 1235, Ögödei determined on a major expedition to the western steppe with the aims of subjugating Bulghār, the Qangli and the Qipchaq, and of punishing the Rus’ for their temerity in aiding the Qipchaq in 620/1223. The campaign, headed by a number of princes under the nominal command of Jochi’s son Batu and accompanied by the veteran Sübe’edei, amply fulfilled this purpose, incorporating the remnants of the Qipchaq, vanquishing a number of Rus’ princes and reducing them to tributary status; in 1241–2 Batu and his colleagues would go on to devastate Poland and Hungary before retiring eastwards.92 But their first action had been the sack of Bulghār (1237) and the destruction of the Volga Bulgar state, a bastion of Islam in these distant parts for well over three centuries.93 Here too a strongly Muslim population now passed under infidel rule.

The Mongol art of war94

It is unlikely that the Mongols’ success in reducing the Khwārazmshāh’s empire and the territories of some of its neighbours was due to superior numbers. According to a Song Chinese envoy writing in or soon after 1237, the Mongolian military comprised every male over the age of fourteen (‘fifteen’ by Chinese reckoning).95 This in itself might suggest an enormous force. Yet in reality the Mongols were usually outnumbered by their adversaries.96 The figure supplied by the ‘Secret History’ for Chinggis Khan’s steppe troops – at a point early in the century – is 95,000.97 Assuming a ratio of 1:5 between the males on military duty and the total number of Mongols (and including a figure of 10,000 for the Önggüt), the population of present-day Mongolia in Chinggis Khan’s time has been estimated at a little over 695,000;98 and of those adult males performing military service, a significant proportion would have been engaged on the Chinese front. Some confusion has stemmed from the fact that the largest military unit – the tümen or ‘ten thousand’ – only nominally comprised that number of
men at any time, in view of depletion through warfare; recent estimates put the tümen at merely 60 per cent of full capacity.\textsuperscript{99} The high figures given in contemporary sources, and their statements that the invaders were beyond counting, are due in part to the fact that the Mongols sometimes generated rumours exaggerating the size of their armies;\textsuperscript{100} they also stem from the invaders' favoured tactic, mentioned in both Muslim and Western Christian sources,\textsuperscript{101} of pressing into service as arrow-fodder elements from the populations of previously conquered cities in order to lessen the risk of heavy Mongol casualties. Ibn al-Athīr says that the deployment of the prisoners from Bukhārā – in groups of ten, each with a banner – greatly intimidated the citizens and garrison of Samarqand, who took them to be genuine warriors from Chinggis Khan's own army.\textsuperscript{102}

It is true that the Mongols’ military power rested in some degree on their access to vast reserves of Inner Asian ponies, enabling each trooper to bring spare mounts (vital if the ponies were not to become exhausted); Carpini would conclude that their mounts outnumbered those found everywhere else, and it has been suggested that they constituted almost 50 per cent of the world’s total stock.\textsuperscript{103} But the steppe pony suffered from a number of drawbacks compared with the horse: it lacked the strength to be armoured, and its pace was markedly less smooth.\textsuperscript{104} The Mongols’ strength, in fact, lay principally not in numbers of men or mounts, but in their capacity to muster vital resources, their communications, their skill in reconnoitring the terrain, their discipline and their military planning. Their distinctive pattern of campaigning, which Timothy May has christened ‘the Tsunami Strategy’, should be mentioned here: a wide area was devastated, but only partially occupied by a tamma force, which consolidated Mongol control there before moving into adjacent regions that had thus already been gravely weakened.\textsuperscript{105}

The Mongols’ intelligence was excellent. They relied naturally on espionage, in which a pivotal role was played by the many merchants who had made their way to Chinggis Khan’s headquarters, attracted by the wealth that he, his family and his officers were acquiring through successful warfare.\textsuperscript{106} The Song envoy Zhao Hong (1221) speaks of a Uighur merchant who had allegedly passed on to the Mongols information regarding the wealthy and populous Jin provinces of Shandong and Hebei;\textsuperscript{107} and it will be recalled that Inalchuq suspected the traders who arrived at Uṭrār from Mongol territory of being spies, no doubt with good reason. By some such means Chinggis Khan learned of the antipathy between the Khwārazmshāh and his mother Terken Khatun and played upon it skilfully. The Mongols were also adept at spreading disinformation, with the aim of sowing dissension and mutual distrust among the enemy, as Chinggis Khan did when
he sent Muḥammad treasonable letters purportedly written by Qipchaq commanders.¹⁰⁸

The Mongols were additionally aided by their remarkable mobility and their well-honed system of communications, which enabled them to conduct widely dispersed operations over considerable distances while yet adhering to rigid timetables determined in advance.¹⁰⁹ Sometimes these operations involved the formation of a *nerge*, the vast and gradually contracting circle that would eventually envelop the enemy – a tactic borrowed from the annual winter hunt, when large quantities of game were trapped in this fashion and which served as a form of military training.¹¹⁰

Enterprises of this kind would have been unthinkable without the distinctive calibre of Chinggis Khan’s staff and the proverbially iron discipline among the rank and file, which attracted comment from several contemporaries.¹¹¹ His personal bodyguard, the *keshig*, formed an elite corps of 10,000 men from whom the conqueror drew those he could rely upon for particular commissions; it thus served as a veritable nursery for the Mongol officer class, and promotion was based on merit alone rather than on birth.¹¹² As early as 1202, he had promulgated an edict (*Mo. jasaghl*; hence *Tu. yasaq* and *Ar.-Pers. yāsā*) forbidding his troops, on pain of death, to abandon the pursuit of the enemy for the sake of plunder, until victory was a *fait accompli*.¹¹³ A subsequent edict prescribed the death penalty, again, for any soldier who abandoned the unit to which he had been allocated.¹¹⁴ Our sources also note the hardiness and resilience, bred of the herdsman’s harsh life in the steppe, that the nomadic Mongol warriors displayed – again in contrast with their sedentary opponents. For Juwaynī, this was both ‘an army after the fashion of a peasantry’ and ‘a peasantry in the guise of an army’; and Rubruck remarked that if Western peasants (not to mention kings and knights) were prepared to endure such privations and a similar diet, they could conquer the world.¹¹⁵

The efforts of the Mongol rank and file may also have been energized by the conviction that they were indeed destined to conquer the world, but as we saw (pp. 74–5) this may in fact postdate the seven-year campaign.

It would be possible to list further characteristics of the Mongol military that served them well in other theatres of war: the compound bow, for instance; manoeuvres in battle such as the *caracole*, in which successive squadrons repeatedly attacked with dense arrow-fire and then retreated; their use of dummy warriors to deceive the enemy.¹¹⁶ On occasions the Mongols used the feigned retreat to lure part of the enemy force into an ambush, as occurred during the siege of both Samarqand and Gurgānj.¹¹⁷ But these weapons and tactics were part of the time-honoured military traditions of earlier Eurasian steppe nomadic powers (and were, moreover,
THE MONGOLS AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD

hardly peculiar to nomads). In addition, the Mongols themselves spread misleading ideas about the effectiveness of their weaponry. And of those few field encounters that did take place, one – at Parwān – resulted in victory for Jalāl al-Dīn’s forces despite the Mongols’ efforts to intimidate his forces by deploying dummy warriors. Yet to focus on known Mongol strengths in the battlefield is to ignore the fact that the strategy adopted by the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad largely precluded pitched engagements.

The leitmotif of the war against the Khwarazmian empire, in fact, was siege operations. Contrary to popular belief, the invading armies were by no means unaccustomed to siege warfare, and it was one respect in which they enjoyed a clear advantage over their precursors. Carpini pays oblique tribute to the Mongols’ confidence in this sphere when he says that they preferred their enemies to shut themselves up behind fortifications, equating them in such situations with piglets penned in their sty. Siege engines were present in the assault on the Khwarazmian empire. Catapults (manjanīqāhā) and missiles are mentioned at Jand, Samarqand and Nīshāpūr, and both Juwaynī and Jūzjānī refer to catapults in the investments of Tirmidh and of Naṣr-Kūh. The latter author says that Chinggis Khan despatched *Abka (Ambughai) Noyan, at the head of 10,000 ‘Mongol’ catapult-operatives (mughul-i manjanīqī) against the fortress of Ashiyār in Gharchistān. This contingent may have achieved the capture of ‘all the strongholds in Gharchistān’ in 619/1222–3; though admittedly it took the Mongols over fifteen months to reduce Ashiyār itself – and then only because most of the defenders had perished of hunger. Some decades later, Kirakos Ganjakets’i speaks of the Mongols’ skilful use of siege artillery of various kinds in Georgia and Greater Armenia, and Rus’ chroniclers of the power and range of the engines used at Chernigov in 1239.

By that date, some of the engines would have come from subject rulers; the Mongols compelled Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’ of Mosul to supply them with equipment and provisions (and probably troops) for the investment of Irbil in 634/1237. But the armaments deployed during Chinggis Khan’s expedition are likely to have been of Chinese origin. The Mongols were using Chinese siege weaponry, including catapults (Ch. pao), in China by 1221. It was their practice to conscript skilled craftsmen of many kinds from conquered cities; and they had benefited from numerous desertions from the Jin dynasty’s forces. The striking-range of Chinese siege engines had undergone a threefold increase during the twelfth century, and it has been suggested that the counterweight trebuchet emerged in China rather than, as previously thought, in Western Asia. No less importantly, both the Jurchen-Jin and the Song had long used gunpowder. We know of at least
one Chinese siege engineer who accompanied Chinggis Khan to the west, and there is evidence from Chinese sources that at Bukhārā, Khujand and Gurgānj the invading Mongol armies deployed incendiary devices based on gunpowder; in the Islamic source material these would be masked by the conventional term for naphtha (nafṭ; more will be said on this subject in chapter 5). Although the scale and pace of Chinggis Khan’s conquests owed little to the use of gunpowder-based weaponry, we can at least say that the Mongol forces were considerably better prepared for siege warfare than the Khwārazmshāh and his advisers might have anticipated, their own experience of hostilities with nomadic peoples being mainly confined to the eastern Qipchaq-Qangli. That the latter – decentralized and ‘stateless’ as they were – did not engage in siege operations can be inferred from Rashīd al-Dīn’s remark that the people of Jand, on the very fringes of the Qipchaq steppe, had ‘never experienced battle’ and were even amazed at the Mongols’ ability to mount the city walls.

The disunity of their enemies certainly contributed to the Mongols’ success. The Khwārazmshāh’s heterogeneous forces, riven with ethnic antipathies and possessing little loyalty to their sovereign, as we have noticed, lacked the cohesion of Chinggis Khan’s troops, welded together over more than two decades and commanded by officers in whom the Mongol ruler had complete confidence. So too the recent purge of the upper echelons of the Saljuq military by Sa’d al-Dīn Köpek and the Türkmen revolt under Bābā Iṣḥāq in 1240 had enervated the Rūm Sultanate. In Iran, several cities had been torn by faction since the era of the Great Saljuqs. Yet to attach significant weight to such circumstances begs the question whether even a more robust and cohesive opponent could have withstood the invaders. In any case, as we shall see below, the Mongols readily attracted Muslim defectors in significant numbers from the ranks of their enemies.

**Muslim support for the Mongol invaders**

No assessment of the reasons behind the success of the seven-year campaign would be complete that did not take into account the composition of Chinggis Khan’s forces. This was at no point an enterprise undertaken exclusively by the various steppe nomad or forest peoples he had conquered in Mongolia during the first decade of the century. Nor was he accompanied only by contingents from the semi-sedentary peoples who had yielded to him, such as Uighur and Kitan soldiers and administrators, or by Chinese siege technicians. His was not, in short, an army made up only of infidels,
since from the very outset the Mongol sovereign drew on the assistance of Muslim confederates, who provided not just additional bodies of cavalry but infantry, an element lacking in the traditional steppe nomadic force.

Neither Güchülüg nor the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad had rendered himself uniformly agreeable to his Muslim subjects, and we have seen how, like the Uighur iduq-qut, one of the Gür-khan’s Muslim basqaqs and Muslim Turkish princes tributary to the Qara-Khitai had submitted to the Mongols (above, p. 66). Two of them joined the expedition against the Khwārazmshāh. Buzar (or Ozar), the Qarluq ruler of Almaligh, whom Juwaynī praises as pious and God-fearing, had perished at Güchülüg’s hands in reprisal for his alliance with Chinggis Khan; a contingent under his son and successor, Sighnāq-tegin, duly accompanied the Mongols in 616/1219. Arslan Khan, the ruler of Qayaligh, expressly called a Muslim by Jūzjānī and possibly a Qarakhanid, had also submitted to Chinggis Khan in c. 1211; at the head of 6,000 horsemen, he participated alongside the Mongol general Dölen Cherbi in the siege operations at Walkh. He had received a princess from Chinggis Khan’s family in marriage.

From the Khwārazmshāh’s territories too the conquerors recruited prominent Muslim supporters. At the point when Muḥammad withdrew south of the Oxus, the ruler of Qunduz, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, and one of the grandees (qudamā’) of Balkh, both deserted him to join the Mongols. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn subsequently commanded the auxiliary force (charīk) that assisted the Mongol general Tekechük to eliminate the Khalaj, Türkmen and Ghūris formerly in the service of the Khwārazmshāh Jalāl al-Dīn. Juwaynī also refers fleetingly to the yarligh that Chinggis Khan issued to the Ghūrī amir Rukn al-Dīn Kurt, evidently the ancestor of the Kurtid dynasty at Herat, who must therefore have submitted to the Mongols at this early date. Others alienated by Muḥammad’s ruthless expansionism went over to the invaders, among them a second Rukn al-Dīn, whose uncle and cousin the Khwārazmshāh had put to death and who now seized the opportunity to recover his principality of Kabūd-jāma with the Mongols’ help. In the 1230s this fledgling dynasty would profit still further from the conquerors’ favour (see p. 249 below). After the fall of Uṭrār, Badr al-Dīn al-’Amīd, whose father and uncle, both qadis there, had been executed by the Khwārazmshāh, went over to the Mongols; he provided valuable intelligence on the estrangement between Muḥammad and his mother and personally drafted the treasonable letters referred to above (pp. 86–7).

The advent of the Mongols could furnish a timely opportunity for Muslim princes who required allies in their own struggles. If we can believe the anonymous author of the Taʾrikh-i Sīstān, one of the three contenders
for the throne of that kingdom appealed in 619/1222 for their assistance against his brother and uncle; although by the time the Mongol army arrived he had been murdered by a slave. And other sources of support for the Mongols were to be found further west. From Kirmān in 623/1226 Baraq Ḥājib, who as we saw would be confirmed as ruler by Ögödei a few years later, wrote to the Mongols warning them of Jalāl al-Dīn’s growing power. In the wake of Jalāl al-Dīn’s defeat by a Saljuq-Ayyubid alliance at Yasi-chemen in 627/1230, the Ismā’īlī Assassins, whom he had repeatedly attacked, are alleged to have sent word to the Mongols in Transoxiana, inciting them to make an end of him. An Ismā’īlī source that has only recently become accessible furnishes valuable internal evidence that their relations with Chinggis Khan were initially cordial. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the Ismā’īlīs’ ambitions had grown since the advent of the Mongols. It has been suggested that they had entered into an alliance with the Mongols that persisted into the 1240s, well beyond Jalāl al-Dīn’s death (see also p. 74 above).

Nor was it only princes and amirs who welcomed the conquerors. During the final attack on Iṣfahān in 633/1235–6, the Shāfi‘ī element, at loggerheads with the Ḥanafīs, opened the gates; according to Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, they had appealed to Ögödei to assist them against their opponents. The Mongol envoy to Mayyāfāriqīn in 638/1240–1 could be described by Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī as ‘a congenial (laṭīf) shaykh from Iṣfahān’.

We have noticed how merchants in particular furnished the Mongols with valuable intelligence. Chinggis Khan and his successors cemented close relations with the mercantile class, advancing capital to traders and taking a cut from the profits, and Muslim merchants were involved in the lucrative business of tax-farming in Mongol-occupied Chinese territory from an early date. Chinggis Khan had long numbered merchants among his followers: Ja’far Khwāja, who had shared his privations at an early stage, rendered valuable service in the war against the Jin empire; Hasan Ḥājjī, a long-time associate, was killed during negotiations with the inhabitants of Sighnāq. We have already met with Maḥmūd Yalavach, who took part in Chinggis Khan’s first mission to the Khwārazmshāh and who advised the conqueror in matters of urban administration; both he and his son Mas’ūd would rise to high office under Ögödei (see p. 110). And in Ögödei’s reign merchants continued to play a more direct role in Mongol expansion. Shams al-Dīn ’Umar Qazwīni, a dealer in precious stones, prevailed upon the Sultan of Rūm to send his submission to the Qaghan’s court in 633/1236. According to Jūzjānī, the defence of Lahore in 639/1241 was sapped by the half-hearted efforts of the populace, many of whom had
obtained Mongol permits to trade beyond the Indus, in Khurāsān and Central Asia.\textsuperscript{155}

More turbulent elements, too, threw in their lot with Chinggis Khan’s forces. Already, we are told, by the time the Mongols reached Rayy in 617/1220–1, they were accompanied by other troops, both Muslim and infidel, as well as by ‘troublemakers’ who merely sought an opportunity to plunder and ‘do mischief’.\textsuperscript{156} Nasawī writes of a certain Ḥabash, from a village near Khabūshān, who, at the head of a gang of renegades, conducted siege operations on the invaders’ behalf against several towns in Khurāsān and is said to have matched the Mongols themselves in ferocity.\textsuperscript{157} Ibn al-Athīr furnishes another example of a Muslim condottiere – Aqush, a mamluk amir of the Eldegüzid ruler of Azerbaijan – who gathered a large body of Türkmen and Kurds, and collaborated with the Mongols in their first attack on the Georgian kingdom towards the end of 617/early in 1221.\textsuperscript{158} In both instances, the attraction was perhaps the prospect of revenge on an enemy of longer standing – and, in the second case, by aiding one infidel to inflict damage on another. Mongol operations could thus take on the complexion of a welcome intervention in pre-existing local conflicts.

The ‘Great Mongol People’

All such Muslim confederates were now subject (Tu. il/el)\textsuperscript{159} to the qaghan. Like the numerous Turkic steppe peoples and the auxiliaries from other sedentary regions of Asia who were enrolled in the conquerors’ forces, they had become – in the political sense – Mongols. As Friar Julian put it, ‘it is required of them that hereafter they be known as Tartars’.\textsuperscript{160} In much the same way, the many disparate groups in Attila’s armies 800 years earlier had been classed as Huns regardless of their origins, and the seventh-century Türks had included several elements that were ethnically and linguistically quite distinct from the ruling stratum.\textsuperscript{161} More was at stake than simply nomenclature. The conquered sedentary peoples, along with the many tribal elements in Mongolia that had been reduced at an earlier date, were technically the hereditary bondsmen (ötegū boghol) of the Mongols.\textsuperscript{162} Nor was this status altered by flight into non-Mongol territory. ‘I have learned’, wrote Batu to the Hungarian king in the ultimatum brought back by Friar Julian in 1237, ‘that you keep the Cumans, my slaves, under your protection.’\textsuperscript{163}

Servitude of this kind meant subjection to Mongol military discipline and compliance with certain norms. There is early evidence that these included adoption of the hairstyle of the Mongol male (which involved shaving a horseshoe-shaped area of the head and allowing a braid to grow
When the citadel of Samarqand fell in 617/1220, the garrison troops, numbering over 30,000 Qangli and other Turks, were separated from the Täjik populace on the pretext of having their heads shaved. This involuntary fashion statement proved to be merely a prelude to their slaughter; but the incident suggests that head-shaving for those absorbed into the Mongol military was already a familiar practice. Western European and Chinese observers reveal that it was a token of submission imposed not merely on the pastoralist Qipchaq/Cumans/Polovtsi but also on the Chinese officials of the defunct Jin dynasty and on Muslims in the Mongol armies.

Equally, of course, the conferment of Mongol apparel on a client prince could represent a mark of distinction, as when Hülegü in 658/1260 presented the Ayyubid al-Sa’id Ḥasan of Bānyās with a Mongol cloak and cap (sarāghūch). To some extent, the underlying impulse may have been military security – the need to distinguish auxiliary from foe – and perhaps also tactical – the desire to give an inflated impression of the numbers of Mongols in their military establishment. But the broader rationale was clearly that the empire’s armed forces were now regarded as constituting, as it were, a single ethnicity. Becoming ‘Mongol’ might have a bearing even upon diet. As we shall see (p. 307), Chinggis Khan appears to have required his Muslim subjects to eat Mongol food. The Galician Chronicle describes how in 1246 the client Rus’ Prince Daniil Romanovich, visiting Batu’s headquarters, was offered fermented mare’s milk (qumis). ‘You are now a Tatar like us,’ Batu allegedly told him; ‘drink our drink.’

Enrolment in the Chinggisid project of world-conquest came at a cost. But for Rashid al-Dīn, writing some decades later (and possibly overstating the case), there were compensations. ‘The peoples of Khitāī [North China], Jūrcha [Chörche, i.e. Manchuria] and Nangiyās [South China], the Uighurs, the Qipchaq, the Türkmen, the Qarluq, the Qalach [Khalaj] and all the prisoners and the Täjik nations that have been reared among the Mongols,’ he says, ‘are likewise called Mongols; in their entirety they recognize it as beneficial to their reputation and status that they call themselves Mongols.’ The advantages of participation in a vast and growing empire clearly outweighed the price paid. How that empire was run in the early decades will be the subject of the next chapter.
2. The Iranian world from Chinggis Khan's invasion down to c. 1250
The empire that Chinggis Khan bequeathed to his successor covered a vast area. It stretched from northern China and the borders of the Korean kingdom to Khwārazm and the steppes north of the Aral Sea, and from the Siberian forests to the Hindu Kush and the Iranian plateau. Under Ögödei it would grow still further. But how realistically can it be described as a unity in these early decades? What forms did Mongol domination take across such widely separated tracts? How was the qaghan able to project his power into lands that lay thousands of miles distant from the Mongol homeland? By what means did the Mongols extract the resources that enabled their sovereign both to reward loyalty and service and to continue the work of expansion?

The character of the empire

Chinggis Khan’s empire marked a significant advance on its precursors, the Kitan-Liao and the Jurchen-Jin. Both these dynasties had presided over a multi-ethnic dominion and had developed the capacity to exploit directly the sedentary population of northern China under their rule through regular taxation. They were accordingly no longer dependent exclusively on tribute from sedentary powers or on controlling long-distance trade and tapping its proceeds (as had, for instance, the Türk empire of the sixth to eighth centuries), though they continued to draw revenue from both sources. The Liao and the Jin regimes, however, had maintained two separate administrative systems for the sedentary and nomadic sectors, as also did the Qara-Khitai further west. The Mongols, at first, did not. They recruited troops and civil officials alike from peoples, like the Qara-Khitai, the
Jurchen-Jin and the Tangut, who had some experience of governing heterogeneous societies. They also incorporated individuals from societies that had nomadic antecedents but had undergone partial sedentarization, like the Uighurs, the Önggüt and the Kitan; the most distinguished individual in this last category was Yelü Chucai (d. 1243), who was for a time the principal adviser on Chinese affairs. And the Mongols acquired, too, the services of Muslim bureaucrats and merchants in sizeable numbers from Central Asia, Khwārazm and the Iranian world. Although the absence of any sophisticated indigenous administrative tradition in the mostly forested tracts to the north of the steppe obliged them to exercise indirect rule there, in the regions to the south – that is, China, Transoxiana and much of Iran – they created a governmental machinery that went further than the Liao or the Jin, since here they not only drew on multiple administrative traditions but blended them.

The Mongol empire, like other great empires in history, was a heterogeneous structure. If during Chinggis Khan’s time the Mongols were still dependent on a combination of plunder, tribute and the exploitation of international trade, under Ögödei and his successors they enjoyed direct access to sedentary resources and were able to integrate nomadic and sedentary models of governance. They generally maintained the revenue administration inherited from conquered dynasties, while incorporating other taxes, such as the qubchur (pp. 112–13 below), for instance, derived from the Uighurs. They borrowed from the Kitan-Liao the paiza (Ch. paize), the tablet authorizing functionaries or merchants to travel on government business. They took over from vanquished rivals such as the Jurchen-Jin and the Tangut existing networks of relay-stations, and extended these from the Far East to Central Asia and beyond: the nucleus of this system, known as the yam, which was designed primarily for the use of official couriers and envoys, was already in place in Chinggis Khan’s lifetime and would be considerably expanded under Ögödei.

Nevertheless, for all that it embraced great swathes of sedentary territory, the empire was, in the early period, governed as a nomadic state. The seat of government was the ordo (Tu.orda), the mobile encampment of the qaghan or one of his princely kindred, perhaps comprising thousands of tents – like Batu’s headquarters, which to William of Rubruck resembled a large city on the move. Juwaynī depicts Körgüz, Ögödei’s governor in Khurāsān and Māzandarān (and a Uighur), as departing from Mongol custom when he took up residence within the fortress of Ṭūs. Even the town of Qaraqorum was simply one of a number of localities near which the qaghan pitched his tents according to the season (and Möngke spent
less time in its vicinity than had Ögödei); it functioned as a storehouse and as a centre of craft production. In this, the Chinggisids resembled previous dynasties of steppe origin, notably the Saljuqs, who for the most part kept to their tents, and the western branch of the Qarakhanids, who had ruled for over a century and a half before moving their residence into the citadel of Samarqand. And in two other important respects the Chinggisid empire still exhibited the characteristics of the traditional Inner Asian steppe polity (albeit an enormous one that penetrated more deeply into the territories of agrarian-urban societies in China and Iran): in the transmission of the dignity of qaghan and in the distribution of appanages and assets from the conquered territories. We shall examine each of these in turn.

The succession to Chinggis Khan

All – and only – members of the altan orugh (‘golden kin’), the imperial family, were possessed of the charisma that qualified candidates for sovereignty. Otherwise, there were no hard-and-fast rules governing the succession to the headship of the empire, apart from a preference for the prince (Mo. ke‘în; Tu. oghul, later oghlan) perceived to be the wisest and most experienced and the best war leader – a mode of selection for which Professor Joseph Fletcher borrowed from the Celtic world the term ‘tanistry’. Experience in this context might well involve a knowledge of Chinggis Khan’s utterances (biligs) and subsequently those of other rulers. These attributes tended to be associated with the more senior princes, although the criteria for seniority are unclear – whether it was simply a matter of relative age or was reckoned in terms of degrees of descent from a common ancestor. But conflicting with collateral succession of this type, on the other hand, were the efforts of the qaghans to nominate their successors. Ultimately, legitimacy might well lie with the claimant who could make good his title by force – though this tactic, if it did not also rest on a consensus, was expressly forbidden by a law (yasa) of Chinggis Khan.

Chinggis Khan’s eldest son Jochi had predeceased him in 622/1225. According to the ‘Secret History’, the Yuan shi, Juwaynî and Rashîd al-Dîn, the conqueror designated Ögödei as his heir, even though he was the third son and the second, Chaghadai, was still alive (as also was Jochi, according to the ‘Secret History’). The chronological context of Ögödei’s nomination varies. The ‘Secret History’ places it on the eve of his father’s seven-year expedition to Western Asia, and Rashîd al-Dîn places it in the period immediately preceding Chinggis Khan’s death; while the principal annals in the Yuan shi describe it as the conqueror’s last command but mention it only in
the setting of Ögödei’s enthronement. At the quriltai of 1229, when Ögödei was formally acclaimed and installed as qaghan, there was nevertheless some support for Tolui, Chinggis Khan’s youngest son by his chief wife, who had acted as regent during the two-year interregnum.

Professor Dorothea Krawulsky contends that the story of Ögödei’s nomination by Chinggis Khan is a fiction, possibly arising in part from the failure of authors writing in the historical tradition of sedentary China and Iran to envisage any other basis for the transfer of power. Yet according to Juwaynī, Chinggis Khan’s sons had promised their father in writing that the imperial dignity should be settled upon Ögödei and their written statements (khaṭṭhā) were presented at the quriltai of 1229. Krawulsky’s argument does not apply, of course, to the narrative provided by the ‘Secret History’; but certain of the details in this account are highly suspect. Here Ögödei expresses misgivings on the grounds that his descendants might include some so unfitted to rule that:

even if one wrapped them in fresh grass, they would not be eaten by an ox; even if one wrapped them in fat, they would not be eaten by a dog.

Chinggis Khan responds by hinting that in such circumstances the descendants of his other sons might qualify. Since this section is absent from the seventeenth-century Altan Tobchi, which otherwise closely follows the text of the ‘Secret History’, it is in all likelihood an interpolation not present in the original version and inserted in the ‘Secret History’ only after the coup of 1251 that ousted Ögödei’s family and enthroned as qaghan Möngke, the eldest son of Tolui. As so often, the history we have was redrafted by the victors.

Conversely, Ögödei’s line argued in 1251 that the imperial dignity should rightly be restricted to his progeny, a claim reiterated later by Qaidu on the strength of an alleged law (yasa) of Chinggis Khan himself; a variant account, current in Jamāl al-Qarshī’s day, has Ögödei hold the infant Qaidu and express the desire that he should eventually reign. For Juwaynī, serving Möngke and his brother Hülegü, claims of this kind were merely ‘tales . . . and yarns (taṣānīf . . . wa-dāstānhā). But the issue is by no means so clear-cut. In Rashīd al-Dīn’s history, the regent Oghul Qaimish, Güyüg’s widow, accuses Möngke’s supporters of betraying a written pledge (Mo. möchelge) they had given to keep the sovereignty in Ögödei’s line. Earlier, in his account of the Turkish and Mongol tribes, the same author has the
noyan Elchidei (or Eljigidei) of the Jalayir tribe remind those attending the quriltai of 1251 that they had sworn to choose a descendant of Ögödei as long as there remained even one whom an ox or dog would reject, though wrapped in grass or fat.27 And when Güyük, at his accession, demands a written pledge from those present at the quriltai to keep the sovereignty in his line, they promise, in precisely these same terms, to elect no other.28 The fact that the phrases that recur in these pledges echo so vividly those employed by Ögödei in the account of the ‘Secret History’ may well be significant. In Rashîd al-Dein’s narrative (in contrast with the interpolated passage in the ‘Secret History’) the formula is not deployed in support of the Toluid cause, and could indicate the existence of some genuine undertaking to restrict the sovereignty to Ögödei’s line. In the account of the quriltai of 1251, Möngke’s brother Qubilai, in a feeble bid to counter Elchidei’s remonstrations, charges the opposition with having contravened ‘the stipulations, the declarations and the long-standing edict (shurūṭ-u sukhun-u yāsā-yi qadīm)’ even before Möngke’s adherents did29 – a telling admission of Toluid guilt which gives further support to the likelihood that the Ögödeyids’ claims were justified. If this is indeed the case, the election of Möngke would represent a still more dramatic volte-face than we have hitherto imagined.

Subsequently, Juwayni and Rashîd al-Dein in turn would further amplify Toluid pretensions by a piece of obfuscation, confusing Tolui’s rights as the ‘hearth-prince’ (ot-chigin) – the youngest son (by the chief wife), who inherited his father’s patrimony or original territory – with a prior claim to the headship of the empire as a whole.30 To reinforce this equation, Rashîd al-Dein at one juncture has Chinggis Khan respond to an appeal for gifts from his grandsons Güyük and Ködön (Köten) by claiming to have nothing to give, on the grounds that everything belonged to Tolui, ‘lord of the home and the great yurt’.31 The incongruity in Rashîd al-Dein’s presentation of the Toluid case is thrown into even starker relief when Batu, in support of Möngke’s candidacy in 1251, claims that the sovereignty rightfully belongs to Möngke because according to Mongol law and custom the father’s place goes to the youngest son (Tolui)32 – when at that juncture, in reality, his reasoning would have conferred the imperial dignity on Tolui’s own youngest son Arigh Böke.

Moreover, Rashîd al-Dein makes out that Tolui inherited the vast majority of his father’s troops. But when recounting Chinggis Khan’s distribution to his kinsfolk of groups of ‘thousands’ from among his nomadic subjects, with their commanders, the ‘Secret History’ provides the following figures for the sons: Jochi had received 9,000 troops under the command of the
The Mongols and the Islamic World

noyans Qunan, Möngge’ür and Kete; Chaghadai, 8,000 under Qarachar, Möngke and Idoqudaï; Ögödei, 5,000 under Ilüge and Degei; and Tolui, 5,000 under Jedei and Bala. Rashid al-Dīn, who supplies a different figure of 4,000 for each of the three elder sons and sometimes variant details regarding the commanders, omits any allocation for Tolui, who instead inherits from his father ‘the centre (qūl; Mo. qol) and the right and left wings’, totalling 101,000 as against much smaller forces conferred on his brothers and on other kinsmen. This situation can have obtained only during the two years in which Tolui, as regent, would have been in control of the ‘centre’ pending Ögödei’s enthronement. As it stands, Rashīd al-Dīn’s statement is surely preposterous. Had Tolui, and later his widow Sorqaqtani and her sons, enjoyed such an overwhelming military preponderance during the reigns of Ögödei and Güyüg, it is hard to see how the qaghans could have exercised any authority at all in practical terms. True, elsewhere Rashīd al-Dīn concedes that when Ögödei became qaghan the forces of all the princes came under his command. But the explanation he gives for Tolui’s 101,000 troops betrays his underlying design: Chinggis Khan, he assures us, had foreseen the eventual accession of the Toluids and sought to provide them with the necessary resources; indeed, he contemplated making Tolui his heir. As we shall see (p. 147), the final years of Ilkhanid rule in Iran would witness yet a further inflation of Tolui’s status.

The disputed successions of 1241–6 and 1248–51

If Ögödei truly was designated, he proved to be the last qaghan for several decades of whom this can be said. His own bid to leave the throne to his grandson Shiremūn failed. And although he was in the event succeeded by his eldest son Güyüg, primogeniture – the principle favoured by the Mongols’ sedentary subjects – would take root only gradually. Already, during the five-year interregnum (1241–6) in which Ögödei’s widow Töregene acted as regent, Temüge Ot-chigin, Chinggis Khan’s youngest brother and the most senior surviving member of the dynasty, had attempted to seize the throne; he was tried and executed after Güyüg’s accession in 1246. In distant Delhi, Jūzjānī heard rumours of internecine conflict and of the flight of some of Ot-chigin’s offspring to China, though this is not corroborated elsewhere.

Batu, who had quarrelled violently with Güyüg during the campaign of 1236–42 against the Qipchaq and Rus’, became the senior among Chinggis Khan’s descendants on the death of Chaghadai (642/1244–5). He and his brothers appear to have been viewed as ineligible for the imperial dignity owing to the questionable legitimacy of their father Jochi, thought to have
been conceived while Börte, the young Temüjin's wife, was a prisoner of his Merkit enemies. But Batu was determined to prevent Güyük's enthronement and employed procrastinating tactics that delayed the election for five years. Eventually, however, he had to acquiesce, sending a number of his brothers to Mongolia to participate (August 1246). Nevertheless, relations between the two men were still strained, and an armed conflict was averted only by Güyük's death in April 1248. With his enemy removed, Batu seized the opportunity to secure the election of a more congenial candidate in the person of Möngke, first at a rump election held in Central Asia in 1250 and then at a fuller quriltai in the Mongolian homeland in the following year.

The transfer of the imperial throne to Möngke was accompanied by bloodshed on a significant scale. Ögödei's line and their adherents were divided in allegiance between the claims of Güyük's sons and those of Shiremün, rendering it impossible for Güyük's widow, the regent Oghul Qaimish, to muster a united front behind a single candidate. But the Ögödeyids and their allies among Chaghadai's descendants were prepared to work together against Möngke. According to the standard account found in a number of independent sources – Juwaynī, Jūzjānī and William of Rubruck – they plotted to encircle the new Qaghan's encampment and kill him. They were foiled when one of Möngke's armourers fell in with them, discovered a large cache of weapons in the wagons they were bringing, and hurried off to report to his master. The enemy princes were rounded up, and they and their supporters were put on trial. Many, including Yesü Möngke, the head of Chaghadai's line, and his nephew Büri, were put to death. The same fate befell their womenfolk, notably Oghul Qaimish herself, Shiremün's mother and Yesü Möngke's wife. A number of those Chinggisid princes who were spared were exiled to the Chinese front. There followed a major redistribution of assets among the members of the imperial dynasty.

**Appanages and shared authority**

As in previous steppe polities, the conquered territories were regarded as the common patrimony of the entire imperial family, and most of the princes and princesses were allotted a share (Mo. qubi; Ch. fendi) in the empire as an appanage. The requirements of a nomadic society dictated the assignment of specific pasturages to individuals, so that every one of Chinggis Khan's descendants, as Juwaynī tells us, had his or her own station (maqām) and camping-ground (yurt). Thus, for instance, his younger brothers and their progeny were allotted territories in eastern Mongolia and present-day Manchuria. Members of the dynasty, as we saw, were granted
a certain number of ‘thousands’ of the conquered nomadic peoples (above, pp. 99–100). Such a patrimony, combining defined pastureland and population, is termed *ulus* in the sources. By virtue of his office (and independently of his own appanage), the qaghan administered directly the *qol-un ulus* (‘ulus of the centre’). In territorial terms this was most probably the region surrounding Qaraqorum (rather than the original Mongol heartlands on the Onon and the Kerülen) and its inhabitants; in terms of military resources it included Chinggis Khan’s guard, which the ‘Secret History’ shows us being ceremonially handed over to Ögödei, as part of the ‘great [i.e. imperial] centre (*yeke qol*)’, on his enthronement.\(^{45}\)

The largest appanages were those bestowed on the conqueror’s sons by his chief wife.\(^{46}\) Juwaynī tells us that Jochi, as the eldest, was granted the most remote territory, stretching ‘from the confines (*hudūd*) of Qayaligh and Khwārazm to the furthest parts (*aqṣā*) of Saqsīn and Bulghār’ and ‘as far on that side as the hooves of Tatar horses had reached’. Chaghadai received a tract from the border of the Uighur dominions as far as Samarqand and Bukhārā; its heartlands were the Ili basin, where the khan’s summer residence lay close to the city of Almaligh, and the shores of the Issyk Köl.\(^{47}\) It did not include the Uighur principality, which remained directly subject to the qaghan.\(^{48}\) Ögödei’s camping-grounds (*yurt*) lay in the region of the Emil and Qobuq rivers; on attaining the dignity of qaghan, he transferred his appanage to his eldest son Güyüg. Curiously, we are given no information regarding the territory of Tolui, of whom Juwaynī appears to say that he was in attendance on his father.\(^{49}\) A parallel passage of Rashīd al-Dīn confirms this impression, saying that Chinggis Khan for this reason called him his *nökör* (‘comrade-in-arms’), although elsewhere he says simply that each of the sons was allotted a portion of the empire.\(^{50}\) Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-’Umarī at this juncture follows Juwaynī and employs closely similar phrasing, while at two other points in his work he goes further: as a counterblast to Ilkhanid pretensions, the khans of Jochi’s and Chaghadai’s lines denied that Chinggis Khan had given Tolui any land to rule, and this view is endorsed by al-’Umarī’s informant al-Īsfahānī.\(^{51}\) Only Waṣṣāf understands Juwaynī’s phrasing differently and says explicitly that Tolui’s *yurt* lay adjacent to that of Ögödei, though still without defining its location.\(^{52}\) We can infer from other contexts that Tolui was destined, as the ‘hearth-prince’, to inherit his father’s original territory along the Onon and Kerülen rivers,\(^{53}\) and Rashid al-Dīn might be suggesting that he did so even before the conqueror’s death when he tells us that according to Mongol custom the *ot-chigin* remained at home.\(^{54}\) But on the balance of the evidence it is possible that Tolui received no land during Chinggis Khan’s lifetime.
The original purpose, as far as we can tell, was that the various branches of Chinggis Khan's progeny should exercise some measure of autonomy in their appanaged territories. Within each ulus, just as in the succession to the imperial dignity, the preferred mode of succession was by seniority, although the appanage-holder might try to nominate his heir. Thus Güyük at his accession replaced Chaghadai's grandson and designated heir, Qara Hülegü, with one of Chaghadai's sons, Yesü Möngke, an old friend (and a habitual drunkard, we are told), on the grounds that a senior prince took precedence over a junior one. But the qaghan on occasion took the opportunity to impose his own choice as head of an ulus in defiance of this principle. Batu's son and successor Sartaq, for example, was Möngke's candidate, if we can believe the Armenian Kirakos; and having restored Qara Hülegü as ruler of Chaghadai's ulus, Möngke entrusted it, on that prince's premature death, to his widow Orqina, who was to rule on behalf of their infant son Mubārak Shāh. By such means the head of the dynasty sought to strengthen his influence in regions far remote from Qaraqorum.

The concept of corporate sovereignty – of joint possession by the dynasty as a whole – was reflected in the consultative assemblies (qurultails) convened to reach major decisions, whether on the choice of a new qaghan, on fresh expansionist campaigns, or on judicial matters. Representatives of the families of Chinggis Khan's four sons were instrumental in the creation of the yam network. The same principle found expression in the composition of the armies of conquest. As early as Chinggis Khan's assault on the Khwarazmian empire, we find troops being detached for further campaigns on a proportional basis – one in ten, in the case of the division that accompanied Tolui into Khurāsān – from those belonging to the different princes of the imperial family. When Güyük despatched the general Eljigidei to Iran in 1247, his army too was made up by means of a levy 'from each prince' of two in every hundred soldiers. Juwaynī informs us that the forces accompanying Qubilai and Hülegü respectively against Yunnan in 1252 and into Iran two years later were likewise assembled by taking two out of every hundred from 'the armies of the east and the west'.

The major expeditions were led by princes representing the various branches of the dynasty. The forces with which Batu and Sübe'edei moved westwards in 1236 included not only troops under certain of Batu's brothers but also contingents headed by the Chaghadayid princes Büri and Baidar, the Qaghan Ögödei's sons Güyük and Qadan, Tolui's sons Möngke and Böchek, and Kölgen, a son of Chinggis Khan by one of his lesser wives. Hülegü's army incorporated divisions led by three Jochid princes, a Chaghadayid prince and the son of one of Chinggis Khan's daughters, as
well as further troops supplied by imperial sons-in-law; Ögödei’s line, it seems, was no longer represented.64

It was envisaged that the garrison forces (tamma, tammachi: see p. 82) left in the subjugated lands would be quartered there permanently. When Möngke despatched him to command the troops in the Indian borderlands and northern Afghanistan, the noyan Sali asked how long he was to stay. ‘You will remain there,’ replied the Qaghan, ‘for ever.’65 Originally, each of Chinggis Khan’s four sons had been ordered to supply a ‘thousand’ under one of his lieutenants to take up its station in this region; and fresh troops sent there on Ögödei’s accession had been similarly commanded by noyans representing the Qaghan, Batu and Chaghadai (on this occasion, for some reason, Tolui is not mentioned).66 Tamma forces were selected, it seems, on the same proportional basis as the larger armies of conquest. In the fourteenth century, the name of a new quasi-tribal grouping that had emerged in Khurāsān, the Ja‘ūn-i Qurbān (Mo. je‘üni qurban, ‘three per cent’), would preserve a distant echo of this method of recruitment.67

With the extension of Mongol power into areas of sedentary culture, members of the dynasty received shares here too: entire towns, for instance, assignments of annual income and proprietary rights over colonies of skilled craftsmen. Princely property of this kind was termed inchü.68 A prince’s appanage (Mo.-Tu. ulus; Ch. touxia) might thereby take on a somewhat diverse complexion. Thus Nasawī says that Chinggis Khan conferred on Jochi the city of Gurgānj (Ürgench) prior to its capture in 1221,69 and Rubruck mentions that an Alan (Ās) fortress north of Darband was the personal property of the Qaghan Möngke, who had captured it during Batu’s expedition of 1236–42.70 It appears that the conquests in sedentary China and Iran in general remained part of the ‘ulus of the centre (qol)’, in other words under the qaghan’s immediate authority, but that other Chinggisids enjoyed rights over populations and revenues from particular cities, frequently places in whose capture they, or their forebear, had participated.71 We see this principle at work in 1236, when Ögödei divided up the population of the recently conquered Jin empire between himself and his kinsfolk. The inhabitants of Taiyuan were conferred on Chaghadai, who had taken part in its capture in 1213 and had received the original plunder from the city; Tolui’s line inherited spoils that Tolui himself had acquired on campaign in northern China during Chinggis Khan’s lifetime.72

It is to be assumed that Juwaynī provides us with a snapshot, as it were, and that the early territorial grants made by Chinggis Khan had been subject to modification as the empire expanded. We can trace the growth – and the westward shift – of Jochi’s ulus in our principal sources.73 The
earliest grant of which we know is recorded in the ‘Secret History’, where his father gives him the ‘forest peoples’ (e.g. the Oyirat and the Qirghiz).74 But Rashīd al-Dīn, at different points in his narrative, furnishes conflicting details regarding the location of Jochi’s ulus. At one juncture, it is said to have embraced ‘all the territory and ulus in the confines of the Irtysh river and the Altai mountains’ and to have been centred on the Irtysh,75 details that evidently apply to a fairly early date, perhaps around 1207 when Jochi was engaged in operations against the ‘forest peoples’. By the time his lands passed to his sons, headed by Batu, the real founder of the power later known to historians as the ‘Golden Horde’, the centre of gravity of the ulus seems to have lain significantly to the west. It moved still further as a result of the expedition of 1236–42, which reduced the Bulghār qaghanate, the Rus’ principalities and Danubian Bulgaria, and completed the subjugation of the Qipchaq. The Jochid territories seemed to stretch away indefinitely76 – in the north-east up to the frontier of the qaghan’s dominions in the region that Rashīd al-Dīn calls Deresū;77 in a northerly direction into the Russian forest belt and even beyond, into the fur-bearing lands of the Yughra and the Samoyed; and in the west as far as the Danube basin, the Carpathians and the fringes of the Baltic world. Well might Jūzjānī put into Batu’s mouth, at the quriltai of 1251, the sentiment that he and his brothers already possessed enough territory in the west not to desire the imperial dignity as well.78 The kernel of his lands was the Qipchaq steppe (dasht-i Qipchāq) – the former grazing-grounds of the Qipchaq-Qangli, whence the designation ‘Qipchaq khanate’ often applied to the lands of his descendants – and the wealthy and culturally advanced region of Khwārazm. Within these territories, each of Jochi’s numerous sons had his own appanage. While Batu’s grazing-lands lay along the Volga, we also read, for instance, of the ulus of Orda, who as the eldest son enjoyed a position of especial honour.79 His lands lay to the north-east, in the upper Irtysh region that had been Jochi’s principal encampment80 (his mother is not named as Jochi’s chief wife, but since she is described as a lady of status, it is possible that he was the only son by a former chief wife and hence the ‘hearth-prince’).

In the far west, the Jochids had the twin advantages of the lush grasslands in the river basins of the Pontic-Caspian steppes – the Ural (or Yayiq, as Turkic-speakers called it), the Volga, the Don, the Dnieper and the Dniester – and a lengthy open frontier that invited expansion. The other branches did not possess either of these assets in the same measure – particularly the Chaghadayids, whose only external frontier with non-Mongol states was the Hindu Kush. Possibly this is what lay behind the protest of the Chaghadayid prince Büri, who, according to Rubruck, had demanded why he should not
be allowed to graze his livestock along the Volga, suggesting, perhaps, that the transfer of the Jochids’ eastern grazing-grounds to the Chaghadayids was somewhat overdue (although it should also be noted that he had taken Güyük’s side in the quarrel with Batu during the 1236–42 expedition). Rubruck heard that Büri was in his cups; but this did not secure him a reprieve at the time of the coup d’état in 1251, when he was arrested by Batu’s men, taken to Batu’s encampment (ordo) and put to death.81

That coup, and the elimination of several members of the two middle branches of the imperial dynasty, were followed by a fresh apportionment of territories. Some went to ‘have-nots’ – Chaghadayid and Ögödeyid princes of lower status who had thrown in their lot with the new Qaghan Möngke or who were too young to have been party to the opposition. We have seen how Qara Hülegü and his young son Mubārak Shāh were successively made head of Chaghadai’s ulus. Hoqu, Güyük’s infant son, and Qadan and Melik, two of Ögödei’s sons by a concubine, were granted appanages, as was a grandson of Ögödei named Qaidu. Another grandson, Totoq, received as his appanage the Emil region, the kernel of Ögödei’s territory; but we are nowhere told whether he or anyone else now headed Ögödei’s ulus or indeed whether Ögödei’s ulus still existed.82 Toluid holdings certainly grew at the Ögödeyids’ expense. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Möngke’s youngest brother Arigh Böke had his summer quarters in the Altai and wintered on the Ürünggü and in the Qirghiz territory, and their mother Sorqaqtani had also lived there;83 part of this region had probably lain within the appanage successively of Ögödei and Güyük. In Tibet, where not long previously Ögödei’s son Ködön (Köten) had wielded considerable power, new appanages were carved out for Möngke’s brothers, notably the third, Hülegü; though Ködön’s progeny retained their lands in the Tangut country.84 As we shall see, the Jochid territories underwent a still more striking expansion.

The role of elite Mongol women

It is a commonplace that women in nomadic Inner Asian societies enjoyed considerable freedom.85 In the Kitan-Liao state, dowager empresses had exercised political power, and two of the twelfth-century Gür-khans of the Qara-Khitai had been female.86 Within the Mongol territories, only one princess, Sāṭi Beg in Ilkhanid Iran in 739/1338, was ever recognized as sovereign ruler, with her name inserted in the khuṭba and on the coinage.87 But both Ögödei’s chief wife, Töregene, and Güyük’s, Oghul Qaimish, were installed as regent of the empire following their husbands’ deaths, and in Chaghadai’s ulus Orqina, widow of the khan Qara Hülegü, acted as regent
for her infant son. Chinggisid princesses attended quriltai, where their opinions carried weight. Tolui’s widow Sorqaqtani Beki, the mother of Möngke, Qubilai, Hülegü and Arigh Böke, played an active role in politics after her husband’s death (1233) and is depicted as one of the chief instruments behind Möngke’s succession to the imperial throne; Qubilai’s wife Chabi was a major influence on him. According to Rashid al-Din, when Möngke sent Hülegü west he advised him to consult his chief wife, Doquz Khatun, in all matters. Elite Mongol women in the pre-imperial era had evidently possessed military skills, which they transmitted to their sons; though direct participation in warfare by women was unusual enough to attract comment in our sources.

Nor were the Jochid dominions and the Ilkhanate an exception (although here there were no instances of female regencies). Ibn Batṭūṭa would comment on the freedom of high-status women in the Jochid lands. In Iran certain princesses were allotted their own ordos and possessed armed retinues, at least until 1295, when it seems Ghazan began to absorb these contingents in his forces. If the Western Christian missionary Riccoldo da Montecroce somewhat overstated the case when he observed that ‘the Tartars greatly honour all the women in the world and especially their own’, he was nevertheless correct with regard to the esteem enjoyed by Mongol women of rank.

It is important, however, to distinguish between (1) the less circumscribed role of women in general, including the conspicuous position of elite women in public ceremonial, which Ibn Batṭūṭa observed as he travelled both in the Golden Horde territories and in the Ilkhanate; (2) the prominence of certain royal women in governance, not least as regents; and (3), conversely, the total absence of females – with the single exception of Satī Beg – from the lists of Mongol sovereigns. We should take care not to exaggerate the freedom allowed to females of the imperial dynasty: even Riccoldo tempered the remark we have just cited, by pointing out that elite women were still subject to the authority of menfolk, adverting by way of symbolic (but misplaced) illustration the fact that their head-dress, the boghtaq, was shaped like a foot (Plate 1). That said, however, the above examples leave little room for doubt that under the Mongols, as in steppe polities in general, elite women enjoyed a greater political influence than in traditional sedentary Islamic society.

The administrative structure of the empire

The two principal officers appointed to govern the newly conquered regions were the basqaq and the darughachi (or darugha). The office of basqaq, it
has been suggested,97 was borrowed from the Qara-Khitai, who had in all probability themselves taken it over from the Qarakhanids; the Gür-khans had customarily appointed a representative (termed shiḥna in the Arabic and Persian sources) for each of the client states within their empire. So too the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad b. Tekish, on receiving the submission of the Qarakhanid ruler of Samarqand, had appointed a basqaq to keep him under surveillance and ensure his loyalty.98 Describing Chinggis Khan’s appointment of governors in 1221, Rashīd al-Dīn employs shiḥna; he later calls Chin Temur, Körgüz and Arghun Aqa alike ‘basqaq of Iran’, and at one point gives the last named the title shiḥna.99 Semantically the Turkish term basqaq (bas-, ‘to hold down, control’) corresponds to the Mongol darughachi/darugha, and at times the basqaq appears simply to be the darughachi under another name. Yet we cannot be certain that the content of these two terms was identical.100

According to the ‘Secret History’, Chinggis Khan nominated darughachis to all the cities when the conquest of the Sarta’ul (the Muslims) was completed: the cities specified are Bukhārā, Samarqand, Ürgench (Gurgānj), Khotan, Kāshghar, Yārkand and Kūcha.101 As in the case of the Qara-Khitai basqaq, the title of darughachi often indicates the commissioner, or ‘resident’, who oversaw the activities of client princes. From the account of the journey of the Daoist adept Changchun (Qiu Chuji) we know that in 1221 there was already a darughachi at Almaligh, alongside the local dynast.102 But not every one of the places listed in the ‘Secret History’ had retained its own ruler, and the link with cities, rather than rulers, suggests that the darughachi’s office was distinct, more localized and, probably, subordinate. In any case, as Professor István Vásáry has observed, the meaning of the two terms would change over time.103

Of the appointments made in 1221, only two – both in the former dominions of the Khwārazmshāh – are known by name. One was the Kitan Yelü Ahai, who became ‘governor and shiḥna of the region (nāḥiyat) of Bukhārā’ (that is, probably Transoxiana as a whole) and who resided in Samarqand. Ahai’s career, obscured by Juwaynī’s reference to him simply as ‘Tūshā the basqaq’, was investigated by Professor Paul Buell, who demonstrated that this name is in fact a Chinese title (taishi, ‘Grand Preceptor’). On his death shortly after 1222, it seems, Ahai was succeeded by his son Yelü Miansige, who was still in office at the time of the revolt of Maḥmūd Tārābī in 1238.104

About the second appointment dating from 1221, that of Chin Temur, we are rather better informed. Described by Juwaynī as a Qara-Khitai but by Rashīd al-Dīn as belonging to the Önggüt, he was made basqaq in Khwārazm
(Ürgench) by Jochi (on whom, it will be recalled, that region had been conferred). Ordered by Ögödei in c. 1229 to join Chormaghun from Khwārazm and render him military assistance, he spent the next few years in Khurāsān. Here his prompt intervention against the rebel Khwarazmian amirs Qaracha and Yaghān Sonqur, and his despatch to the Qaghan Ögödei in 630/1232–3 of a group of the province’s local rulers (maliks) who had freshly submitted, secured him the governorship of Khurāsān and Māzandarān in the face of the rival claims of Dayir Noyan, on whom Ögödei had previously conferred it. When Chin Temür died in 633/1235–6, the aged general Nosal (or Naisal) governed for a few years, only to be superseded on Ögödei’s orders by the Uighur Körgüz and confined to his military command. But Körgüz, it seems, took inadequate care to avoid offending the powerful. Following the death of Ögödei, he fell victim to the rancour of the Qaghan's widow Töregene; she sent him to the headquarters of Chaghadai’s ulus, where truculent remarks he had made on an earlier occasion brought about his execution. He was succeeded by the Oyirat noyan Arghun (later to be known as Arghun Aqa), who was Töregene’s nominee and who nevertheless contrived to retain his post not only through the change of regime at the centre in 1251 but beyond, contemporaneously with Hülegü’s campaigns and (technically, at least) until his own death in 673/1275.

What functions did these noyans fulfil? Yelü Ahai’s responsibilities in Transoxiana in the 1220s included the levying of taxation, the mustering and provisioning of local security forces, the allocation and supervision of corvée duties, and the reception of distinguished visitors such as the Daoist Changchun. During the first few years of his governorship of Khurāsān and Māzandarān, Körgüz is said to have conducted the first census in the province, reassessed the taxes and founded workshops (kārkhānahā). When Ögödei confirmed Körgüz in office in or just before 637/1239, however, he greatly expanded his sphere of competence by transferring to him responsibility for all the territories conquered by Chormaghun west of the Oxus. Chormaghun’s authority was thereby confined to purely military matters, in much the same way as that of Nosal within Khurāsān a few years previously. Körgüz now presided over the administration of an enormous area that Juwaynī defines as extending, at the time of the governor’s downfall, ‘from the Oxus to Fārs, Georgia, Rūm and Mosul’. What we see here is the creation in Iran of a ‘branch secretariat’ (Ch. xingsheng) – an institution which the Mongols had borrowed from the Jurchen-Jin and which Professor Buell has christened the ‘joint satellite administration’ – and its assumption of governmental responsibilities hitherto exercised by the
Two such administrative structures had already been established elsewhere. In northern China the Khwarazmian Maḥmūd Yalavach was responsible for the former Jin territories and those so far conquered from the Song; and his son Masʿūd presided over an administration that covered, by the beginning of Möngke’s reign, Transoxiana, Turkestan, the Uighur territories, Khotan, Kāshghar, Farghāna, Uṣrār, Jand and Khwārazm.

In these early years of Mongol rule, there was no differentiation between military and civil authority. Those appointed as darughachi tended to be drawn from the qaghan’s guard (keshig), which, as we noticed (pp. 64–5), was the core institution of Mongol government. The establishment of the ‘joint satellite administration’ may have entailed a reduction in the power of the tamma commander, but it did not introduce a total separation of civil and military affairs. The whole region was still under military rule, albeit with a greater degree of bureaucratization. The Mongols would move slowly in this regard. In China the darughachi would continue to exercise both civil and military functions until Qubilai’s attempt to separate the two spheres in the 1260s.

At the lower levels of the bureaucracy, the scribe or secretary (Tu. bitikchi; Mo. bichechi) was similarly incorporated in the guard. Members of several different ethnic groups filled this office. Changchun, visiting Yelü Ahai in Transoxiana en route for Chinggis Khan’s headquarters, noticed Chinese among the ‘people of various nationality’ employed in the local administration. Three decades or more later, Juwaynī refers to Muslim bitikchis at the imperial court, and says that there were scribes for each language – Persian, Uighur, Chinese (khitā’ī), Tibetan and Tangut, among others. This was clearly a world that prized the skills of the interpreter, a circumstance that will be discussed later (chapters 8 and 10). During the early decades the conquerors undoubtedly set the highest value upon the Uighur language and script, which is presumably why Rubruck was misled into concluding that Uighurs provided the Mongol regime with its principal bitikchis. Juwaynī mentions that both Körgüz and Arghun had achieved high office on account of their familiarity with the Uighur script. According to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, the minister Maḥmūd Yalavach, who successively governed Transoxiana and northern China, could write Mongolian, Uighur, Turkish and Persian and spoke ‘Khitā’ī’ (Chinese or Kitan?), ‘Hindi’ and Arabic. It seems that many – including Muslims – employed by the conquerors thanks to their knowledge of the Uighur script were of low origins. As a scion of an old-established Persian bureaucratic family Juwaynī does not mince his words: ‘They consider the Uighur language and script to be the pinnacle of knowledge and learning … They consider the breaking
of wind and the boxing of ears to proceed from the kindness of their nature.\textsuperscript{124} At one point we are given a specific example of such low-bred conduct, in the person of Aṣīl, Körgüz’s steward and later wazir, the son of a farmer (\textit{dīhqān}).\textsuperscript{125} Indeed, since Juwaynī’s view of Arghun seems to have been ambivalent (though he stops short of criticizing him directly),\textsuperscript{126} the foregoing strictures may have been intended to include him as well.

The notion that the administration should be structured in collegial fashion, with regard both to the composition of military expeditions and to the allocation of territory and peoples, was likewise reflected in the composition of the governor’s staff at a regional and local level. Thus when Chin Temür set out from Khwārazm to support Chormaghun’s operations, he placed at his disposal ‘amirs representing the princes’, while Chormaghun in turn attached to Chin Temür an amir to represent ‘every prince and prince’s son’. Chin Temür having appointed Bahā’ al-Dīn Juwaynī (the historian’s father) as finance minister (\textit{ṣāḥib-dīwān}), each of the other amirs, we are told, sent a secretary (\textit{bitikchī}) to the bureau (\textit{dīwān}) to represent the respective princes.\textsuperscript{127}

\textbf{Taxation}\textsuperscript{128}

Disregarding at this point the tribute levied on client princes, which will be examined in chapter 9, taxation of the conquered sedentary populations initially amounted to no more than a series of extraordinary levies designed to provision the conquering forces or to fuel the war effort in the longer term. Exactions of the former kind, usually subsumed under the term \textit{ṭaghār},\textsuperscript{129} need no illustration. Those in the latter category include the demand for horses, clothing and money from Hamadān, Tabrīz and Ganja by Jebe and Sūbêdei in 617–18/1220–1, or for silks and other rare textiles from Tabrīz by Chormaghun in 628/1231;\textsuperscript{130} the requisitioning of two ropes, one arrow and one horseshoe from every Armenian at the time of Hülegū’s expedition;\textsuperscript{131} or that of an axe from every adult male, as also of any unwrought iron, in the case of the inhabitants of the territory between the Don and the Danube (and even, if Rubruck is to be believed, south of the Danube).\textsuperscript{132} The accent on fine textiles and on metal, in such short supply among the nomads, is to be noted.

The taxes levied during the early phase of Mongol dominion could perhaps most conveniently have been classified as those customarily demanded by pre-Mongol rulers and those required (intermittently) from the nomads themselves and now extended to the sedentary peoples. Let us begin with the latter category, which comprised the \textit{tamghā}, the \textit{qalan} and
The qubchur. The tamgha was a tax on commercial transactions. When it was implemented in Central Asia is unknown. Paul Ratchnevsky, who thought it unlikely that it existed in Chinggis Khan's time in view of the close ties the Mongol sovereign cultivated with traders (above, pp. 73, 91–2), suggested that it was introduced by Ögödei. Its appearance in Iran may have followed upon the arrival of Hülegü.

The meaning of the term qalan is often unclear in the sources and may have covered a variety of impositions. Professor John Masson Smith has argued that qalan (probably from Tu. qal-, ‘to remain, continue’) denotes the levies traditionally imposed on the Mongols’ sedentary subjects by their previous rulers. If so, this was only one of the senses in which it was employed: it was also used more broadly, to embrace corvée duties in addition, and more narrowly, of the agricultural taxes traditionally paid by the cultivators – that is, in the Islamic world, the kharāj or (in the case of land that was irrigated artificially) the ‘ushr or tithe.

Qubchur first surfaces in the ‘Secret History’ (in its Mongolian guise, qubchiri) as a levy of beasts from the nomadic population, when Temüjin imposed it on his followers in order to assist his (then) ally Toghril, who had fallen on hard times. At the quriltai of 1235 Ögödei levied a qubchur of one beast in every hundred for his own establishment and one for the relief of the poor. After the rate had been raised temporarily to one in ten by the hard-pressed Oghul Qaimish in 1250, Möngke reissued the original edict, but decreed that anyone who owned fewer than 100 animals within a particular category was to pay nothing. It has been proposed that walled centres found in Mongolia were designed for the temporary housing of large quantities of livestock raised in this fashion. The imposition of the qubchur on the sedentary population in Iran is usually associated with Möngke’s reign, though a decree of Ögödei ordering that for every ten measures of grain one be levied for the relief of the poor seems to correspond to the levy of 1235 on the nomads (which Rashīd al-Dīn mentions immediately before it) and perhaps represented its ‘sedentary’ counterpart.

Whatever the case, under Möngke the qubchur first appears as a head-tax on the sedentary population, in which sense it frequently recurs in the Persian sources. Its implementation was invariably preceded, from the early 1250s at least in Iran, the Caucasus and Russia, by the census, though censuses had earlier been conducted in other regions of Iran such as Sīstān, and in China, without, as far as we can tell, necessarily heralding the qubchur, and in Khurāsān and Māzandarān by Körgüz (637/1239–40) explicitly as the basis for taxation (mālhā). In all likelihood these previous counts had been devised as a basis for the recruitment of auxiliary troops;
or they may simply have served to determine a global tribute figure. Möngke decreed that the new tax was to be levied only once a year; the proceeds were reserved for the costs of the forced levy (ḥashar), the relay-system (yam) and the maintenance of envoys (elchis). The Qaghan also set graduated rates: a wealthy man was to pay ten dinārs per annum and a poor man only one. Juwaynī’s phrasing suggests that the figures were modelled on the system in Transoxiana, where the governor Masʿūd Beg had already introduced the collection of qubchur (though whether this was a recent innovation or dated from the reign of Ögödei or Gıyūg, we are not told); and we know from the report of Changde, dated 1259, that in Transoxiana the rich paid a higher poll-tax than the poor and that the maximum payable was ten gold coins. On arriving back in Khurāsān with Möngke’s edict, Arghun Aqa consulted his officials and set the maximum annual rate at seventy dinars for every ten persons. Then in 656/1258, in the wake of Hülegü’s arrival in the Transcaucasus, the governor instituted a more far-reaching reform, whereby the richest paid 500 dinars and the poorest one.

Whereas the principle underlying traditional Islamic taxation was the ownership and use of land, the basis of the qubchur, as the Mongols’ use of the census demonstrates, was the individual (whether the possessor of land or not). It is important to notice, however, that the conquerors maintained the old land-tax – the kharāj or the ‘ushr – alongside the new fiscal imposts; Grigor Aknerts’i gives the impression that it amounted to half the produce. Apart from the jizya (on which see p. 315), they discontinued only one tax that (though strictly uncanonical) had traditionally been levied in Islamic territories, namely a tax on the estate of a man who died without heirs, irrespective of whether he was a high-ranking official or a peasant. For this we have the testimony not merely of Juwaynī, who says that the Mongols viewed it as inappropriate and that he himself abolished it as governor of Baghdad, but of a report seemingly drafted, on the first Ilkhan’s orders, by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, who confirms that Chinggis Khan and his dynasty were opposed to such a tax. The reason for this aversion – and for an uncharacteristic readiness on the conquerors’ part to forgo revenue – is not given; but it was most probably the steppe taboo regarding contact with the effects of those recently deceased, attested by Western European visitors among others.

Mongol law

Juwaynī tells us that Chinggis Khan issued a regulation for every circumstance. The Arabic-Persian term yāsā (Tu. yasaq) that Juwaynī and other
Muslim authors employ for such enactments corresponds to the Mongolian *jasagh*, the sense of which is ‘normative law’. The scope of Chinggis Khan’s rulings has been much discussed. The controversy surrounding the so-called ‘Great Yasa’, supposedly a legal code promulgated at his enthronement in 1206, has been fuelled in part by our failure to understand two things. One is that the epithet ‘great’ (*buzurg*), often linked with *yāsā* by the Persian historians (and corresponding to *da* in the Chinese sources), simply has the connotation of ‘ancestral’, i.e. ‘imperial’. The other is the fact that in the Persian material *yāsā*, sometimes coupled with *yūsūn* (Mo. *yosun*, ‘custom, practice’), can denote ‘law’ more generally – as virtually tantamount, that is, to ‘rule’ or ‘regime’. The concept seems to correspond to the older Turkish term *törü/töre* current in the Türk and Uighur empires. On these grounds ‘order’, given its twofold meaning in English, might be the most appropriate rendering of the term *yasa*(q), since what is intended in this broader sense is the Chinggisid (world-)order. It was with some such general purport that the Qaghan Güyük employed the term in 1246, when he summoned Pope Innocent IV to appear in person at his court and ‘hear every command that there is of the Yasa’, and that the Ilkhan Abagha used what was evidently the same phrase in his letter to Sultan Baybars in 1268–9.

There is nothing inherently improbable in the idea that a written body of regulations existed by the time of Chinggis Khan’s death. We have a good deal of evidence that when the Mongols embarked upon the reduction of territories beyond East Asia they already employed scribes to produce documents in the Uighur script. In the act of appointing Shigi Qutuqu as *yarghuchi* or chief judge (according to a passage in the ‘Secret History’ long mistakenly thought to refer to the inception of the ‘Great Yasa’), Chinggis Khan instructed him to keep a written record not only of the subject populations distributed to members of the imperial family but of all judicial decisions as well. To take another example, during Changchun’s audiences with Chinggis Khan, Li Zhichang tells us, the conqueror twice commanded scribes to note down his visitor’s words, on the former occasion in Chinese and on the latter in Uighur characters. By Ögödei’s reign, Rashīd al-Dīn tells us, ruling princes like Chaghadaï had their intimate attendants write down daily their every utterance (*bilig*).

According to Rashid al-Dīn, Chinggis Khan ‘drew up and anthologized the customs and usages of the *yasaq* and *yosun* of rulership (*rusūm-u qawānīn-i yāsāq-u yūsūn-ipādishāhī-rā murattab-u mūdawwan gardānīd*). But the earliest evidence that these originally ad hoc edicts or rulings were seen as a corpus (rather than a ‘code’) comes from 1229, when Ögödei at his accession is said to have ordered that they be preserved unaltered. Juwaynī
assures us that Chinggis Khan’s yasas, which were recorded in a ‘great book of yasas (yāsā-nāma-yi buzurg)’ kept in the treasury, were brought out and consulted at major assemblies, marking the accession of a new qaghan, for instance, or convened to discuss military expeditions.\textsuperscript{160} It is clear that the reigns of Ögödei and his successors witnessed accretions to the corpus, as further yasas were promulgated and added to those of Chinggis Khan. Thus at his enthronement in 1246 Güyüg decreed that his father’s yasas be kept unchanged.\textsuperscript{161} As late as 1311 the newly enthroned Qaghan Buyantu (reigned as Renzong, 1311–20) ordered that an inquiry be made into the yasas of his great-grandfather Qubilai and that any which had fallen into disuse should be observed afresh.\textsuperscript{162} The public occasions to which Juwaynī refers were in all probability identical with those on which Rashīd al-Dīn says the conqueror’s descendants conducted a yasl or yasamishi, a term he defines as ‘setting in order (rāst kardan) their customs and practices’.\textsuperscript{163}

One problem confronting us is the absence of any comprehensive list of yasas. Attempts have been made to reconstruct the ‘Great Yasa’,\textsuperscript{164} but they have by no means commanded widespread assent among historians.\textsuperscript{165} There is a strong possibility that writers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries read back into the thirteenth century conditions that obtained in their own time and thereby identified as yasas promulgated by Chinggis Khan or his immediate successors regulations (or customs) that represent later accretions or, rather, interpolations. A case in point is the institution in the Crimean khanate of the four qarachu begging (qarachi beys), which in the eyes of a seventeenth-century writer went back to Chinggis Khan’s Yasa but which dates from the fourteenth century at the earliest.\textsuperscript{166} Another is the right of a grandson whose father was dead to inherit a share in his grandfather’s property on an equal basis with his uncles. In the early sixteenth century no less a figure than the Uzbek khan Muḥammad Shibānī believed this to be one of Chinggis Khan’s own yasas; but we have no evidence whatever for its existence in the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{167} More will be said on this subject in the Epilogue. But we might mention in passing Ibn ‘Arab Shāh, who had been carried off as a prisoner from Damascus to Central Asia in 1401 by Temür’s forces and had written a hostile biography of the conqueror. In his Fākihat al-khulafā’ (1448), a collection of fables in the ‘mirror for princes’ genre, he lists provisions of ‘Chinggis Khan’s Tūra’ that he regarded as contrary to the Islamic law (Sharī’a) and evidently found ridiculous: they are not encountered elsewhere and are surely apocryphal.\textsuperscript{168}

Juwaynī tells us that the business discussed in the course of great assemblies was ‘the disposition of armies and the destruction of provinces or cities’; and certainly, in his chapter on Chinggis Khan’s yasas, as David
Morgan noticed, he confines his attention to affairs of state, the military, the relay-station network and the organization of the annual hunt. Thus one yasa prohibited the seizure of the throne without consultation among the princes. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the conqueror issued no yasas relating to other matters. Indeed, Juwaynī further observes that Chinggis Khan abolished several (unspecified) reprehensible practices, establishing customs that were estimable from the vantage point of reason, and that many of these rulings (ḥakām) were in harmony with the Shari’a. Juwaynī’s motive in saying as little about yasas as he does is perhaps that, as we shall see in chapter 11, some yasas were undeniably in conflict with Islamic law and practice, although it is debatable how far they affected the subject Muslim population as a whole.

The distribution of authority: an overview

By the mid-thirteenth century Mongol imperial government had acquired the appearance of an extremely complex pattern of imperial or princely rights, direct rule or indirect control through client rulers, and civil or military appointments. In several of the conquered tracts, the regimes in power at the advent of the Mongols had been swept away: the Khwarazmian and Qara-Khitai empires, like the Tangut (Xi Xia) state and the Jin empire, ceased to exist. Considerable territories in the steppe, and to some extent beyond it, were assigned to Chinggisid princes as ulus; though at times the qaghan endeavoured to install there his own nominee to protect his interests. And in many regions – notably in southern Iran – local dynasts survived, or new ones were installed, under the qaghan’s overlordship; these will be surveyed in greater depth in chapter 9. In certain cases, such client rulers found a Mongol prince stationed close at hand. Thus the dynasty founded by Buzar (or Ozar) retained its capital at Almaligh, near which lay the spring and summer quarters of Chaghadai and his successors. And while the Uighur iduq-qut at Beshbaligh initially enjoyed a privileged status following his submission to Chinggis Khan and had hitherto been directly subject to the qaghans, Möngke evidently deemed it necessary to grant the Beshbaligh region to the Ögödeyid prince Totoq as his appanage, no doubt as a result of the iduq-qut’s partisanship in the succession dispute (see p. 318). The situation was further complicated by the fact that some of the Mongol commanders at the head of the tamma contingents located on the fringes of the steppe owed immediate loyalty not to the qaghan but to the particular member of the imperial family whom they represented and whose residence might be situated at a distance of hundreds of miles.
From Ögödei’s reign, moreover, a new layer of authority was inserted into this already intricate mesh, with the creation of the three regional secretariats – Buell’s ‘joint satellite administrations’, as we saw – to supervise the sedentary conquests, including not merely territories directly under the qaghan’s authority but also those granted to his kinsfolk; these bodies were headed by the qaghan’s own appointees. The new secretariats, which oversaw the levying and collection of taxation, were further responsible for the distribution of their allotted revenues to the qaghan’s relatives, who nevertheless had their own representatives within these regional bureaucracies and were naturally eager to exploit directly the sources of their wealth. Even during Ögödei’s lifetime, Chaghadai had overstepped his rights by disposing of part of Transoxiana, but the Qaghan had overlooked the offence. After Ögödei’s death, Juwaynī tells us, each of the princes appropriated a region, making assignments (iṭlaq) on the tax revenues and issuing yarlighs and paizas in his own name. The Chaghdayids, with the approval of Ögödei’s widow, the regent Töregene, profited from the Qaghan’s demise to eliminate Körgüz; and it was possibly also at this time that one of them, Yesü Möngke, made an unsuccessful bid to assert his authority over Herat. The princes are said to have availed themselves of a similar opportunity to extend their power during the interregnum that followed Güyük’s death.

Various polarities are to be observed apropos of the administrative arrangements for the Mongol conquests west of the Oxus, the region on which, of course, our sources are the most informative. The first polarity was that between what we might term an embryonic civil administration and the military. Juwaynī lays some emphasis on Körgüz’s role in remedying the damage done by the armies of Chormaghun and Baiju, who, he claims, ‘regarded that territory [Tabrīz] as their own property’. The area under his authority having been considerably extended by Ögödei, Körgüz’s officials duly took over responsibility for the levying of taxes in Iraq, Arrān and Azerbaijan, but not without many disputes with Chormaghun’s lieutenants. Even if Juwaynī’s claim that under Körgüz the peasantry no longer suffered the exactions and requisitions of the military is an exaggeration, reflecting only partisanship for one of the two administrators his family had served, the governor’s concern for the rehabilitation of the territories he governed, and his readiness to oppose the rapacity of the military, are evident.

A second tension existed between the governor and the local maliks, who had like him benefited from the qaghan’s favour to secure an extension of their territory and who sought from the imperial court yarlighs and paizas on their own account: as Körgüz observed to his patron, Ögödei’s chief minister Chinqai, if they were successful, how would they differ from
himself? Chinqai was instrumental in seeing that Ögödei did not accede to their requests. On his accession, Güyük in turn took care to confer a yarligh and paiza upon Arghun alone, making him essentially the sole intermediary between the Qaghan and local maliks and officials; Arghun (for Iran), Mahmūd Yalavach (for China) and his son Masʿūd (for Central Asia) were allegedly the only provincial administrative personnel admitted to the new sovereign’s presence.

Yet a third source of tension lay in the potentially conflicting interests of princes who might hold property or revenue rights in close proximity to one another. The situation was manageable provided that the members of the dynasty focused on the imperial mission of expanding the borders of the Chinggisid empire. But Mongol princes were still remarkably young when they began to father the next generation. The passage of the decades thus rapidly diluted the common blood that might once have lent a sense of shared purpose to brothers or cousins (though the quarrel during the Qipchaq campaign of 1236–42 and the disputes of the period 1241–51 had already thrown its limitations into stark relief); and Chinggis Khan’s much-quoted precepts regarding dynastic solidarity doubtless rang a trifle hollow for those with a common ancestor no less than four or five generations back.

The final dichotomy to be noticed was that between the qaghan and his kinsfolk at large, whose representatives within the ‘joint satellite administration’ were sometimes in conflict with the regional governor or with the central secretariat, and who found opportunities to intervene directly in the affairs of a province bordering on their own domain, particularly during the lengthy interregnum following Ögödei’s death. In the past these centrifugal tendencies were believed to have remained unchecked under Güyük, but Professor Hodong Kim has made a good case for rehabilitating this brief reign. And indeed the chief offender in Western Asia was his enemy Batu, the head of Jochi’s ulus, whom Güyük was planning, at the time of his death, to bring to heel.

Möngke and centralization

Möngke’s chief instruments in the administration of the empire, like those of his predecessors, were the members of his keshig – his household establishment and his guard. Thomas Allsen has argued strongly that the new sovereign embarked upon a series of reforms, in order to maximize the resources that would be required for further campaigns of conquest in the west and in China. All seals and tablets of authority that had been issued to court officials and imperial princes and princesses since Chinggis Khan’s
day were recalled. The imperial courier system (*yam*) was to be used by members of the dynasty and by merchants only when official business was involved. *Ortaq* merchants – those, that is, in partnership with the government\(^\text{187}\) – were not to use the network at all; in addition, tax exemptions they had previously enjoyed were removed. Within the appanages, princes were forbidden to summon their subjects on their own authority and were not to intervene in fiscal matters without the approval of imperial officials. The aims of the Qaghan’s reforms were to broaden the tax base and to curtail the prerogatives of appanaged princes. Möngke appears in the sources as extremely careful in the fiscal sphere – even parsimonious;\(^\text{188}\) though it is only fair to add that he seems to have acted more generously towards the merchants who were creditors of the regime of Güyüg and Oghul Qaimish than his own counsellors urged.\(^\text{189}\) Juwaynī, at pains to stress Möngke’s humanity and clemency, makes out that his reforms were also designed to reduce the burden on the subject populations. Allsen is surely correct in pointing to the primary impulse behind the measures – namely, to ensure that the taxpayers were not so impoverished by excessive exactions as to jeopardize, in the longer term, their capacity to contribute to the treasury.\(^\text{190}\) Whether the Qaghan’s reforming policy reflects the influence of Iftikhār al-Dīn Muḥammad Qazwīnī, who Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī claims had tutored Möngke, ‘his brothers and his kinsmen’,\(^\text{191}\) we cannot be sure.

Allsen points out that Möngke cannot be securely classified within the category of either a champion of centralized imperial authority or a ‘steppe traditionalist’; he was obliged to permit the continuance of practices inimical to bureaucratic efficiency, such as the appanage system and the collegial structure of the regional secretariats.\(^\text{192}\) It may well be that the image of Möngke as an energetic reformer requires qualification on other grounds also. To some extent much of the source material is open to the same reservations as David Morgan has expressed regarding Rashīd al-Dīn’s account of the reforms of the Ilkhan Ghazan. Those who praise reform programmes may well have an interest in exaggerating the sorry state of affairs that preceded them, and their eulogies are a better indication of what was wrong than of what was in fact remedied.\(^\text{193}\) Here our principal source, Juwaynī, was admittedly no chief minister instrumental in the reforms, as was Rashīd al-Dīn in those of Ghazan; but his work, even so, was dedicated to the Qaghan’s brother Hūlegū. Is it perhaps possible that Juwaynī saw it as his task to play down what had been achieved by Möngke’s predecessors, Ögödei and Güyüg?

The resistance of the Ögödeyids and Chaghadayids in 1250–1 furnished the new Qaghan with a convenient pretext for reducing the power of
princes of these lines and thereby extending his own power and that of his family. But what of his relationship with the Jochids, the branch of the imperial dynasty that had given him unqualified support? As Allsen neatly puts it, ‘[h]aving disposed of his enemies, Möngke now faced the equally important task of dealing with his friends’.194

**Jochid power in Western Asia**

Despite the accent upon collegial authority that we observed earlier, eastern Iran throughout Ögödei’s reign was effectively governed by the Qagaghan’s representatives and those of Batu.195 Of the amirs attached to Chin Temür’s staff, Juwaynī specifies that Kül Bolod was to act for the Qaghan, Nosal for Batu, Qizil Buqa for Chaghadai and Yeke for Sorqaqtani as Tolui’s widow.196 But of the two last named we hear nothing further. When Ögödei appointed Chin Temür – one of Jochi’s officers, as we saw – as governor of Khurāsān and Māzandarān, he gave him Kül Bolod, his own agent, as partner;197 and after Chin Temür’s death Kül Bolod appears to have continued in this role alongside Nosal (who was deputizing for Batu).198 Following Kül Bolod’s death Arghun was similarly appointed as associate (nökör) to the new governor, Körgüz.199 Körgüz too had entered Jochi’s service at an early juncture, had been enrolled among the bitikchis and had been sent to Ürgench in attendance on Chin Temür, under whom he subsequently rose to the rank of chamberlain and deputy (ḥijābat-u niyābat).200 A phrase of the historian of Herat, Sayfī, also strongly indicates that Körgüz remained Batu’s man.201 Jūzjānī draws particular attention to the authority that Batu, as the senior among Chinggis Khan’s grandsons, enjoyed in Iran:

> Of every province in Iran that came under the rule of the Mongols, he had his allotted share, and his representatives used to take away [that] part in proportion to his share; and all the Mongol grandees and commanders obeyed him.202

Sayfī furnishes evidence of this situation on the ground, as it were, both for the 1230s and 1240s and for the reign of Möngke. At a date given as 637/1239–40, he reports the arrival at Herat of envoys from both Ögödei and Batu, who confirmed in office the shihna, Qarlugh, and the malik, ’Izz al-Dīn.203 In the following year, Majd al-Dīn, the malik of Kālyūn, applied in person to Batu for permission to restore his town’s fortifications. When Majd al-Dīn visited Herat on his return, and brought a paiza from Batu nominating him as its malik, we are told that Qarlugh greeted Batu’s command as
tantamount to that of the Qaghan Ögödei. Majd al-Dīn is said to have treated Batu’s envoys with greater distinction than those of the Qaghan and to have sent the choicest gifts to Batu’s headquarters. On Majd al-Dīn’s death at the hands of a subordinate of Arghun Aqa, Batu had the malik’s son Shams al-Dīn Muhammad installed as ruler of Herat, though in the event the prince was killed in 642/1244–5 on his return from Batu’s ordo. At a later point in the narrative, Sayfī claims that the rulers of Herat had been obliged twice a year to hand over to Batu’s representatives ten post-horses (ulagh), two luxury tents and 300 fine dinars, to be forwarded to his headquarters in the Qipchaq steppe, a practice that continued unchallenged until the 1250s, when the malik Shams al-Dīn Kurt rejected the demand.

In the Near East, too, Batu’s power grew apace, particularly during the five-year interval between Ögödei’s death and the accession of his cousin and enemy Güyük. Ibn al-‘Amīd says that Batu brought Baiju and his forces under his authority and that the general constantly waited upon him and obeyed his orders. The Mamlūk encyclopaedist al-Nuwayrī describes the army that invaded Anatolia in 640/1242, and which Baiju commanded, as coming on Batu’s behalf; while Ibn Bībī tells us that in the wake of his defeat at Kösedagh the Saljuq Sultan Kaykhusraw II was obliged to send envoys to Batu in the Pontic steppe. In 1247 the Qaghan Güyük attempted to redress the situation by despatching Eljigidei to supersede Baiju and to take control of the affairs of ‘Rūm, Georgia, Aleppo, Mosul and Takawur (Lesser Armenia); in Juwaynī’s noncommittal phrasing, ‘that no one else might interfere with them’; and in 1248 Eljigidei’s envoys to the French King Louis IX, then in Cyprus on crusade, duly described Baiju as subordinated to their master. According to Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umari, Eljigidei’s instructions were to arrest Batu’s lieutenants in the region. Güyük was himself advancing westwards against Batu at the head of a large army at the time of his premature death (646/1248), which put paid to this looming confrontation. Eljigidei was seized and executed; evidently Baiju and his troops once more became subject to Batu, who in 650/1252 secured their withdrawal from Mayyāfāriqīn following an appeal from its Ayyubid prince.

Batu’s agents apparently enjoyed a privileged position at the level of provincial bureaucracy. When Chin Temûr was appointed to administer Khurāsān and Māzandarān and his colleagues sent bitikchis to serve on the princes’ behalf, the new governor nominated Sharaf al-Dīn as wazir representing Batu, on account of his seniority and precedence (qadamat-ū sabaqat). A native of Khwārazm, Sharaf al-Dīn had joined Chin Temûr as a bitikchi when the latter departed for Khurāsān. He remained in office under Körgüz, though powerless in view of the governor’s iron rule, and
was confirmed as chief secretary (ulugh bitikchi) by Töregene when she appointed Arghun to succeed Körgüz.\textsuperscript{216} Throughout his tenure of office Sharaf al-Dīn repeatedly travelled to and from Batu’s ordo. His successor, Niẓām al-Dīn Shāh, died while in Batu’s ordo soon after 647/1249.\textsuperscript{217} In or just before 649/1251 Najm al-Dīn ‘Alī Jīlābādī arrived from Batu with a yarligh appointing him ulugh bitikchi; his appointment was confirmed by the newly enthroned Qaghan Möngke, and when Arghun set out for Möngke’s court later that year he appointed him his deputy in Khurāsān.\textsuperscript{218}

The Jochids were the principal beneficiaries of the purge of 1251 that so drastically pruned the two middle branches of the dynasty. It is striking that Juwaynī accords such prominence to Jochid representatives within the bureaucracy in Iran during Möngke’s reign: far less attention is given to Sirāj al-Dīn Shujā’ī, who represented first the Qaghan’s mother Sorqaqtani and then, after her death, his youngest brother Arigh Böke,\textsuperscript{219} and none at all to those (if any) who acted on behalf of the lines of Chaghadai and Ögödei. A Mamlūk historian learned that in c. 1260 Batu’s successor Berke enjoyed one-fifth of the revenues west of the Oxus, while the Qaghan took two-fifths and the rest went to the troops (including, presumably, the Jochids’ own contingents in Iran).\textsuperscript{220} Further north, part of Transoxiana appears to have passed under Jochid control, since Jūzjānī speaks of Batu’s protection (himāya) extending over the Muslims of ‘Turkistān; and in 658/1260 he would hear that following Möngke’s death the khutba was being read there, as also in Khurāsān and other parts of Iran, in Berke’s name.\textsuperscript{221} At this date, 5,000 of the 16,000 craftsmen domiciled in Bukhārā belonged to Jochi’s ulus; of the remainder, 3,000 were the property of Sorqaqtani (i.e. her son Arigh Böke, since she had died in 1252) and 8,000 belonged to the ‘ulus of the centre’.\textsuperscript{222} When Rubruck traversed Central Asia in 1253, he observed that the limits of Batu’s authority, where the friars entered the immediate jurisdiction of the qaghan’s people, lay not far east of Talas.\textsuperscript{223} The price for this extension of Jochid power may have been the creation in 1257 of a new regional secretariat for the sedentary territories within their sphere, headed by Kitai, whom Möngke appointed as darughachi of Rus\textsuperscript{224} – the earliest occasion on which we hear of that post.

During Batu’s lifetime contacts between the Toluids and their Jochid cousins who had been instrumental in Möngke’s election were apparently harmonious. On his death in 1255 Batu was succeeded by his son, Sartaq, who in turn died after a short reign, when returning from the Qaghan’s headquarters. The headship of the Jochid ulus then went briefly to Ulaghchi, a son or younger brother of Sartaq, before passing in c. 1257 to Batu’s brother Berke.\textsuperscript{225} Sartaq and Berke had been on bad terms. Armenian historians,
favourable towards the Nestorian Christian Sartaq, accused Berke and his brother Berkecher (both Muslims) of poisoning Sartaq and portrayed his death as a heavy blow to Möngke and Hülügê. On the basis of reports reaching Delhi, Jūzjānī claimed that Sartaq had insulted Berke, and ascribed his early demise to his uncle's prayers (though he also quoted a rumour that Sartaq had been poisoned by Möngke's agents). On balance, it seems that Berke was in some way implicated in his nephew's removal. Whatever Möngke's true feelings about this, Berke, who had played an important role in the Qaghan's accession in 1251, was rewarded with the grant of Georgia, and relations between the khan and the Toluids do not appear to have suffered. Rashīd al-Dīn goes so far as to say that they remained good for most of Berke's reign. They deteriorated only after Möngke's death, when a new configuration of power emerged in Western Asia with the creation of the Ilkhanate.

**Imperial unity**

The cohesiveness of the Mongol empire derived from various elements. Foremost, perhaps, was the Chinggisid dynasty, whose members had a share in the conquests and, in some degree, in governance. Second was its Turco-Mongol aristocracy. The history of the tribes in Rashīd al-Dīn's Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh makes it clear that members not only of the same tribe but of the same elite lineages were dispersed throughout the length and breadth of the empire, constituting (in a manner reminiscent of the aristocratic dynasties of the Roman empire or the ninth- and tenth-century Frankish nobility of the less far-flung Carolingian dominions) a truly transcontinental ruling stratum. The *yam* was a third element. The 'Secret History' has Ögödei, Chaghadai and Batu exchanging messages in which they agreed to link up their post-stations. Almost seventy years later, when the Qaghan Temür informed the Ilkhan Öljeitü that he and his Chinggisid enemies had concluded a general peace, he spoke of caravans and convoys being now connected stage by stage from the outlying parts of the empire to the heart of his own domain. 'We have joined our postal stations together,' Öljeitü would write in 1305, when transmitting the good news to Philip IV of France.

The last, and perhaps the most significant, constituent of imperial unity was an abiding allegiance to the system that its founder was deemed to have instituted. Rashīd al-Dīn makes Möngke despatch his brother Hülügê to Western Asia with an admonition to observe 'the customs, *yosun* and *yasa* of Chinggis Khan' in all affairs great and small. It matters less whether Möngke said this than that Rashīd al-Dīn, writing fifty years later, believed
he had done so. Although our sources frequently employ the term *yasa* to signify a particular edict, ‘Chinggis Khan’s Yasa’ had also become a shorthand expression for his precepts as a whole, not least his injunction to his descendants to preserve their unity (vividly illustrated with an anecdote in which a single arrow is easily broken but several arrows together prove unbreakable). For Juwaynī this injunction was nothing less than ‘the pivot of their actions and of their Yasa’. In that context of family solidarity, Chinggis Khan’s posterity attributed to ‘the Yasa’ the phenomenal success of Mongol arms. As we shall see in the next chapter, Hülegü’s actions would prove far from conducive to imperial unity.
Hülegü’s campaigns in south-west Asia

In 1252 the Qaghan Möngke launched fresh campaigns against powers that still resisted the Mongols, partly in order to inject fresh vigour into the process of expansion, which had faltered under Güyük, but also as a means of consolidating his rule in the wake of his disputed election and the conflict with his Ögödeyid and Chaghdayid kinsfolk. The expeditions were headed by two of his brothers. Qubilai was first deputed in 1252 to outflank the Song empire by subduing the kingdom of Dali (modern Yunnan) and subsequently resuming the war against the Song themselves, an enterprise of which the Qaghan took personal command in 1258, only to die while besieging a Song fortress in the following year. Hülegü was despatched to Iran.

The immediate objective of Hülegü’s expedition was the destruction of the Niẓārī Ḩūsainīs – the Assassins, or the Mulāḥida, as orthodox Muslims termed them – based in the Alburz mountains and Quhistān. As we saw (pp. 74, 91), they had offered their submission to Chinggis Khan at the time of his attack on the Khwarazmian empire, and appear to have cooperated with the Mongols in the 1240s. But relations had deteriorated, possibly as a result of Chinggis Khan’s demand that the Master should visit his headquarters. The Assassins subsequently murdered the Mongol general Chaghadai ‘the Greater’, who had given them offence, and following his accession in 1246 Güyük contemptuously dismissed the envoys of the Master Ḥā’ al-Dīn with an angry message. Naturally, the Mongol regime could not for long tolerate the existence of a power centred upon a network of reputedly impregnable strongpoints in northern Iran. As the vanguard of
Hülegü’s army, the general Kedbuqa had been despatched against the Assassins in Jumādā II 650/August 1252. Obtaining the submission of the Ismā‘īlī governor (muḥtasham) of Qhīstān, he had invested the fortress of Girdkūh without success and had then taken the towns of Tūn and Turshīz.5 William of Rubruck, visiting Möngke’s headquarters in 1254, heard a rumour that the Assassins were seeking to assassinate the Qaghan.6 This may have been their response to the Mongol attack, but it could equally well have represented propaganda by Shams al-Dīn, qadi of Qazwīn, who had often appealed for Mongol assistance and was currently inciting Möngke against them: in a melodramatic gesture he appeared before the Qaghan, we are told, wearing mail beneath his clothing and explaining this breach of court etiquette by the terror that the Ismā‘īlīs inspired.7

The subjugation of the Assassins was not Hülegü’s sole task, however. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Baiju had recently sent word to Möngke complaining of both the Ismā‘īlīs and the Caliph al-Musta‘ṣīm, and so the prince’s commission included the reduction of the ’Abbasid territories in Iraq; al-Musta‘ṣīm was to be given the chance to submit of his own free will. Hülegū was also to bring to heel the Lurs and the Kurds, notably those of Shahrazūr.8 In advance of Hülegū’s arrival and to ease pressure on the grasslands of western Iran, Baiju and his forces were ordered to move into Anatolia.9 The Saljuq Sultan Izz al-Dīn Kaykāwūs attempted to resist this new influx of nomads, but was defeated on 23 Ramaḍān 654/15 October 1256 at Akseray. After a brief flight into the territory of the Greek state of Nicaea, he returned and engaged in a struggle with his half-brother, Rukn al-Dīn Qilich Arslan; but at length the two Sultans made peace with Hülegū.10 Of operations conducted by other Mongol divisions in southern Iran, we know only of those by the general Ötegü China against the Kurds of Shabānkāra, who submitted in 658/1260 after their ruler was killed in the fighting.11

Hülegū’s westward march through Central Asia to Iran was a protracted affair, which lasted well over two years. He left his encampment in Mongolia on 24 Sha’bān 651/19 October 1253 and did not cross the Oxus until 1 Dhū l-Ḥijja 653/1 January 1256.12 The winter of 1255–6 was spent in the meadows of Shabūrghān,13 doubtless because an attack on the Assassin strongholds in the Alburz prior to the warm season would have courted disaster. The delays were only partly a question of logistics.14 We have no precise total for the Mongol forces, which have been estimated at around 150,000;15 but extensive preparations had been made in advance, including the commandeering of provisions and the appropriation and reservation of all grazing-lands in Hülegū’s path.16 One relevant circumstance is that his
army was to be reinforced not only by Muslim troops recruited along the way, in Transoxiana, but by troops contributed by other branches of the imperial dynasty. The Oyirat chief Buqa Temûr, whose mother was Chinggis Khan’s daughter Chechegen, may have accompanied Hûlegû from Mongolia. But three princes from Jochi’s ulus, Balagha, Tutar and Quli, and the Chaghadayid prince Tegûder all joined Hûlegû en route, and the need to halt at more than one preordained rendezvous may have dictated his pace.

Hûlegû headed first for Qhîstân, where Tûn had rebelled but was once again taken by force (Rabî’ I 654/March–April 1256). He then gradually moved on the Assassins’ principal strongholds in northern Iran. Confronted by the main Mongol army, Rûkn al-Dîn Khûrshâh, who had just succeeded his murdered father ‘Alâ’ al-Dîn as Master, repeatedly played for time over several weeks, sending out first one of his brothers, then his wazir and lastly an infant son, but neglecting to comply with Hûlegû’s orders to dismantle his fortresses. However, the mild weather enabled the Mongol forces to converge on his stronghold at Maymûndiz from three directions. Even after some days of bombardment by the Mongols’ siege artillery had compelled him to seek a truce, Khûrshâh still procrastinated, until on 29 or 30 Shawwâl/19 or 20 November he appeared in person. Received kindly by Hûlegû, he despatched contingents of Ismâ’îlîs to destroy other fortresses, though the garrisons at Alamût and Lambasar refused to cooperate. Alamût was invested by the Jochid prince Balagha and brought to submit through Khûrshâh’s mediation; Lambasar held out for a whole year. Khûrshâh, his usefulness by now greatly reduced, asked to be allowed to go to the Qaghan’s headquarters, but was put to death on Möngke’s orders, either en route or on the way back from a visit that had proved fruitless because Möngke refused to see him. All the Ismâ’îlîs in the Mongols’ power, including Khûrshâh’s entire family, were massacred.

Juwaynî’s paeans on the destruction of the Assassins, allegedly an object of fear for monarchs past and present and those of the Greeks and Franks included, were at once overblown, as a vehicle for praising his master the Ilkhan, and a trifle premature. Girdkûh would resist the Mongols until the end of Rabî’ II 670/early December 1271, during Abagha’s reign. The Persian historian also ignored the fact that the Ismâ’îlî strongholds in Syria were still untouched by the Mongols. They would remain so, succumbing only to a series of campaigns by the Mamlûk Sultan Baybars during the years 668–71/1270–3; and even thereafter many of the sectaries would find that their talents were a welcome asset to the Mamlûk regime. Nevertheless, the Mongol forces had effectively eliminated the Ismâ’îlî state in Iran, a matter for universal rejoicing on the part of orthodox Muslims.
This would not be the reaction to Hülegü’s next campaign. During the operations against the Ismā‘īlīs he had demanded reinforcements from the Caliph.19 Al-Musta‘sim’s instinct was to comply; but at the prompting of his ministers and amirs, who argued that the Mongol prince’s real purpose was to reduce Baghdad’s capacity to resist a siege, he had failed to send any troops. His position was an unenviable one, since Baghdad had suffered a number of natural disasters over the previous fifteen years and the government lacked sufficient funds to pay its soldiery.20 When the wazir Ibn al-‘Alqamī urged the despatch of valuable gifts to Hülegü, the Caliph made preparations to do so, only to be dissuaded by the Lesser Dawātdār and his associates, who accused the wazir of currying favour with the enemy; goods of small value were sent out instead. On Hülegü ordering him to send either the wazir, the Dawātdār or the general Sulaymān Shāh Ibn Barjam, the Caliph instructed them to go but then changed his mind, possibly because all three refused; as a result, those deputed were persons of lesser importance.21

Hülegü decided to wait no longer. While the vanguard under Baiju and Sughunchaq headed by way of Irbil, he followed with the main army through the Ḫulwān pass. When the Dawātdār attempted to obstruct the progress of Baiju and Sughunchaq, who had crossed the Tigris, he suffered a severe defeat, losing most of his men and retreating into the city. Hülegü reached Baghdad in mid-Muḥarram 656/January 1258 and the Mongols began a close investment. The prince’s own forces built a rampart on the eastern side of the city, while Baiju, Sughunchaq and Buqa Temūr constructed one to the west. The Caliph belatedly endeavoured to enter into negotiations, sending out the wazir, but Hülegü claimed that this was no longer enough and required the Dawātdār and Sulaymān Shāh as well; it was al-Musta‘sim’s decision whether to follow them. The two men were put to death, while Ibn al-‘Alqamī was spared. The Caliph himself emerged with his sons and his family on 4 Ṣafar/10 February, and the sack of Baghdad began shortly afterwards. Once al-Musta‘sim had made over his treasury and his harem to the victors, he was no longer of use to them. As the Mongol army withdrew from the city and halted for the first night, Hülegü had the Caliph and one of his sons executed by the time-honoured method of being wrapped in felt and beaten to death. Another son was put to death in Baghdad around the same time.22

It seems that Hülegü had approached the assault on Baghdad in a spirit of caution, possibly because Mongol generals like Baiju were aware of Baghdad’s large population and thought that the Caliph had a formidable army.23 But he was also influenced, we are told, by the fact that the Mongols
were the most recent in a long line of enemies to harbour designs on the city and that their precursors had all come to grief; terrible disasters were forecast in the event of an attack. In an era when the caliphs had been shorn of real political power, some effort had been made to promote an image of hallowed inviolability. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, this theme had been prominent in the response of al-Musta’ṣim and his officers to Mongol demands for submission, and it also underlay the gloomy prognosis of the astronomer Ḥusām al-Dīn when summoned to provide guidance. But his Shīʿī colleague Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī offered a more sober – and more congenial – verdict. Asked what would be the consequence of taking Baghdad, he is said to have retorted simply: ‘Hülegü will reign in place of the Caliph.’ Waṣṣāf says that Ṭūsī had been consulted earlier, at Hamadān, when Hülegü first determined to advance against Baghdad, and had predicted an equally auspicious outcome after examining the stars. He and other authors differ from Rashīd al-Dīn in linking this debate with an issue that surfaced some weeks later, namely in what manner – or indeed whether – the Caliph should be put to death. In all likelihood, the sharp difference of opinion manifested itself at successive stages in the assault on the ’Abbasids. What Hülegü feared – if, as some authors claim, he really was afraid – was offending Tenggeri by shedding al-Musta’ṣim’s blood on the ground, since this taboo in relation to royal figures had long been current among the steppe peoples; hence the mode of death adopted. Bar Hebraeus may well have been right in hinting that Hülegü ordered the Caliph’s execution as a means of ‘facing down’ the doom-laden predictions.

The end of the ’Abbasid Caliphate, which had lasted for just over five hundred years, was by any reckoning a momentous event that undeniably made a strong impression on contemporaries and posterity alike. In the wake of al-Musta’ṣim’s downfall, one story of his death circulated widely and passed into folklore. This was that Hülegü had confronted him with his treasure and asked why he had not used it to recruit more troops in order to resist the Mongols (or, in one version, why he had not despatched it to the Mongols to save himself and Baghdad); he was then incarcerated in a cell with nothing but the treasure and died of starvation within four days. The tale obviously represents an embellishment of a conversation between Hülegü and the Caliph that appears in Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s account of the fall of Baghdad and is repeated by Waṣṣāf and other Muslim writers. It clearly held a ready appeal for Christian writers, since variants are supplied by authors as diverse as the Byzantine historian Georgios Pachymeres (d. c. 1310), the Armenian historian Grigor Aknerts’i (c. 1313), the expatriate Armenian prince Hayton of Gorighos (1307), the anonymous ‘Templar of
Tyre’ (c. 1314), the Venetian adventurer Marco Polo (1298), the Dominican missionary Riccoldo da Montecroce (c. 1300) and St Louis’ biographer Jean de Joinville (1309).32

In 657/1259 Hülegü sent troops under his son Yoshmut against Mayyafāriqīn. Its Ayyubid prince, al-Kāmil Muḥammad, who had in person done homage to Möngke in 650/1252 (p. 84), had experienced a change of heart during the siege of Baghdad and prepared to bring aid to the Caliph, although in the event he was too late; he had further endeavoured, unsuccessfully, to form an alliance against the Mongols with Sultan al-Nāṣir Yūsuf of Aleppo. But although Yoshmut received reinforcements from Mosul, Mayyafāriqīn proved strong enough to hold out until Rabī’ II 658/April 1260, when al-Kāmil paid for his temerity with his life.33 Mārdīn, whose Artuqid ruler, al-Sāʿid Najm al-Dīn Īlghāzī, had omitted to wait upon Hülegü and was playing for time while secretly trying to engineer joint resistance to the Mongols with al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, was another target. Yoshmut’s forces were able to enter the city on 22 Jumādā I/5 May, but the citadel held out until al-Sāʿid died and his son al-Muẓaffār Qara Arslan, whom he had imprisoned, probably for advocating capitulation, was released and surrendered Mārdīn on terms, whereupon the Mongols withdrew (Rajab 659/June 1261) and al-Muẓaffār was confirmed as prince.34

Sultan al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, the principal Ayyubid ruler of Syria, who governed the three major cities of Aleppo, Damascus and Ḩimṣ, had himself been in contact with the Mongols since 642/1244 (p. 84). He had been represented at Güyüg’s enthronement two years later, had reaffirmed his submission at the accession of Möngke, and had exchanged messages with Hülegü since the fall of Baghdad.35 Yet like al-Sāʿid of Mārdīn he had repeatedly failed to visit the Qaghan’s court and more recently had neglected to appear before Hülegü, who, according to Ibn al-ʿAmīd, was offended that al-Nāṣir had sent him no gifts when he had despatched them annually to Baiju.36 In 657/1259 the Mongol prince lost patience. During that year he occupied himself with the reduction of al-Nāṣir’s fortresses in the Jazira, notably Ḥarrān, al-Ruhā (Edessa), Sarūj, Qalʾat Jaʿbār and al-Bīra; the Ayyubid Sultan thus forfeited all his possessions east of the Euphrates. Towards the end of the year, Hülegü moved into northern Syria. Aleppo was commanded by al-Nāṣir’s great-uncle al-Muʿazzam Tūrān Shāh, one of the few surviving sons of the illustrious Saladin. The city fell after a seven-day investment, on 9 Ṣafar 658/25 January 1260, and was subjected to a massacre. The citadel held out under Tūrān Shāh for another few days, but then surrendered on terms; Tūrān Shāh was spared on account of his age.37
News of the fall of Aleppo, which had defied successive invaders since the Byzantine attacks of the tenth century and whose fortifications the Ayyubids had strengthened in recent decades, aroused the greatest alarm throughout Syria. The inhabitants of Damascus, deserted by al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, sent to offer the Mongols the keys to their city. When Kedbuqa made a triumphal entry in Rabī’ I/March, allegedly accompanied by King Het’um of Lesser Armenia and the Frankish Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch, who had both accepted Mongol overlordship, the Mongols were given a by no means unfriendly reception. The people of Ḥamā were similarly quick to send Hülegü their submission, although their Ayyubid ruler, al-Manṣūr, who was absent at Birza with al-Nāṣir, thereupon abandoned him to join the Egyptians. Al-Nāṣir himself, distrusting the offer of asylum in Mamlūk Egypt, wandered through Palestine for some weeks before falling into the hands of Kedbuqa’s troops. But some Ayyubid princes rallied more or less willingly to the conquerors. Al-Nāṣir’s brother, al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī, submitted and remained prince of Ṣarkhad. Al-Ashraf Mūsā, the former Ayyubid ruler of Ḥimṣ who had been dispossessed by al-Nāṣir, visited Hūlegū’s headquarters and was rewarded with the restoration of his principality and possibly some kind of precedence over all other Muslim rulers in Syria. Al-Sa’id Ḥasan, whom al-Nāṣir had imprisoned at al-Bīra but whom the Mongols had released and restored to his principality of Bānyās, is said not only to have donned Mongol garb but to have become a Christian at the desire of Hūlegū’s chief wife Doquz Khatun. At Kerak, in southern Palestine, the ruler was another distant cousin, al-Mughīth ‘Umar, who had offered his allegiance to the Mongols as early as 1254, when Rubruck encountered his envoy at Möngke’s headquarters. Confronted now with Hūlegū’s demand for his submission, al-Mughīth sent his own envoys to the Mongol prince. In response he was given Hebron and a shīḥna was despatched to Kerak, though in the event he retired northwards on learning of the Mamlūk victory over Kedbuqa. But at the point of his withdrawal in the spring, Hūlegū was technically the master of all Muslim Syria. His treatment of those Ayyubids who had submitted suggests that he had no plan to eliminate the dynasty but rather envisaged maintaining them as client princes.

Within a few weeks of the capture of Aleppo, Hūlegū retired from Syria with the bulk of his forces, leaving Kedbuqa with an army of 10,000 or possibly 20,000 to guard the newly subjected territories. His exact movements are unclear, though Rashīd al-Dīn dates his arrival at Akhlāṭ on 24 Jumādā II/6 June 1260. The same historian cites as the reason for Hūlegū’s withdrawal reports of Möngke’s death on campaign in distant China.
(August 1259), an explanation also found in Mamlūk sources. The lapse of some months since the Qaghan’s demise renders it more probable that Hülegü had learned of tensions over the succession in the Far East, which would lead to the elections of his brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke as rival qaghans in May and September/October 1260 respectively. In a letter he wrote to the French King Louis IX in 1262, Hülegü himself was to explain his departure by the exhaustion of his provisions and of the Syrian grasslands and the necessity to move to upland pastures at the onset of the warm season. These were probably not the sole grounds for his withdrawal. In endeavouring to secure Frankish cooperation against the Mamlūks, the Ilkhan naturally made no reference either to the outbreak of internecine war in the Far East or to the need to keep watch on the frontier with his (now) hostile Jochid cousins in the Caucasus.

Prior to leaving Syria, Hülegü had despatched an embassy conveying an ultimatum to the new Mamlūk Sultan Sayf al-Dīn Quṭuz. Although the regime in Cairo since its inception in 1250 had not been characterized by any great stability, it had in recent months profited from an influx of military elements fleeing the Mongols. Prominent among these were the Syrian troops brought by al-Manṣūr of Ḥamā, Shahrazūrī Kurds, and groups of mamluks, including many of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf’s and a corps of Bahrīs headed by Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, an enemy of the Sultan who had earlier fled Egypt to enter al-Nāṣir’s service but had now returned and made his peace with Quṭuz. Already committed to a policy of resistance as a means of buttressing his own doubtful title to rule, Quṭuz, at Baybars’ prompting, took the offensive; he had the Mongol envoys executed and made preparations for an expedition into Palestine. Leaving Cairo on 15 Sha’bān 658/26 July 1260, the Mamlūk army – 12,000 horsemen, according to Waṣṣāf – made its way up the coast to Acre, the capital of the kingdom of Jerusalem. In response to the Sultan’s overtures, the Franks, still smarting from a recent attack on Sidon by Kedbuqa’s forces, were ready to grant the Egyptian forces safe conduct through their territory and to furnish them with provisions. Near 'Ayn Jālūt, in Galilee, on 25 Ramaḍān/3 September 1260 Quṭuz and his army engaged in a hard-fought battle with the Mongols. The Mamlūk forces, aided by the fact that al-Ashraf of Ḥimṣ deserted to them in the heat of the conflict, inflicted a serious reverse on the enemy. Kedbuqa was killed, and those of his forces who escaped fled northwards towards Lesser Armenia; al-Saʿid Ḥasan of Bānyās was captured and executed for apostasy. A smaller Mongol contingent that entered northern Syria some weeks later was crushed near Ḥimṣ in December. The surviving Ayyubids swiftly acknowledged the overlordship of Cairo, and the frontier
between the Mamlūk and Mongol territories would soon stabilize at the Euphrates. Ironically, Quṭuz did not live to savour the fruits of his victory: on route back to Egypt he was murdered by a group of mamluk officers headed by Baybars, who made a triumphal entry into Cairo as the new Sultan.51

Hülegü was unable to avenge these defeats owing to the growing need to keep watch on events in the Far East and, in all probability, to his own plans to establish his autonomy in Iran and Iraq (below, pp. 138–48). As the event that halted the seemingly inexorable Mongol advance, the Mamlūk victory at 'Ayn Jālūt therefore proved more significant in hindsight. Yet there is no doubt that contemporary Muslims in Syria and Egypt viewed it as an unprecedented triumph over a formidable enemy. Abū Shāma commented that the Mongols had been worsted by those of their own race, Turks (ibnā’ jinsihim min al-turk), and that for every pestilence there existed an antidote of its own kind.52 Even the Syrian Franks and their confrères in Western Europe greeted the news in tones that suggest they saw Quṭuz’s victory as their own.53 Hülegü himself was under no illusions as to the implications of the defeat. A few weeks before, Kedbuqa had sent him the captive al-Nāṣir Yūsuf. Hülegü treated him kindly and gave him a patent to rule as a Mongol vassal. But when the news of 'Ayn Jālūt reached him he smelt duplicity and had al-Nāṣir put to death, either at his headquarters or while the Ayyubid prince was on his way back to Syria.54

The predicaments of Hülegü’s opponents

One might well ask why certain of the Mongols’ antagonists, and particularly Khūrshāh and the Caliph, acted in the way they did and thereby brought down destruction upon themselves. Khūrshāh may, of course, have been aware that the Mongols had determined to annihilate the Assassins in any case55 and that he could achieve nothing more than prolonging his own life and that of his followers by a few months at best. Al-Musta’ṣim was in a different position. We cannot dismiss the possibility that the Caliph was as light-headed as he is depicted. He may indeed have been as parsimonious when it came to military expenditure as both his enemy Hülegü and his would-be ally al-Kāmil of Mayyāfāriqīn would subsequently claim.56 Ibn al-Kāzarūnī accuses him of leaving the conduct of government to officials (wulāt al-amr) who delayed paying the troops and reduced their numbers, and the author of al-Hawādith al-jāmi’a, who blames the Caliph in person for neglecting the military and dismissing many of them, says that they were reduced to begging. Already in 650/1252–3 a large number of the troops
had left Baghdad for Syria because their wages had been discontinued. On the other hand, al-Musta’sim stood to lose a great deal of dynastic prestige by appeasing the Mongols. He and his entourage were evidently anxious not to betray the vulnerability of their position, for instance by sending out an impressive array of gifts. His patronizing comments, moreover, on Hulegu’s youth and relative inexperience – counterproductive as they were – could nevertheless have been designed to overawe him by bolstering the image of Baghdad and the ‘Abbasid dynasty as inviolable.

We should not, in any case, ignore the character of the counsel on which each of these rulers depended. The powers with which Hulegu and his subordinates had to deal were deeply divided. This was the case not merely in the obvious sense that the Assassins were an object of loathing to their Sunni Muslim neighbours or that Syria, for instance, was fragmented among a number of Ayyubid princes. What also undermined concerted and decisive action was the divergence of opinion among the rulers’ advisers and officials, some urging resistance at all costs and others advocating surrender. This had been true of the entourage of the Assassin Master, which was split and offered conflicting advice; Khurshah was under pressure from Nasir al-Din Tusi and other Muslims to reach an accommodation with the Mongols. It was also the case at the caliphal court, where counsels differed sharply. The Dawatdar was seeking to depose al-Musta’sim with the aim of securing a more energetic Caliph and his supporters accused the wazir, the Shi’i Ibn al-‘Alqami, of secret contacts with Hulegu. In consequence, al-Musta’sim, torn between the advice of rival factions, repeatedly countermanded his own orders. Ibn al-Tiqtaqa defends the wazir against the commonly levelled charge of having betrayed Baghdad to the Mongols. This might have indicated nothing more than Shi’i partisanship; but Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, pointing to known Mongol practice, declares that had the wazir been a traitor to his master Hulegu would have put him to death in view of his untrustworthiness. It should be noted, on the other hand, that Ibn al-‘Alqami, who died only weeks after the city’s capture, at the onset of Jumada II/early in June 1258, was denied the governorship of Baghdad on these very grounds.

Similar considerations help to explain the vacillations of al-Nasir Yusuf, since one of his most influential advisers, the physician Zain al-Din Sulayman al-‘Hashimi, who had served as his ambassador to Mongke’s court in 648–9/1251, had since been committed to the Mongol cause and advocated submission; though we should not ignore the further circumstances that al-Nasir’s military forces were dominated by ethnic rivalries and that his distrust of both the Muslim princes with whom he had to deal – his
cousin al-Mughīth of Kerak and the Mamlūk Sultan Quṭuz – exacerbated his innate lack of resolve.64

The Mongols’ antagonists in south-west Asia also suffered from the major disadvantage that Hülegū’s army was reinforced not merely by Christian Georgian and Armenian forces (who played an enthusiastic role in the sack of Baghdad) but also by various Muslim potentates at the head of contingents of Muslim troops. The Akhbar-i mughūlān furnishes an impressive list of such rulers: Abū Bakr b. Sa’d, the Salghurid atabeg of Fārs; ’Īzz al-Dīn Kaykāwūs and his half-brother Rukn al-Dīn Qilich Arslan, the two Saljuq Sultans of Anatolia; and ‘the maliks of Khūrāsān, Sistān, Māzandarān, Kirmān, Rustamdār, Shīrwān . . . Iraq, Azerbaijan, Arrān and Luristān’, all joined Hülegū with their troops, while others sent reinforcements under their brothers or kinsmen.65 Contingents from Kirmān and Yazd, for example, conducted siege operations against minor Ismā’īlī strongholds in the Ṭāliqān region of Khūrāsān.66 The Mongols’ chief ally in Iraq was Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, the ruler of Mosul, who first provided troops under his son al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā’īl for the assault on Baghdad and was then himself instrumental in the capture of the citadel at Irbil.67 Late in 657/1259, though exempted from serving in person in view of his advanced age, he was ordered to send troops, again under al-Ṣāliḥ, to assist in the operations against Aleppo; en route Hülegū deputed al-Ṣāliḥ to secure Āmid. Badr al-Dīn’s forces also participated in the siege of Mayyāfāriqīn. He was in some measure acting in his own interests: both Irbil and Āmid were strongholds on which he had harboured designs for some time past, and he had briefly occupied Āmid a few years earlier. But his contribution to the Mongol war effort was by no means negligible.68

The presence in Hülegū’s army of all these Muslim auxiliaries, who surely exceeded by far the total number of Muslims accompanying Chinggis Khan against the Khwārazmshāh forty years previously, did not merely facilitate his task by increasing the Mongols’ strength and intimidating the recalcitrant with a show of overwhelming force. It also projected the image of a largely Muslim host, thereby undermining any attempt to invoke against Hülegū the spirit of jihād, and furnished him with often high-ranking agents who could mediate with their co-religionists and secure a surrender on terms. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kurt, the ruler of Herat, for instance, induced the Ismā’īli governor of Quhistān to yield in 654/1256.69 Muslims of lesser status, too, could similarly be used to suborn the enemy’s supporters. Zayn al-Dīn al-Ḥāfīzī was just one among many figures – amirs and city notables – within Aleppo who threw in their lot with the infidel, whether from antipathy towards al-Nāṣir Yūsuf or the hope of self-aggrandizement.
or simply a sense of Mongol invincibility. His father-in-law was rumoured to have opened the gates to Hülegü’s forces. Other Muslim officers and bureaucrats – in Ba’labakk and Ḥamā – went over to the invaders. This is not to say that all those who acted as intermediaries for the Mongols proved effective in easing their progress. The Qipchaq officer Qarasonqur, who commanded the caliphal advance guard, was deaf to the persuasions of the commander of Hülegü’s van, Sulṭānchūq, described as a person ‘of Khwarazmian stock’ (that is, presumably, likewise a Qipchaq); while ’Izz al-Dīn Kaykāwūs of Rūm sought in vain to persuade the citizens of Mayyāfāriqīn to capitulate in 657/1259, and the son of the prince of Erzurum (Arzan al-Rūm), who was sent to induce Aleppo to surrender in the following year, was no more successful.

The question of armaments

The Mongol victories were also due to the considerable superiority they now enjoyed in weaponry. Hülegü was accompanied by formidable siege machinery which seemingly outstripped that brought a few decades earlier by Chinggis Khan’s forces. This may in part be a trick of the light; the sources are more informative about the armaments deployed in Hülegü’s campaigns than in those of his grandfather. But certain weapons undeniably made a strong impression on two Ilkhanid writers. The first is the author of the Akhbār-i mughūlān, who describes a composite arcubalista made up of three crossbows strung together and capable of firing large bolts with a bore of almost three-quarters of a gāz (possibly about 70 cm.) – a weapon known to have been in use in China for some centuries. From an Egyptian account of the battle of Ḥimṣ in 680/1281 it appears that the invading Mongol army on that occasion would be accompanied by similar machines, of which four could be mounted on a single wagon.

The other author is Juwaynī. He highlights the role of a team of 1,000 Chinese catapult-operators and naphtha-throwers (naft-andāzān) that accompanied Hülegü to Iran. Chinese artificers had constructed an enormous crossbow, a kamān-i gāw (‘ox-bow’), which allegedly had a range of 2,500 feet (gām) and which appears to have secured the prompt surrender of Maymūndiz. Stephen Haw cites a reference to an ‘eight-oxen crossbow’ in a Chinese work dating from c. 1044, which would explain the term used by the Persian historian. Since the Ismā’īlī defenders are expressly said to have been burned up (sūkhta gashtand) by the missiles it hurled, we are evidently dealing here with a machine that propelled ‘fire arrows’. The ‘naphtha machines’ mentioned in Ṭūsī’s account (ālāt-i naft) and in Bar
Hebraeus’ Arabic chronicle (ālāt al-nafṭ), and the ‘pots of naphtha’ (qawārīr-i naft) to which Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf refer, all alike in the context of the Baghdad campaign, may also refer to incendiary devices fired from a tube.\textsuperscript{80} As we have seen (p. 89), the term naft, traditionally denoting Greek Fire, was also applied to the new phenomenon of gunpowder, of which Mongol armies were clearly making use by the mid-thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{81}

Hülegü was also, it seems, deploying counterweight trebuchets constructed and operated by Muslim siege engineers – a considerable advance on the ‘traction’ type that had accompanied Chinggis Khan, since they required teams of only ten to fifteen men as opposed to 250.\textsuperscript{82} Machines of this kind, manned by Muslim operatives, would be used against the Song for the first time at Xiangyang in 1272–3.\textsuperscript{83} Professor Smith has argued, on the strength of illustrations found in the early fourteenth-century Edinburgh manuscript of Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh (Plates 2 and 3), that the Muslim trebuchet outstripped its Chinese counterpart in having socket-bearings, and possibly also axles, made of iron rather than of wood.\textsuperscript{84} The comparatively laconic account of the fall of Baghdad in the Akhbār suggests that the Caliph and his staff were brought to seek terms primarily by the Mongols’ capacity to hurl stones weighing from 100 to 500 manns (83.33 kg. to 416.66 kg. – the higher figure definitely an exaggeration).\textsuperscript{85} In a passage on Hülegü’s siege weaponry that otherwise closely resembles the Akhbār, the late sixteenth-century Ta’rīkh-i alfē refers to catapults (manjanīqhā) comprising five or seven sections that could be dismantled and reassembled.\textsuperscript{86} Whether any of these armaments were of Near Eastern or Chinese manufacture we cannot be sure. Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’ provided Yoshmut with catapults for the investment of Mayyāfāriqīn, and some of the hundred engines deployed at Mārdīn must have been supplied by the Mongols’ Muslim clients.\textsuperscript{87} What is beyond question is that the Mongols’ artillery was superior to the Caliph’s, for the local historian Ibn al-Kāzarūnī, though alluding in only vague and conventional terms to Hülegü’s engines (manāğiq), describes those mounted on the walls of Baghdad as useless, inadequate in both range and accuracy.\textsuperscript{88} The disparity may well reflect the fact that the Mongols had access to the best siege technology of both the Chinese and the Islamic worlds.

The terms of Hülegü’s commission

Thomas Allsen speaks of Möngke’s creation of two new regional khanates, in Iran and in China, and the emergence of a ‘new dispensation’ in southwest Asia, whereby Hülegü enjoyed the same kind of princely jurisdiction as did Qubilai in China.\textsuperscript{89} Both he and Jean Aubin have posited, independently,
that the Qaghan instituted fresh arrangements for the Iranian lands at the
time of Hülegü’s departure for the west. These authors tend to assume the
transfer of rulership to Hülegü and the exclusion of any future intervention
in the affairs of the region by the khan of the Golden Horde. We have to
distinguish two separate issues here. (1) Did Möngke genuinely intend his
brother to create and rule over a new ulus in south-west Asia, or did he plan,
in reality, to do no more than bring the region fully into the ulus of the
centre (qol-un ulus)? And (2) had he, in either eventuality, secured the
acquiescence of his kinsfolk, and in particular the Jochids, for new arrange-
ments that superseded those hitherto obtaining in the region?

Hülegü’s status during Möngke’s reign is unclear. Not until the year
658/1260 does the title ‘Il-khan’ first appear linked with his name on coins
minted in what would become the Ilkhanid territories, although there is some
slight evidence that it was already in use in the previous year. Whatever the
case, there is no evidence that it had been conferred by Möngke.90 The
meaning of the title has been much discussed.91 It is conceivable that it equates
to the Chinese guowang, ‘prince of the polity’ (borne, for instance, by Muqali,
Chinggis Khan’s first governor-general in northern China), and in effect
means viceroy.92 But the most convincing explanation is offered by Professor
Erdal: that the first element does not signify ‘peaceful/subordinate’ khan (as
the meanings of Mo. el/il would suggest) but derives from the old Turkish title
ilig (borne, for instance, by a sixth-century Türk monarch and later by various
Qarakhanid princes), and that the style adopted by Hülegü means simply
’sovereign’.93 This interpretation gains support from three circumstances. One
is the appearance, on a seal employed by Öljeitü (1305) and Abū Sa’id (1320),
of the Chinese title zhenming huangdi (‘Emperor with a genuine mandate’);94
it is possible that this title, most probably of domestic provenance rather than
conferred by the Yuan, corresponds to the style il-khan. The second is the
occasional application of the title Il-khan to the khans of Jochi’s ulus.95 And
the third is the fact that Ibn al-Fuwaṭī’s biographical dictionary twice applies
the style Il-khan to Chinggis Khan himself,96 a context in which any sense of
subordination would have been totally incongruous.

What do the sources tell us specifically about the terms of Hülegü’s
commission? There is remarkably little indication that Möngke established
him as the head of a new ulus. Even Juwaynī, a contemporary of these
events writing under Hülegü, tells us merely that Möngke had seen in his
brother’s character the signs of rulership and detected in his enterprises the
practices of conquest, and had therefore charged him with the subjection of
the western lands.97 The Ḥawādith al-jāmī‘a similarly confines itself to the
statement that the Qaghan despatched Hülegü to Transoxiana and adjacent
regions. Although Jūzjānī alleges that Möngke had entrusted Hülegū with the government of ‘Iran and ‘Ajam’, a number of the reports reaching distant Delhi at this time were highly inaccurate (including, for instance, a report of Hülegū’s death). In the second recension of his history, dating from after 1295 (but not, we might note, in the first, written twenty years earlier), Bayḍāwī says that Möngke conferred on Hülegū the lands west of the Oxus, namely Iran. Later authors, writing when the Ilkhanate had existed for seven decades or so, are likewise divided. Shabānkāra’ī alone commits himself to the statement that Möngke conferred the western lands on Hülegū, but somewhat undermines his testimony, as we shall see below (p. 147), with the improbable assertion that these lands had been the patrimony of their father Tolui. Banākatī says merely that Hülegū was sent to conquer these regions; so too does Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī in his Ta’rīkh-i guzīda and Zafar-nāma. At a later point in the Zafar-nāma, strikingly, Ḥamd-Allāh puts a remarkably explicit statement into the mouth of an Ilkhanid noyan – that when Möngke despatched Hülegū westwards, it was to command a military campaign, not to be Iran’s ruler. The sources, then, are far from speaking with one voice.

Let us now examine the evidence of Rashīd al-Dīn, who wrote over four decades after the fragmentation of the once unitary empire into a number of rival khanates, and whose loyalties were firmly with the Toluids: namely, his own employers, the Ilkhans, and their cousins and allies in the Far East, the Qaghans Qubilai and Temūr. We saw (pp. 99–100) how unconvincingly he seeks to prepare the ground for the transfer of the imperial dignity to Tolui’s line by making out that Chinggis Khan had allotted to his fourth son the great majority of his troops. It is true that he speaks of Möngke deciding to assign territory in each direction to one of his brothers so that they might complete its subjugation and keep guard over it. Despatching Qubilai to the eastern regions, the Qaghan ‘appointed (mu ’ayyan gardānīd)’ Hülegū ‘for (jihat) the countries of the West, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Rūm and Armenia’ (phrasing, we might note, that falls short of an outright grant of these lands); in this fashion the two princes would constitute respectively his left and right wings. Other statements elsewhere in the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh are more cut-and-dried. We read that the troops picked out and allocated to Hülegū were given to him as his personal property (inchū), with which he was to come to Iran and settle (mutamakkin binishīnad); once he had conquered it, the territory and the troops alike were to belong to him and to his progeny. Rashīd al-Dīn reinforces this impression with repeated statements that Hülegū had been given all the troops earlier despatched as tamma to Iran, including both those commanded successively by Chormaghun and
Baiju and those sent to Afghanistan and the Indian borderlands with Dayir and Möngedü and (later) with Sali Noyan (and that all these forces had naturally passed down to the writer’s own master Ghazan).  

All this might seem on balance to favour Hülegü’s appointment as the ruler of a new ulus. Yet even this most pro-Toluid of witnesses is far from unequivocal regarding Hülegü’s status. At another juncture he describes the prince’s commission in curiously guarded terms:

Although Möngke Qa’an had planned and determined privately (dar khāṭir) that Hülegü Khan should, with the troops he had been given, settle in and reign over the realm of Iran in perpetuity (hamwāra), and that this kingdom should be securely conferred upon him and his illustrious house, just as it [now] is, nevertheless he publicly (ẓāhir‘ī) ordered him, when he should have accomplished these tasks, to return to his original camping-grounds.

This statement begs a large question: why the discrepancy between the Qaghan’s ostensible instructions and his private intention? Rashīd al-Dīn’s very wording here arouses suspicions that the situation was by no means as straightforward as he would have us believe elsewhere in his narrative.

We must turn next to the Masālik al-‘āṣar of Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umarī (c. 1338), which furnishes a very different perspective on the emergence of the Ilkhanate. According to the other Mongol khans, al-‘Umarī tells us, when Chinggis Khan distributed his territories among his sons neither Hülegü nor his father Tolui had received any (lam yamallaka tūlī wa-lā hūlākū waladuhū); Hülegü’s line had acquired rulership (al-mulk) not at the hands of Chinggis Khan or of the qaghans who succeeded him, but in the course of time and by force (bi l-yad wa l-‘udwān wa-muṭāwila al-‘ayyām); Hülegü had originally been merely the representative (mandūb) of his brother, the Qaghan Möngke, but in the wake of the capture of Baghdad he settled, rebelled and asserted his autonomy (tamakkana wa-‘aṣā wa-istaqalla bi-nafsihi).  

Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umarī was of course writing under a regime that until 723/1323 had been in conflict with Hülegü and his dynasty and in friendly diplomatic contact, moreover, with their enemies in the Golden Horde. We might accordingly expect the view he purveys to reflect a sharply different bias, at the opposite pole to Rashīd al-Dīn. And yet it is surely significant that in each case his informant was no Mamlūk officer or Jochid envoy but an immigrant from Mongol Iran: the scholar Shaykh Shams al-Dīn al-Īṣfahānī, a resident of Damascus since 725/1324–5, and al-Fāḍīl
Niẓām al-Dīn Abū I-Faḍʿil Yahyā al-Ṭayyārī, whom al-ʿUmarī describes as a secretary (kātib) in the service of the Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd and who had arrived in Cairo from Baghdad as recently as 738/1337.¹¹¹

The break with the Jochids and the creation of the Ilkhanate

We must now consider Hülegü’s actions in the wake of the conquest of Iraq, the temporary reduction of Syria and the death of his brother the Qaghan, and the outbreak of conflict with the Jochids. One important point must be made before we proceed. Since his conversion to Islam, Berke, the khan of the Golden Horde, had corresponded and exchanged gifts with the Caliph, according to both Jūzjānī and Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-ʿUmarī;¹¹² and it is indeed possible, as Jūzjānī and later Mamlūk writers claim, that al-Mustaʿṣim’s execution had caused an estrangement with Hülegü.¹¹³ Yet in the event it took Berke a full three years at least to act upon a sense of outrage at his cousin’s treatment of the ʿAbbasid dynasty; this was certainly not the primary cause of their conflict.¹¹⁴ The immediate cause, in fact, seems to have been Hülegü’s violent assault on the Jochid princes in his army and the forces under their command.

Rashīd al-Dīn, who refers to the fate of the Jochid princes in Iran at three different points in his history, is again somewhat coy on the subject. Having just related how Möngke’s death and the outbreak of hostilities between Hülegü and his kinsmen left the prince no opportunity to avenge ʿAyn Jālūt, he claims that around this time Balagha died during a banquet. Tutar was then arrested on charges of sorcery and treachery, found guilty, and despatched for punishment to Berke, who sent him back to Hülegü in accordance with Chinggis Khan’s yasa; his execution is dated 17 Ṣafar 658/2 February 1260. Subsequently, Quli also died, and thereupon the contingents of the three princes fled to the Qipchaq steppe.¹¹⁵ A few pages later, Rashīd al-Dīn narrates the outbreak of war between Hülegü and Berke. He attributes the growth of tension between the two men to Berke’s overbearing attitude, although he does concede that their hostility became open in the wake of the three Jochid princes’ deaths.¹¹⁶ At an earlier juncture, in Rashīd al-Dīn’s section on Jochi’s progeny, we are told that it was Balagha who was accused of treason and sorcery, sent to Berke and duly returned to Hülegü for punishment (events dated in the impossible year 654/1256–7), and that the deaths of Tutar and Quli shortly afterwards were ascribed to poison and caused the estrangement with Berke.¹¹⁷ When war broke out, Hülegü and Berke each slaughtered the ortaq merchants in his territories who represented the interests of his antagonist.¹¹⁸
The Armenian historian Grigor Aknerts‘i provides the nearest thing we have to a connected narrative of this crisis. He tells us that Hülegü and the Jochids fell out, whereupon the former wrote to Möngke: ‘We sent back the old troopers and t’emayc‘ik from here.’ This cryptic message presumably referred to the tammachi troops, who had been sent west with Baiju into Anatolia, and must have been intended as a hint that in consequence Hülegü now enjoyed greater freedom of action; as we saw (p. 121), there is evidence that Baiju had been acting under Jochid orders. The Qaghan responded, continues Grigor, by ordering that his brother was to be installed as ruler. Confronted by this decree at a local gathering, the majority of princes and commanders in Hülegü’s entourage acquiesced. The Jochid princes did not, and were put to death, with the exception of Quli’s son Mingqan, who was spared in view of his youth and merely imprisoned on an island on Lake Urmiya. Grigor’s story that all three Jochid princes were executed together is at variance with Rashīd al-Dīn; and it must be said that he is not the most accurate of witnesses, particularly compared with Kirakos (who refers to their ‘interference’ in the administration but mentions their seizure and execution only briefly). But in outline his account seems plausible.

The reason for this violent confrontation was the Jochid claims to regions of north-western Iran, regions where, in Juwaynī’s words, ‘the hooves of Tatar horses had reached’ during Chinggis Khan’s lifetime (see p. 102 above). It is again al-‘Umari, quoting Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, who supplies us with the greatest detail. At one point it is said that Hamadān, Arrān, Tabrīz and Marāgha formed part of Chinggis Khan’s grant to Jochi; at another, al-‘Umari mentions only Tabrīz and Marāgha, but asserts that these regions had been earmarked for the maintenance (’ulūfa) of the Jochid troops who had accompanied Hülegü’s expedition. He claims that Hülegü put to death 700 leading figures in Hamadān and other territories that belonged to Berke, from a suspicion that they harboured Jochid sympathies and were conspiring against him. Of the Ilkhanid sources, Rashīd al-Dīn is silent regarding Jochid territorial claims. But Waṣṣāf more or less corroborates al-‘Umari. Jochi’s winter quarters, he tells us, had lain beyond Darband, but from time to time Jochid troops had moved into Arrān and Azerbaijan and used to assert that these tracts were also part of their territory. He tells us that an embassy from the khan Toqto’a in 702/1302–3 demanded their cession by virtue of Chinggis Khan’s apportionment of his dominions among his sons. According to a Mamlūk author, Toqto’a went still further, informing the Egyptian Sultan in 704/1304–5 that he had demanded the surrender of ’Khurāsān as far as Tabrīz.”
It is, of course, possible that the Jochids had relinquished their authority, revenues or territorial rights in these and other regions of Iran, at the point when Möngke sent Hülegü westwards. Yet we have noticed (p. 122) the claim of the contemporary author Ibn Shaddād that prior to the outbreak of conflict with Hülegü the Jochids were entitled to one-fifth of the spoils or revenues of conquered territories west of the Oxus. Symptomatic of a curtailment of Jochid rights, for Aubin, was the nomination of agents representing each of the Qaghan’s brothers to the staff of the ‘joint satellite administration’ as associates (nökös) to the governor Arghun Aqa and the removal of the Jochids’ representative Najm al-Dīn Jīlābādī, who, having accompanied Arghun on a journey to Sarai, allegedly did not return to Iran. But the chronology does not support Aubin’s argument, which confuses two distinct visits to Sarai. Juwaynī indicates that at the time of Najm al-Dīn’s second journey in 656/1258 – three years after the first – he was still in post as chief secretary (ulugh bitikchi) on Batu’s [sic] behalf. This itself suggests that the Jochids were still in a powerful position in Iran. Stronger evidence relates to the friction that had already arisen in the early 1250s in Khurāsān, where Shams al-Dīn Kurt, the malik of Herat, had defied the local Jochid commander and complained about the exactions of Balagha and Tutar to Hülegü, who gave him his backing. On this occasion, as Allsen points out, Hülegü administered a firm rebuff to Batu’s kinsmen, and perhaps we can accordingly identify a reduction in the freedom of action allowed to appanage-holders.

We should admittedly have expected a heightened Toluid presence in the administration in the wake of Möngke’s accession, and representatives of Möngke’s brothers are duly found in Arghun Aqa’s suite from as early as 651/1253. As regards territorial interests, Juwaynī hints at a fresh distribution twice, stating firstly that after his second quriltai Möngke shared out the entire realm among all his kinsfolk, offspring, brothers and sisters, and, secondly, that following a census of the Iranian provinces Möngke apportioned them all among his kinsmen and brothers – a matter to which Juwaynī promises to return (without, in the event, doing so). The Yuan shi corroborates this latter statement, dating the measure in the winter of 1256–7. This undoubtedly implies that the Qaghan’s brothers now each acquired a share in the territory or revenues of Iran and the other conquests. There is other evidence, too, that Möngke had made fresh allocations of land. According to the Yuan shi, he had in 1252 granted Georgia to Berke, and an embassy sent to the Ilkhanid court by Özbeg, khan of the Golden Horde, on his accession in 712/1312 based his territorial claims, not on Chinggis Khan’s original dispensation, but on Möngke’s own yarligh.
suggesting that the Qaghan had confirmed Jochid rights at least over the Transcaucasus. Yet it does not necessarily follow that Möngke took advantage of Batu’s death and the brief reigns of Sartaq and Ulaghchi to redefine and curtail Jochid assets and rights in south-west Asia, as Allsen proposes.\(^{135}\) It could equally be the case that Toluid interests were enhanced at the expense of the lines of Ögödei and Chaghadai and that any new shares for Toluid princes became available through the recent conquest of Ismā ’īlī territory in Quhistān and the Alburz.

Since the authors on whom we have traditionally relied fail to yield a clear-cut picture, we are fortunate that a new witness has emerged within the last few years. In the present context, the *Akhbār-i mughūlān* is a source of considerable value and interest. Its description of the events leading up to the creation of the Ilkhanate is admittedly a trifle rambling (and marred, furthermore, by gaps in the coverage for certain years); but on balance it throws a fresh and clearer light on them. The *Akhbār* says nothing of the Qaghan appointing Hülegü as ruler of Iran or even intending to do so; for him, Möngke’s aim was simply that Hülegü should ‘set in order’ (rāst kunad) the lands beyond the Oxus.\(^{136}\) It confirms that the roots of the conflict with Berke went back to Balagha’s death, which it dates, more realistically than Rashīd al-Dīn, in 656/1258; the account of the deaths of Balagha and Tutar more or less parallels one of the versions in the *Jāmi ’al-tawārīkh* (although the *Akhbār* is silent regarding Quli’s fate).\(^{137}\) Most importantly of all, it clearly links the conflict with the Jochids’ status in Iran, and tells us not only that the three Jochid princes enjoyed authority there (dar mulk ḥukm mīkardand), but moreover that the shiḥnas and administrators (ḥākimān) representing Berke and his family governed the choicest and best (har chi nīkūtar-u bihtar būd) territories of the fine provinces of Khurāsān, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Arrān and Georgia, and used to say: ‘They are our inchū’ (meaning, as glossed here, ‘our private property’).\(^{138}\)

The account in the *Akhbār* provides the most outspoken description that we have of Jochid rights in Iran – not least the mention of Khurāsān, as distinct from the territories lying in the north-west of what would become the Ilkhanate. Coming as it does from an Ilkhanid source and one composed at a relatively early date, in the 1280s, it is highly significant. Taken together with the material supplied by Waṣṣāf, by Ibn Shaddād and by al-‘Umarī, it indicates that Berke still possessed rights in the Transcaucasus and in eastern Iran that Batu had enjoyed – in other words, that the Jochid holdings in Iran can have suffered little or no diminution between Ögödei’s era and the point when Hülegü launched his attack on the Jochid troops. The ‘new dispensation’ in south-west Asia, in other words, dated not from Möngke’s reign but from the period following his death.
The mention of Möngke as Qaghan in Grigor Aknerts’ account of the rupture is almost certainly anachronistic. Given that the war between Hülegü and Berke cannot have begun earlier than the winter of 660/1261–2, it is far more likely that Hülegü’s exchange of messages was with Qubilai. Rashid al-Din mentions the arrival of emissaries from Qubilai around that very date, bearing a diploma that conferred on Hülegü all the lands from the Oxus to the borders of Syria and Egypt. In the passage quoted above from Ḥamd-Allâh Mustawfî’s Zafar-nâma, the legitimation of Hülegü’s dynasty is dated still later – after Hülegü’s death and the arrival of a diploma from Qubilai that authorized Abagha to ‘gird himself with the rulership of Iran’. Whatever the precise chronology, Qubilai’s position was much more precarious than Möngke’s had been. His authority was strongly contested, not only by Arigh Böke but by the Jochids: he needed to make concessions in order to secure Hülegü’s support.

Uppermost in Hülegü’s mind would surely have been the need to wait upon events with the aim of profiting from them. If we can trust the Majma’ al-ansâb of the later Ilkhanid author Shabânkâra’î, as soon as he learned of Möngke’s death Hülegü recalled a consignment of treasure that he had despatched from Iran to Mongolia. Interestingly, when recounting his withdrawal from Syria in 1260 a Western European chronicler (probably indebted to information from the Franks of Palestine) says that Hülegü halted and proceeded no further east because he hoped to attain to sovereignty. We may doubt that Hülegü was a possible candidate for the imperial dignity at this stage, as Hayton of Gorighos would claim almost half a century later; and clearly the allusion is to sovereignty within Iran. It is even possible that Hülegü initially remained neutral in the struggle in the Far East. Rashid al-Din would have us believe that he supported Qubilai’s candidacy from the outset. But the picture of Hülegü’s partisanship that emerges from the Jâmi’ al-tawârîkh is a trifle more complex. Rashid al-Din mentions rumours that both Hülegü and Berke favoured Arigh Böke, but ascribes them merely to the latter’s propaganda, when we know that Berke at least consistently supported Arigh Böke. Hülegü’s eldest son Jumughur, moreover, who had been left in charge of his father’s ordo in Mongolia on his departure for the west in 651/1253, is found among Arigh Böke’s adherents and fighting against Qubilai. Rashid al-Din alleges that Jumughur had no choice (Qubilai being far away in China) and that Hülegü, displeased at his actions, ordered him to transfer his support to Qubilai. Jumughur later secured Arigh Böke’s permission to leave his army on some pretext, but died en route for his father’s headquarters. Rashid al-Din’s ambivalent treatment of alignments in the civil war reflects the fact that Qubilai was the sole fount of such legitimacy as the Ilkhans possessed.
The conflict in the Caucasus with a Mongol khan who claimed extensive rights in northern Iran, and whose propaganda exploited his own Muslim faith and Hülegü’s infidelity, explains the execution of various Muslim figures in Hülegü’s entourage, notably the chief minister Sayf al-Dīn Bitikchi, which Rashīd al-Dīn, in obscure fashion, sandwiches amid a narrative of the outbreak of hostilities late in 660/1262; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī says expressly that the malik of Tabrīz, who was also among them, was accused of correspondence with Berke. The execution of Baiju and the transfer of his command to Chormaghun’s son Shiremūn, which Rashīd al-Dīn mentions elsewhere, may also be connected (although he places these events within Möngke’s reign).

In the longer term, Jochid contentions that Hülegü had been merely Möngke’s representative and that his ulus did not derive from any territorial allocation made by Chinggis Khan (above, p. 141) seem also to have touched a raw nerve within the Ilkhanid court. There is a curious echo of this sensitivity in Shabānkāra’ī’s Majma’ al-ansāb, which was composed initially for the Ilkhanid wazir, Rashīd al-Dīn’s son Ghiyāth al-Dīn. This author alleges that the ‘western lands’ from the Oxus to the borders of Syria and Egypt were the patrimony (mīrāth) of Hülegü’s father Tolui, who had received them from Chinggis Khan himself. Shabānkāra’ī further makes Tolui out to be Chinggis Khan’s son by a different wife who was senior to the mother of his three brothers Jochi, Chaghadai and Ögödei – namely, a daughter of the Kereyit Ong Khan (Toghril, here sometimes referred to by the grandiose title of ‘Khan of Khans’). This would surely have been mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn, had there existed any grounds for believing it in his day. As it is, however, Shabānkāra’ī’s patently spurious testimony finds no corroboration in earlier sources, even those written from a Toluid vantage point. It can only be a fabrication designed to counter Jochid and Chaghadayid challenges to the Ilkhan’s title and to bolster the Toluid claims to Iran.

By juxtaposing the various accounts reviewed here, then, it is possible to arrive at a closer understanding of Hülegü’s situation around the year 1260. The sources do not exclude the possibility that Möngke had been clandestinely engaged in creating a new ulus for him to rule, as Rashīd al-Dīn seeks to suggest. But the indications are that while he exercised overall military command in Iran, Hülegü was far from enjoying the level of political authority that he bequeathed to his son. Whatever Möngke’s private intentions may have been (and Rashīd al-Dīn’s statement begins to appear somewhat threadbare), the Jochids seem to have been remarkably unaware of any reduction in their rights and possessions even in Khurāsān, let alone in the Transcaucasus.
Hülegü’s action against the Jochid princes in some measure simplified the situation in Iran. Of the Jochid troops who escaped annihilation, some took flight through the Caucasus into the Qipchaq steppe, while a group numbering more than 200 and acting apparently on Berke’s orders moved westwards into the territories of the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars and entered his service. The majority of those under the erstwhile command of Tutar and Quli either fled homeward via the Dīhistān steppe or headed east into present-day Afghanistan, where they took up their quarters, as Rashīd al-Dīn puts it, in ‘the mountains of Ghazna and Bīnī-yī Gāw as far as Multān and Lahore’. Here, under the leadership of a certain Negüder, who had from an early date commanded a Jochid contingent in eastern Khurāsān, they created in effect an autonomous polity (see p. 183).

There was now only one major non-Toluid contingent in Iran, that headed by the Chaghadayid prince Tegüder, who would prove cooperative until the reign of Hülegü’s successor Abagha. Then, in 667/1268–9, prior to his invasion of Khurāsān, the Chaghadayid khan Baraq sent a clandestine message to Tegüder with instructions to support his campaign. Tegüder, who was stationed in the Transcaucasus, attempted to head north into the Qipchaq steppe in order to make his way east into Chaghadayid territory. He was frustrated by the opposition of the Georgian King David V and was then defeated by Shiremūn, son of Chormaghun, the one-time military commander in Iran. Brought back as a captive, Tegüder was pardoned; but he forfeited his command, and his troops were incorporated fully within Abagha’s military establishment. This completed the process that had begun with Hülegü’s attack on the Jochid forces some years previously; from then on, all the Mongol troops quartered in Iran owed allegiance to the Ilkhan.

The reconstitution of the ulus of Chaghadai

Hülegü was not the only Chinggisid prince in the west to profit from the succession dispute in Mongolia. Among the first actions of the newly elected Qubilai in 658/1260 was to nominate a prince to take over the Chaghadayid ulus and to muster its resources in his interest. But his candidate, Abishqa, was intercepted and murdered by the agents of Arigh Böke, who thereupon appointed as khan one of his own adherents, Alughu. On arriving in Central Asia, Alughu brought under his control, in Waṣṣāf’s phrase, ‘the territory from Almaligh to Kenjek and Talas and from Kāshghar to the banks of the Oxus’. This was achieved, however, by dint of an extraordinary volte-face. Once Alughu felt firmly established, he rebelled
against Arigh Böke, withholding the revenues and provisions that he was expected to ship eastwards. It was clearly as part of this dramatic switch that he suddenly moved against Arigh Böke’s Jochid allies. His forces invaded Transoxiana and installed there as governor his kinsman Negübei; in Bukhārā, Berke’s officers (nökös) and dependants, including 5,000 skilled craftsmen and their families, who were the property of the Jochids, were rounded up and put to death, much as Hülegü had slaughtered Berke’s ortaq merchants in Iran. Alughu’s troops also made an incursion into Khwārazm (a Jochid possession since Chinggis Khan’s era) and brought Sali Noyan’s tamma force in the Indian borderlands under his sway, sending him Sali as a captive. Subsequently, Alughu defeated Berke’s forces and plundered Uţrār. The Armenian historian Kirakos Ganjakets’i heard that Alughu offered assistance to Hülegü; even if this is true, such help is unlikely to have materialized.

Although Arigh Böke reacted sharply to Alughu’s betrayal, invading the Chaghadayid ulus, occupying Almaligh and forcing him to take flight to Khotan, Alughu was able to retrieve his position when Arigh Böke was deserted by the majority of his troops and obliged to make his submission to Qubilai (1264). It was around this point, in all likelihood, that Alughu cemented his position by marrying the regent Orqina and also received a patent of authority from Qubilai for the lands between the Oxus and the Altai. We should note, firstly, that he emerged from this struggle as the master of a Chaghadayid ulus that was enhanced in size and, secondly, that he had further secured the services of Mas’ūd Beg, who had hitherto been answerable directly to the qaghan but who now acted as finance minister (ṣāhib-dīwān) to Alughu and administered the ample revenues of Transoxiana on his behalf. It is from this juncture that we can speak of a Chaghadayid khanate.

The end of the unitary empire

Rashīd al-Dīn stresses that a quriltai was summoned to formalize Qubilai’s accession once Arigh Böke had surrendered; not only Hülegü and Alughu but even the hostile Berke, allegedly, were invited. No such gathering ever took place. On Alughu’s death not long afterwards, the Qaghan sent the Chaghadayid Baraq to rule jointly with Mubārak Shāh and to represent his own interests. This was the last time he was able to interfere in the succession in Central Asia; and he failed, since Baraq rapidly displaced his young colleague and rose in revolt against Qubilai. As for the Jochid khans, neither Berke (d. 665/1267) nor his successor Mengü Temür ever appears to have
recognized Qubilai. For many years, the Qaghan’s sole allies were the Ilkhans, Hülegü and Abagha.

Within a few years, moreover, Ögödei’s grandson Qaidu had carved out an ulus for himself in Central Asia.\footnote{164} Having been granted the Qayaligh region by Möngke in 1252, Qaidu supported Arigh Böke in the succession conflict that followed Möngke’s death and, even after Arigh Böke’s capitulation, rejected several invitations to attend Qubilai’s court. At first Qaidu was on hostile terms with Baraq; but by 1268 they had reached a \textit{modus vivendi} with each other and with Mengü Temür of the Golden Horde, and in a quriltai near Talas in 667/1269 the three princes agreed to divide the revenues of Transoxiana, with Baraq keeping two-thirds and Qaidu and Mengü Temür sharing the remainder. Qaidu’s chief residence was apparently near Talas, where he was enthroned in the latter part of Muḥarram 671/late August 1272 and where in c. 1275 he received the eastern Christian monks Markôs and Rabban Ṣawma.\footnote{165} In a sense he had recreated the ulus of his grandfather Ögödei, which had been in virtual eclipse since 1251; although, as Michal Biran has suggested, it would have constituted an inadequate base for his power,\footnote{166} and Rashid al-Dīn says that he was obliged to gather piecemeal a military force of his own because he was unable to rely upon any reservoir of Ögödeyid troops left over from that earlier period.\footnote{167} Qaidu’s territories, moreover, were by no means confined to the one-time appanage lands of Ögödei and Güyük. Following Baraq’s death (670/1271), Qaidu asserted his authority over the ulus of Chaghadai and appointed its khans himself. The most notable of them was Baraq’s son Du’a, whom he installed in c. 681/1282–3 and who would collaborate with him over the next two decades against the Yuan and the Ilkhanate. Jamāl al-Qarshī reveals that the veteran administrator Mas’ūd Beg b. Maḥmūd Yalavach (d. 688/1289), who had served in turn the qaghans and the Chaghadyids, now answered to Qaidu, as did his three sons who each followed him in office down into the early fourteenth century.\footnote{168} Although doubts have been expressed whether Qaidu claimed the title of qaghan, we should note both that Qāshānī says he did and that Jamāl al-Qarshī, writing under his son and successor, speaks at one point of ‘our qaghans’.\footnote{169} Until his death early in Rajab 702/late in February 1303,\footnote{170} Qaidu acted as a focus of opposition to Qubilai and his line.

It was not, however, simply a matter of dissension within the Mongol ranks on a more serious scale than heretofore. Within a few months of the outbreak of war in the Caucasus, Berke was in diplomatic contact with the Mamlûk regime in Cairo, playing up his Islamic faith and inciting Sultan Baybars against the infidel Hülegü.\footnote{171} Hülegü for his part turned to the Mamlûks’ other principal enemies, the Christians of Western Europe. In
1262 he wrote both to Pope Urban IV and to Louis IX of France to enlist their aid against Egypt. The letter to the Pope has not survived; we have only Urban’s reply, indicating that Hülegū’s envoy had been waylaid in Sicily by its hostile king, an ally of Egypt. But in his letter to Louis the Ilkhan sought to engineer a Frankish blockade of Egypt by sea while his own forces attacked by land. For the first time Mongol princes had shown themselves ready to ally with external powers against fellow Mongols.

The events of 1261–2 accordingly marked the dissolution of the Mongol empire in more than one sense. There was no loss of territory – other than Syria and Palestine, overrun only within the previous few months. The vast Mongol dominions were still in Chinggisid hands. There would be no attempt in Iran for more than seven decades to set up a ruler who was not of the imperial line – in China for even longer. Moreover, Chinggisids continued to reign in the Pontic-Caspian steppes and the Volga region until the sixteenth century and in the steppes of Central Asia until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Loyalty to Chinggis Khan’s dynasty was to prove remarkably tenacious. But the state he had founded had ceased to be a unity – even, paradoxically, as expansion in the Far East peaked in a triumph never hitherto achieved by nomads. Qubilai is deservedly celebrated for his conclusion of the long war against the Song (1279) and his unification of China under a single government for the first time in over three centuries; less so, perhaps, for other achievements like the definitive assertion of Mongol authority over Korea and Tibet and the reduction of Pagan (Burma) and Annam (modern-day Vietnam) to tributary status. Equally, however, the magnificent ruler of Cathay immortalized by Marco Polo was the first Mongol qaghan not acknowledged throughout the length and breadth of the empire.
4. The Mongol dominions after 1260
Alongside the Mongol invasions, the crusaders' occupation of the Levantine coast from 1098 onwards, or even the subjugation of Central Asian Muslims by the Qara-Khitai in the twelfth century, paled into little more than frontier violation. The Mongol campaigns have become byword for the devastation of fertile agricultural land, the sack of towns and cities, and the massacre of populations. 'In its . . . purposeless cruelty, ' wrote E. G. Browne over a century ago, ' . . . this outburst of savage nomads . . . resembles rather some brute cataclysm of nature than a phenomenon of human history.' Of the suggestions offered for the impulses behind Mongol violence, we have already noted the blind unreasoning fear and hatred of urban civilisation, adduced by J. J. Saunders (above, p. 4). Other explanations include 'steppe wisdom about how nomads could best obtain what they wanted from the agrarian world', a desire to deter further resistance, and punishment for disobedience to the Mandate of Heaven. Of the suggestions offered for the impulses behind the planned destruction of those elements of the population that were 'capable of resistance, the intimidation of the remainder, and sometimes the providing of pasture for the nomads'.

Our capacity to appraise the extent of the destruction, or to understand the motives behind it, is not aided by the tendency of both contemporary and later sources to indulge in high-flown extravagance. For Yāqūt, the appearance of the Mongols was an event unlike any other since the Creation of the World, and the devastation of fertile agricultural land, the sack of towns and cities, and the massacre of populations, 'in its . . . purposeless cruelty, ' wrote E. G. Browne over a century ago, ' . . . this outburst of savage nomads . . . resembles rather some brute cataclysm of nature than a phenomenon of human history.' Of the suggestions offered for the impulses behind Mongol violence, we have already noted the blind unreasoning fear and hatred of urban civilisation, adduced by J. J. Saunders (above, p. 4). Other explanations include 'steppe wisdom about how nomads could best obtain what they wanted from the agrarian world', a desire to deter further resistance, and punishment for disobedience to the Mandate of Heaven. Of the suggestions offered for the impulses behind the planned destruction of those elements of the population that were 'capable of resistance, the intimidation of the remainder, and sometimes the providing of pasture for the nomads'.
heavens and the earth. We have already noticed Ibn al-Athīr’s reactions to the cataclysm (pp. 17–18). His powerful lament under the year 617/1220–1, for instance, has often served as the prototype for a mise-en-scène. He had delayed writing about the irruption of the Mongols for some years, for who would find it easy to write the obituary of Islam and the Muslims? There had been no disaster like it – not even Nebuchadnezzar’s destruction of Jerusalem and deportation of the Children of Israel to Babylon; and perhaps no comparable cataclysm would occur before the end of time, not excluding the advent of Yājūj wa- Mājūj (Gog and Magog). And whereas al-Dajjāl (the figure in Muslim tradition corresponding to Antichrist) would at least spare those who rallied to him, the Mongols, he says, had spared nobody. It is to Ibn al-Athīr that we owe the recurring anecdote about a single Mongol trooper cutting down in succession several Muslim inhabitants of a captured city while his victims displayed only passive acceptance of their fate; one Muslim even obeyed the order to wait on the spot while his killer went off to fetch a sword.

The Mongol campaigns in Khurāsān attracted the attention of two other contemporaries. ‘It is as if their aim were the extermination of the species,’ wrote Ibn al-Labbād; ‘... they do not seek territory or wealth, but only the destruction of the world that it may become a wasteland.’ He retails stories about Mongol atrocities: tales of their drinking the blood of those whose throats they had cut; of the gradual dismemberment of captives as a form of recreation; of the ravishing of comely women for several days prior to their murder – stories that later find echoes in Latin sources recounting the Mongol assault on Eastern Europe (1237–42). Nasawī, who like Ibn al-Athīr engages in tendentious generalization, alleges that in Khurāsān his own fortress of Khurandīz alone was spared. And after describing the destruction of Nīshāpūr, which, as we shall see, was singled out for especially harsh treatment, he denies any need to detail the fate of other cities in Khurāsān, Khwārazm, Iraq, Māzandarān, Azerbaijan, Ghūr, Bāmiyān and Sījistān (Sīstān) ‘as far as the frontiers of India,’ since the foregoing account furnishes a precise idea of what transpired elsewhere; no more would be required than to change the names of the besiegers and of the besieged.

We might expect a certain sensationalism from these authors, writing in the first shock of a major infidel invasion of Islamic territory. Yet their statements are corroborated by those who lived through the experience but recounted it decades later. The sufi Najm al-Dīn Rāzī ‘Dāya’ (d. 654/1256) alleges that ‘the confusion and ruin, the killing and seizure of captives, the destruction and burning that were enacted by those accursed creatures had never before been witnessed in any age’ and that they resembled only ‘the
catastrophes that shall ensue at the end of time.' Narrating the fate of the Muslim cities of Transoxiana, Farghana and Turkestan – notably Balasaghnun, Bukhara and Samarqand – Juzjani gives us to believe that the great majority of the populations were martyred and only a small number survived as captives (this despite the fact that Balasaghnun was spared after offering no resistance). The massacres by the fresh forces that arrived in western Iran under Chormaghun, he says, were similarly beyond the capacity of the pen to record.

Nor did this grim picture of pitiless bloodshed fade with the passage of several decades and the emergence in Iran of the stable government of the Muslim Ilkhans. The Dominican Friar Riccoldo da Montecroce, domiciled in Iran in the 1290s, was told that the Mongols had perpetrated ‘such great slaughter, destruction and ruin’ that nobody could believe it who had not seen it. Authors writing when Mongol conquest and sovereignty had been largely rehabilitated in Muslim eyes by Ghazan’s conversion in 1295 could afford to be more prosaic about the slaughter and rapine over which Ghazan’s ancestors had presided in south-west Asia several decades earlier. Wassef alludes almost incidentally to the ‘general massacre’ perpetrated by Chinggis Khan’s forces in Transoxiana and Khurasan. Even Rashid al-Din concedes that Chinggis Khan and his dynasty had killed more people than anybody before them since humankind began, and lists those cities – Balkh, Shaburghan, Taliquan, Merv, Sarakhs, Herat, Turkistan, Rayy, Hamadan, Qum, Isfahan, Maragha, Ardabil, Barda’a, Ganja, Baghdad, Mosul and Irbil – where the Mongols had conducted such a massacre that ‘scarcely anybody survived’. One of his concerns, of course, was to stress the work of restoration set in place by Ghazan. How effective this was is debatable; but it is noteworthy that a generation later Ḥamd-Allah Mustawfī Qazwīni doubted whether Iran would recover from the damage inflicted by the Mongol conquest within a thousand years.

**The incidence of massacre by Chinggis Khan’s armies**

Such judgements reinforce the impression of wholesale and indiscriminate carnage throughout the urban world of the Islamic East. For E. G. Browne, ‘if death was the punishment of resistance, it was also in most cases the consequence of surrender.’ It is undeniable that as an act of vengeance for the murder of his envoys at Utrak, Chinggis Khan’s assault upon the Khwarazmian empire was accompanied by a good deal of bloodshed. Yet by piecing together the material from a wide range of sources we can identify a variety of responses towards vanquished populations on the part of the invaders.
We have first to distinguish between the treatment suffered by fortified cities and that meted out to the inhabitants of the countryside. The Franciscan friar and papal ambassador Carpini, writing in 1247, describes how the Mongol advance parties engage in no looting, arson or killing of livestock but merely kill or wound people if they are able and put them to flight if not. Thus in 1236, for instance, the letter of a Jewish traveller has Mongol squadrons engaging in indiscriminate killing along the main routes in the vicinity of Mosul. Settlements between Rayy and Hamadān, according to Ibn al-Athīr, fared worse than either city at the hands of Jebe and Sübe'edei. The Mongols ‘burned, destroyed and put men, women and children to the sword; they spared nothing’; and the same tactics were employed in the villages on the way from Hamadān to Azerbaijan and in the towns and villages lying between Sarāb and Baylaqān. Here the aim, presumably, was to ‘soften up’ the region, to set a grim example to those lucky enough to be sheltering behind city walls, whose resistance would have caused the invaders heavy losses, and to undermine their economic capacity to hold out.

We have considerably more information concerning the fate of fortified places. Professor Jürgen Paul has thrown into relief the heterogeneous character of the enemies confronting the Mongols during the seven-year campaign. They comprised Khwarazmian generals and their mainly Qangli troops; the urban patriciates and (distinct from them, on occasions) leaders in charge of towns or of whole regions; the mass of the population, both urban and rural; and local nomadic groups already present prior to the Mongol invasion, whether Türkmen, Kurds or Arabs. These various elements might differ in their readiness to oppose the Mongols. Capitulation was frequently the work of the city’s notables, although resistance on the part of the military could also be lacklustre, while the common people, often led by ‘àyyārān (‘vagabonds’), were more prone to defy the invaders. The strength of resistance in turn had a bearing on the scale of devastation.

Prompt submission was rewarded, after a fashion. The towns of Balāsāghūn, Üzkand and Barchinlighkent avoided a massacre by putting up no great resistance. Juwaynī says that during the advance from Bukhārā to Samarqand Chinggis Khan refrained from molesting townships that yielded, but left troops to besiege those, like Sar-i Pul and Dabūsiya, that held out, and that the regions neighbouring Bukhārā and Samarqand escaped slaughter because they submitted. The price of such indulgence was usually a levy (ḥashar) to assist the conquerors in operations elsewhere. Having spared the lives of the people of Zarnūq, Chinggis Khan made a levy of young men (jawānān) to participate in the attack on Bukhārā; and although the inhabitants of certain towns in eastern Khurāsān – Zawzan, Andkhūd,
Maymand (Maymana) and Qāriyāt – were unharmed, they were obliged to provide auxiliaries for future Mongol campaigns.29

We might expect Uṭrār itself to have been singled out for especially savage treatment, though of our principal sources only Jūzjānī expressly indicates that the entire population was put to the sword, and the fact that a forced levy from Uṭrār later participated in the Mongol attack on Khujand (see below) might suggest that he exaggerated.30 Rashīd al-Dīn writes that the populace emerged in groups of fifty to be killed, but also speaks of ‘peasants and craftsmen’ surviving and being drafted for operations elsewhere.31 Bukhārā and Samarqand fell into a category of their own, inasmuch as their merchants had obtained the goods taken from Chinggis Khan’s murdered envoys at Uṭrār.32 At one point Juwaynī seems to indicate that their populations had reason to be grateful, on the grounds that the Mongols perpetrated slaughter and looting here just once.33 But the more detailed account he supplies a little later, as also that of Ibn al-Athīr, suggest that an example was made of both cities. The citizens of Bukhārā, learning that the Khwārazmshāh’s troops had deserted them and fled, sent their qadi to ask for terms, which were granted. They were unharmed, though their property was treated as forfeit to the conquerors and they were compelled to serve as cannon-fodder in the attack on the citadel, whose garrison held out. Once the citadel had fallen, they were ordered out of the city, divided up and deported, while the place was given over to plunder; the women were systematically violated, and anybody found within Bukhārā was put to death. The district became a wasteland.34 The deportees were incorporated into the Mongols’ forces and used in order to intimidate Samarqand. Here, following the surrender, the population (as opposed to the Turkish garrison: see below) was treated in the same fashion as that of Bukhārā.35 Juwaynī says that levies from the city were despatched to both Khūrāsān and Khwārazm; and in their assault on the citadel of Khujand, we are told, the Mongols employed not only the young men of that town but also forced levies (ḥashar) from Bukhārā, Samarqand and Uṭrār.36

Certainly failure to respect the inviolability of their envoys brought down the Mongols’ wrath upon other strongholds also. In the early stages of the attack on the Khwarazmian empire, Jochi conducted a wholesale massacre at Sighnāq, in retaliation for the killing of Ḥasan Ḥājjī, a long-time associate of Chinggis Khan’s who had been sent to negotiate.37 The lesson may have proved salutary, since we know of no other such episodes north of the Oxus. By contrast, at Jand, where an agreement was reached for the town’s capitulation, only some of the leaders were executed for having insulted the Mongol envoy, Chin Temür, during the negotiations.38 This is
possibly the earliest indication of some kind of tariff of unacceptable behaviour on the part of an enemy.

Other circumstances can be identified that determined the massacre of an urban population. The Mongols exacted an especially grim penalty when a siege claimed the life of an imperial prince or a prominent commander. Because Chinggis Khan’s favourite grandson, Mö‘etügen, had perished during the siege of Bāmiyān in 618/1221–2, after the city fell the conqueror ordered his troops to kill every living creature and decreed that nobody should ever live there; the town was still in ruins in Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī’s day.39 The Mongol general Toghachar, a son-in-law of Chinggis Khan, was killed before Nīshāpūr, which had revolted after earlier submitting to Jebe and Sübe‘edei. At its capture following a siege of five days, a bloodbath took place over which Toghachar’s widow presided, and from which even cats and dogs were not excluded; only 400 craftsmen were spared and removed to Turkestan.40 When a lesser commander was killed in a skirmish with the people of Nasā, the Mongols took the town after a fifteen-day siege and slaughtered the population.41

In addition, we find the Mongols conducting a general massacre in order to vent their spleen on those strongpoints that mounted too vigorous or too prolonged a resistance. Examples are Tirmidh, stormed after operations lasting eleven days; Gurziwān, taken after one month; the citadel at Ṭāliqān, called Naṣr (Nuṣrat)-kūh, invested at first by Chinggis Khan in person but captured some time later with the aid of reinforcements under his son Tolui; Sabzawār, which was taken after three days’ fighting by a division of Toghachar’s army; and Shahr-i Sīstān (Nīmrūz) on two occasions, in 619/1223 and (after a siege of nineteen months) 632/1235.42 At Gurgānj – ‘the city of Khwārazm’, as Ibn al-‘Athīr calls it, described by Yāqūt only a year or two earlier as the richest and largest of the cities he had visited and classed by Yelü Chucai as formerly wealthier and more populous than Bukhārā43 – the entire population perished. This was partly in reprisal for their desperate resistance, lasting (according to Jūzjānī) four months, but also because the Mongols took the city by breaking the dam that held back the waters of the Oxus, so that those who might otherwise have survived in hiding were drowned; though Juwaynī speaks only of an unsuccessful attempt to divert the river.44

Harsh treatment awaited those cities that capitulated but subsequently repudiated the conquerors’ authority and killed the khan’s representatives. Nīshāpūr, which further compounded its offence by occasioning the death of a Mongol general, has already been mentioned. As the news spread that Khwārazmshāh Jalāl al-Dīn had defeated the Mongols near Parwān, several
towns in Khurāsān that had previously submitted rose in revolt. Balkh, for example, had surrendered in 617/1220–1 and suffered no pillage or slaughter, the Mongols merely installing a governor (shiḥna) there; some of its population were later employed in the assault on Merv. When Jalāl al-Dīn's victory inspired fresh defiance, however, the inhabitants of Balkh were driven out onto the plain and massacred. Herat had been granted terms after an investment lasting ten days, and the populace spared, with some exceptions. But again, when the people rose and put to death Mengütei, the shiḥna appointed over them, the Mongols returned, took it after an eight-month siege, killed everybody – except some of the women, who were enslaved – and burned the city. We are not told of the fate meted out to Sarakhs. Its qadi, who had conveyed its submission, had been appointed as malik, and a shiḥna had also been installed; but on the arrival of military assistance from Merv the populace rebelled and put one or both of these officials to death. For events in Merv prior to its fall, we are indebted to the detailed account supplied by Juwaynī. A group including the shaykh al-islām had sent an envoy to Jebe and Sübe’edei with an offer of submission; but before the Mongols could react, the city was taken over by other elements, which opted for resistance and killed the shaykh al-islām. Clearly it was for this reason, as also for fomenting the Sarakhs rising, that when Merv fell to Tolu’s forces the entire population, except the artisans and craftsmen, was annihilated.

It seems that the variant accounts of Ghazna’s fate can be explained in similar fashion. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the town, which lacked adequate garrison forces, fell easily and the inhabitants were killed, other than women who were enslaved. But Juwaynī again gives a more complete picture, telling us at one point that it submitted and the Mongols appointed a basqaq; it must be to this earlier attack that we should ascribe Juwaynī’s own description of the unexpected arrival of a Mongol force, the killing in the streets and the setting alight of the Friday mosque, since this was the contingent that went on to a humiliating defeat at Parwān. Subsequently, Ögödei, whom Chinggis Khan had sent back to Ghazna immediately following Jalāl al-Dīn’s defeat on the Indus, butchered the inhabitants, the artisans excepted; this is confirmed in outline by Jūzjānī, and Ibn al-Athīr’s sparse details, too, are expressly placed after the Indus engagement.

So far we have been concerned with the activities of Chinggis Khan’s main forces. Since the primary task of Jebe and Sübe’edei was to apprehend the fleeing Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, the need for haste had a distorting effect on their conduct. Jūzjānī believed that they had orders from Chinggis Khan not to harm any of the cities of Khurāsān. At one point, admittedly,
in the context of Mongol operations in Khurāsān and eastern Iraq, Ibn al-Athīr makes the rather suspect generalization that their forces did not spare a single city, destroying, burning and sacking ‘everything they passed by’. But earlier, when describing the beginning of the pursuit, he says that the Mongols did not engage in acts of plunder or killing but pressed on at Muḥammad’s heels. Generally speaking, however, the same pattern is visible in the operations of Jebe and Sübe’edei as we have noticed elsewhere. One of their staff having fallen before ‘Ṭūī of Būshanj’, near Herat, the two generals put its entire population to the sword. There was much killing at Khabūshān, owing to what Juwaynī terms, with tantalizing imprecision, the ‘heedlessness (‘adām-i īltifāt)’ of its people. The inhabitants of Marāgha, which the Mongols took by force early in 618/1221, were massacred, though the womenfolk were merely enslaved; those citizens who had hidden were lured out by a stratagem and killed too. Ardabīl held out against the invaders during two successive attacks, but was taken by force on the third occasion and its population slaughtered.

A massacre occurred at Qazwīn, whose populace had mounted a fierce resistance to the point of hand-to-hand fighting in the streets; the later historian Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, a native of the city, describes the slaughter in his Zafar-nāma. Here the Relatio de Davide rege (1221) comes to our assistance by revealing that Qazwīn had yielded and received a governor but had later risen in revolt and killed him and many of his suite. Rayy too had submitted to Jebe and Sübe’edei, but at a subsequent juncture it was sacked and its people massacred. These are evidently the two episodes referred to by Ibn al-Athīr, who first tells us that the inhabitants had been taken by surprise and that the women and children were enslaved, but later describes how fresh Mongol forces arrived at the onset of 621/1224 and killed those of the inhabitants who had returned in the interval and had begun to rebuild the city (presumably to refortify it). The people of Baylaqān, in Arrān, committed the unforgivable offence of killing a Mongol envoy sent, at their own request, to arrange terms. When the Mongols stormed the town, they allegedly killed everyone within regardless of age or sex, even ripping out foetuses from their mothers’ wombs.

Regarding other towns lying in the path of the two noyans, our information is admittedly often vague; we are given no details of the fate of Mongol envoys sent to require their submission, the vigour of their resistance or the duration of any siege. We cannot explain the fate of Sāwa (where, according to Yāqūt, the invaders left absolutely nobody alive), or the general massacres at Āmul, Isfarāyīn and Nakhchiwān, or that in the city of Jurjān (Gurgān), mentioned only by a fourteenth-century author, or the slaughter at Zanjān
(where Rashīd al-Dīn claims that they killed many times the number they had killed in other cities) and Sarāw (Sarāb). Nor are we told why the fresh division that crushed Rayy in 621/1224 went on to destroy Qum and Kāshān, which had lain off the route of the earlier campaign, and to slaughter their populations.

Although Juwaynī says expressly that after leaving Nīshāpūr, Jebe and Sübêdei spared those who submitted and destroyed those who resisted, the evidence to corroborate this comes primarily from north-western Iran. Thus no attack was launched against Tabrīz, because its Eldegüzid ruler, the indolent and pusillanimous Özbeg, sent out horses, clothes and money as a bribe to the Mongols to go away – clearly corresponding to the na’il-bahā (‘shoe-money’) demanded by the Mongols’ enemy Jalāl al-Dīn.72 When Mongol forces approached the city a second time and Özbeg took flight, preparations were made to resist, but the invaders withdrew once their demands for further offerings of money and clothing were met.73 Gifts of money and clothing similarly secured a reprieve for Ganja and for Darband.74 When the headman of Hamadān had emerged with money, clothes and horses and sought terms, the city was spared and the Mongols passed on; they appointed a shihna at this juncture, to gather more wealth on their behalf.75 It was only subsequently that the inhabitants, rendered desperate by their inability to raise any further sums and fortified by the joint leadership of the headman and a lawyer, slew the shihna; and then, in 618/1221, despite an offer to surrender to the Mongols when they reappeared, Hamadān was subjected to a punitive siege, its people slaughtered, and the city set on fire.76

The conduct of war under Ögödei and Güyüg

At the time of Chin Temür’s appointment as governor of Khurāsān and Māzandarān, these provinces were in a state of unrest and chaos, and Juwaynī indicates that the new governor was ruthless in enforcing his authority and ridding the territory of insurgents. But even here a distinction is drawn between places that submitted, where the Mongols made only modest requisitions of goods, and those that had to be taken by storm, where the inhabitants were killed after disgorging all their possessions.77 We have relatively few details relating to the campaigns of Mönggedü and Dayir further east, on the frontier of India, but it appears that the menfolk of Lahore, which had to be taken by force in 639/1241, were slaughtered and their dependants (atbā’) taken prisoner.78

The activities of the Mongol armies operating in western Iran, Iraq and Anatolia after 627/1229, and commanded successively by Chormaghun and
Baiju, present a similar pattern. Fārs and Kirmān were both spared a Mongol attack by their rulers’ prompt submission.\(^7\) The city of Irbil, taken by force in Dhū l-Ḥijja 634/July–August 1237 after a siege of uncertain duration (the citadel defied the Mongols for longer), suffered a general massacre, such that the place stank of rotting corpses; though prisoners were also taken, probably mainly girls.\(^8\) When Baiju invaded Anatolia in 1242, according to the Armenian Kirakos, Erzurum held out and had to be taken by storm, with the result that its populace was slaughtered. The local historian Ibn Bībī, who tells us that the besiegers had suffered heavy losses and would have withdrawn but for the treachery of the comptroller of finances (\textit{mushrif}) Duwayni, qualifies the picture drawn by Kirakos, specifying that the Mongols divided the inhabitants, spared those who could be of use to them and killed the rest.\(^9\) In the next year, the people of Kayseri were put to the sword for their resistance and the city was left deserted. Bar Hebraeus says that the young men and girls who were suitable for slavery were spared and carried off; Ibn Bībī, that the women and children were taken away into slavery.\(^2\) During this same campaign, on the other hand, Sivas and Divriği hastened to yield, and the victors contented themselves with exacting loot.\(^3\) According to Ibn Bībī, the surrender of Sivas was conveyed by its qadi, who had been in Khwārazm at the time of the Mongol conquest (in 1221) and had obtained a yarlıgh and a paiza, which he now presented to Baiju. In response, the general allowed only a limited number of Mongol soldiers to enter the city to loot for three days before being withdrawn.\(^4\)

**General patterns down to 1254**

The Mongols, then, exhibited a range of reactions to the urban and other sedentary populations in the path of their advance. At one extreme, when they had encountered strong resistance or when a city had yielded but subsequently revolted, the entire populace might be put to the sword; and on those few occasions when an especially prominent Mongol had been killed during the siege, the slaughter extended to every living creature – although even then skilled elements might be spared and carried off as slaves. Slightly less drastic expedients were the killing of all adult males (though in these circumstances too the skilled craftsmen and artisans were usually spared and deported) and the enslavement of women and children. In some towns, only the military, or perhaps just their leaders, were killed. Urban populations that yielded would be spared, but elements would frequently be conscripted for operations against a neighbouring town. And at the other extreme, in response to rapid submission or when haste was an
imperative the Mongols might accept provisions and money, and pass on; such precautions, of course, were no guarantee against the conquerors’ return at a later date in order to demand goods and services on a more burdensome scale. But had the Mongols really been as eager to remove all potential resistance as some authors have supposed, they would surely not have given so many strongholds a second chance.

Amid all this, moreover, there seems to be a significant body of evidence that in general the invaders observed something like the laws of war, whereby a city that surrendered was spared, while one that held out and had to be taken by force was subjected to a general massacre, at least of the menfolk, while the females were enslaved. We should not forget that Muslim princes had adhered to these same principles, including Chinggis Khan’s chief antagonist, the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad b. Tekish. After the people of Samarqand had annihilated all Khwarazmians in the city and resisted his army, Muḥammad had conducted a similarly extensive slaughter in Samarqand in c. 609/1212–13, sparing only the foreign merchant quarter.85

Certain fortified places, it is true, furnish exceptions to the Mongols’ observance of the laws of war. They sometimes offered terms, only to break them once a place had surrendered and the commander and garrison were in their power; and it seems clear that they deployed this ruse in response to protracted and strenuous opposition. It is apparently to this tactic that the papal envoy Carpini alludes when he describes how the Mongols induce those who have capitulated to evacuate the city in order to be counted, but then systematically cut them down with the axe, apart from the artisans and others whom they regard as useful slaves.86 At Samarqand, after a brief initial resistance the Qangli/Qipchaq garrison, believing that the Mongols would welcome them because, as Turks, they were of the same ‘race’, asked for terms, only to be slaughtered once they had been disarmed.87 This may also have been true of Fanākat, in Transoxiana, which surrendered on terms but where the soldiery were then slaughtered.88 In 628/1231 the Mongols massacred the inhabitants of Isʿird following their capitulation on terms after a siege of five days; though they also spared as many of the girls and comely women as they wanted and carried them off to Akhlāṭ.89 Six years later, as we learn from Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, the caliphal governor of Irbil, holding out in the citadel, offered tribute in return for peace; although having accepted the money, the Mongols then redoubled their efforts, without success.90 The same author’s description of the fall of Iṣfahān in 633/1235–6, after repeated attacks, suggests a similar duplicity born of exasperation, since the victors massacred the Shāfiʿis, whom they had promised to spare for betraying the city to them, alongside their Ḥanafi neighbours;91 though in fairness it cannot have been
easy, in the heat of the carnage, to distinguish the two groups. The Mongols broke their word in 1242 both at Erzurum following a twenty-day siege and at Arzinjān after a spirited resistance; tricked into coming out, the inhabitants were then massacred, with the exception of ‘a few lads and girls’ at Arzinjān who were taken off into slavery.92 Denying the conquerors the spoils of victory, too, was to invite destruction. At the capture of Ganja in 1236, according to Kirakos, himself a native of the city, the Mongols were incensed that so many of the inhabitants had burned their dwellings and possessions in order to prevent them from falling into enemy hands, and put everyone to the sword – men, women and children alike.93

Other contributors to the destruction

In assessing the destruction resulting from the first thirty years or so of Mongol attacks, however, we should note, firstly, that north of the Oxus significant devastation had preceded the advent of Chinggis Khan’s armies. The Gür-khan’s forces had spent three days and nights slaughtering the rebellious inhabitants of Balāsāghūn in c. 1209 (an experience that may have induced the survivors to surrender to the Mongols), and a few years later Gūchūlūg had sacked Kāshghar to avenge the murder of its Qarakhanid ruler, an ally, putting most of its leading figures to the sword.94 Nor were such atrocities exclusively the work of the infidel. In the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad’s sack of Samarqand, Ibn al-Athīr tells us, 200,000 Muslims had perished, although the figure in Juwaynī’s account – almost 10,000 – is rather more convincing.95 Ibn al-Athīr also heard that in the early stages of his conflict with Gūchūlūg, Muḥammad had evacuated the populations of Shāsh (Tashkent), Isfījāb, Farghāna, Kāsān and other towns, which he had then demolished. It is probably this same policy to which Yāqūt refers when he says that after taking from the Qarakhanids the frontier regions (thughūr) of Transoxiana – by which he apparently means Isfījāb, Ṭarāz (Talas), Ṣabrān (Sawrān), *Sānīkath (Yangikent?) and Fārāb – Muḥammad lacked the resources to defend them, so that his forces laid them waste and the inhabitants emigrated elsewhere. The populace killed off by the Mongols when they arrived at Isfījāb in 616/1219, for instance, comprised merely those who had remained behind after these deportations.96 In the aftermath of a large-scale infidel invasion, popular thinking may have failed to distinguish the most recent cataclysm from earlier misfortunes.

In addition, the Mongol onslaught had the indirect consequence of undermining security, especially in Khurāsān, where some of the damage visited upon orthodox Muslims following Chinggis Khan’s invasion was the work of
others and would have served to impede recovery from the Mongols' own operations. With the eclipse of the Khwarazmshāh, power in many towns of Khurāsān fell into the hands of local amirs. According to Nasawī, contemporary wits dubbed these figures ‘the Amirs of the Year Seven’, i.e. those whose rise dated from 617.96 He lists some: Tāj al-Dīn Qamar in Nishāpūr; ʿIltaq b. Elchi Pahlawān in Sabzawār and Bayhaq; Shāl, apparently a Qara-Khitai, in Juwayn, Jām and Bākharz; an officer called Nizām al-Dīn ‘Ali in Isfarāyīn. The local dynasty displaced by the Khwarazmshāhs returned to Nasā. Tāj al-Dīn ‘Umar b. Masʿūd, a Türkmen chief, took control of Abīward, Kharraqān and Margha.98 There is just a hint that the mutual conflicts of these petty rulers prior to Jalāl al-Dīn’s arrival from India in 621/1224 may have inflicted further harm on the province.99 A similar situation that threatened to develop in the Ghazna region, where local Ghūrī and Turkish commanders were locked in conflict,100 was nipped in the bud, first by the appearance of Jalāl al-Dīn and then by Chinggis Khan’s arrival in pursuit.

Following Jalāl al-Dīn’s return and his vain bid to revive Khwarazmian power in western Iran, fresh instruments of chaos made their appearance. They were often aided by the fact that the Mongols had required the demolition of so many cities’ fortifications, rendering them vulnerable to fresh attack not only by the conquerors themselves but by lesser elements. Juwaynī describes how in the 1230s two of Jalāl al-Dīn’s former amirs, Qaracha and Yagha ʿSonqur, raided Nishāpūr and its dependencies; Qaracha would kill everyone who had submitted to the Mongols until he was defeated and driven from Khurāsān by the Mongol general Kül Bolod.101 Jalāl al-Dīn’s followers, who fled west after his death (628/1231), wrought havoc in Mesopotamia and northern Syria until 644/1246–7. In Iran, the Ismāʿīlī Assassins had profited from the overthrow of the Khwarazmian empire to seize Dāmghān, though to hold it they had to agree to pay Jalāl al-Dīn an annual tribute.102 And in 642/1245 the town was again surrendered to them in order to escape the attentions of the tax-collectors sent out by Sharaf al-Dīn: the Ismāʿīlis slew some of the inhabitants, carried off most of the rest, levelled the citadel and left the houses in ruins.103

The deployment of violence by Hülegü’s forces (1255–62)

There has been an inclination to portray Hülegü’s operations as marked by greater restraint than those of his grandfather. In some degree this is because, unlike Chinggis Khan’s assault on the Khwarazmian empire, his expedition in itself did not constitute an act of vengeance. But the difference also reflects the tone of our sources. The poignant dirges of Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn
al-Labbād find little echo in later authors’ descriptions of the campaigns of the 1250s, and this may have led us to underestimate the damage. Their reticence must be due at least in part to circumstances that had put the Mongols in a new perspective, as potentially bringers of order. Encroachments by the Assassins were only one such development: their proximity to Qazwīn, which led Juwaynī to describe the city as ‘an outpost (thughr) of Islam’, would prompt an appeal to Möngke from its people (see p. 126 above). Further west, the Khwarazmians’ reputation for brutality had become a byword: Ibn Wāṣil viewed the abominations (fawāḥish) they perpetrated against the Muslims’ womenfolk (haram) in the wake of their victory over the army of Aleppo in 638/1241 as worse than those committed by ‘the Tatars or other infidels’. The introduction of some semblance of a stable government by Hülegü may explain the rather suspect claim of a post-Ilkhanid author that the people enjoyed respite from oppression throughout the Ilkhanid era. To quote David Morgan (in a slightly different context), ‘even the Mongols were better than nothing’.

It is important to recognize, moreover, that the contrast with the earlier campaigns of Chinggis Khan’s armies – insofar as one exists – applies only to Iran. Here, where powers in the south of the country such as the Salghurids of Fārs, the Qutlughkhanids of Kirmān and the atabegs of Luristān had submitted as early as Ögödei’s reign, and only Shabānkāra now required a siege, it is reasonable to assume that the past three decades of Mongol military activity had furnished a powerful disincentive to resist. Hülegü’s forces, in fact, encountered relatively little opposition other than from the Ismā’īlī Assassins, who may have seen no alternative to resistance. Their stronghold of Tūn in Quhistān, which had reneged on its earlier submission to Kedbuqa, was stormed and its inhabitants slaughtered, apart from younger women and all below the age of ten.

Juwaynī ends his narrative with Hülegü’s operations against the Ismā’īlis. He makes no reference to the assault on the ’Abbasid Caliphate and other powers in Iraq and beyond. The coverage of operations further west, therefore, involving the slaughter of orthodox Muslims and enabling us to compare the damage done by Hülegü’s troops with that inflicted by his grandfather’s, is simply absent from his work. For that coverage we are dependent on Rashīd al-Dīn and on the Arabic sources, generally composed in enemy territory. What emerges is that, in his dealings with independent powers in Iraq and northern Syria, Hülegü for the most part behaved very much as Chinggis Khan had done amid the crumbling empire of the Khwārazmshāh; the treatment of Muslim towns and cities was again largely contingent on their willingness to make prompt submission.
In orthodox Muslim territory, the first hint of continuity with earlier practice is the fate of Kirmānshāh, where a massacre occurred for reasons unspecified.\textsuperscript{110} No slaughter is reported from other towns lying along the approaches to Baghdad. But that city paid dearly for the Caliph's defiance and vacillation once the Mongols were victorious. Assaults on Hūlegū's envoys as they left Baghdad in 655/1257, and an arrow-shot that killed a Mongol commander during a parley and prompted the exasperated Hūlegū to order the capture of Baghdad with all speed,\textsuperscript{111} sealed its fate. On 1 Ṣafar 656/7 February 1258 caliphal troops emerged from the city, accompanied by large numbers of the inhabitants, hoping to be granted quarter. Instead, they were divided up into units of ten, 100 and 1,000 and put to the sword. When on 4 Ṣafar/10 February al-Musta'sīm himself, with his sons and 3,000 sayyids, imams, qadis and dignitaries, surrendered, the Caliph was told to instruct those still in the city to throw down their weapons and come forth; but all who obeyed these orders were then killed. A ‘general massacre and pillage (qatl-u ghārat-i āmm)’ commenced three days later, when Hūlegū himself entered Baghdad, and an amnesty was not finally declared until 10 Ṣafar/16 February.\textsuperscript{112} Sayyids, Muslim scholars, the Christian clergy, and merchants from Khurāsān and other regions, whose contacts with the Mongols went back some years, were spared, having in advance marked their houses on the victors' instructions.\textsuperscript{113} The account of the sack given by the calligrapher and musician Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī provides further evidence that the violence was highly organized and controlled and that the killing was by no means indiscriminate.\textsuperscript{114}

Of the other cities and regions of Iraq, Ḥilla had been quick to submit: some Ḍālids had appeared in the Mongol encampment during the siege of Baghdad in order to request a shiḥna from Hūlegū, and the populace threw bridges over the Euphrates when Mongol forces appeared under Buqa Temūr. Wāsiṭ, by contrast, neglected to surrender, with the result that Buqa Temūr took it by force.\textsuperscript{115} According to Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, Hūlegū perpetrated a great slaughter in Kurdistan, killing the majority of its amirs.\textsuperscript{116} Testimony on the fate of towns east of the Euphrates varies. Ḥiṣn Kayfā yielded and was left in peace.\textsuperscript{117} Bar Hebraeus indicates that the people of both Ḥarrān and al-Ruhā (Edessa) surrendered and were spared, but that massacres took place in Manbij, al-Bīra, Qalʿat Jaʿbār, Qalʿat Najm and Bālāsh.\textsuperscript{118} Ibn Shaddād confirms that Hūlegū’s forces took al-Bīra only after a difficult and protracted siege; he also says that the Mongols dispersed the population of al-Ruhā, but that the inhabitants of Ḥarrān were unharmed;\textsuperscript{119} Rashīd al-Dīn’s suggestion that Ḥarrān, like Dunaysir and Naṣībīn, was taken by force and subjected to a bloodbath is therefore mistaken.\textsuperscript{120}
fate naturally befell cities that reneged on a previous submission, though famine and disease had taken such a toll of the inhabitants of rebellious Mayyāfāriqīn in 658/1260 that few remained to be slaughtered. When the ruler of Mosul, al-Ṣāliḥ b. Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, who had repudiated Mongol sovereignty late in 659/1261, capitulated in Ramādān 660/July–August 1262 after a six-month investment, the Mongols killed those inhabitants who had survived famine and the other ordeals of the siege, sparing only some artisans (pīsha-war); Rashīd al-Dīn says that not a soul was left in Mosul (although after the Mongols departed almost 1,000 persons emerged from caves and hilltops and assembled there). On the Mongol recapture of Sinjār in the same year, however, we learn only that they demolished the city walls and the two citadels.

In Syria we find a similar pattern. The city of Aleppo, which was very strongly fortified and which none of its inhabitants expected to fall swiftly, held out for a full week. Hülegū, angered by its resistance, rejected the overtures of a delegation headed by the Jacobite Maphrian Bar Hebraeus, who was placed under arrest and incarcerated for a time in Qal’at Najm. The population was subjected to a massacre. Contrary to the Mongols’ usual practice and for reasons unknown, Hülegū spared the garrison of the citadel, which had held out for a little longer. But the historian Ibn al-‘Adīm, briefly returning to Aleppo from Egypt before his death in 660/1262, was appalled by the desolation, which inspired him to pen a mournful qaṣīda. To the east, Ibn Shaddād says that the Mongols expelled the population of Bālis, which was still ruined and uninhabited in his day. Elsewhere in Syria and Palestine, although some of the inhabitants of Nablus were slaughtered the great majority of urban populations opted for prompt surrender, including those of the major centres of Damascus, Ḥāmā and Ḫimṣ, and the towns of Șahyūn, Balāṭunus, ’Azāz and Kerak.

It will be as well at this juncture to consider the invaders’ attitude towards the dhimmī communities – that is, Jews and Christians – within the major cities. A number of sources confirm that the Christians of Baghdad had been exempted from the carnage. They may have owed their lives to the Jacobite (Monophysite) Catholicos, who had accompanied the Mongols into the city; this at any rate is the impression given by Bar Hebraeus. Regarding the Christians of Aleppo the evidence is equivocal. One possible reason why both Bar Hebraeus and his fellow Christian author Ibn al-‘Amīd judged the slaughter there greater than that at Baghdad was that the Jacobite Christians did not benefit from the same immunity. Despite taking refuge in the Greek Orthodox basilica, they were massacred; the remnants were rescued by Armenian troops. Yet according to Ibn Wāṣil the Mongols
clearly made some effort to spare monks and ascetics at Aleppo just as they had in the Caliph’s city: certain buildings, among them the Jewish synagogue, were protected on Hülegü’s orders, and those residing or taking refuge in them had their lives spared. But nothing suggests that dhimmis in cities other than Baghdad and Aleppo were exempted from a general slaughter.

One category of towns constituted an exception to the general rule. As even Rashīd al-Dīn is ready to admit, Hülegü’s failure to keep his word to spare potentates such as Khūrshāh, al-Musta’ṣim and Tāj al-Dīn Ibn Ṣalāya, the caliphal governor of Irbil, fuelled a determination to resist in some quarters. And Hülegü reacted especially violently towards cities where the population, for that reason, demanded a pledge of security for their lives prior to surrender, as happened at Sarūj. Similarly, the inhabitants of Ḥārim resisted for a time but eventually asked for quarter with the stipulation that it be guaranteed by Fakhr al-Dīn Ayās al-Sāqī, the former commander of the citadel of Aleppo. A furious Hülegü had them slaughtered, including the women and children down to infants in the cradle, despite the fact that Fakhr al-Dīn had indeed sworn the oath on his behalf. Abū Shāma’s statement that Hülegü had granted terms to the city of Aleppo but broke his word might possibly indicate a similar context. At any rate, it seems that the Mongol prince was highly sensitive to the implication that he was not to be trusted.

The problem of contemporary figures

Our sources furnish grim numbers for those killed in cities that defied the Mongol armies. ‘Wherever there was a king, or a provincial ruler, or the governor of a city that offered resistance,’ writes Juwaynī, ‘him they annihilated together with his people and his followers, and native and alien, to the extent that where there had been a population of 100,000 there remained, without exaggeration, not one hundred persons.’ He was, however, sceptical about the figure he heard for the casualties at Gurgânj and hence refrained from quoting it, although he alleges that the craftsmen and artisans, who were spared, themselves totalled over 100,000; Bar Hebraeus, who here either used a source other than Juwaynī or misunderstood him, supplies 100,000 for the total number of citizens killed. The figures for some other localities similarly strain our credulity. Najm al-Dīn Rāzī, who fled before the Mongols in 617/1220–1, heard that the invaders had slaughtered or taken prisoner about 500,000 people in his native city of Rayy and its region. Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī was struck by the fact that in
his birthplace, where the Shāfiʿīs constituted an overwhelming majority and the Ḥanafis were ‘one in a thousand’, the Ḥanafī dead alone totalled 12,000.141

Incredibly high figures are associated in particular with the great urban centres of Khurāsān in the years 617–18/1220–2. Īzjānī arrived at a death toll of 2,400,000 for Herat (at its second capture) by the dubious expedient of quadrupling the figure of 600,000 that had been reported for a single quarter of the city142 – a reminder, if one were needed, of how haphazard such statistics tend to be. Sayfī’s figures of 1,747,000 for Nīshāpūr and over 1,600,000 for Herat143 are likewise unbelievable; and it is noteworthy that a merchant told Ibn al-Labbād that he had calculated the dead at Herat as 550,000.144 At Merv, Ibn al-Athīr was informed, approximately 700,000 Muslims were martyred.145 The author of the Taʾrīkh-i Sīstān, writing almost a century later, tells us that in the course of the second Mongol investment of the kingdom’s capital (632/1235) 100,000 ‘more or less’ had perished of famine and disease even before it fell.146

It is true that foreign observers corroborate the image of slaughter and depopulation. The estimates relayed by Simon de Saint-Quentin, writing a few years later, for those killed at Kayseri range from 100,000 to 300,000.147 Changchun, arriving in Samarqand in December 1221, after the city’s capture, says that its population stood at only a quarter of the 100,000 or more households it had previously comprised;148 and he is speaking, we might note, of a city that had surrendered on terms. Some months later he passed by Balkh, whose inhabitants had recently been ‘removed’ following their rebellion; his party could still hear dogs barking in the streets.149 The Armenian Constable Smbat, who travelled through Iran and Transoxiana in 1247–8 and wrote of his experiences to the King of Cyprus and others, speaks – with a certain relish – of enormous Muslim cities abandoned, and vast heaps of bones lying round about.150 These were not necessarily the remains only of slaughtered Muslims, of course. Desperate resistance could mean heavy losses for the invading forces as well. Ibn al-Athīr was told that more besiegers than defenders had perished at Gurgānj, and in Rashīd al-Dīn’s time piles of the bones of dead Mongols could still be seen around the old city.151

Yet even if we assume that, in some cases where the conquerors are known to have indulged in a wholesale bloodbath, the existing urban population had been swollen by an influx of refugees from the hinterland and by ‘strangers’, as we are told occurred at Nīshāpūr,152 the great majority of the numbers we are given evoke only scepticism. On the whole they entitle us to conclude, with David Morgan, merely that the carnage was on
an unprecedented scale.\textsuperscript{153} Some of the notable families of Qazwīn evidently survived the general massacre of 617/1220.\textsuperscript{154} And on occasions our sources themselves further undermine any confidence we might place in their statements. Juwaynī heard from a sayyid, who claimed to have been among those counting the corpses in Merv, that they totalled more than 1,300,000. Yet we are then expected to believe that fresh Mongol forces, converging on the city after reports that it was drawing many people from elsewhere as well as some of its previous inhabitants \textit{[sic]}, killed another 10,000.\textsuperscript{155} By the same token, Ibn al- Athīr's statements about the Mongol atrocities at Baylaqān forfeit much of their impact when he subsequently mentions the return of the surviving inhabitants and describes their fate at the hands of the Georgians, who (he claims) perpetrated worse slaughter and pillage than the Mongols.\textsuperscript{156}

Conceivably, some of the figures transmitted by Muslim authors were not based on impressionistic guesswork but were derived from the conquerors themselves. We know that the Mongols did not simply record the number of their own dead.\textsuperscript{157} They also made a tally of the enemy’s, as with the slaughtered population of Merv, or indeed of those they were about to slaughter, as they did with the Qangli and other Turks in the Samarqand garrison.\textsuperscript{158} This was often done by severing an ear from every corpse and counting the total. Thus we read of the victors heaping up a mound of the right ears of a vanquished Jin army, and Bar Hebraeus heard that during Batu’s campaigns of 1237–8 the right ears of all slain in Rus’ and in Volga Bulgar territory were cut off on the Qaghan Ögödei’s express orders; this was in all likelihood the campaign mentioned by Juwaynī that was allegedly responsible for a count of 270,000 ears.\textsuperscript{159} And in 1258 Hülegü’s lieutenants sent him 12,000 ears belonging to the Dawātdār’s slaughtered troops near Baghdad.\textsuperscript{160} A grisly census of this kind surely underlies the piles of severed heads at Nīshāpūr, since otherwise the care taken to keep those of the men separate from those of the women and children is inexplicable.\textsuperscript{161} Even when armed with reliable figures, of course, the Mongols may not have felt obliged to adhere to them in public. We know that they were not above intimidating independent powers with inflated statistics for the populations they had annihilated, much as they exaggerated their own numbers (above, p. 86). Perhaps the best-known example is the figure of two million for those recently killed in Baghdad, cited in Hülegü’s letter of 1262 to Louis IX (alongside a list of potentates the Mongols had destroyed) and patently designed to overawe the French king into cooperation.\textsuperscript{162}

Not all the numbers are of this order. Plausible figures are associated with places of less significance than the major cities of Khurāsān. Ibn
al-Athīr’s estimate of ‘more than 40,000’ for the dead at Qazwīn in 1221\textsuperscript{163} inspires greater confidence than the usual numbers (or, for that matter, the dark hints thrown out by Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī a century later). So too do the total of 70,000 corpses allegedly buried following the capture of Sabzawār,\textsuperscript{164} and the same figure, expressly said to have comprised both the inhabitants and refugees from outside, for those who perished at the fall of Nasā.\textsuperscript{165} Our few figures for the towns further west, assailed by the forces of Chormaghun and Baiju during what has been characterized as a period of ‘raids, small invasions, diplomatic pressure, and complete inactivity’,\textsuperscript{166} are still lower. At Is’īrd in 628/1231 the number slain is given in two independent sources as ‘more than 15,000’ and as ‘20,000 or more’.\textsuperscript{167} In a raid on Diyār Bakr and Mayyāfāriqīn in 650/1252–3 Mongol troops are said to have killed more than 20,000 people.\textsuperscript{168} When Baiju took Abulustayn in 655/1257, those killed totalled about 7,000; this did not include the young men and girls, who were carried off into captivity.\textsuperscript{169}

Insofar as numbers have come down to us from Hülegū’s campaigns, most of them elicit confidence. The figure of almost 40,000 for those killed in Wāṣīṭ is not unreasonable.\textsuperscript{170} Ibn Wāṣil’s 50,000 for the survivors at Aleppo, and al-Dhahabī’s assertion that a quarter of the inhabitants were massacred, have given rise to an estimate that 25,000 (out of a possible total population of 100,000) perished;\textsuperscript{171} the figure of more than 100,000 women and children sold as slaves as far afield as Lesser Armenia and the Frankish-held islands must be an exaggeration.\textsuperscript{172} As for Baghdad, Möngke’s Chinese envoy Changde, who reached Hülegū’s headquarters in the very next year (1259), heard that the dead in the eastern part of the city numbered ‘several tens of thousands’ (the populace of the western, unfortified part had already been massacred).\textsuperscript{173} Only two decades or so later, Bayḍāwī would claim that ‘the majority of the population’ had been slaughtered.\textsuperscript{174} The figures of 1,800,000 given by al-Dhahabī, and of 800,000 or so supplied by the fourteenth-century author of al-Hawādith al-jāmi’a and by Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, are almost certainly too high (for the more obviously inflated figure that Hülegū himself cited in a letter to the French king four years later, see above, p. 171), and need to be set against the evidence of the city’s shrinkage and decline that went back some decades: even if we discount the scathing comments of Ibn Jubayr, who visited Baghdad in 580/1184, Yāqūt had observed in the 1220s that some western parts of the city were already isolated quarters.\textsuperscript{175} Yet we should bear in mind that the mortality figures were swollen by an epidemic among the survivors of the massacre.\textsuperscript{176} And just as during Mongol attacks in 635/1238, 643/1245 and 647/1249, the Caliph’s city was inundated with refugees from elsewhere in Iraq, particularly, no doubt, since stories of
Baghdad’s historic impregnability, which seem to have exercised even Hülegü (pp. 128–9), were widely trusted.177

**After the slaughter: secondary depopulation**

Whatever the fate of conquered urban populations, the removal of forced levies to assist the Mongols in the capture of other strongholds was a further blow. From the remarks of contemporary observers, who describe these conscripts as nothing more than human shields for the Mongol troops and hence equally likely to be slaughtered by the enemy or, if they fought half-heartedly, by their new masters,178 it is doubtful whether many of them ever returned home. Skilled personnel, too, were regularly transported from their homeland, whether exempted from a general massacre or simply picked out from the bulk of a city’s inhabitants whose lives had been spared. Juwaynī tells us that the artisans carried off from Samarqand in 617/1220 numbered 30,000, and confirms that artisans were removed from Khwārazm and from Nishāpūr,179 while Sayfī claims that a thousand households of weavers were conveyed from Herat to Beshbaligh.180 These, and the many others who suffered a similar fate (see below, pp. 225–6), were the Muslim counterparts of the Europeans whom the Mongols abducted during their devastation of Hungary and Poland in 1241–2 and whose whereabouts the Franciscan William of Rubruck discovered when he visited Mongolia in 1254: a Parisian goldsmith, for example, who had constructed an intricate silver fountain for dispensing various beverages at Möngke’s court, and a corps of German silver miners from Transylvania.181

We have relatively sparse information concerning the exodus of refugees from lands conquered or threatened by the Mongols. Jūzjānī tells us that when Chinggis Khan’s forces were operating in present-day Afghanistan many from Khurāsān and Ghūr abandoned their homeland, moving first into Sind and then onwards into the Punjab.182 But there was probably a still greater movement from Iraq and the Jazīra westwards into the Mamlūk dominions.183 It is easier to identify members of the elite than to ascertain the incidence of mass migration. We know that it occurred, however, even though reliable figures are elusive and exaggeration is rife, as when Bar Hebraeus assures us that the entire population of Syria fled to Aleppo (presumably from the northernmost regions, in 1259).184 Egypt was one haven that beckoned to those who sought to escape the conquerors. Using the material in two fifteenth-century Mamlūk biographical dictionaries, Professor Carl Petry has identified, among the population of Cairo, scholars (‘ulama) whose nisbas were derived from all the main centres of Persian
civilization. Syria and Palestine were another source of immigrants, among them the historian Ibn Shaddād. In the year of his arrival, 658/1260, we even encounter local chiefs in far-off Sīstān trying to sail down the Indus in order to escape to Egypt by way of the Red Sea. The geographer Shams al-Dīn al-Dimashqī (d. 727/1327) tells us that by that same year the population of Cairo had swollen to one million as a result of immigration from Iraq, the Jazīra and Syria. The figure would be more helpful if we knew how many inhabitants the city had in, say, 1220. But what is striking is the fact that by specifying this date al-Dimashqī may be excluding those who fled these regions at the time of Hülegū’s invasion of Syria.

No little uncertainty surrounds the question whether the conquerors deliberately converted agricultural land into pasturage for their livestock. According to Juwaynī, the Qaghan Ögödei reacted angrily to unrest in Khurāsān by decreeing that the entire population of the province be annihilated and their homes flooded. The order, though subsequently countermanded, is reminiscent of the destructive steps allegedly contemplated in northern China during his reign, with the aim of creating more extensive pastureland. Ḥamd-Allāh may refer to clearance of the agricultural population in the vicinity of Sujās and Suhraward, in ‘Irāq-i ‘Ajam, when he speaks of both towns as ruined and shrunk to the size of villages and says that the hundred or more villages in the vicinity were mostly inhabited by Mongols. His statement, too, that Darāward, in Azerbaijan, had once been the name of a provincial town but was now merely that of a district in which a contingent of Mongols had their winter quarters (qishlaq), could hint at the same fate.

Yet material of this kind is an inadequate foundation on which to reconstruct a policy. The earliest – and indeed the only – evidence we have for that policy comes from Central Asia. In 1246 Plano Carpini came across ‘innumerable ruined cities and demolished forts and many deserted towns’ as he passed north of the Aral Sea and the Sir-daryā; the towns of ‘Iaunikint’ (Yangikent), ‘Barchin’ (Barchinlighkent) and ‘Ornas’ (variant reading ‘Orpar’, i.e. Uṭrār) are mentioned in the next line. Carpini himself tells us that Yangikent and Barchinlighkent lay in the path of Batu’s advance towards the Qipchaq steppe (i.e. c. 1236) and that although Barchinlighkent put up resistance, Yangikent at least surrendered promptly. It is possible that Carpini confused these operations, mentioned by no Muslim source, with Chinggis Khan’s expedition (although on that occasion Barchinlighkent surrendered). Crossing the plains south of Lake Balkhash in 1253, Rubruck observed that most of the large towns there had been destroyed to create pasturage. But we have no reason to link this to the seven-year campaign.
Conceivably it formed part of the preparations for Hülegü’s expedition, which coincided with Ru- bruk’s outward journey and entailed the reservation of extensive pastureland along his entire route between Qaraqorum and the Oxus.195

**Economic malaise and cultural decline**

There can be little doubt that the advent of Chinggis Khan brought economic dislocation to Western Asia. To what extent cultivated land was devastated, and how long it remained so, is unclear. But on the Iranian plateau, where agriculture was so dependent on underground irrigation channels (*qanāts*) that required regular maintenance, the damage may have been more protracted. Even where the invaders did not directly damage these systems, the slaughter of peasants, or more probably their flight, meant that the untended channels would have fallen into disrepair, as at Herat.196

Commerce and crafts will inevitably have suffered, but doubtless for a shorter period, given the Mongols’ interest in both. Ibn al-Labbād was told that merchants from many localities had sought shelter in Nīshāpūr, and Ibn al-Athīr makes a point of mentioning that merchants visiting Khurāsān from other regions were killed during the Mongol campaigns there.197 The attacks also affected trade indirectly, though for how long is not always clear. Ibn al-Athīr learned that the export of sable, squirrel and beaver furs from the Qipchaq territories (no doubt from Sūdāq in the Crimea, which he describes as the port of the Qipchaq and which the invaders took in c. 620/1223) was briefly interrupted by the Mongol campaigns.198 The production of dated lustre pottery of fine quality at Kāshān appears to have ceased between 619/1222 and 660/1262, perhaps partly in response to a collapse in the market, and revived in the early years of the Ilkhanate.199 There was also a large-scale westward emigration of metalworkers from Khurāsān in the 1220s.200 But much will have depended on the date and circumstances of a city’s conquest. Mosul, seat of the pliant Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, was not subject to a siege and violent capture until 1262, after his son’s revolt, and continued to flourish under Hülegū, now ruler of Iraq, as a centre of silk production.201

The impact of the invasions on intellectual and spiritual life is also hard to gauge. During Chinggis Khan’s invasion, the Mongols’ unwelcome attentions extended to prestigious buildings, including those charged with a religious significance. The chief mosques at Qazwin, Rayy and Hamadān were burned down.202 At Merv, the mausoleum of the Great Saljuq Sultan Sanjar, which the Mongols had ransacked in search of precious objects, suffered a similar fate, while at Ṭūs the shrine containing the bones of the Eighth
Imam ʿAlī al-Riḍā and of the ʿAbbasid Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd was demolished. As far as we can tell, religious buildings suffered only looting during Hülegü’s invasion of Syria, apart from those at Aleppo, where the great mosque was set on fire by his Armenian auxiliaries and the flames spread to neighbouring quarters and consumed a madrasa. In Syria, at least, the damage would shortly be made good by the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars.

Writing a few decades after the initial onslaught, Juwaynī observed that colleges had been destroyed and that ‘the surface of the earth in general’, and Khurāsān in particular, were now bereft of men of learning and letters, who had perished in the invasion. From the context, the reader is evidently expected to blame this situation on Chinggis Khan’s campaigns, but the nature of the link remains unclear. Yāqūt’s lament on the fate of Merv hints darkly at the obliteration of illustrious buildings and the absence of scholars. He heard that the Mongols had burned down the library at Sāwa, reputedly the largest in the world. But the contents of libraries did not necessarily go up in flames: Christian manuscripts were removed as loot from Erzurum, and Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī transferred many books from Baghdad, Mosul, Wāsīṭ, Baṣra, Syria and the Jazīra to Marāgha. Scholars may indeed have perished in the widespread slaughter of Muslim populations. Over a century later, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s amanuensis Ibn Juzayy was told that 24,000 scholars had died in the course of the Mongol invasion of Iraq; and Juwaynī’s comment that it was necessary to seek learning in the belly of the earth, since that was where the learned were located, suggests a heavy casualty rate among this class. But it is worth noticing that he also singles out the harmful effects on Samarqand of successive levies of young men to take part in Mongol operations elsewhere. Possibly his complaint is that they were being drawn into administrative service to the conquerors at an age when they should have been acquiring knowledge and spiritual insight: this was his own lot, through having been employed in the finance office (dīwān) since the age of twenty. Juwaynī also remarked that Muslims had travelled far beyond the horizons of Islam and established schools where the learned taught the faith; but most of these journeys represented involuntary deportations.

**Efforts at reconstruction**

Recovery was patchy. Even Ibn al-Athīr – writing, it should be remembered, prior to 630/1232–3 – heard that Transoxiana had begun to recover once Mongol rule became established; while in Khwārazm, where Gurgānj, as
Yaqūt testifies, had been totally destroyed and little trace remained, the conquerors had already built a new city (known to the Mongols as Ürgench) close to the site of the old capital. There was thus a stark contrast with Khurāsān, which remained a ruined no man’s land since Muslims were afraid to take up residence there again. A generation later, Juwaynī too believed that Transoxiana had virtually recovered its original level of prosperity, and draws a similar comparison with Khurāsān and ‘Irāq-i ’Ajam, which had been several times subjected, he says, to pillage and massacre. The difference is explicable on the grounds that Chinggis Khan had decided to incorporate Transoxiana in his empire (above, p. 75) but that, if he ever contemplated doing so in the case of Khurāsān, the revolt of its cities in 1221 (pp. 158–9) had led him to change his mind.

We need to treat with caution the testimony of Yelü Chucai in his Xi you lu, since although he describes Samarqand, plausibly enough, as wealthy and populous, he also speaks of the prosperity of Balkh, which was certainly then in ruins. But Changchun, visiting Transoxiana as early as 1222, provides strikingly early evidence of efforts at rehabilitation when he reports that Chinese, Kitans and Tangut were being called upon to assist with agrarian tasks in the Samarqand region, though how many and to what extent they were soldiers rather than colonists deliberately imported for the purpose, we cannot tell. Changde, passing through Central Asia in 1259, noticed Chinese among the inhabitants of Almaligh, and described Samarqand as very large and populous. Carpini heard that the Mongols had populated Yangikent with new inhabitants.

Where some limited recovery occurred in Khurāsān in the years immediately following the Mongol invasion, it was the work of the local urban elements (‘ayyārān), as at Herat, for example, which had been virtually a ghost city in 1222. But in time the Mongols themselves endeavoured to redress the ill effects of their campaigns. In the late 1230s Ögödei issued orders for the return to Herat of two groups of silk weavers. As a result of all these efforts, the census in 1240 revealed a population of 6,900. Accompanying the invading Mongols in 654/1256, Juwaynī obtained Hülegü’s permission to restore Khabūshān, which he found still derelict and in ruins from the earlier Mongol attack, its buildings deserted, its underground channels (kārizhā) devoid of water; the only walls standing were those of the Friday mosque. In Rashīd al-Dīn’s day Kitan (or possibly Chinese) cultivators were to be found in Merv and Tabriz, and a significant group was installed at Khūy (Khoy) in western Iran, where the fair-skinned good looks of their descendants would attract comment from Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī towards the mid-fourteenth century; we are not told when they
had arrived. Here in western Iran there is more evidence of speedy recovery. Yāqūt (d. 626/1229) heard that Ardabil had already returned to its previous condition (prior to the sack) or better. Kirakos says that Ganja remained desolate for a mere four years before instructions were given that it be rebuilt (apart from the walls); while the Mongols ordered the reconstruction of Erzurum (Karin; Theodosiopolis) as early as c. 1244. Kirakos mentions the rebuilding of Rayy and Iṣfahān at a date that the context suggests was prior to 1241. But the partial restoration of Qum may have been deferred until the end of the century.

Some of the restoration was due to personal acts of patronage by members of the imperial dynasty. Tolui’s widow, Sorqaqtani Beki, donated 1,000 silver ingots (bālish) for the construction of the Madrasa-yi khānī (‘Khan’s College’) at Bukhārā, ordering villages to be purchased for its endowment and the teachers and students provided with accommodation. Other initiatives were the work of the civil administrators – representatives of the sedentary or semi-sedentary societies in the Far East who had been reduced by the Mongols early in Chinggis Khan’s era. In Bukhārā, some progress was made by Chinggis Khan’s first nominee as governor, the Kitān ‘Tusha’ (Yelü Ahaï; see p. 108), though it was Maḥmūd Yalavach, acting on behalf of the Qaghan Ögödei, who was responsible for its recovery in earnest. Even in Khurāsān, officially sponsored improvement occurred, as at Ṣūs, which had lain in ruins until Ögödei’s governor, the Uighur bureaucrat Körgüz, took steps to redress the situation in c. 637/1239. According to Sayfī, Ögödei himself, nominating ‘Izz al-Dīn as governor of Herat in the mid-1230s, expressly ordered him to take measures for the recovery of the city and its region. In c. 1247 Arghun Aqa gave orders for rebuilding in both Merv and Ṣūs. But such efforts at repopulation were sometimes long delayed. Nishāpūr had to wait until it was restored by Wajih al-Dīn Zangī Faryūmadī, the wazir of Khurāsān, in 669/1271, and Ibn al-Fuwaṭī says that when, on the instructions of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṣūsī (most probably in the early 1270s), 500 households were brought back to Marāgha from centres as distant as Irbil and Mosul, forty years had passed since their emigration.

What distinguished Hülegü’s campaigns most sharply from his grandfather’s seven-year expedition, or the campaigns of the intervening decades, was not an absence of massacre and devastation but the speed with which measures of reconstruction were implemented. The Mongols’ occupation of Syria and Palestine in 658/1260 was of course ephemeral; but Iraq, which remained under their rule, offers grounds for a more realistic comparison with Chinggis Khan’s operations. Most of the holy places in Baghdad,
including the caliphal mosque, the shrine of Mūsā al-Jawād and the tombs at Ruṣāfa had been set on fire at its fall, but on 14 Šafar 656/20 February 1258, the very day of al-Mustaṣ'īm’s death, 'Imād al-Dīn 'Umar Qazwīnī was appointed as deputy to the noyan Qarabuqa, and began restoring the two first-named buildings. Two noyans also undertook reconstruction, so that dead animals were cleared from the roads and bazaars were re-established.236 Ibn al-Fuwaṭī mentions that the magnificent Mustansūriyya college reopened in the very next year, and praises 'Imād al-Dīn 'Umar (who died as early as 661/1263) for his rebuilding of mosques and madrasas and the repair of shrines and ribāts (hospices).237 Al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi‘a lists the officials whom the wazir Ibn al-'Alqamī and others appointed to supervise reconstruction in other cities of Iraq.238 But both Ibn al-Fuwaṭī and Waṣṣāf ascribe much of the recovery to the historian Juwaynī himself, as governor of the province during the following years: he oversaw the excavation of a canal linking Najaf and Kūfa, the rebuilding of a number of religious edifices (even Shi‘i ones), the repair of Baghdad’s water system and the construction of bridges.239 After 1258 Muslims from the Mamlūk empire continued to visit Baghdad to study, and Michal Biran has demonstrated that libraries there still flourished.240 Marianna Simpson shows that the city had given birth to the Persian art of manuscript painting by the 1290s, a whole decade before Rashīd al-Dīn established ateliers near Tabrīz.241 Juwaynī’s brother Shams al-Dīn also receives credit for many rebuilding projects in Iran.242

How effective or widespread were the efforts at rehabilitation? Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī tells us that Rayy had lain in ruins since the Mongol invasion (yielding place to Warāmīn as an administrative centre), though the work of reconstruction was begun on Ghazan’s orders.243 The fifty or so villages dependent on Sarjahān, in ‘Irāq-i ‘Ajam, are said to have been destroyed by the invaders.244 But more frequently Ḥamd-Allāh describes some town as ruined, without specifying whether this dated from the conquest or hinting at any alternative cause: Ḥulwān, for instance; most of Qum; Baylaqān; Turshīz, in Sīstān; Merv; and Kabūd-jāma, in Māzandarān.245 He repeatedly draws attention to a sharp reduction in a region’s revenues (presumably the kharāj): of ‘Irāq-i ‘Ajam, from 25,200,000 dinars in Saljuq times to 350,000 in his own day; of Gushtāsfi, in Mūghān, from 1,000,000 to 118,500; of Rūm, from over 15,000,000 under the Saljuqs to 3,300,000; of Akhlāt, from nearly 2,000,000 to 390,000; of the Jazīra province, centred on Mosul, from 10,000,000 in Lu’lu’s era down to 1,925,000; of Kurdistan, from almost 2,000,000 to 201,500; and of Khūzistān, from over 3,000,000 in the ‘Abbasid era to 325,000.246 Ḥamd-Allāh is careful to express the former
suns in current values; but even assuming that he is scrupulously comparing areas of similar extent in each case, we cannot know how far the fall reflects the destructiveness of the conquest rather than later maladministration, or how far it stems from the prioritization of commercial revenues over agricultural tax (kharāj; below, p. 207). But that the decline in revenues was much lower in Kirmān, which avoided invasion and was ruled indirectly, suggests we should blame the circumstances of the conquest.

* * *

It seems appropriate to conclude by asking whether the conduct of Mongol forces during these decades differed appreciably from that of earlier armies, whether infidel or Muslim. We might cite the atrocities of the crusaders in Jerusalem in 1099 (where by c. 1200 received wisdom was that 70,000 or so Muslims had been killed); the actions of the Qara-Khitai forces in Balāsāghūn in 1209; the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad’s treatment of Samarqand in c. 609/1212–13; and the excesses that the army of his father Tekish committed in Persian Iraq in the 1190s and which, according to the near-contemporary author Rāwandī, surpassed those of the Georgians, the Qara-Khitai and the Franks. Nīshāpūr doubtless fared worse than at the hands of the Ghuzz in 549/1154–5; but did the towns of eastern Iran receive more savage treatment than the vengeful Ghurid ruler ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Ḥusayn (Jahānsūz, ‘the World-Burner’) had visited upon Ghazna in c. 544/1150?  

In the context of Mongol massacres, admittedly, there are many towns for which the sources provide only skeletal information. But the more detailed evidence we have suggests that in Iran, northern Mesopotamia, Anatolia and Syria-Palestine the conquerors reacted in a more rational manner to resistance than has often been supposed; they appear even to have recognized a gradation of offences on the part of their enemies. And in Iran, Iraq and Anatolia, after intervals that admittedly varied, we see them taking measures to bring about recovery. What set the Mongols apart from other conquering armies of the era was not, in all likelihood, blind antipathy towards urban civilization. Rather, it was a far greater rate of success in reducing a large number of strongpoints, within a much shorter interval than their precursors or contemporaries, and the ruthless efficiency with which they crushed opponents or made use of those they spared.  

The destruction was less a function of ideology or the nomadic mindset than of unprecedented striking power.

A further caveat is necessary. Whatever verdict be entered on the destruction perpetrated by the Mongols during the period from Chinggis Khan’s expedition to that of Hülegü, it would be wrong to ascribe the desolation of
Islamic lands exclusively to the campaigns of conquest. The inter-Mongol warfare following the fragmentation of the empire after 1260 inflicted considerable damage. Even the migration of fresh nomadic elements into sedentary areas was not confined to the decades of expansion, but occurred in some measure in tandem with the hostilities among, and within, the rival khanates that emerged following Möngke’s death. To these successor-states we must next turn.
The conflict between Qubilai and Arigh Böke in the Far East in 1260–4, combined with the outbreak of war between Hülegü and Berke in the Caucasus in the winter of 1261–2, had momentous consequences. The Mongol empire fragmented into a number of virtually independent states, each a considerable power in its own right. They are usually listed as follows: (1) the dominions of the ‘Great Khan’ (qaghan) in China and Mongolia proper, known within China as the Yuan empire; (2) the Ilkhanate in Iran, Iraq and Anatolia; (3) the ulus of Chaghadai in Central Asia; and (4) the ulus of Jochi in the western steppes, sometimes called the ulus of Batu or of Berke (and still often termed by historians the ‘Golden Horde’). The conquered Muslims of the empire were now divided among these states. In the first, they represented only a small minority of the subject population; in the second and third, a majority; and in the fourth, at the very least a large and burgeoning minority.

To speak of four khanates, however, is to ignore the other polities termed ulus in our sources,1 notably the ‘left wing’ of the Jochid realm, the so-called Blue (or, in some sources, White) Horde in western Siberia, presided over by the line of Batu’s brother Orda (see p. 105); Rashīd al-Dīn tells us that although its khans headed their every command (yarlıgh) with the name of Batu’s successor, they nevertheless enjoyed complete autonomy and did not attend his court.2 The conventional taxonomy discounts also the extensive domain of Qaidu (d. 702/1303) and his son and successor Chapar, which for over forty years incorporated the Chaghadayid ulus (p. 150).3 We occasionally encounter the phrase ‘the ulus of Qaidu and Du’a’, as if they...
ruled jointly over a single state; and this usage is also reflected, anachronistically, in Western European writings. A further anomaly was the existence of the independent Negüderi Mongols or ‘Qara’unas’, former Jochid contingents who had escaped slaughter at Hülegü’s hands in c. 1261, had coalesced in present-day Afghanistan under the local Jochid commander Negüder, and dominated the borderlands between India, Transoxiana and Iran (see p. 148). Until the Negüderis’ subjection by the Central Asian Mongols in the 1290s, and even in some measure thereafter, this territory was no man’s land. Marco Polo describes Negüder as making war on ‘all the Tartars who dwell round about his kingdom’.

On occasions, moreover, one of the ‘four khanates’ splintered. For the last decade of the thirteenth century the western Jochid lands were effectively divided between the khan Toqto’a (690–712/1291–1312), who ruled east of the Dnieper, and his distant cousin and rival, Noghai, whose sway extended from the Dnieper to the Danube; their conflict ended only with Noghai’s defeat and death in 699/1299. In the 1340s the ulus of Chaghadai fractured permanently into a western half, centred on urban Transoxiana, and an eastern half, known as Mughalistân (‘Mongol territory’) and characterized by nomadic culture. Arguably, the Ilkhanate had likewise split into two rival states in 737/1336 with the election of Togha (or Taghai) Temür in Khurāsān.

Insofar as it corresponds to reality, the quadripartite division of the Chinggisid dominions belongs more comfortably in the fourteenth century. This was how Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umarī, for instance, saw the Mongol world in c. 1338. The concept would have a long life, into and beyond the Timurid era. The history of the Chinggisids at one time attributed to Temür’s grandson Ulugh Beg (d. 853/1449), and utilized by Khwānd-Amīr in the sixteenth century, bore the title Ta’rīkh-i arba’ a ulūs-i chingīzī (‘History of the Four Chinggisid Uluses’). A hundred years after Ulugh Beg, Mirzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt could write as if the four major khanates originated with Chinggis Khan’s own conferment of large appanages on his four sons by his chief wife. But the political map that emerged from the events of the early 1260s bore only a limited relation to the system that had evolved out of the conqueror’s distribution of lands. Any apparent parallel amounts to no more than coincidence.

The qagahan and Mongol unity

Had the break-up of the empire occurred by design, historians would no doubt have viewed it as a rational development. By 1260 Mongol expansion had virtually reached the limits of the steppe. The distances between the
constituent parts of the empire, moreover, were enormous; it was hardly practicable to dominate them from the old centre at Qaraqorum, still less from Qubilai’s summer capital in the Mongolian-Chinese borderlands, Kaiping (renamed Shangdu and better known as ‘Xanadu’), or his winter residence in Khanbaligh (Dadu, founded between 1266 and 1275 close to the former Jin capital of Zhongdu). But from 1259 until 1304 there was no longer a qaghan who commanded universal recognition throughout the Mongol dominions, and Hülegü’s successors were the only Chinggisids consistently to acknowledge Qubilai and his line. The qaghs continued to despatch to Iran a patent of authority on the accession of each Ilkhan, with the possible exceptions of Tegüder Aḥmad (r. 681–3/1282–4), of whose election Qubilai may have disapproved, and of Baidu, whose reign (694/1295) was too brief. It has been suggested that the reigns of Gaikhatu and Baidu witnessed a loosening of the ties of overlordship, since although both monarchs struck coins in the qaghan’s name (apart from certain of Gaikhatu’s issues) they ceased to employ the title Il-khan. The removal of the qaghan’s name and title from the coinage soon after Ghazan’s conversion to Islam and his enthronement (and a matter of months after Qubilai’s death) did not imply any formal breach with the Yuan. On the contrary: regular diplomatic contacts and cultural exchanges (see chapter 8) bespeak a relationship between trusted allies, and the qaghs were still conferring exalted titles on certain of the Ilkhan’s chief ministers as late as Abū Sa’īd’s reign. This allows us to speak of a ‘Toluid axis’ spanning the Asian continent throughout the period down to the 1330s.

Two other expressions of dynastic unity had disappeared soon after 1260. One was the presence within a region of troops owing allegiance to different branches of the imperial family. The other was the possession by the khan and princes of one ulus of rights, property and personnel within the territory of another, as such enclaves inevitably became a target for rulers determined to deprive their rivals of valuable assets and appropriate them for their own purposes. We saw earlier how Hülegü’s assault on the Jochid forces in Iran, followed a few years later by the absorption of Tegüder’s Chaghadayid contingent, terminated the existence of such discrete military forces in the Ilkhanate; how Jochid pasturelands and revenues in Iran passed into Ilkhanid possession; and how Alughu massacred Berke’s dependants in Bukhārā (pp. 142–3, 148–9). According to al-ʻUmārī, Abagha destroyed workshops in Tabrīz that belonged to Berke. When he turned against the qaghan, Baraq in turn seized the dependants of Qubilai and Abagha in his territory and appropriated their possessions. Late in 666/in the spring or summer of 1268, prior to his invasion of Khurāsān, Baraq despatched
Mas’ūd Beg to the Ilkhan’s court for the purpose of espionage, but with the ostensible mission of conducting an audit of the personal property (inchü) of Baraq and Qaidu in Iran; what became of this property following Baraq’s attack and defeat, we never learn.

The overall result of these changes was the transition from the ulus to the more self-contained khanate, through a consolidation and concentration of resources in the hands of regional khans. On balance, the shift favoured those who ruled over a great many wealthy towns and cities, at the expense of those whose territories for the most part comprised steppe. Princes in Central or Western Asia were still technically entitled to the revenues of certain districts in China, and the Ilkhans, as dutiful subordinates, continued to receive their share, at intervals, down into the fourteenth century. In relation to other, ‘rebel’ Mongol rulers, Qubilai tried to use the rights that they held within his dominions as leverage, to secure their acquiescence in his sovereignty. Marco Polo could perhaps be forgiven for blaming the conflict between Qubilai and Qaidu on the Qaghan’s refusal to send Qaidu what was his due from China; but it has to be said that here the policy was completely ineffective.

The attitude of the khans of the Golden Horde towards the Qaghan shifted. Having backed Arigh Böke in the civil war of 1260–4, Berke withheld recognition from Qubilai following the latter’s victory. His successor Mengü Temür (r. 665–79/1267–80) aligned himself with Qaidu. In 1275, when Qubilai’s son Nomoghan was arrested in Central Asia by a group of mutinous princes in his army, he was packed off as a prisoner to Mengü Temür. Qonichi, the ruler of Orda’s ulus, likewise supported Qaidu. The unwillingness of the Jochids for some decades to collaborate with the Qaghan as they had done in Möngke’s reign may have been as crucial in undermining Qubilai’s efforts to extend his control over Central Asia as were his preoccupations in the Far East. But in 1283 Mengü Temür’s brother and successor Töde Mengü (r. 680–6/1281–7), in consultation with Qonichi, released Nomoghan, sending him back to the Qaghan and acknowledging Qubilai’s supremacy; the prince rejoined his father in Khanbaligh in March 1284. Any rapprochement at this juncture may have been merely temporary, since the Yuan shi indicates that friendship was not restored until the reign of Qubilai’s grandson, the Qaghan Temür (1294–1307). According to Rashīd al-Dīn, a niece of Qubilai named Kelmish Aqa, who was married to a leading Jochid noyan and was the grandmother or mother-in-law (or both?) of Mengü Temür’s son, the khan Toqto’a (r. 690–712/1291–1312), was influential in restoring good relations with the Toluids. Toqto’a may also have been drawn into closer relations with Khanbaligh by the predicament of his ally Bayan, Qonichi’s son
and successor, whose rival for the throne of Orda’s ulus was supported by Qaidu and Du’a. In 702/1303 Bayan sent envoys both to the Qaghan Temür and to the Ilkhan Ghazan to propose a grand coalition against the Central Asian Mongols, who in turn strove to prevent a junction between the forces of the Jochids and the Qaghan.  

In 1304 Du’a persuaded Chapar to propose a general reconciliation within the Mongol world and to acknowledge the authority of the Qaghan Temür. Chapar’s approach met with a prompt and positive response, and the Ilkhan Öljeitü received an embassy from Temür, accompanied by envoys from Chapar, Du’a, Toqto’a, Orda’s ulus and other princes, and announcing the establishment of peace. But the new-found harmony rapidly dissolved, as we shall see, and no general peace was ever achieved again; even regional peace agreements tended to be short-lived. In 709/1309, following a succession struggle, the Chaghadayids renewed their submission to the qaghan.  

Yet an exchange in 713/1313 between representatives of the Chaghadayid khan Esen Buqa and one of the qaghan’s frontier commanders illustrates the self-confidence bred in the Chaghadayids’ officers by decades of resistance to the Yuan and by their dynasty’s role in destroying Chapar’s realm. The qaghan’s general reacted violently to the use of the term *yarlıgh* by Esen Buqa’s envoys to denote their master’s orders; it could apply, he shouted, to no order but the qaghan’s own; the princes’ orders were styled *linkāji* (Ch. *lingzhi*). ‘For us,’ the envoys retorted, ‘Esen Buqa stands in the qaghan’s place.’ Clearly the relationship between the qaghan and regional khans could not be expected to revert to where it had stood in 1259. This altercation heralded a decade-long war between the Chaghadayids and the Yuan, and on occasion also with their Ilkhanid allies. It was not until 723/1323 that Esen Buqa’s successor Köpek (c. 720–6/c. 1320–6) finally made peace with the qaghan and recognized his nominal authority.  

Professor Kim has argued that the empire continued to be viewed as a unity even after 1260 and that the constituent khanates were not regarded, and did not see themselves, as independent. The Chinggisids indeed retained – or affected to retain – an undiminished sense of their common ancestry and political heritage. But whereas the two Toluid regimes observed consistently amicable relations, the attitude of the other regional khans ranged from outright opposition to the qaghan to a merely nominal recognition of his seniority. In the late 1330s al-’Umari, embarking on his account of the qaghan’s territories, felt obliged to emphasize that the dominions of his kinsmen lay outside his authority. He likened the qaghan’s position to that of a caliph, and commented that if confronted by any important matter they informed him but did not require his sanction.
The ‘Middle Empire’

It is worth pausing to reflect in particular on the situation and distinctive role of the Central Asian Mongol polity. Lying at the heart of the Mongol world, Chaghadai’s ulus came to be known as *Dumdadu mongghol ulus*, ‘the Middle Mongolian people/state’, a designation that Western European observers had perhaps picked up when they christened it the *Medium Imperium* (sometimes corrupted to the incongruous *Imperium Medorum*, ‘the Empire of the Medes’). Following the emergence of the Ilkhanate after 1260, the Chaghadayid state was potentially the greatest source of disruption, since it was now almost totally deprived of access to outside frontiers with non-Mongol powers. In his account of the quriltai convened by Qaidu in 1269, Rashīd al-Dīn makes the khan Baraq refer bitterly to ‘this shrunken ulus (hamīn mukhtaṣar ʿūlūs)’ and complain that it was both hemmed in by the more extensive lands of his kinsmen and under Qaidu’s thumb; by these means he secured Qaidu’s support for his bid to expand into Ilkhanid territory. Over forty years later, we find Baraq’s grandson, the khan Esen Buqa, apprehensive of being crushed between the Yuan and Ilkhanid forces and considering a pre-emptive attack on Ilkhanid Khurāsān as his only recourse.

The language of our sources suggests that internally, moreover, Chaghadai’s ulus was the least stable and the most volatile. Significantly, both Alughu, in the early 1260s, and Du’a, two decades later, are described as ‘gathering together’ the armies of Chaghadai. We should imagine Central Asia as a veritable reservoir of footloose princes and their followers, alert for new confederates and richer spoils: they included the numerous posterity of both Chaghadai and Ögödei, together with some descendants of both Möngke and Arigh Böke and others belonging to the line of Chinggis Khan’s brother Jochi Qasar. In the wake of Baraq’s failed invasion of Khurāsān and his death in 670/1271, the ulus of Chaghadai went through a period of crisis, and several princes abandoned it to enter the service of Qubilai or the Ilkhan Abagha. Notable among the former group were Alughu’s sons Chübei and Qaban, who spent the rest of their lives fighting for the Yuan; those who joined Abagha included the former khan Mubārak Shāh, a prince named Böjei and certain of Jochi Qasar’s descendants. It must be significant that apart from Baba (below, pp. 201–2) no princes from the far less constricted Jochid territories are known to have taken refuge in the Ilkhanate (had they done so, Ilkhanid sources would assuredly have told us).

The activities of Qaidu, who according to Waṣṣāf fought as many as forty-one battles, whether with the qaghan’s forces or with others, and his
sponsorship of the Chaghdayid Du’a (c. 681–706/1282 or 3–1307), Baraq’s son, who cooperated closely with him, introduced a more forward policy and the recovery of lost territory. But the state he had forged survived him by only a few years. His death and the succession of the weaker Chapar put an end to the alliance. In 705/1305, Du’a treacherously turned against Chapar in the name of his new overlord, the Qaghan Temür, inaugurating a war in Central Asia in which Du’a was supported by several Ögödeyid princes as well as by other members of Chaghdayi’s line. The result was the dismemberment of Qaidu’s ulus to the advantage of both the Chaghdayid khan and the Qaghan. A number of princes, headed by Qaidu’s son Sarban, migrated into Ilkhanid Khurasan and sought refuge under the Ilkhan Öljeitü.

Du’a has a claim to be regarded as the second founder of the Chaghdayid state. From his death until c. 1340 the succession was monopolized by his sons and grandsons, apart from a distant kinsman, Naliqo’a (c. 707–8/c. 1308–9), possibly a grandson of Chaghadaï himself, who was regarded as a usurper by the adherents of Du’a’s line and was soon overthrown by Du’a’s son Köpek. When Köpek’s eldest surviving brother Esen Buqa was enthroned as khan (709–c. 720/1309–c. 1320), he united under his rule, in Waṣṣāf’s words, ‘the greater part of the empires of Qaidu and Du’a; Talas, at one time Qaidu’s chief residence, was now Esen Buqa’s summer quarters. Yet although Waṣṣāf hails Esen Buqa’s accession as introducing a period of peace and repose in the ulus of Chaghadaï, fresh tensions arose. Already Chapar, seeking to retrieve his position, had been worsted by Du’a’s sons (708/1309) and had taken refuge in China, where Temür’s successor Qaishan (reigned as Wuzong, 1307–11) granted him and his descendants land and an honorific title. Esen Buqa entrusted Köpek with an enormous territory in the west, namely Farghana and Transoxiana, possibly in order to concentrate his own energies on the conflict with the qaghan’s forces. But a distant cousin and ally, Naliqo’a’s great-nephew Yasa’ur, whose encampment (yurt) lay near Samarqand and who no doubt resented Köpek’s new-found authority in Transoxiana, quarrelled violently with him, and an armed struggle ensued before Yasa’ur abandoned Transoxiana for Khurasan in 716/1316 to throw himself on Öljeitü’s mercy.

A glance at the frontier with Orda’s ulus, to the north, brings home vividly how far the territory of these steppe polities shifted. The outcome of the early fourteenth-century civil war among Orda’s progeny (above, pp. 185–6), which was still raging in 712/1313, is uncertain. But in 705/1305 Chapar was able to make his headquarters in the vicinity of the Irtys and the Altai, the former region, at least, had at one time been the kernel of Orda’s territory and may have been recently acquired. On the other hand,
Rashīd al-Dīn had spoken of the territory of Talas and ‘Old Sayrām’ (formerly Isfījāb) as belonging to Qaidu but adjacent to the realm of Orda’s grandson Qonichi. By the middle decades of the fourteenth century the khans of Orda’s line had extended their authority over Jand, Barchinlīghkent, Sighnāq and Sawrān; Bayan’s son, the khan Sasi Buqa, was buried in Sawrān in 720/1320–1 and his grandson, İrazān, in 745/1344–5 at Sighnāq, where the rulers of this branch were striking coins by 768/1366–7. This marked shift in the centre of gravity of the Blue Horde may have begun in the era of Chaghadayid weakness in the 1270s and have accelerated during the struggle between Chapar and Du’a in the early fourteenth century.

Inter-Mongol conflicts and the imperial enterprise

The rivalries between Mongol powers effectively halted the growth of the empire in the west. Imperial expansion between 1229 and 1260 had focused the resources of the Chinggisids on the task of realizing the work begun by their revered ancestor – namely, bringing the known world into the yeke mongghol ulus. That period had not been free of tension, as is clear from the succession dispute of 1241–6 and, more conspicuously, that of 1250–1; but the more violent and more prolonged confrontations from 1260–1 onwards inaugurated a period of stasis. Berke’s invasion of Poland in 1259 and Hülegü’s invasion of Syria and Palestine in 1259–60 marked the last major attacks on independent powers by forces representing the entire Chinggisid dynasty. The growth of Hülegü’s fledgling Ilkhanate was effectively at an end following the defeats at Mamlūk hands late in 1260. Of the invasions of Syria launched by the Ilkhans, in 1281, 1299, 1300 and 1303, the second alone was successful, when Ghazan inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Mamlūk army and overran the country; but even then the Mongol forces withdrew after a matter of weeks.

The Ilkhanid pasturelands south of the Caucasus were vulnerable to the Jochid forces; those of Khurāsān (notably the meadows of Shabūrghān and the Bādghis) and Māzandarān, to the Mongols of Central Asia. Not for nothing did Hülegü and his successors spend more time in both regions than in any other part of their dominions; and even when the Ilkhān in person was not in the east, his son or future successor tended to be stationed there as viceroy of Khurāsān and Māzandarān – Abagha on Hülegü’s behalf, Arghun for the latter part of Abagha’s reign and under his uncle Tegüder Aḥmad, Ghazan from 683/1284 under Arghun and Gaikhatu, Öljeitü throughout the reign of his brother Ghazan, and Öljeitü’s son, the young Abū Sa’īd, for a few years prior to his accession.
Abagha’s envoys at the Second Council of Lyons (1274), seeking Western cooperation against the Mamlūks, blamed his previous failure to move against Egypt on the fact that his empire was surrounded by the mightiest enemies. Those enemies chose their moment with care. When Chaghadayid forces raided Fārs in 700/1301, they were exploiting Ghazan’s absence on campaign in Syria. In pursuit of their policy of containing the Ilkhanate, the Mamlūk Sultans were in frequent contact with the khans of the Golden Horde, and sometimes with Qaidu and the Chaghadayids also. On occasions the Ilkhans must have experienced the same sense of constriction as did the Chaghadayids. An informant from Transoxiana in 715/1315 told Öljeiṭū that Esen Buqa and Köpek, Özbeg of the Golden Horde and the Mamlūk Sultan al-Ḥarīr Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn had formed a coalition against him, with a view to partitioning Iran among themselves; though in the event the man was denounced as a liar and a spy and imprisoned in Tabrīz gaol.

Only in the Far East, under Qubilai, was the momentum of expansion maintained for a time against external powers. But apart from those princes who had entered the Qaghan’s service or those who, like the Ilkhans, maintained cordial relations with him from a distance, the other Chinggisid lines had no share in these triumphs or the resulting access of fresh spoils. As the imperial dynasty turned in upon itself, conflict between the uluses over frontier territories threatened to absorb the energies that had hitherto been directed against unsubdued and defiant states. The external advances dried up that would have yielded new appanages for the next generation. Prior to 1259, admittedly, not every prince had received an appanage; but thereafter the pool of grazing-lands, revenues and human capital dwindled in relation to the number of aspiring Chinggisids. Princes and noyans, with their followers, might accordingly be readier to desert their khan for the prospect of greater rewards from one of his hostile neighbours, and in the act of doing so they sometimes perpetrated considerable damage as a parting shot. When relatively long-distance movements of this sort had occurred in the era of the unitary empire, it was in response to the decision of a quriltai and the qaghan’s fiat; now they were unpredictable and unregulated.

Compounding the problems of warfare between different Mongol khanates, and of the curtailment of resources, were contests for the throne of one ulus or another, as a khan or his henchmen tried to confine the succession within the segmentary lineage of his immediate family while a rival party upheld the principle of seniority. The sources highlight discord of this sort within the Ilkhanate in 1282–4 (between uncle and nephew), within the ulus of Orda at the turn of the thirteenth century, over the
succession to Qaidu in 1303 (when his throne was claimed by a grandson or great-grandson of Güyük), and within Chaghadai’s ulus in c. 707–8/c. 1308–9 (when Naliqo’a, a descendant of Büri, displaced Du’a’s line). In 1284 and 1295, Ilkhanid Iran, commonly viewed today as the most stable of the three westernmost Mongol states, was the scene of an armed struggle for the throne.

Admittedly, the Chinggisids had not lost sight of the goal of world-conquest even after 1260. In the very context of Berke’s diplomatic exchanges with Sultan Baybars, a Mamlūk author makes him deprecate the fact that Mongols were now falling to the swords of fellow Mongols and add – somewhat ingenuously – ‘had we remained united, we could have conquered the world’. Indeed, Anne Broadbridge adduces evidence that Berke viewed his ally Baybars as a subject ruler. The Ilkhans, smarting from the reverse at ’Ayn Jālūt and nursing the conviction that their Mamlūk antagonists were nothing more than the Mongols’ runaway Qipchaq slaves, appear no less committed to expansion. In a letter to Baybars in 667/1268 Abagha employed the traditional expressions ʿil/ʿel (‘peace’) for the Sultan’s submission and ʿyaghi (‘rebellion’) in the event that Baybars continued to reject Mongol imperial authority. Abagha also made the dubious statement that a quriltai of Chinggisid princes (‘all of us older and younger brothers’) had recognized the qaghan’s authority. This seemingly formed part of Ilkhanid diplomatic stock-in-trade. Abagha’s envoys at Lyons in 1274 spoke of a recent peace (otherwise unrecorded) between the Ilkhan and his Mongol neighbours. And his successor, Tegüder Aḥmad, in his second letter requiring the submission of the Mamlūk Qalāwūn in 682/1283, reinforced the message by alleging that the Mongol rulers were once more at peace. Ghazan would make the same claim in a proclamation to the Mamlūk military in Syria in 699/1299–1300. On these latter two occasions, a spurious Mongol consensus was being used as a covert threat that the Ilkhans were now free to turn against their external enemies.

Peace proved, at best, ephemeral. In 699/1299–1300 an observer in Mamlūk Egypt commented that all the monarchs in the east and the west alike were at war; and the Mongol dominions were no exception. In a letter of 1305 to the French King Philip IV, Öljeltū hailed the reconciliation of 1304 as laying to rest quarrels that had raged for forty-five years. He concluded with veiled threats against those who persisted in their hostility towards either the Mongols or the Franks, and the idea of Mongol world-rule was understandably muted. His fellow Chinggisids, when making peace in the previous year, and Özbeg, the khan of the Golden Horde, in relation to Western European monarchs during the 1330s, had fewer inhibitions about
using the rhetoric of world-domination. But during the decades following Möngke’s death, that rhetoric more often than not had evoked an ideal to which Mongol princes could only pay lip-service.

**Jochid ambitions and Ilkhanid territory**

The khans of Jochi’s line never relinquished their claims on the rich grazing-grounds in Azerbaijan and Arrān, which had been appropriated by Hülegü. Not that the Jochids were consistently aggressive. Rashid al-Dīn assures us that after Mengü Temür made peace with Abagha (doubtless in 669/1270, when he sent envoys to congratulate the Ilkhan on his victory over the Chaghadayid khan Baraq), there were no hostilities until 687/1288; he is mistaken, since we know from other sources of a large-scale attack in 678/1279–80. Again, the same author tells us that since the invasion of 687/1288 peace had reigned down to the time that he wrote, though he ascribes it to the Jochids’ weakness and speaks of their friendship as merely an outward display; and elsewhere, in any case, he reports yet another attack in 689/1290. Toqto’a sent envoys to make a truce with Gaikhatu in 693/1294, but since they also made ‘all sorts of requests’ it is possible that the purpose was merely to renew Jochid demands for the return of territory south of the Caucasus. On the other hand, Wāṣṣāf evidently regarded Gaikhatu’s reign as something of a watershed, since he associates it with a resumption of diplomatic contacts between the two powers. The lack of incursions south of the Caucasus and the absence of any recorded embassies from Toqto’a to the Mamlūk Sultan prior to 1304 are perhaps due to the conflict with Noghai and hence a need to avoid provoking the Ilkhan. During the latter stages of the struggle, both sides courted Ghazan, but – so Rashid al-Dīn smugly informs us – the Ilkhan nevertheless resolutely refrained from intervening for his own advantage. A Mamlūk author claims that Toqto’a had made peace with Ghazan, presumably to cover his flank.

Charles Halperin argued vigorously that conquests beyond the Caucasus were the primary concern of the khans of the Golden Horde, far outstripping, that is, the attractions of the economically less desirable Rus’ principalities. If anything, Jochid diplomacy and military activity would grow more menacing in the fourteenth century. Toqto’a reiterated the habitual Jochid demands in 702/1302–3, and they were revived on Özbeg’s accession in 712/1312. The latter would personally head two major incursions into Azerbaijan, in 719/1319, during Abū Sa’id’s minority, and in 736/1336, following that monarch’s death; in 722/1322 we find him allied with the
Chaghadayid khan Köpek, who was then attacking the Ilkhanate.\textsuperscript{86} In 758/1357, some years after the demise of the Ilkhanate, Özbeg's son Janibeg invaded Azerbaijan, and as late as the 1380s the khan Toqtamish was still staking the time-honoured Jochid claim to this region.\textsuperscript{87}

In an incomplete list of those borderlands that were wasted and whose populations were killed or fled elsewhere, Rashīd al-Dīn mentions the region between Darband and Shirwān.\textsuperscript{88} We are told very little, in fact, about the damage that Jochid-Ilkhanid warfare inflicted on this territory, though it is worth noting that, during the first few decades of the Ilkhanate, command of the incursions from Darband tended to be entrusted to Jochid princes whose fathers’ deaths at the hands of Hülegū’s forces (above, pp. 142–3) gave them a particularly strong personal motive for vengeance: Noghai, the son of Tutar, in 660–1/1262 and 663/1265, and Tama Toqta, a son of Balagha (Balaqan), in 687/1288.\textsuperscript{89} On the other hand, Abagha’s construction of a barrier (\textit{sibe}, \textit{sübe}) and deep ditch north of the Kur river in 663/1265\textsuperscript{90} possibly limited the Jochid forces’ access to Azerbaijan and Arrān, further south, and reduced their capacity to inflict damage.

**The borderlands between the Central Asian Mongols and the Yuan**

For twenty years or so Qaidu and Du’a proved capable of stemming the advance of the Yuan. Almaligh itself, lost in 1271 to the army commanded by the Qaghan’s son Nomoghān, was recovered a few years later.\textsuperscript{91} The Uighur \textit{iduq-qut}, who owed allegiance to Qubilai, was forced to abandon Beshbaligh and take up residence first at Qaraqocho, at Qāmul (Qomul; Hami) and then at Yongchang in Gansu; he was only briefly restored at Qaraqocho in 1313. Qaidu and the Chaghadayids appear to have appointed their own clients as \textit{iduq-quts}.\textsuperscript{92} In passages that seemingly relate to his overland journey to China (c. 1274), Marco Polo describes Kāshghar and Khotan as still subject to the qaghan (whereas Yārkand was already in Qaidu’s power). At any rate, Qubilai’s garrisons evacuated both towns in the late 1280s.\textsuperscript{93} Qaidu did not, it seems, go so far as to occupy them (although Waṣṣāf includes Kāshghar among his territories), but these regions were in Chaghadayid possession by the second decade of the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{94} Qubilai had thus forfeited control over important Muslim settlements in Central Asia. The seemingly inaccessible Muslim kingdom of Badakhshān, too, which recognized the qaghan’s suzerainty, was being repeatedly harassed by Qaidu’s forces by the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{95} In 716/1316, when we find a contingent from Badakhshān collaborating with a Chaghadayid invasion of Khurāsān, it was evidently under Chaghadayid overlordship.\textsuperscript{96}
Uighūristān and other lands between Qaidu’s dominions and those of the qaghan are the second region that Rashīd al-Dīn singles out as subject to devastation in the inter-Mongol wars. The Muslim populations of these territories undoubtedly suffered in the course of repeated fighting. In 1266 Baraq plundered Khotan, then governed by one of Qubilai’s lieutenants, and Du’a maintained the pressure. The anonymous life of Mar Yahballāhā claims that Hoqu (a younger son of Güyüg) had slaughtered thousands of people in Khotan just before the Catholicos passed through the region in c. 1274 and that the caravan routes had been interrupted; Yahballāhā and Rabban Ṣawma found Kāshghar, which had been recently sacked by Qubilai’s enemies (doubtless Hoqu again), bereft of inhabitants. The Yuan government took measures in 1274 to provide comfort and assistance to Khotan, Yārkand and Kāshghar. Hoqu had been pushed into the camp of Qubilai’s enemies by an unprovoked attack on the part of Nomoghan’s colleague, the general Hantum Noyan.

The labile frontiers in eastern Iran

Rashīd al-Dīn’s list of devastated territories omits the long frontier between Iran and the Chaghadayids. Here there was no sibe to hamper invading forces, which may well be the reason why one of al-‘Umarī’s informants assured him that a single Chaghadayid trooper was worth a hundred from the Qipchaq steppe and that attacks from beyond the Caucasus provoked less alarm in the Ilkhanate than did those by the Chaghadayids in the east. As on their eastern frontier, so also did Qaidu and his allies make notable advances to the south, chiefly at the expense of the Ilkhans.

In Hülegū’s time, the Oxus had divided the Chaghadayid dominions from the Ilkhanate. Although Baraq’s invasion of Khurāsān in 668/1270 failed, the Ilkhan Abagha was dissuaded from sending a force to apprehend the recalcitrant malik of Herat in 674/1275–6, on the grounds that Khurāsān was still a wasteland as a consequence of Baraq’s attack and was in no state to support such a campaign. The Ilkhanate’s eastern territories were also open to attacks by the Negüderis or Qara’unas, based in present-day Afghanistan. The Persian sources testify to their turbulence; for Sayfī their depredations were proverbial. Abagha attempted to exert indirect authority over them through refugee Chaghadayids such as the former khan Mubārak Shāh. The policy failed: Mubārak Shāh proved a fickle subordinate, meeting his death in an attack on Kirmān in 674/1275–6; and when Böjei’s son ’Abd-Allāh, who commanded the Negūderi bands in the Ghazna region a few years later, responded to an overture from the rebel
6. The Ilkhanate
Sultan Ḥajjāj of Kirmān, he was acting on behalf of Qaidu and the Chaghadayids.107 An audacious Negüderi raid on Fārs and Kirmān in the winter of 677/1278–9,108 doubtless provoked by this appeal, in turn prompted Abagha’s expedition to Khurāsān and Sīstān in the following year. Abagha drafted certain Qara’unas bands into Ilkhanid service and transported them to central and western Iran.109 But their confrères in eastern Iran and Afghanistan continued to pose a threat to the territories of the Ilkhan’s clients, raiding Kirmān again three years later; Waṣṣāf says that the people of Shīrāz lived in fear of their attacks every winter until the end of Arghun’s reign (690/1291).110 When one of Abū I-Fidā’s informants told him that Hurmuz was ruined as a result of Tatar incursions, he must have been referring to the Negüderis.111

According to Waṣṣāf, Qaidu stationed his son Sarban south of the upper Oxus. No date is given, but already in c. 1290 we find Sarban based near Shabūrghān and Du’a’s noyan Yasa’ur in the regions of Balkh and Bādghīs.112 A bid by the Central Asian Mongols to control the Negüderis of the Ghazna region through the renegade Ilkhanid noyan Nawrūz113 failed when he turned against Qaidu and then in 694/1295 submitted to Ghazan. They succeeded, even so, in bringing the majority of the Negüderis within their orbit. In the mid-to-late 1290s Du’a summoned the Negüderi leader ‘Abd-Allāh, himself a Chaghadayid prince, and replaced him with his own eldest son Qutlugh Qocha. Rashīd al-Dīn speaks of Qutlugh Qocha in terms that suggest he virtually ruled the ulus jointly with his father.114 He enjoyed overall command of various princes at the head of forces totalling five tümens and was master of a considerable tract between the Oxus and the Arghandāb, including, if Waṣṣāf is to be believed, even Merv.115

From their advance bases, the Central Asian Mongols launched frequent attacks on the Ilkhan’s territories and inflicted greater damage. Waṣṣāf hints that Qutlugh Qocha benefited from the defection of Ilkhanid troops, possibly attracted by the prospect of rich plunder from his raids on India.116 When the forces of Du’a and Qaidu, guided by the rebel noyan Nawrūz, entered the province in 690/1291, says Rashīd al-Dīn, the killing, pillage and destruction they perpetrated defied description. Although Nishāpūr successfully resisted a siege, the villages were raided and many captives carried off; the shrine at Tūs (Mashhad) was also plundered.117 In 695/1295–6 Du’a and Sarban profited from Ghazan’s departure from Khurāsān to subject that province and Māzandarān to a campaign of devastation lasting for eight months.118 Malik Fakhr al-Dīn of Herat offered the depredations of Qutlugh Qocha’s forces as a reason for failing to send the Ilkhan the stipulated tribute.119 During Ghazan’s absence on campaign in Syria in 700/1301,
they ravaged Kirmān and Fārs, penetrating as far west as Tustar (Shustar). They ravaged Kirmān and Fārs, penetrating as far west as Tustar (Shustar). The winter of 702/1302–3 witnessed an attack on Khurāsān by Sarban and his lieutenants, whose attempt to effect a junction with Qutlugh Qocha’s army, however, miscarried badly. Such incursions must have been responsible for slowing any recovery from the campaigns of Chinggis Khan. According to Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, the town of Jurjān was still ruined and sparsely populated in his own day; and it was surely Chaghadayid attacks that Marco Polo had in mind when he observed that Balkh had been ravaged many times by ‘the Tartars and other peoples’ and that its fine mansions still lay in ruins. Significant recovery may have been delayed until the early fourteenth century, when the wazir ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Hindū Faryūmādī is said to have restored Khurāsān to its former splendour.

Although Qutlugh Qocha was mortally wounded during his return from an invasion of India in 699/1299–1300, his command remained in Chaghadayid hands: the Negüderis were ruled first by his lieutenant Taraghai until 705/1305 and then in turn by two other sons of Du’a, Esen Buqa and (after the latter’s accession as khan of Chaghadai’s ulus in 709/1309) It-qul. It-qul was apparently succeeded by Qutlugh Qocha’s son Dā’ūd Qocha, who was expelled by Öljeitū’s forces in 712/1312 at the instigation of some Negüderi chiefs. Whether the retaliatory expedition sent by Esen Buqa reinstated the prince, we never learn. But in 724/1324 Du’a’s youngest son, the future khan Tarmashirin, crossed the Oxus and seized the Ghazna-Kābul region, only to be defeated in 726/1326 by the Ilkhan Abū Sa’īd’s forces under Ḥasan b. Choban. Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī paints a grim picture of the outrages committed in the city of Ghazna by these Ilkhanid troops, acting though they did on behalf of a Muslim monarch: they destroyed the tomb of Maḥmūd of Ghazna and made no distinction between the citizens and the military. According to Ibn Baṭṭūta, Ghazna was again in the hands of Tarmashirin, now himself khan and a Muslim, in the 1330s, but was mostly in ruins. It may be that the devastated condition of the territory extending for twenty days’ journey in the vicinity of Ghazna was in part the work of this Ilkhanid campaign, although al-’Umarī attributes it to the conflict between the Chaghadayids and the Delhi Sultan.

**Transoxiana, Turkestan and Khwārazm**

Nor had the Chaghadayids’ other lands been immune from savage attack. Writing in (or at least of) the period prior to the death of the Qaghan Möngke, Juwaynī had contrasted the restoration of Transoxiana to a flourishing condition with the dismal fate of Khurāsān. This happy state of
affairs did not last. Rashid al-Din says that the territory of ‘Turkestan’ was devastated successively by Alughu, by his sons Chübei and Qaban, by Baraq (in all probability, Baraq’s sons are intended) and, most recently, by Bayan of the Blue Horde. In the course of the civil wars of 1260–4, as we have seen, Alughu’s troops slaughtered elements representing Berke’s interests in Samarqand and Bukhārā; among other victims was a son of the celebrated Shaykh Sayf al-Din Bākharzī. Then in 671/1272–3, on the advice of his chief minister, the Şāhib-dīwān Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, and in order to profit from the upheavals north of the Oxus as Qaidu tried to assert his control over the sons of Baraq and of Alughu, the Ilkhan Abagha’s forces invaded Transoxiana. They made several attacks on Kish and Nakhshab. When the people of Bukhārā rejected the option of accompanying them back to Khurāsān, the city was subjected to a slaughter, beginning on 7 Rajab/28 January 1273 and lasting for seven days; the number of those killed is given as 10,000, and the prisoners – boys and girls – carried off are put at 50,000. In reprisal for Mas’ūd Beg’s disdainful attitude towards the Şāhib-dīwān during his embassy to Iran some years before, the college he had built was burned down. Chübei and Qaban, in pursuit of the Ilkhan’s retreating troops, recovered half the captives, though whether they were returned to their homes we are not told. Only three years later, in 674/1275–6, Chübei and Qaban, possibly acting on Qubilai’s behalf, themselves subjected the region of Bukhārā and Samarqand to an orgy of killing and looting, with the result that it lay desolate for seven years.

According to Mīrzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt, the nomads of Mughalistān were known to their more sedentarized western neighbours as Jata/Chete – usually translated as ‘bandits’ and perhaps bearing the connotation of ‘freebooters’, like the word qazaq (whence ‘Kazakh’), which surfaces as the name of a new and powerful grouping around Ḥaydar’s own time. We first encounter the term Jata in Jamāl al-Qarshī’s account of a raid on Kāshghar by ‘the accursed Jatā’iyya’. This episode is undated but must have occurred at a time when the town was in theory under Qaidu’s protection; it may have been the above-mentioned attack by Hoqu. At any rate, the marauders killed a good many people, including members of the ʿālim class, and drove off 5,000 more as slaves. These Mughal nomads were presumably the ‘infidels’ whose repeated attacks on the villages of Transoxiana, says Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, obliged the local inhabitants to go about armed.

The conflict in Central Asia between the supporters of Du’a and of Chapar in 705/1305–6 was a brutal affair. Usually the details in our sources relate to the plundering and slaughter of nomadic armies – actions that in themselves, of course, had grave consequences for the economic prosperity
7. The dominions of Qaidu and the Chaghadyids
of a region. But occasionally we are given a glimpse of unbridled attacks upon a sedentary population, as when, following a victory over Chapar's brother Shāh Oghul in 705/1305–6, Du’a’s supporters, headed by the Chaghadayid prince Yasa’ur, laid waste the districts of Talas, Yangī, Kenjek and Chigil, tormenting the inhabitants, driving off livestock and setting light to anything they could not take with them. Waṣṣāf wrote that the whole of Turkestan and Transoxiana had been rendered desolate by the warring of the princes, the concentration and movement of troops, and the destruction of dwellings. Merchants ceased to travel, while headmen and cultivators were ground down by the requisitioning of provisions and levies of grain, and many folk had emigrated.

With the outbreak of conflict between Esen Buqa and Köpek, on the one hand, and their kinsman Yasa’ur, on the other, Transoxiana was once again subjected to a harrying. In 713–14/1314, prior to Yasa’ur’s submission to the Ilkhan Öljeitü, his troops sacked Samarqand, Sāghraj, Kish, Nakhshab, Kūfīn and other towns; Bukhārā and Khujand avoided the same fate only through the good offices of Shaykh Badr al-Dīn Mandānī. The notables from the stricken cities contrived to escape to Khwārazm, but Yasa’ur’s forces drove a vast number of the populace across the Oxus (rendering it hard to share Qāshānī’s confidence that the devastation occurred without the prince’s knowledge or consent). In Khurāsān their sufferings were considerable. Continued hostilities with Köpek obliged Yasa’ur to move them southwards from an initial camping-ground in the Murghāb region into the territory of Herat, with the result that as many as 100,000 souls allegedly perished from the cold or from starvation. Unsurprisingly, Yasa’ur has been characterized as a champion of nomadic interests and one impervious to the needs of the sedentary population.

Khwārazm also suffered periodic devastation. At the time of Alughu’s assault on Jochid Transoxiana in the early 1260s, some of his forces carried the war into Khwārazm. And when Abaga’s army invaded Transoxiana in 671/1273, a number of his commanders were sent against Khwārazm, conducting a general massacre (qatl-i ʿāmm) in Gurgānj (Ürgench), Khiva and Qarāqash. In Jumādā I 715/August 1315, Baba Oghul (a descendant of Chinggis Khan’s brother Jochi Qasar), who had earlier abandoned Chapar for the Jochids, deserted them in turn for the Ilkhan Öljeitü. Having repelled an attack by the governor of Khwārazm, Qutlugh Temūr, he subjected the entire province to a campaign of devastation that is graphically described by Qāshānī, plundering several major towns, notably Hazārasp, Kât and Khiva, committing numerous atrocities and carrying off 50,000 captives. Although he was relieved of his prisoners in a surprise
attack by Yasa’ur, they arrived back home in a wretched state. Öljeitü responded to Özbeg’s incensed protests by executing Baba in the presence of the Jochid envoy, but – understandably, given that Baba had acted without his authority – offered no other form of reparation.144

The impact of internecine conflict

Instances of devastation, then, during the numerous wars within the Mongols’ ranks, are not far to seek. To assess the magnitude of the damage is a different matter; nor is it easy to determine how far these conflicts prolonged the economic instability inflicted by the earlier campaigns of conquest. We are too often confronted by generalization – and suspect generalization at that. Rashīd al-Dīn tells us that on account of Qaidu’s ‘rebellion’ many Mongols and Tājīks had been killed and flourishing regions laid waste;145 he further claims that through the assistance given to Qaidu and Du’a by the renegade Nawrūz much damage was done to Khurāsān and innocent Muslims were killed.146 But as an Ilkhanid minister he had every reason to stress the adverse consequences of Qaidu’s activities (or, following the downfall of Nawrūz, of that noyan’s earlier disloyalty) for the Toluid cause. And how many times did a town have to be sacked, or an entire region devastated, before recovery became an impossibility?147 It is difficult to repress a nagging scepticism.

The numbers involved in the attacks by Mongol potentates on their neighbours and rivals are an inadequate gauge of destructive capacity. Often suspiciously large, they doubtless represent the total strength notionally available to a ruler (bearing in mind that all males over fourteen, at the very least, were warriors) rather than an army on a particular campaign. Thus one version of Marco Polo’s book has Hülegü and Berke do battle in 1262 with 300,000 men each. The figure recalls Rashīd al-Dīn’s epic narrative concerning ‘Ayn Jālūt, in which Kedbuqa defiantly tells his Mamlūk captors that Hülegū has 300,000 horsemen and could therefore afford to lose him,148 and al-’Umarī’s statement that in its heyday the Ilkhanate could field thirty tümens.149 The same reservation applies to the figures that have come down to us for the Golden Horde armies.150 Insofar as they have any value, it can only be as a reliable indication that the Jochid ulus could draw on larger reserves of manpower than its neighbours. Al-’Umarī indeed confirms that the Golden Horde’s forces greatly outnumbered those of the Chaghadayids, while Hayton of Gorighos attributes 400,000 and 600,000 men to Chapar and Toqto’a respectively.151 All these totals pale alongside the incredible claim by an informant of al-’Umarī’s that when Toqto’a
mustered one man in ten for a campaign against Esen Buqa, this produced an army of 250,000.\textsuperscript{152} Whether the Jochid totals include the auxiliary forces of client princes, we cannot know; Toqto’a was certainly accompanied on campaign by Rus’ soldiers.\textsuperscript{153}

We seem to have more modest, and hence more likely, figures for the campaigns by the Central Asian Mongols. Baraq is said to have entered Khurāsān with 150,000 men in 668/1270, and Du’a with 100,000 men in 695/1295; Sarban and his confederates moved on Ṭūs with 50,000 men seven years later; the force with which Köpek and his Chaghadayid colleagues invaded Khurāsān in 713/1313 is variously set at 40,000, 50,000 or 60,000 horse (although at one point Sayfī gives a more precise figure of 56,000); and on the eve of his downfall Chapar allegedly planned to face the Yuan army at the head of twenty tümens (doubtless including the troops of his supposed ally Du’a).\textsuperscript{154} Conceivably all the figures cited above were originally expressed in tümens. We should therefore remember that, as noted earlier (pp. 85–6), the tümen only notionally comprised 10,000 men and such a unit at any given time would have been reduced by campaigning.\textsuperscript{155}

Too much uncertainty attaches to the circumstances in which towns were deserted. In the early seventeenth century it was believed that Balāsāghūn had been covered by sand since soon after Chinggis Khan’s time.\textsuperscript{156} The fact that Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī has nothing to say about the town and describes the region’s inhabitants as predominantly nomads in his own day\textsuperscript{157} may mean that it was among the places cleared in advance of Hülegü’s passage (but cf. p. 50 above). Yet Rashīd al-Dīn’s statement that in his time there were a great many villages in the region between the Ili and the Chu rivers, where Qaidu was buried, suggests that not far away agriculture was still flourishing after 1300.\textsuperscript{158} Supposedly eyewitness Muslim travellers, too, afford us scant help. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa describes Samarqand and Bukhārā as largely in ruins. Travelling through the Chaghadayid-I lkhanid borderlands, he notices evidence of considerable destruction, but attributes it to Chinggis Khan’s forces over a century earlier.\textsuperscript{159} One wonders whether it resulted, in reality, from more recent strife. In any case, the fact that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa describes Balkh as in ruins when, according to the Timurid author Sharaf al-Dīn ’Ālī Yazdī, the city had been restored by the Chaghadayid khan Köpek,\textsuperscript{160} aggravates the doubts surrounding his true itinerary.\textsuperscript{161}

Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-’Umarī, drawing, in all likelihood, on information obtained in the 1330s, sketches another picture of desolation:

I was told by someone who passed through its [sc. Turkestan’s] countryside and travelled through its villages, ‘There remain of its settlements
nothing but traces of their location and dilapidated ruins. You see in the
distance a settlement with impressive buildings and verdant surround-
ings, and are cheered by the expectation of finding there congenial
inhabitants. But when you arrive, you find the said buildings empty of
people and inhabitants other than tent-dwellers and herdsmen. There is
no sowing or tillage. Its greenery is that of pastures which God created.
The vegetation there is of the steppe: no sower has sown it nor cultivator
planted it.¹⁶²

Impressions of this kind defy evaluation. Which parts of Turkestan did
al-’Umari’s informant see? Was this wilderness a direct consequence of the
conflicts of Chapar’s era, or of the warfare between Qaidu and Qubilai? Or
did it date back several decades, to a time when agricultural land was
converted to pasturage (see pp. 174–5)? The simple answer is that we cannot
know.

Nomadic khans, their military and their sedentary subjects

The foregoing section has been concerned with the way in which Mongol
princes treated the subjects and territories of their enemies. Let us now
consider the policies they adopted towards their own, which we might
reasonably expect to have been more restrained. There was undeniably a
marked variation in social and economic conditions between the two
Mongol polities centred on the major regions of sedentary culture, namely
Yuan China and Ilkhanid Iran, and those dominated by a pastoralist nomad
economy. Yet two qualifications should be made. In the first place,
throughout the Mongol world Chinggisid rulers and their military
continued to follow a nomadic lifestyle well into the fourteenth century,
and it was not merely invading armies that inflicted devastation on the
agricultural regions. The Ilkhans themselves still adhered to the customary
seasonal movements, following, as Charles Melville has demonstrated, a
rhythm of migration between summer and winter quarters right down to
Öljeitü’s reign.¹⁶³ And secondly, in many cases Mongol rulers whose territo-
ries were predominantly steppelands were by no means hostile towards
urban culture.

The needs and aspirations of nomadic cavalry forces certainly conflicted
with agrarian interests.¹⁶⁴ In the spring of 1264, Arigh Böke’s troops, quar-
tered in the Almaligh region, were obliged to feed their mounts with wheat
instead of barley; in consequence, many of the townsfolk of Almaligh
starved to death.¹⁶⁵ During Mubārak Shāh’s brief reign over Chaghadai’s
inus, Rashid al-Dīn tells us, the military continued to pillage and harass the populace, though the khan—a Muslim—reportedly prevented them from oppressing the peasants.\textsuperscript{166} His successor Baraq twice hatched the design of plundering Transoxiana, but was prevented by Qaidu on the first occasion and dissuaded by Masʿūd Beg on the second.\textsuperscript{167} He nevertheless caused a serious dearth by requisitioning wheat as well as barley to fatten up his horses in preparation for his invasion of Khurāsān.\textsuperscript{168}

In Iran the Ilkhans’ own forces, perhaps on the move to repulse an enemy, damaged sedentary land. Anecdotes in the Ṣafwat al-ṣafā of Tawakkulī Ibn Bazzāz, an account of the life of Shaykh Ṣafi’ al-Dīn Ardabīlī (d. 735/1334), testify to the damage done to agrarian districts and the peasantry by the passage of troops.\textsuperscript{169} It seems to have been important to Rashīd al-Dīn that on the long journey from Azerbaijan to Khurāsān to do battle with Baraq, Abagha had forbidden his men to damage a single stalk, and that during their return march they refrained from injuring a single creature; but Egyptian authors (not necessarily a dispassionate source either, in this context) insist that his cavalry grazed their mounts in cultivated fields.\textsuperscript{170} So too, it was the Ilkhan’s troops who on occasions allowed their zeal to carry them away when conducting a punitive campaign against unruly subjects, like the Türkmen groups in the Konya region of Anatolia in the early 1280s, since which time, says an anonymous author writing over eight decades later, it had remained ‘virtually uninhabited (hamchunīn kharāb)’.\textsuperscript{171} During his operations as governor of Khurāsān against the rebel Nawrūz, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Ghazan forbade his soldiery to allow their livestock into fields or orchards, or consume the grain, or treat the peasants with violence,\textsuperscript{172} which (whether true or not) suggests that these abuses were common. His decree for the allocation of iqtāʾs (land-grants) to the Mongol soldiery referred to their habit of damaging the provinces when setting out on campaign.\textsuperscript{173}

There was also periodic conflict between the Ilkhan’s sedentary subjects and nomadic groups introduced by the Mongols at the time of the conquest. This category includes the tamma forces that had been quartered within the regions since Hūlegū’s era, or even earlier, and had virtually acquired a title to their pasturelands through long usage. By the early fourteenth century some of these provincial Mongol armies had been transmuted into artificial tribal formations that took their name from their original commander (much as the residue of the Jochid troops had regrouped in eastern Iran at an earlier date to form the Negüderis): the Jurma’īs of Fārs and Kirmān, for example, whose nucleus was the force led by a certain Jurma, or the Úghānīs, initially a thousand on the frontier of Kirmān
commanded by Ughan of the Jalayir.\textsuperscript{174} Although Jurma’īs, having intermingled with the local village population, were caught up and enslaved in the Negüderi raid of 677/1278–9, and although they and the Ūghānīs for some days put up a spirited defence against a Chaghadayid invasion in 700/1301 (above, pp. 197–8),\textsuperscript{175} friction also readily arose between these nomadic troops and the sedentary population. A local chronicler speaks of the iniquities that the Ūghānīs perpetrated against ‘the warm regions and the cold’ in the 1280s, and they and the Jurma’īs were still plaguing Kirmān in the post-Ilkhanid period, when the new Muzaffarid rulers were called on to check their depredations.\textsuperscript{176} A fifteenth-century poet preserves the laments of the people of Abīward, in Khurāsān, regarding their oppression by the Mongols of the Ja’un-i Qurbān.\textsuperscript{177}

Responsibility for damage to agricultural land in Iran also lies with outside pastoralist groups technically subject to the Ilkhans’ own authority. Waṣṣāf describes the Qara’unas/Negüderi bands who submitted to Abagha in Khurāsān in 677–8/1278–9 and entered his service (p. 197) as ‘like demons rather than humans and the most brazen of the Mongols’, and says that plundering was their customary activity. These Ilkhanid Qara’unas wrought havoc in the civil war between Tegüder Aḥmad and Arghun, when they devastated the Dāmghān region, and again in the upheavals towards the end of Arghun’s reign.\textsuperscript{178} A band led by Dānishmand Bahādur laid waste the Juwayn district in 689/1290.\textsuperscript{179} In 698/1299 another Qara’unas thousand, under a certain Buqa, abandoned its quarters near Ṭārum and headed east to rejoin the Negüderis, ravaging the borders of Yāzd and Kirmān.\textsuperscript{180}

Further nomadic groups accompanied fugitive Chinggisids seeking fresh pasturelands and offering their services as auxiliaries. Following Chapar’s defeat by Du’a, several princes abandoned Central Asia. Chapar himself, as we saw, sought asylum in the Yuan dominions. Others took refuge in the territories of the Ilkhan Öljeitū. First was a group numbering 30,000 and headed by Chapar’s brother Sarban, Mingqan, a grandson of Arigh Böke, and Temūr, of Jochi Qasar’s line, who entered Khurāsān together early in 706/the summer of 1306.\textsuperscript{181} Later, in the summer of 708/1308, the Chaghadayid Dhū l-Qarnayn too entered Khurāsān to seek fresh camping-grounds from the Ilkhān.\textsuperscript{182} Supervising this influx of successive nomadic groups, and their absorption, cannot have been easy. Since Sarban, Temūr and Dhū l-Qarnayn all died shortly after crossing the Oxus, the province was possibly spared a problem of the scale that it would experience in the next decade. This was the responsibility of Yasa’ur, who, accompanied by various Ögödeyid princes, had been settled in Khurāsān by Öljeitū but who then fomented trouble during Abū Sa’īd’s minority,
trying to subject to himself local dynasts, including the maliks of Herat and Sistān. In the course of these struggles, Khurāsān and Māzandarān suffered considerable devastation. Yasāʿur was overthrown in 720/1320 by his old enemy Köpek, to whom the ruler of Herat had appealed for assistance.

The second qualification that must be made to the time-honoured view of the Mongol states is that even those khans who have been cast as proponents of the nomadic lifestyle and customs made efforts to remedy the damage inflicted by the campaigns of conquest or by more recent warfare. The quriltai that Qaidu summoned in 1269 voiced a concern to preserve the flourishing towns of Transoxiana, under threat from the rapacious Baraq; it was agreed that the princes would live in the mountains and plains, avoiding the urban centres, and would not pasture their livestock on cultivated land. After Transoxiana had lain desolate for seven years as a result of the depredations of the sons of Baraq and of Alughu, Masʿūd Beg, on Qaidu’s orders, reassembled the scattered populations of Samarqand and Bukhārā and took steps to revive economic activity (c. 681/1282). Wassāf, writing in 699/1299–1300 (and thus before the conflicts that began in 1305), heard that it was once more a thriving region. According to an early fifteenth-century author, Du’a (probably with Qaidu’s backing) restored a number of towns in Turkestan and Farghāna, notably Andijān, where the development of a flourishing commercial entrepôt is implicit in the reference to separate quarters for each of the various ethnic groups. Some decades later, as we saw above, Du’a’s son Köpek would restore Balkh. Old Tirmidh, reduced to a ruin by Chinggis Khan, had evidently been refortified by 716/1316, when Köpek’s forces were able to hold out there against Yasaʿur’s troops. Khwārazm, where the irrigation network had suffered during the Mongol attack of 1221, was again a prosperous agricultural region by the early fourteenth century. Sighnāq and Sawrān, on the lower Sīr-daryā river, revived when the region became the centre of the ulus of Orda around the same time. The Jochids are known to have founded many small towns as craft and supply centres.

Much of this princely solicitude was directed towards towns and trade. We know that in the Ilkhanate, at least, taxes on commerce and crafts yielded larger sums than did those on the land. The monarchs, their families and the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and the military were maintained by these taxes; the costs of administering the empire were met chiefly from agricultural revenues. Philip Remler argues that this explains the relative neglect of the agrarian sector prior to Ghazan’s reign and the fact that the pastoralists were allowed to live off the countryside. Such information is lacking for the other two western khanates; but here too the
rulers often made their seasonal quarters in the vicinity of towns, which served as centres of revenue collection and craft production and in some cases as mints. Qaidu’s principal residence, as we saw, was near Talas. From 696/1296–7 the town of Ṣāqchī (Isaccea, in present-day Rumania), on the lower Danube, was an important centre in Noghai’s steppe domain; coins were minted here in his name, and it is described by the Mamlūk author Baybars al-Manṣūrī as one of his halting-places (manāzil).193 Some of these walled centres had even been constructed by Mongol qaghans or other princes: Emil, on the river of that name, by Ögödei, for instance.194 The Chaghadayid khan Köpek built Qarshī, a few miles from the town of Nakhshab in Transoxiana, though whether as Esen Buqa’s viceroy (when the Nakhshab-Kish region is known to have been his summer quarters)195 or during his own reign, we are not told. These were tent cities. Qarshī was still a royal residence over a decade later, Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umarī tells us, confirming, however, that the khans otherwise eschewed living behind walls.196 The most celebrated example is the city-encampment of Sarai (PERS. sarāī, ‘palace’) that Batu had constructed by c. 1250 in the Volga delta, not far from the site of the one-time Khazar capital of Itil. At some subsequent date another city may have been built upstream, possibly by Özbeg, and known as Sarāī-yi jadīd (‘New Sarai’), though it has been argued that this was merely another name for Batu’s foundation.197 Even if far from implying the abandonment of the nomadic life, activities of this kind must have fostered (and even, at times, expressed) a certain sensitivity to the needs of town-dwellers.

On the other hand, the Ilkhans could no more afford to be unmindful of the exigencies of ruling over nomads than were their counterparts in the Pontic-Caspian steppes or in Central Asia. Rashīd al-Dīn makes Ghazan assure the Mongol military of his readiness to fleece the agriculturalists of his realm, should that prove the most profitable means of governance in the longer term:

\[\text{I am not on the side of the Tāzik [Tājik, i.e. Persian] peasants (ra‘iyyat).}\\\text{If there is a purpose in pillaging them all, there is no one with more power to do this than I: let us rob them together . . .}\]

But Ghazan goes on to advocate restraint. His opening words (no doubt inspired by Rashīd al-Dīn) are admittedly designed to ‘sell’ his reforms by pointing to a community of interests; but otherwise the sentiments are almost worthy of a Baraq.198 Yet the crucial distinction, for our purposes, is not a geographical or ecological one. It separates, rather, rulers who failed to
rise above the short-term view, extracting from their sedentary subjects the maximum possible, from others who perceived their own long-term advantage in nurturing the same subjects’ prosperity and hence their potential as a source of revenue. This exercise in delayed gratification was more pressing, perhaps, for Mongol khans who embraced Islam – or at least for Muslim authors who wrote about them.

* * *

Just like the sources that describe the campaigns of Chinggis Khan’s armies against the Khwārazmshāh’s empire and lesser Muslim kingdoms, those for the inter-Mongol conflicts of the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries are prone to exaggerate and to avoid the specific; but there is one marked difference. Only rarely, as on the occasion of the Ilkhanid assault on Khwārazm in 671/1273 (the work, we might note, of troops from a regime often credited with a greater sympathy for sedentary culture), do they give the impression of the wholesale massacre of an urban population. In general the damage and its consequences were of the kind normally associated with medieval warfare.\textsuperscript{199} We have no way of knowing whether the harmful impact on agrarian or urban societies exceeded that of the late Saljuq and Khwarazmian periods. Nor is it possible to judge whether the influx of pastoral nomads created greater dislocation than that caused by, say, the Ghuzz during and for some decades after the collapse of Sanjar’s empire in the mid-to-late twelfth century.\textsuperscript{200} The most we can say with some degree of certainty is that these conflicts impeded or reversed the work of reconstruction which various Mongol rulers and their ministers had undertaken in the aftermath of the initial conquest.
The Mongols brought under their rule not merely the margins but much of the heartland of the sedentary world of Asia; and it is now almost a commonplace that this gave rise to two developments: a growth in transregional trade, through the removal of a multiplicity of tolls and other exactions and the elimination of competitive predators; and a more intense cross-cultural contact between distant regions of Asia (and between Asia and Europe) than in any previous era. The conditions created by the Mongol conquests have often been summed up in the phrase *Pax Mongolica*. But the proverbial security that enables the traveller, laden with riches, to move unmolested across enormous distances is the brainchild of the poet rather than the achievement of the prince. The *Pax Mongolica* repeatedly alluded to in literature on the Mongols carries echoes of this fabled situation. It is borrowed, of course, from the much older concept of the *Pax Romana* – usually without due regard for the sardonic gloss on Roman exploits that Tacitus ascribes to a Caledonian chieftain: ‘they create a wilderness and call it peace’. Chapter 7 will, it is hoped, have called into question the existence of a Pax during much of the period covered by this book. As Nicola Di Cosmo points out, the concept is less apposite still than its Roman counterpart, because after the early 1260s the Chinggisid empire ceased to be a unity.

Any discussion of the impetus given by the Mongols to transcontinental communication hinges in part on the previous history of the Silk Roads. As Professor Valerie Hansen makes clear in her recent excellent study, this was not a road in any recognizable sense but ‘a stretch of shifting, unmarked paths across massive expanses of deserts and mountains’. Nor was silk the
only, or even the most important, item of trade; these routes also carried chemicals, spices, metals, saddles and leather products, glass and paper. In any case, the Silk Roads had a long history reaching back beyond the second millennium B.C.E., and for many centuries contacts had existed – to a degree that naturally varied with political conditions – both between sedentary communities and between agrarian and pastoralist elements, relations that David Christian has characterized, respectively, as ‘trans-civilizational’ and ‘trans-ecological’.

Hansen has shown that down to the end of the first millennium C.E. the Silk Roads were characterized by subsistence trade in locally produced goods, carried by relatively small caravans over limited distances. The sources – whether documents, inscriptions or cave paintings like those at Dunhuang – barely hint at the existence of international trade. Insofar as goods were conveyed in bulk over long distances, it was a function of Chinese imperial policy: the Tang forwarding bales of silk to Central Asia, for instance, by way of payment to its garrison troops prior to the withdrawal from the region in 755 C.E. During the third–tenth centuries the Silk Roads were in fact less significant as a commercial artery than as a cultural one, enabling the spread of both technical knowledge and religious teachings.

It is far from axiomatic, of course, that political fragmentation, of the kind that preceded the Mongol conquests, was more inimical to commercial or cultural intercourse than was political centralization: in an earlier period, Sogdians had made an impressive contribution to commercial and cultural activity, despite the multiplicity of states in Central Asia at the time. But the emergence of extensive Turkish empires like that of the Saljuqs may have played a part in the growth of trade along the Silk Roads. The Relatio de Davide rege (above, p. 73), dating from the very time of Chinggis Khan’s conquests, furnishes indirect evidence of long-distance overland commerce, at least between the Syrian coast and Central Asia (though not as far east as China), since it names a great many towns east of the Oxus; it often gives the number of days’ journey between them, and does so on the authority, it seems, of ‘traders in fragrant spices and precious stones’ who had arrived in Tripoli. So too at the other end of Asia, the rise of the Liao appears to have inaugurated a greater ‘interconnectedness’ between China as a whole and Central Asia and the lands beyond. We might well be justified, therefore, in seeing the Mongol epoch as the apex of a process of growing integration within Eurasia that had begun in the eleventh century. Even so, the era of the unitary empire was the first (and the last) time in which a single pastoralist state dominated the entire length of the Silk Roads; and at no time did any sedentary state succeed in doing so.
Trade in Mongol Asia: commodities

The principal commodities traded can be classed under three heads. The first was high-value, low-bulk goods that were easy and relatively cheap to transport, such as those which Western European merchants called spezierie (‘spices’, a term that subsumed not only pepper, ginger and cinnamon but also aromatics, dyes and drugs); silks and other luxury textiles (notably cloth of gold, which will be described below); pearls, precious stones and bullion; and furs. The second category was less expensive but bulkier items, such as grain, timber, ferrous metals, wax, non-luxury cloth, and consumables such as wine, sugar, salt and fish. The third comprised human beings and animals. Here I shall focus on a growth in demand that seemingly resulted from the advent of the Mongols.

The first case is the brocade that the Persians termed nasīj and which appears as nasich and nakh in the book of the Venetian adventurer Marco Polo, the mercantile handbook of the Florentine banker Francesco Pegolotti and other Western sources, representing two distinct types of silk cloth decorated with gold thread. Gold is of course quintessentially the imperial colour; the equivalence finds expression in the Mongolian lexis. Mongol khans greatly prized these sumptuous textiles, which they and their wives, chief commanders and courtiers donned on public ceremonial occasions, and which were presented by way of largesse to members of the military elite and to subject princes and were even used as linings (or occasionally coverings) for the large royal and princely tents. On his submission the Uighur iduq-qut had presented Chinggis Khan with gold brocade, and the Mongols took measures to ensure a ready supply, listing it among the tribute they required and employing enslaved weavers to produce it in prodigious quantities. Ilkhanid princes owned groups of such artisans, like the 300 households belonging to Arghun who were carried off from Warāmīn by Tegüder Ahmad’s troops in 682/1284. Given the long-standing production of textiles within the Islamic world not merely for clothing but also for furnishings, the Mongols seem to have valued Muslim weavers especially highly. In one of Juwaynī’s anecdotes the Qaghan Ögödei contrasted Chinese workmanship unfavourably with the nasīj and other products of the Dar al-Islam.

In the second case – slaves – a pre-existing commerce between the Pontic steppes and the Near East was dealt a decisive impetus by the Mongol attacks on the Qipchaq/Cumans, in particular the onslaught of Batu and his colleagues in 1239–40, which drove thousands of Qipchaq from their habitual pasturelands. A large number took refuge in the Hungarian
kingdom and the Balkans; but a great many made for the coasts of the Crimea, where, as Rubruck heard some years later, they were in such straits that they were reduced to cannibalism. Some of these hapless refugees were sold into slavery by their desperate kinsfolk in exchange for the necessities of life; the Mongols themselves sold those they had captured, as a means of converting part of their booty into liquid assets. The acquisition of adolescent males in particular offered new opportunities for traders who sought to capitalize on the desire of the Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt, al-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb (r. 637–47/1240–9), to buttress his position against hostile kinsmen in Syria and Palestine by building up a large corps of mamluk troops. The future Mamlūk Sultan Baybars was among a number of Qipchaq youths sold into slavery at Sivas in Anatolia in 641/1243 and transported to Cairo.

Once securely in control of the Pontic region, the Mongols allowed this commerce to continue; and with the development of friendly relations between the Jochids and the Mamlūk Sultanate from 660/1262, Berke and his successors were happy to preside over a traffic that strengthened a valued ally against their enemy the Ilkhan and from which they also derived considerable revenues. In time, Mongol boys too became an object of this trade. According to al-ʿUmarī, the Circassians, Alans and Rusʿ kidnapped them or bought them from merchants; in time of dire need, the parents themselves sold their sons into slavery. But it seems to have been the conflicts between the Mongol states that periodically brought large numbers of enslaved Mongol captives into the Mamlūk realm. Mamlūk authors speak of a glut on the market as the result of a victory by Qaidu over the Yuan forces in 687/1288, and report the arrival in Egypt of enslaved Mongol soldiers with their wives and families during the war between Toqto’a and Noghai in 697/1297–8 and 699/1299–1300. Rashid al-Dīn reports that Ghazan was appalled at the number of Mongol youths enslaved and sold to merchants as a result of warfare among Chinggis Khan’s progeny, and ordered that those passing through his dominions be purchased, freed and formed into a new military unit within the Ilkhanid keshig. The trade in mamluks through the Straits, further guaranteed by the Byzantine recovery of Constantinople from the Latins in 1261, was in the hands of the Genoese, who secured their position in the Crimean port of Kaffa through a series of treaties with the khans of the Golden Horde. It was only when they exported Mongols who were his own subjects, and thus challenged his sovereign rights, that the khan attacked Kaffa, as did Toqto’a in 1308 and Janibeg in the mid-1340s.

At the other end of the Ilkhanate, there seems to have been a brisk traffic in Indian slaves. Rashid al-Dīn tells us that Sali’s campaigns in Kashmir and the Punjab brought Hülegü a sizeable booty in Indian slaves – several thousand
from Kashmir alone – and that their descendants were to be found in his own
day working the royal estates (*inchū*) in Iran.27 The supply may have dimin-
ished as a result of the loss of the Indian borderlands in c. 1262 to the inde-
pendent Negūderis; but of the Indian prisoners obtained in their many raids28
a considerable proportion were surely still conveyed to the Ilkhan’s dominions
by traders. In the Chaghadayid realm, a *waqf* document of 726/1326 from
Bukhārā names twelve slaves, ten of them plainly of Indian origin.29

Let us turn, thirdly, to the trade in horses. The vast western steppes
sustained an extremely large equine population. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa mentions how
drovers brought a few thousand high-quality warhorses annually from the
Jochid territories to be sold to the Delhi Sultan, who was ready to pay
considerable sums to keep his enormous cavalry forces equipped with
mounts.30 If we can believe the Delhi historian Baranī, horses were already
reaching the Sultanate from Mongol territory during the reign of Balaban
(d. 685/1287).31 Although we have no evidence for the attitude of the Jochid
khans towards this commerce, it is possible that they looked upon it with
favour. As their relations with Qaidu and the Chaghadayids were far from
consistently amicable, supplying choice mounts to the Delhi Sultanate – the
most formidable external antagonist of the Central Asian Mongols – may
well have appeared to them in the same light as did the trade with Egypt in
mamluks. There was in addition a flourishing trade in horses between China
and Iran,32 and by sea between the Red Sea and the Gulf, on the one hand,
and the Hindu states of peninsular India on the other (below, p. 224).

The routes

Just as they generated increased demand for various goods, so were the
Mongols responsible for the diversion of trade routes within Western Asia
and the emergence of new termini; these were either under their direct rule,
for example Kaffā (Theodosiopolis; now Feodosiia) on the Crimean coast
and Tana on the Sea of Azov, or in the dominions of their satellites, for
example Ayās (Laiazzo), in the kingdom of Lesser Armenia, and Trebizond
(now Trapzun), in the Greek empire of that name.33 Behind this shift lay the
creation of Batu’s Sarai and the rise of Tabrīz, now effectively the centre of
a large state comprising the whole of Iran and in large measure superseding
Baghdad. The older routes linking Baghdad to Anṭālya (in Saljuqid Anatolia)
and to Syrian ports, among them Frankish-held cities such as Acre, Tyre
and Tripoli, were less frequented, a development accentuated by the War of
Saint-Sabas between Venice and Genoa, which raged along the coast at
intervals from 1256 to 1287.34
During the Chinggisid era a number of identifiable routes traversed the Asian continent and passed beyond the limits of the Mongol world. The most northerly route to China, referred to by Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-'Umarī, began at the ‘Iron Gate’ (Darband) and went by way of Chūlmān (the Kama basin), Siberia and Qaraqorum. Two others followed the older Silk Roads. The principal one, described by an anonymous Western European treatise on commerce between West and East, dated c. 1315, and later in Pegolotti’s more detailed handbook, linked Tana to Astrakhan (or Ḥājjī Tarkhān, as the Muslims called it), Sarai and Saraichuq on the lower Ural (Yayiq) river, and thence to Ürgench in Khwārazm or by way of Uṭrār and Yangī (near Talas) to Almaligh; from there it was possible to head via Qaraqocho for Ganzhou, in north-western China, and the qaghan’s capital at Khanbaligh. A more southerly route to Ganzhou passed through Transoxiana and the cities of the Tarim basin, Kāshghar and Cherchen. From Ürgench it was possible to turn southwards across the Hindu Kush via Ghazna to Delhi, as did the group of Venetian merchants whom we find in 1346 engaged in litigation in Venice. It was surely this last route that conveyed so many warhorses from the Jochid lands to Muslim India. From Tabrīz highways led east to Khurāsān and thence to Transoxiana, and southwards in the direction of the Persian Gulf, either to Baṣra or by way of Shīrāz to Qays (also called Kīsh) and Hurmuz, and from there on by sea to India and China. To the west, Tabrīz was linked with Mosul, Baghdad, Sivas, Erzurum, Trebizond and Ayās. From Tana and Kaffa, lastly, the sea lanes led through the Straits to Egypt, North Africa and Western Europe. What was new about the Mongol era, it should be emphasized, was not so much the transcontinental routes themselves as the fact that merchants were more likely to travel their entire length.

**Mongol khans and the patronage of commercial activity**

The Mongols’ concern for trade had played a role in the outbreak of war with the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad (above, p. 73). Even amid the upheaval accompanying the conquests, traders and envoys were armed with a paiza granting them safe conduct, a privilege exploited, for instance, by the numerous merchants of Lahore prior to its capture in 639/1241. Ibn al-Athīr speaks of a merchant of Rayy who, following its submission to Chormaghun in 627/1229–30, accompanied the Mongol army into Azerbaijan. The near-symbiotic relationship between nomads and merchants is neatly encapsulated in Rubruck’s observation that Batu’s ordo was always followed by a bazaar.
Under Hülegü and his first successors, who often resided in Tabrīz in the course of their seasonal migrations, the city underwent remarkable growth, so that Ghazan was obliged to begin the construction of new walls to enclose the suburbs; a significant proportion of the inhabitants were foreigners.41 We find a Venetian merchant drawing up his will in Tabrīz as early as 1263.42 It had become a major entrepôt for international trade, acquiring a reputation for semi-legendary prosperity by the early fourteenth century. As befitted a city that was less the monarchs’ capital than the administrative hub of the Ilkhanate, Tabrīz was a notable producer of luxury goods. Marco Polo’s book makes particular mention of the precious stones on sale there in large quantities, and speaks highly of the silk and cloth of gold produced by the city’s craftsmen.43 The crusade theorist Marino Sanudo argued that the ginger and cinnamon to be bought at Tabrīz and Baghdad were superior in quality to those obtained in Alexandria, having depreciated less in the course of a shorter sea journey (although the claim may simply have been designed to promote an economic boycott of the Mamlûk dominions).44 In c. 1330 Pegolotti would deem it worthwhile to devote several pages of his commercial manual to the products of Tabrīz – including silk, spices, indigo, coral, woollen cloth, pearls and furs of various kinds – and the different exchange rates that obtained there.45 By that date, according to a comparison of the type beloved of medieval narrators and relayed to us by the Franciscan missionary Odorico da Pordenone, the French King received less revenue from his entire realm than did the Ilkhan from this single city – nobler than any other, says Odorico, and one that traded with almost the whole world.46

Although the Jochid khans’ city of Sarai could not compete with Tabrīz, it was connected with a number of other flourishing entrepôts that had rapidly emerged in the Golden Horde territories and which supplied it with commodities by way of tribute. By the early fourteenth century Bulghār had recovered from the Mongol attack of 1237 and had become the focus of a trade route that linked Sarai indirectly to the upper Kama region.47 Several other centres, too, principally Tana and Kaffa, attracted traders from the Italian mercantile cities. At Tana, the chief items traded, by Pegolotti’s day at least, included wax, iron, tin, spices such as pepper, ginger and saffron, silk, cotton, linen, furs (of greater variety than those listed for Tabrīz) and pearls.48 Kaffa’s most important export was grain, on which the European lands to the west were increasingly dependent.49

The Yuan emperors, Qubilai and his successors in China, took important steps to foster trade by building new roads, prolonging the network of postal stations and extending the Grand Canal. If they did not reduce the duties on commercial transactions, they nevertheless accorded merchants a
higher status than they had enjoyed under the Song and allowed them to trade throughout the empire rather than confining them to the port cities as the Song had done.\textsuperscript{50} So too Qaidu and Du’a founded (or restored) at least one town, Andijān in Farghāna, which was clearly intended as a centre of craft production and commerce (p. 207). Yet Mongol rulers did more than simply create conditions that facilitated trade; they were also personally involved in it, since khans, princes and princesses advanced funds to ortaq merchants, under contract to trade on their behalf.\textsuperscript{51} And whereas the Yuan, at least until 1294, enforced what has been termed a government-sponsored monopoly trade,\textsuperscript{52} in Western Asia, as far as we can tell, the activities of ortaqs coexisted with those of ‘free’ traders.

But the picture of unalloyed Mongol favour towards merchants requires qualification. Under the year 650/1252 al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi’a mentions how Mongol forces from Azerbaijan fell upon a caravan travelling from Anatolia to Baghdad, killed the merchants and looted their goods.\textsuperscript{53} This was no aberration, no sudden act of indiscriminate savagery by some greedy or undisciplined commander. Rather, it was in all likelihood a calculated strategic blow against the ’Abbasid capital; and it serves as a timely reminder – from less than a decade before the break-up of the empire – that indulgence towards traders did not extend to those whose commercial activities benefited the enemy.

\textbf{Overland trade and travel in the era of the successor-states: obstacles and risks}

Central to our appraisal of a Eurasian commercial network during the Mongol era is the question of how far the Chinggisid states after 1261 continued to function, in some sense, as a unity – to act, in commercial matters, as if the empire still existed.\textsuperscript{54} A few examples of disruption by the intermittent fighting in Central Asia, which inhibited overland travel or trade between China and the western regions in the late thirteenth century and the first few years of the fourteenth century, will suffice. The future Nestorian Catholicos, Mar Yahballāhā, and his colleague Rabban Ṣawma, who had arrived in the Ilkhanate with a commission from Qubilai, were prevented from returning to China in 1280 by the land route.\textsuperscript{55} When Qubilai’s envoys to the Ilkhan Arghun, Bolod Chingsang and ‘Īsā Kelemechi, were on their way back to China in 1286, they were separated owing to disturbances in Central Asia; Bolod was forced to return to the Ilkhanate (where, fortunately for the cause of intercultural contacts, he would remain until his death), and it took ‘Īsā two years to rejoin the Qaghan.\textsuperscript{56} In
697/1297–8 an embassy from Iran to China, headed by Fakhr al-Dīn Aḥmad, was forced by the qaghan’s wars with Qaidu and Du’a to take the sea route. Rashīd al-Dīn himself speaks of ‘the closure of the roads’, which denied him the chance to ascertain the names of all the Qaghan Temūr’s wives for his *Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh*. Western European sources, too, yield insights into the obstacles to transcontinental travel. When Marco Polo and his father and uncle took their leave of Qubilai’s court (1290), they chose to journey to Iran by sea in view of the fighting in Central Asia. A letter from the Franciscan missionary Giovanni di Montecorvino, dated January 1305 from Khanbaligh, confirms the effects of protracted conflict, which had prevented him receiving any news from Europe for twelve years.

One of the impulses behind the reconciliation of Du’a and Chapar with the Qaghan Temūr in 1304, we are told, was that merchants and caravans (*qawāfīl*) should be able to travel between Central Asia and the Yuan dominions. Waṣṣāf tells us that this desirable result was achieved, and caravans once more began to travel throughout the Mongol world. Since Montecorvino in 1305 recommended the land route, he evidently believed that the peace of 1304 had brought an improvement. If so, it was short-lived. Describing the economic consequences of the bitter struggle between the supporters of Du’a and Chapar which erupted only a few months after Montecorvino wrote, Waṣṣāf says expressly that merchants refrained from travel and commercial activity. A. P. Martinez assumes that Chapar’s definitive submission to the qaghan in 1310 made the Pax a reality; but, as we have seen, warfare continued intermittently in Central Asia between the Chaghadayid and Yuan forces and among the Chaghadayids themselves. The establishment of peace between the qaghan and the Chaghadayids in 1323, and al-‘Umari’s testimony that merchants from Egypt and Syria flocked to Transoxiana in the 1330s on learning of the accession of the Muslim khan Tarmashirin, suggest that the overland journey was safe once more. But in 1345, perhaps owing to fresh inter-Mongol conflicts, the route across Central Asia proved impassable, and the Pope’s Franciscan envoy, Giovanni di Marignolli, was obliged to return from the Yuan dominions to Europe by sea. Whether it would have been possible at this time to travel by the northerly route, we are not told. Pegolotti famously assured his readers that the route between Tana and ‘Cathay’ was the safest and the most expeditious; but his information could have been out of date by Marignolli’s time.

It is vital to notice that the damage wrought by inter-Mongol warfare was by no means confined to peasants and townsfolk. Traders were often singled out as objects of royal cupidity or vindictiveness, as the following
examples demonstrate. When the Chaghadayid khan Baraq rebelled against the qaghan in c. 1266, he rounded up the dependants of both Qubilai and Abagha within his own territory and mulcted them of their goods. There is evidence for even more drastic treatment of merchants on the outbreak of war between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde, when Hülegü and Berke each sought to injure the other by killing the merchants who represented his rival’s interests (p. 142). Noghai’s sack and burning of Sūdāq (Soldaia), where the traders were tortured into disgorging their goods, in the spring of 698/1299, and his arrest and expropriation of the Muslim, Alan and European merchants in the other Crimean cities of Kaffa, Saru- kermen (Cherson), Kirkyer and Kerch, were evidently designed to damage the interests of his rival Toqto’a, since the sources make it clear that at Sūdāq those who were trading on Noghai’s behalf were picked out from the rest (totalling over two-thirds of the city’s traders) and were left unmolested. Diplomatic missions were no less vulnerable, because they were usually accompanied by ortaq merchants whom a Mongol ruler had entrusted with capital to trade with on his behalf, as did Ghazan, for instance, when despatching Fakhr al-Dīn Ahmad to the Yuan court with 100,000 gold dinars in 697/1297–8.68 During the years 713–14/1313–15 the Chaghadayid khan Esen Buqa intercepted at least three embassies between the Yuan and the Ilkhanate (on the third occasion putting the personnel to the sword) and confiscated their effects, some of which would have represented mercantile capital.69

Contemporaries clearly entertained no doubts that the fate of merchants and their goods in time of war between the various Mongol powers had a deleterious effect on trade. According to Waṣṣāf, in the period of almost seven decades since the death of Ögödei nobody had ventured to travel through the empire without an escort. After the outrages committed by Hülegü and Berke, he tells us, merchants and envoys ceased to journey between the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde until the era of Gaikhatu (r. 690–4/1291–5) and Toqto’a (r. 690–712/1291–1312), when diplomatic exchanges opened up the routes once more for merchants (tujjār) and ortaq merchants. This is clearly an oversimplification, since Rashīd al-Dīn assures us that merchants continued to pass to and fro after Abagha’s construction of the sibe, and the Jochid prince Tama Toqta had nevertheless found ‘ortaqs and merchants’ to plunder during his campaign in the Transcaucasus in 687/1288. But the point still stands. The mere threat of war in the Caucasus in 701/1302 deterred traders from journeying between the Ilkhanate and the Jochid territories until rumour proved groundless. In 712/1312 a letter from Özbeg to the Ilkhan Öijeitü stressed the desirability of settling their
territorial dispute, so that merchants might once again begin to journey between their dominions.74

So much contemporary testimony makes it difficult to imagine how trans-Asiatic commerce could have continued unhampered during the decades following the break-up of the unitary empire. The evidence runs counter to Abu-Lughod’s claim that ‘safe passage granted by one regional ruler was honoured by the next’ (the context is the early years following the fragmentation of the empire),75 certainly when the two potentates in question were at war; and it also invalidates Ciocîltan’s belief that ‘Chinggis Khan’s successors kept this peace across an enormous stretch of territory, from the Pacific Ocean to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.’ 76 So too Morris Rossabi’s assumption that ‘the generally amicable relationship between the Yuan rulers of China and the Il-khanids of Persia assured relatively safe passage for most caravans’77 ignores the role of the usually antagonistic Central Asian Mongols and hence requires strong qualification. And although Hodong Kim is no doubt right to distinguish ‘unofficial’ traders from the ortaq merchants who enjoyed a more formal association with a regional khan (and hence were a more obvious target for spoliation and violence),78 it is far from certain that hostile Mongol armies recognized the distinction in practice. Timothy May assumes that the communications network, the yam, remained in existence throughout the era of the successor khanates.79 But we have the Ilkhan Öljeitü’s testimony in 1305 that it had been fractured and that the relay-stations had only just been ‘joined up’ once more (p. 123).

The early imperial era may indeed have seen an increasingly brisk commerce both between Eastern and Western Asia and, transversely, across the divide between steppe and agrarian regions. Yet the assessment of conditions within the Mongol world implied by the term Pax Mongolica is too positive for the period after 1260. The sundering of the Chinggisid empire, following Möngke’s death, and the warfare that periodically occurred between the rival khanates – despite rulers’ concern to keep routes open and secure for commerce – disrupted both trade and travel for other purposes. Of course, the authors on whom we depend are probably far more prone to mention the periodic disturbance of trade than a peaceful maintenance of traffic at other times. Even the conflict between the Ilkhanate and the Mamlûks did not prevent the continuance of trade between them in northern Syria.80 Nor is it possible to conceive of a twelfth-century Ibn Baṭṭûṭa being able to travel from the Maghrib to regions as far distant as the Pontic steppe, Transoxiana and the Indian subcontinent. But in the last analysis we need, I suspect, to uncouple the idea of the Pax from
8. The Eurasian commercial network in the Mongol era
transcontinental trade (with the exception, perhaps, of the northerly steppe route recommended by Pegolotti, and of those further south during the 1320s and 1330s) and look instead to the (relatively) peaceful conditions imposed by some Mongol rulers, for some of the time, that encouraged commerce within an ulus.

That said, however, of greater moment than the security – or spasmodic insecurity – of overland travel were possibly the injection of unprecedented quantities of plundered goods and capital into the Eurasian commercial networks, an overall reduction of customs dues, the existence of numerous large nomadic courts (ordo) and caravanserais, support for urban centres and the boost in demand for certain products, not least luxury items and slaves. Recent research suggests that the Mongols’ acquisition of the Song treasury, and the promotion by the Yuan of paper money which was unredeemable for coin, led to massive westward flows of silver ingots from China, and hence to a considerable increase of silver coinage alike in northern India, in the Near East and in Europe at various points between the last quarter of the thirteenth century and the mid-fourteenth century. In addition, there emerged a commensurability across a wide range of currencies, as business came to be conducted in conceptual units of account expressed in terms of silver by weight. There seems little doubt that for much of the Mongol era, until the advent of the Black Death, Eurasia as a whole was growing increasingly integrated, in economic terms. In this process seaborne commerce may have played at least as important a role as overland ventures.

**Seaborne trade during the Mongol epoch**

If the long-distance overland routes were only intermittently free of the hazards of conflict, one marked development in the Mongol era was an increase in the maritime trade of Asia, from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean and across the South China Sea. As with the land routes, what was different about the Mongol period, again, was the readiness of traders to travel the entire distance between the Gulf and China rather than to halt in and return from southern Indian ports; and it may well be that the advantage of bypassing inter-Mongol warfare outweighed the dangers of sea travel and the daunting length of the journey, which Montecorvino estimated at almost two years. For some centuries Muslim communities had resided in Indian ports such as Kanbhāya (Cambay) in Gujarat, whence they made commercial voyages to China; and Chinese ports such as Quanzhou (Zaitun) had housed Muslim traders since the Tang dynasty. By
the early Yuan era it was common knowledge that Muslims enjoyed a favoured position in both the central and the local administration of China, where – as part of the class termed *semuren* (‘Miscellaneous Peoples’) – they ranked second, below only the Mongols themselves and above both northern Chinese (including the Kitan and the Jurchen) and the population of the former Song empire. An influential Muslim merchant assisted the Mongols in the capture of Quanzhou (1276), and the news of Qubilai’s conquest of the Song acted as a powerful stimulus to Muslim merchants in Western Asia to engage in voyages to China by the sea route. The Yuan period witnessed a considerable growth in the number of Muslims resident in China. Gravestones in the Muslim cemetery at Quanzhou commemorate primarily persons originating from the Persian-speaking world (Qunduz, for instance), in contrast with the older established Muslim merchant community in the city, which was of Arab ancestry.

In particular, Muslims formed the overwhelming majority of ortaq merchants. Despite measures that Qubilai took to curtail the privileges of ortaq merchants, they gained a tight hold on maritime commerce through the major port of Quanzhou. One commodity shipped from Quanzhou to the Persian Gulf in growing quantities by the second quarter of the fourteenth century was blue-and-white porcelain, manufactured at Jingdezhen in Jiangsu specifically for the Iranian market. Qubilai encouraged the growth of seaborne commerce, not merely to generate fresh revenue but to maintain contact with his Ilkhanid allies and, in the traditional style of Chinese emperors, to win recognition of his supremacy, and of their own ‘tributary’ status, from rulers who were still independent. These latter two aims entailed frequent communication with the local powers of south-east Asia and of southern India, notably those of Malabar (Kerala) and Ma’bar (the Coromandel coast).

We should note in addition that Muslim traders were acquiring a strong position in the fiscal administration of the Ilkhanid dominions, especially in the south, in Fārs and the neighbouring coastal tracts. Marco Polo speaks only of the port of Hurmuz, where merchants from India congregated and purchased *inter alia* spices, silks, cloth of gold, gems and ivory, which they then sold throughout the world, and the Chinese sources also give the place some prominence. But merchants waiting in the vicinity of Hurmuz for the arrival of ships from India were vulnerable to predatory attacks by the Negüderis, and Hurmuz faced keen competition during the Ilkhanid era from the safer port on the island of Qays (Kīsh), which appears to have enjoyed pre-eminence among the cities of the Gulf region. Around the turn of the thirteenth century the ruler of the island of Qays was Jamāl al-Dīn
Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Ṭībī (d. 706/1306–7), who also farmed the taxes of Fārs from the Ilkhans, obtaining from Gaikhatu the title of Malik al-Islām, and whose activities were conspicuous enough to bring him to the notice of Ibn al-Ṣuqā’ī and, later, al-Ṣafadī in distant Egypt. Jamāl al-Dīn, whose rise dated from his ortaq partnership with Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī and the noyan Sughunchaq, travelled as far as China and was the foremost Muslim trader of his day, with 100 ships engaged in commerce at any one time and with a powerful stake in the external trade of both India and the Yuan empire. For Waṣṣāf, this trade enhanced the prosperity not only of the Gulf region but also of other countries, including Iraq and Khurāsān, ‘as far as Rūm, Syria and the Franks’. Jamāl al-Dīn’s brother Taqī’ al-Dīn ’Abd al-Raḥmān, who in 692/1293 became chief minister to the Hindu king of Ma’bar, used his position to advance Jamāl al-Dīn’s interests, despatching annually to Qays large quantities of goods from which the latter’s agents always took their pick. The brothers made an especially rich profit from supplying the king of Ma’bar with choice mounts, a commodity that was in notoriously short supply in peninsular India and that made up one of the two principal exports from Qays. Ma’bar in turn served as a vital entrepôt in the maritime trade between Mongol Iran and the Yuan empire. Waṣṣāf describes Qays in lyrical terms as a magnet for the products of India, the furthest parts of China, Turkestan, Egypt, Syria, and even distant Qayrawān in Tunisia. He clearly believed himself to be witnessing a situation without precedent in world history.

**The movement of skilled personnel**

It is likely that during the Mongol era political conditions after 1261 had a rather less inhibiting effect on other modes of contact than they did on overland commerce. At issue here are widely differing patterns of movement. To be worthy of the name, trade requires relatively frequent or regular journeys, and the opportunities for disruption are accordingly greater. It is widely accepted that cultural transmission during the Mongol epoch took place at the personal level, rather than through the physical transfer of written sources or technical instruments. But sustained transmission of this kind may spring from the displacement of groups of skilled personnel from one part of the continent to another in the immediate aftermath of conquest; it might also be the result of a single journey from, say, China to Iran, enabling an expert, or group of experts, to enjoy frequent contact thereafter with those of similar skills and interests, without the need for further travel.
For these face-to-face encounters the Mongols' own relocation of their human booty (over and above those whom they had incorporated within their military forces) was chiefly responsible. Steppe society lacked specialists. Nomads in the process of empire-building required personnel with technical skills that were not represented within their own ranks; Chinggis Khan's recruitment of Maḥmūd Yalavach, as one who knew 'the laws and customs of cities' (above, p. 75), furnishes an early example. Captives possessed of such talents fared better than those who lacked them. The censuses that the Mongols conducted in the conquered territories identified individuals with specialist skills and listed them separately from the bulk of the population. Many of them belonged to classes that enjoyed a certain cachet in the Mongol empire: holy men and scholars expert in religious matters, alchemists, philosophers, physicians, astronomers and astrologers (the last two categories barely distinguishable). The conquerors were also on the lookout for skilled craftsmen, like the weavers of fine fabrics picked out from the population of Tabrīz in 628/1231 and set to work on the production of a luxury tent for the qaghan.

We should also bear in mind the prominence of linguistic specialists. There was no lingua franca current throughout the whole empire, though Persian was the nearest thing to it, whether in China or in the western Jochid territories. In governing their enormous dominions, the Mongols attached great value to those with a command of languages (see pp. 110, 287–8); and there was seemingly no dearth of individuals prepared to qualify for their service by mastering foreign tongues. It was not simply a matter of recruiting oral interpreters for dealing with envoys or merchants; the Mongols also required people to translate religious texts and scientific writings (below, p. 236).

Groups of craftsmen were often transported across vast distances in the interests of economic exploitation. Their participation in the imperial project tended to be of an involuntary nature; many of them were enslaved. We saw how Chinese, Kitan and Tangut personnel were brought to Transoxiana and even as far as western Iran to perform agricultural tasks (p. 177), while Changchun, who in 1222 met a Chinese official in charge of the Samarqand observatory, says that Chinese craftsmen were to be found everywhere. At the same time, the skilled craftsmen, often the only survivors of a sacked Muslim city, were deported to the Mongolian homeland or further afield still (p. 173). Juwaynī tells us that many places in the east were inhabited and cultivated by artisans removed from Khwārazm. The thousand households of weavers whom Tolui removed from Herat were sent to Beshbaligh, where they produced magnificent
garments for one of Chinggis Khan’s wives and subsequently for the Qaghan Ögödei. Further groups of craftsmen from Islamic territories were resettled in Mongolia on Ögödei’s orders. They may have included the Muslim engineers who built the palace of Qarshi Suri, about 25 miles north of Qaraqorum, where he repaired at the height of spring in the course of his annual migrations. Some 3,000 artisan households, many of them from Samarqand, were transported to Xunmalin (modern Ximalin), on the Hunhe river in northern China, where they are mentioned seventy years later by Rashīd al-Dīn (calling the locality ‘Sīmalī’); while over 300 Muslim artisan households were settled in Hongzhou, west of Khanbaligh. Thus, in general, colonists were imported from East Asia to repair the damage done in the Iranian world and Muslim colonists were moved eastwards to produce speciality goods; or, to put it another way, ‘the Mongols sent East Asians to the west to increase the quantity of production and Westerners to the east to improve the quality of production’.

During Hülegü’s campaigns skilled personnel were still being preserved from the carnage and put to profitable use. Artisans were removed at the fall of Aleppo, for example, in Ṣafar 658/January 1260. When, some months later, the Ayyubid Sultan al-Nāṣir Yūsf and his suite were massacred on Hülegü’s orders after news of ‘Ayn Jālūt, only the cooks and pages (ghilmān) were spared, along with a certain Muḥyī’ al-Dīn, who indicated to the killers that he was an astronomer; he thereby lived to join Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s staff at the Marāgha observatory and to tell his story to Bar Hebraeus.

In Hülegü’s day, however, we encounter personnel being brought from the Far East who may equally have had little or no choice, but who did not come as slaves, and movement of this kind persisted for some decades. Like certain of their steppe predecessors and their sedentary counterparts, Mongol rulers felt it incumbent upon them to surround themselves not merely with material luxury but also with intellectual luminaries. Hülegü adorned his court with scholars and wise men (‘ulamā’ wa-hukamā’). According to Rashīd al-Dīn, philosophers, astronomers and physicians came to Iran in his train. That author was in no doubt regarding the cultural consequences of the union of the farthest parts of the inhabited world under Chinggisid rule: at Öljettu’s court were assembled philosophers, astronomers, historians and other scholars from China, India, Kashmir, Tibet, the Uighurs and other Turkic peoples, the Arabs and the Franks.

Reciprocal contacts of this kind between the Mongol states give the appearance of being limited to Ilkhanid Iran and Yuan China (the ‘Toluid
which often exchanged envoys and technical experts and on occasion royal brides (Kökechin, for instance, who reached the Ilkhanate in 1291 and whose party allegedly included the three Polos). The impression may be due in part to the fact that the two Toluid states yield more ample source material. The Golden Horde territories apart from Khwārazm perhaps had a narrower range of assets and skills to export than did the other Chinggisid khanates; although the Jochid lands acted as a conduit for the passage of Central and East Asian metalwork techniques into the Middle East. But there is no doubt that Muslims of Central Asian origin played a prominent part in mediating between China and the Islamic world. Much of this topic has been amply and ably covered in Thomas Allsen’s *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia* (2001) and subsequent work, and I shall refer frequently to his findings while adding evidence and ideas advanced by other scholars in the past fifteen years or so.

Two questions need to be addressed. Which developments, firstly, can reasonably be ascribed to the incorporation of a large section of the Dar al-Islam within a world-empire? Even discounting the annual pilgrimage, Muslims had been journeying considerable distances across the Islamic oecumene for some centuries. As for relations with the non-Muslim world, the borrowing of Chinese themes or techniques was no new phenomenon in the thirteenth century. We might reasonably expect as one result of the Mongol conquest, for example, that Muslim weavers in Iran copied Chinese textiles which had become widely accessible; but there is evidence, in fact, that this was occurring already in Tabrīz prior to the Mongols’ arrival. By the eleventh century, Iranian potters had apparently drawn inspiration from Chinese ceramics produced under the Song dynasty, and Chinese motifs had figured on Iranian metalwork contemporary with the Liao and Jin. What was distinctive about the Mongol era was an explosion in the extent and scope of such borrowing.

The second question is: how far-reaching was the impact of closer cultural links with the world beyond Islam in the Mongol period? Whereas the Muslim community in Yuan China was relatively sizeable (in absolute terms, that is), the number of Chinese in Iran was only ever small. Hence the Muslim imprint on Chinese science was stronger than any effects working in the reverse direction. One has only to think of the two Muslim siege engineers, Ismā’īl and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, whom Abagha sent to Qubilai and who hastened the fall of Xiangyang in 1273 by assembling and operating a counterweight trebuchet (for which Marco Polo’s book, notoriously, would give the credit to his father and uncle); or the Muslim astronomer from Bukhārā, Jamāl al-Dīn, who in 1267 presented the Yuan court with a
calendar based on Western-style observations and calculations, together with astronomical instruments that he had devised, and in 1271 was made intendant of the new *Huihui sitian jian* (‘Muslim Astronomical Observatory’). Since, however, the focus of the present book is the impact of Mongol rule upon Muslims, we shall be concerned here with the contribution of other regions of the Mongol world to the culture of Muslim Iran and Iraq, rather than with the Muslims’ own contribution to the culture of lands outside the Dar al-Islam. One highly relevant aspect of the Muslim presence and activity elsewhere – the implantation of Islam within parts of the Yuan empire – will be examined in the Epilogue.

**Cultural brokers: Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Rashīd al-Dīn and Bolod Chingsang**

In the Ilkhanate we can track the activity of prominent individuals, although identifying that of less celebrated figures is a more difficult matter. Cultural activity in Iran is linked especially with two celebrated names: Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Rashīd al-Dīn. At Ṭūsī’s instigation, Hülegü ordered an observatory to be constructed at Marāgha, a locality where observations had been taking place for several decades; Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) was appointed as its first director. He himself lists four Muslim colleagues – Mu’ayyad al-Dīn al-’Urḍī, Fakhr al-Dīn Marāghī, Fakhr al-Dīn Akhlāṭī and Najm al-Dīn Dabīrān Qazwīnī – who are named also by Rashīd al-Dīn and Ibn al-Fuwāṭī as astronomers specially picked out for the task with Hülegü’s approval. But they were joined by others. Bar Hebraeus speaks of the numerous wise men from various lands who gathered around Ṭūsī, and one has only to sift through Ibn al-Fuwāṭī’s *Talkhīṣ* to gain the vivid impression that the observatory and its library, where he himself worked until 679/1280–1, were a magnet for scholars from far-distant regions and a centre of wide-ranging intellectual inquiry. Some of these scholars hailed from outside the Mongol dominions: al-’Urḍī was summoned from Damascus; Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Maghribi, who reached Marāgha soon after the foundation of the observatory, having previously been in the service of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf (p. 226 above), came originally from Tunisia.

According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Hülegü attached to Ṭūsī’s team an astronomer brought from China, the Daoist master (Pers. *sīng-sīng*, i.e. Ch. *xian-sheng*) Fumengji, ordering the Shi’i scholar to acquire whatever knowledge of history and astronomy the Chinese astronomer possessed and Fumengji to learn about Muslim astronomy from Ṭūsī. The latter, we are told, successfully mastered within two days what his new colleague taught him, whereas...
the Chinese scholar benefited remarkably little in reverse, since his knowledge of astronomical tables and the movements of the stars was meagre.\textsuperscript{130} It may be for this reason that Tūsī makes no mention of him in the introduction to his astronomical handbook, \textit{Zīj-i īlkhānī}, listing only his four Muslim collaborators. The \textit{Zīj} is the first such handbook to incorporate a Chinese calendar (\textit{taťrīkh-i Qitā}), often referred to in the past, inaccurately, as a ‘Chinese-Uighur calendar’,\textsuperscript{131} which was possibly Fumengji’s chief contribution to the project. It includes conversion tables for a variety of eras in use in different parts of the empire, namely the Hijrī era, the Chinese sexagenary system, the Turco-Mongol twelve-year animal calendar, the Seleucid era employed by Eastern Christians (beginning in 311 B.C.E.) and the Iranian era of Yazdagird (commencing in 632 C.E.).\textsuperscript{132}

Important work continued at Marāgha after Tūsī’s demise. Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Maghribī (d. 682/1283) produced his own \textit{zīj}, entitled \textit{Adwār al-anwār} (‘The Cycles of Light’), in the very year following Tūsī’s death.\textsuperscript{133} A later astronomer at Marāgha, Shams al-Dīn Muhammad al-Wābkanāwī al-Bukhārī, who began his \textit{Zīj-i muḥaqqaq-i sultānī} (‘The Verified Royal Tables’) on Ghazan’s orders and dedicated it to the later Ilkhan Abū Sa’īd, severely criticized Tūsī’s \textit{Zīj-i īlkhānī}, on the grounds that it was merely derived from earlier tables and that the calculated position of a planet never coincided at an empirical level. In al-Wābkanawī’s opinion, al-Maghribī’s \textit{Adwār} was a superior work, based as it was on independent observation.\textsuperscript{134}

Nor was the work at Marāgha concerned just with astronomical matters. Even in the incomplete \textit{Talkhīš} that survives Ibn al-Fuwaṭī refers to a verse chronicle (now lost) that was deposited in the library\textsuperscript{135} and names many figures who gravitated to Marāgha in Tūsī’s lifetime and took up residence there. Among them were Qutb al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Mas’ūd Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311), who is said to have studied mathematics (\textit{al-‘ulūm al-riyādiyya}) under Tūsī himself, logic (\textit{al-maṭiqa’īyya}) from the works of Najm al-Dīn Qazwīnī, and geometry (\textit{al-ashkāl al-hindīyya}) as well as astronomy (\textit{al-hay’a}) from those of Mu’ayyad al-Dīn al-‘Urḍī;\textsuperscript{136} and Qiwām al-Dīn ‘Abd-Allāh al-Yāzī and Qiwām al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Yāzīrī, who both studied logic under Qazwīnī.\textsuperscript{137}

Cultural and technical fusion, in a number of distinct contexts, is associated still more with the name of Rashīd al-Dīn, who as a Jew by birth was even more of an ‘outsider’ than the Shi‘ī Tūsī, though to all intents and purposes an orthodox Muslim. A truly remarkable figure who occupied, it has been said, a ‘liminal position . . . at the meeting place between Islamic Iran, the Mongol empire and his Jewish background’,\textsuperscript{138} Rashīd al-Dīn patronized, under Ghazan and Öljeitü, numerous scholars from both ends
of Asia. In addition, he is said to have authored a number of works on various learned subjects, although in some instances he may simply have presided over a team of researchers. These writings, not all of which are still extant, are listed in the Jāmiʿ-i taşānīf-i Rashīdī (see p. 26).139

The Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh alone, incorporating as it does histories of the Mongols, the Chinese, India, the Jews, the Armenians and the Franks,140 is a monument to Rashīd al-Dīn’s openness to other cultural traditions outside Islam. In the preface he affirms the historian’s duty to record the histories of non-Muslim peoples without seeking to modify them, even though Muslim tradition is superior to all the rest.141 He even includes a survey of the life and teachings of the Buddha, which makes up virtually the whole of the latter half of his history of India.142 Gregory Schopen showed how, in his use of the Hīnayāna Buddhist texts (the Devatā-sūtra among others) available to him, Rashīd al-Dīn went beyond the bounds of mere translation. Although non-religious passages remain faithful to the original, where the passage had to do with specifically Buddhist ideas the rendering is more expansive and is clearly designed as exegesis for the benefit of Muslim readers.143 This was a man committed to introducing his fellow Muslims to a wider confessional world.

Rashīd al-Dīn took steps to stimulate research in other fields. In the preface to his Tānksūq-nāma-yi ilkhānī dar funūn- i ʿulūm- i khitāʾī (‘Treasure-Book of the Ilkhan on the Branches of Chinese Sciences’), he proclaimed his ambition of emulating the celebrated ʿAbbasid Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd (d. 193/809), who had made Greek scientific lore accessible to Muslims through a programme of translation into Arabic.144 Himself a physician by training, Rashīd al-Dīn is said to have travelled around the Ilkhanid empire in quest of medical knowledge.145 When he attained a position of power, one of his primary aims was apparently the introduction of Chinese medical knowledge into Iran for the benefit of Muslim physicians. And just as Ṭūsī had brought together representatives of the Persian and Chinese astronomical traditions, so did Rashīd al-Dīn introduce one of the leading Persian physicians, Ṣafī al-Dīn, and the Chinese physician ‘Siyū-ša’ (Xiuxie?), in order, he says, to learn from them both. The two men collaborated on a translation of a Chinese work on the pulse.146

As both a substantial landowner and a government minister concerned to revive the agrarian economy of the Ilkhanate, Rashīd al-Dīn also took a keen interest in agronomy. Only a large fragment survives of his book, Āthār wa-ahyāʾ (‘Monuments and Living Things’). To judge from a table of contents that has been preserved in the Jāmiʿ- i taşānīf-i Rashīdī, it dealt with a broad range of matters, including the preconditions for agricultural
development, the varieties of trees, fruits and herbs, methods of cultivation, pest control, animal husbandry, the storage of grain and other produce, and even the mining and extraction of precious stones.¹⁴⁷

For the Mongols foodways and medical matters were closely related. In the preface to the Tānksūq-nāma Rashīd al-Dīn, who had entered Ilkhanid service as a ba’urchi (cook, steward), testifies to his own interest in pharmacology, since he tells us that he had translated a book on ‘medicines from herbs, minerals, trees, animals, fish . . . ’¹⁴⁸ He frequently betrays an awareness of the ingredients used in Chinese cuisine, and some of his information was clearly derived from Chinese residents in the Ilkhanate. We can also assume that the troops from the Far East, accompanying Hülegü in 1253–6 (above, p. 136), had brought with them a taste for their own habitual dishes. One example is rice, a crop by no means unknown in pre-Mongol Iran. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, a variety of rice grown in India was introduced under his auspices in Ghazan’s reign, though the experiment was a failure. It is conceivable that rice became more entrenched in Iranian cuisine during the Mongol era; but the evidence is inconclusive.¹⁴⁹

Rashīd al-Dīn’s known sources¹⁵⁰ in themselves attest to the great distances covered by travellers within the Mongol world. As we saw, much of the information in the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh, particularly about the earlier history of the Mongols and the Turkic peoples and about Yuan China, was evidently obtained from the great noyan Bolod Chingsang, an ambassador from Qubilai who had arrived in 683/1284–5 and had been domiciled in Iran ever since.¹⁵¹ For the history of China, Rashīd al-Dīn describes how two Chinese scholars, Lītājī (Li Tazhi?) and *K.MSWN (Qin/Qian Sun/Song?), well versed in medicine, astrology and the Chinese calendar (ta’rikh-i Khitā), had joined his team, bringing with them a book listing the names of Chinese emperors.¹⁵² But the book in question cannot be identified, and it was evidently a digest of several works. As Herbert Franke pointed out long ago, moreover, the wazir, or his collaborators, were prey to a number of misinterpretations.¹⁵³

The section of the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh that deals with the Ilkhans seems itself to have been inspired by Chinese-style historiographical conventions. The treatment of each reign contains, in addition to a list of the ruler's wives and descendants, a relatively detailed survey of events, with more or less precise dates, usually given in the twelve-year animal calendar as well as according to the Hijra (dates supplied in the other sections of Rashīd al-Dīn's history comprise only the year in either era).¹⁵⁴ This arrangement – so different from that of Rashīd al-Dīn’s precursor, Juwaynī, or his younger contemporary, Waṣṣāf – is reminiscent of the ‘principal annals’ (benji)
found in Chinese dynastic histories. It has been proposed that Rashīd al-Dīn was strongly influenced here by the Chinese practice – doubtless through the medium of Bolod Chingsang, who (as the official responsible for the creation of the Imperial Library Directorate, *Mishu jian*, in 1273) had been concerned, if indirectly, with the collection of materials for the histories of the Liao, Jin and Song dynasties. The similarity is yet more marked in the case of Qāshānī, who (it will be recalled) was apparently one of Rashīd al-Dīn’s research assistants and whose own *Ta’rikh-i Uljāītū* follows, on balance, a still more detailed chronological structure. It could be argued, however, that the Arabic historiographical tradition itself provided sufficient models for this chronological arrangement.

Rashīd al-Dīn’s great history also embraced lands that lay outside the Mongol world. He copied almost verbatim some geographical data and a brief history of the thirteenth–early fourteenth-century Delhi Sultanate from his younger contemporary Waṣṣāf, whose source is unknown. But much of the detail concerning the geography and early history of India he drew extensively from the *Taḥqīq mā li l-Hind* of the famous eleventh-century author Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (whose wide-ranging interests, incidentally, very much parallel Rashīd al-Dīn’s own). For some reason – perhaps because al-Bīrūnī’s account of Buddhism was second-hand, based entirely on that of an earlier Muslim author – Rashīd al-Dīn derived much of his Buddhist material from the Kashmiri Buddhist monk (*bakhshi*) Kamāla Śrī. But it is evident that he also obtained information about Central Asian Buddhism, no doubt from a different source, and some of the detail relates to practices found only in the Chinese Buddhist tradition (though here too his informants may have been Uighurs or Tibetans).

For the early part of his history of the Franks he apparently took his survey of (Judaeo-Christian) sacred history from Adam down to David from the *Mukhtaṣar ta’rikh al-duwal* of Ibn al-Ṭbrī (Bar Hebraeus); and Karl Jahn made a good case for linking the fourth and final section, which amounts to little more than a catalogue of emperors and popes, with the remarkably similar *Chronicon Pontificum et Imperatorum* (1268/9) of Martin of Troppau (Martinus Oppaviensis), perhaps mediated through Dominican friars who were at that time engaged in evangelism in Iran.

For the *Āthār wa-aḥyā*, just as in the composition of his history, Rashīd al-Dīn benefited from the experience and expertise of Bolod Chingsang, like him at one time a *ba’urchi*, who had served as director of the supervisors of agriculture in Qubilai’s China between 1271 and 1277. Rashīd al-Dīn’s geographical work, *Ṣuwar al-aqālīm* (‘The Configurations of the Climes’), listed among his writings in the *Jāmi’-i taṣānīf* and originally
designed as a supplement to the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, is regrettably lost. But he included significant data on the geography of China in the historical sections of the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh*, where, for example, he describes the Gulf of Bohai and gives an account of the Grand Canal, constructed, on Qubilai’s orders, to link Khanbaligh with the major port of Hangzhou. Here too, since the *Ṣuwar al-aqālim* is said to have included details of the stages of the *yam* network, Bolod was probably a major source of information. Allsen has thrown into sharp relief the career of this figure who, more than anybody else, was responsible for imparting a knowledge of Chinese history and culture to the upper echelons in Ilkhanid Iran.

**The expansion of geographical horizons**

Muslim awareness of the wider world witnessed significant advances, thanks to the growth in contacts with China and other regions of the Far East. One problem confronting us is the agency by which this knowledge was acquired. We know, for example, that the astronomer Jamāl al-Dīn’s familiarity with western geography left its mark on Yuan cartography and that many other Muslims reached China in the Yuan era. The most prominent individuals known to have made the journey from the Yuan dominions to the Ilkhanate are Mongol envoys like Bolod or representatives of other Far Eastern peoples, such as Mar Yahballāhā III and his companion Rabban Ṣawma, both of the Önggüt tribe. We know less about Muslims native to the Far East who visited Western Asia in the Mongol period. But Muslims from the west who spent time in China, such as the merchants Jamāl al-Dīn Ibrāhīm al-Ṭībī and Ibn al-Ṣayqāl al-Jazāri (d. 701/1301–2) and certain of Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-ʿUmarī’s informants, disseminated information about the country after their return.

It took some time before the new knowledge was reflected in geographical works composed in Iran. The writings of the cosmographer Zakariyāʾ b. Muḥammad Qazwīnī (d. 682/1283), *Āthār al-bilād* (‘The Monuments of Countries’) and *ʿAjāʾib al-makhlūqāt* (‘The Marvels of Creation’), still betray a heavy dependence on the eleventh-century geography of al-Bīrūnī; only the map attached to the *ʿAjāʾib* departs from previous convention by depicting China as a major subcontinent on a par with India and Africa. Our literary sources tell us of other maps, such as that presented to Arghun in 689/1290 by Qutb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, which depicted ‘the western sea and its gulfs and coastlines, including many territories to the west and north’. A terrestrial globe that the architect (*muhandis*) Karīm al-Dīn Abū Bakr al-Salmāsī had fashioned, it seems, from papier mâché greatly impressed
Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, who met him at Marāgha in 664/1266.\(^{169}\) Whether this carried a relief map, of the kind that had first appeared in eleventh-century China, is unclear.\(^{170}\) The map in the Safīna-yi Tabrīz (c. 1320) follows earlier Muslim geographers in its representation of Africa and the Mediterranean region but provides a comparatively realistic delineation of the Arabian and Chinese coasts. We cannot know whether it owed anything to Rashīd al-Dīn or his sources.\(^{171}\) It is a testimony to the strong links between Iran and China by the second quarter of the fourteenth century, however, that Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī and Waṣṣāf each provided a detailed account of the port of Hangzhou.\(^{172}\)

**The visual arts**

This chapter would be lamentably incomplete without reference, lastly, to the arts. The impact of Chinese practice on Persian miniature painting and ceramics, in particular, is among the most palpable of all the developments of the Mongol era. Involved were a number of profound changes: in materials, techniques and motifs. It should be stressed that the creations resulting from access to Chinese culture represented what Linda Komaroff has called 'a new visual language' and 'an original aesthetic idiom'.\(^{173}\) Much as Central Asian craftsmen during the era of the unitary empire had combined Chinese and Central Asian styles,\(^{174}\) so too did Iranian potters, metalworkers and miniature painters select Chinese themes and motifs and adapt them to develop hybrid forms. Two further contextual points need to be made before we proceed. One is that the highly ornate luxury textiles favoured by the new rulers (p. 212 above) familiarized craftsmen in Western Asia with a number of themes and designs (some of them found in pre-Mongol textiles, from the Liao and Jin epochs) that could be applied in ceramics or in miniature painting.\(^{175}\) The second is the increasing availability of paper, from China. This both fostered the development of the illustrated manuscript and, by encouraging craftsmen to draw patterns and diagrams, made possible the transfer of motifs not merely from designer to artisan but from one medium to another.\(^{176}\)

Here we shall limit the discussion to manuscript painting.\(^{177}\) Illustration had a relatively long history in the Islamic world, but it had been confined to medical and scientific writings, books of animal fables and belles-lettres (ādāb). Only a few of these illustrated manuscripts have survived, however, mainly from the twelfth century onwards; while from the Persian-speaking world a single example survives from before 1250.\(^{178}\) A marked characteristic of the Mongol period was the explosion of manuscript painting over a
much broader range of literary activity, poetical and historical works included. Improved techniques of paper manufacture, moreover, made possible the creation of large-folio manuscripts such as the Edinburgh/Khalili text of the *Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh* and the ‘Great Mongol’ *Shāh-nāma* (formerly known as the ‘Demotte *Shāh-nāma’*); and the dimensions and elaborate quality of the images accordingly increased. The codices produced at the scriptoria established by Rashīd al-Dīn are prominent examples. But they are not the only ones: major Sufi hospices (*khānqāhs*) are known to have commissioned deluxe manuscripts for teaching purposes.

The Chinese impact on miniature painting in Ilkhanid Iran was not just a question of artists in Rashīd al-Dīn’s scriptorium copying images of Chinese emperors from Chinese woodblock-printed scrolls or of Iranian artists more generally borrowing characteristic Chinese motifs – the clouds that played such a prominent part in Chinese painting, richly knotted tree-trunks, dragons, phoenixes and lotuses. It is also visible in the more naturalistic character of certain Persian painting from the mid-Ilkhanid era onwards, reflecting a capacity to depict landscape in greater detail and with greater realism and to deploy it with more striking effect in relation to the central theme. The adoption and adaptation of Chinese themes and motifs is of course uneven, less marked in painting produced in Shīrāz or Iṣfahān (insofar as we can identify provenance) than in work generated in proximity to the Ilkhanid court. Chinese inspiration would be more pronounced, too, in fifteenth-century Timurid art than it had been under the Ilkhans or their Jalayirid and Muzaffarid successors.

It is noteworthy that manuscript artists now sometimes used illustration, not in order to explain or amplify the text but as a means of commenting on contemporary historical events, notwithstanding, on occasion, the lack of any obvious connection between those events and the text in question. Examples are the final two illustrations in the Edinburgh manuscript of al-Bīrūnī’s work on calendrical systems, *Āthār al-bāqiya* (Or. 161, copied in 707/1307–8), in which historical episodes are depicted in relation to particular dates in the Muslim year. Larger and better crafted than the others in the manuscript, these two illustrations, which give prominence to the claims of ’Alī to be Muḥammad’s rightful successor (Plate 6), may well echo the current debates at Öljeitü’s court that led to the Ilkhan’s adoption of Shi’ism two years or so later. Johan Elverskog argues persuasively that this readiness to use representational art as a means of propagating a theological viewpoint reflects the influence of Buddhism, where the practice, advocated by Śakyamuni himself, had a long history.
One cannot fail to be struck by an increased readiness to defy the canonical prohibition against portraying the human form. This phenomenon is found in the Islamic world in the twelfth century, well before the advent of the Mongols; but it reached new heights in the Ilkhanid era. In particular, we should note that the artists involved in the production of the Edinburgh manuscripts of the *Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh* (Or. 20, copied in 714/1314) and of al-Bīrūnī’s *Āthār al-bāqiya* inserted several depictions of the Prophet Muḥammad himself. This was not completely unheard-of even in the pre-Mongol era – there are two scenes depicting Muḥammad in a late twelfth–early thirteenth-century manuscript – but it is extremely uncommon in Islamic art generally. Naturally there existed few or no models in the Islamic artistic tradition on which the illustrators of the two Edinburgh manuscripts might draw, so that the figures in a depiction of the Prophet’s birth, for example, are borrowed and adapted from a Nativity scene in Christian devotional art (Plate 7).

The Chinggisids’ own role

What part did Mongol khans play in the developments surveyed above? To what extent were they instrumental in the process of cultural exchange beyond simply presiding over a court resplendent with learning? In China the Yuan court is known to have sponsored written translations into Mongolian of several works that related to scientific subjects and to Buddhist teaching. But much of the translation that occurred in Iran and Transoxiana, where the fourteenth century witnessed the appearance of a number of multilingual glossaries, was ‘unofficial’. In any case, it is a moot point how far the Chinggisids shared in the polyglot culture within their dominions (below, pp. 286–7). Yet it is worth noting that the two most renowned cultural brokers – Ṭūsī and Rashīd al-Dīn – were active at Marāgha and Tabrīz respectively, both nodal points on the annual Ilkhanid itinerary.

When Juwaynī entered newly captured Alamūt in 1256, he took charge of all the astronomical instruments there. He does not say explicitly whether this was at Hūlegū’s behest; but according to Qāshānī, Hūlegū had a particular love of astronomy and geometry. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī says expressly that the initiative for the construction of the Marāgha observatory came from Hūlegū, and we have seen (p. 228 above) how Hūlegū is said to have had a hand in summoning Ṭūsī’s collaborators. Rashīd al-Dīn gives an unconvincing catalogue of Ghazan’s expertise in several spheres, which allegedly included not merely the crafts of the goldsmith and blacksmith,
carpentry and painting, but also philosophy, theology, alchemy, pharmacy, botany, minerals and astronomy. He tells us that the Ilkhan repeatedly visited the observatory at Marāgha, carefully examining the instruments, and that he ordered the building of another observatory, close to the tomb constructed for him at Tabrīz, astonishing the local experts with his grasp of technical matters and issuing detailed instructions when they raised difficulties. After the same author’s solemn assurance that Möngke had solved some problems bequeathed by Euclid, the reader is likely to be wary of topoi. It is noteworthy that the Byzantine historian Pachymeres credits Ghazan only with skill as an artisan and specifies the accoutrements of war: saddles, spurs, briddles and the like. But however excessive the claims that Rashīd al-Dīn makes for his royal master’s talents, his statements regarding the Ilkhan’s knowledge of astronomical matters, at least, are substantiated by the recently discovered al-Risālat al-Ghāzāniyya fī l-ālāt al-raṣādiyya (‘Ghazan’s Treatise on Astronomical Instruments’), which describes no fewer than twelve instruments that Ghazan had invented. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī confirms what Rashīd al-Dīn says about Ghazan’s interest also in varieties of herbs.

Even where royal intervention is certain, however, it is important to avoid misapprehensions as to the motives behind it. In a telling passage, Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā remarks how the fields of knowledge patronized by past Muslim kings – notably grammar, semantics and poetry – had now fallen out of favour. Instead, the Mongol rulers prized careful accounting as an instrument of administrative control, medicine as a means of preserving the body, and familiarity with the stars in order to determine the days most favourable to their endeavours. While praising Hülegū’s patronage of learning (ḥikmat), Rashīd al-Dīn says that he was particularly fond of alchemy, on which he wasted vast sums of money. In the sphere of astronomy, too, what led Hülegū to commission the building of the Marāgha observatory was not a desire for knowledge that might appear to our eyes strictly scientific, but the exigencies of astrology, to which he, like the other early Ilkhans, was greatly attached. Similar motives may have inspired Ghazan’s observatory at Tabrīz. For the Mongols, identifying the most propitious moment for action, not least military action, was of paramount importance. The Ilkhans’ interest in the stars was thus pragmatic – after the Mongols’ own lights.

Any such pragmatic impulse behind Ilkhanid patronage of the arts is harder to detect. The production of ceramic vessels (as opposed to tilework) was not aimed at the higher echelons of society, aside, possibly, from some of the vessels excavated at Takht-i Sulaymān. But we have no reason
to suppose that the Ilkhans took no active interest in paintings or in the
designs of the sumptuous textiles they wore and presented as gifts. Their
Yuan cousins certainly did so. On taking Hangzhou from the Song in 1276,
Qubilai’s troops were careful to preserve the paintings in the Imperial
Palace collection and transport many of them to Khanbaligh. In 1270 the
Qaghan forbade the deployment of certain motifs – the sun, the moon,
dragons and tigers – on silk and satin fabrics and the depiction of the
dragon and the rhinoceros on saddles; each of these symbols had been
closely associated with imperial power under both the Liao and the Song.
In 1314, for the same reason, the Yuan court restricted the portrayal of
five-clawed dragons to imperial robes. In other words, where textiles
were concerned Mongol sovereigns were mindful of artistic conventions
that had a bearing on the imperial prerogative.

It would be rash to discount the possible value of art also, in many
instances, as visual propaganda. Indeed, it has been proposed that the new-
found salience of book painting reflects the need of ‘hitherto stubbornly
alien rulers’ to express ‘a new and public commitment to the religious and
cultural heritage’ of Iran. Such commitment did not necessarily have to
wait for the adoption of Islam. We shall notice later (p. 327) Abagha’s enthu-
siasm for the depiction at Takht-i Sulaymān of themes from the Shāh-nāma
that implied the assumption of the Ilkhan into the venerable tradition of
Iranian kingship. But the bulk of the evidence from which we might infer
Ilkhanid engagement postdates Ghazan’s acceptance of Islam. The
Edinburgh manuscript of the Arabic text of Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmi’
'al-tawārīkh may well furnish a prime example of miniatures as a propagan-
distic device. Like other large-folio manuscripts of the work, this was
designed to reach a wide public audience and was illustrated on a lavish
scale. The monarch and the warriors are always depicted with Mongol
features, even in illustrations that relate to some event in the pre-Mongol or
the still more remote pre-Islamic past. The themes encapsulated in many of
the miniatures are of a kind calculated to remind the reader of some impor-
tant facts: violence, whether the violence of conquest or that which sanc-
tioned the monarch’s writ; the authority and grandeur of the monarch
enthroned; and at the same time the monarch’s Islamic allegiance. Öljeitū
– and Ghazan before him – would assuredly have approved of the message.
The fact that some of the miniatures portray the Prophet in person suggests
that the initiative in these cases came from a non-Muslim or, perhaps, a
recent convert with a limited grasp of Muslim sensitivities. But how far the
miniatures as a whole owed their origin to a specific Ilkhanid directive
remains a matter of surmise.
The limits of cultural diffusion

The earlier sections of this chapter examined the constraints on transcontinental trade. The diffusion of ideas and techniques across Mongol Asia, while spared the same obstacles, had its limitations too, although the growth of Muslim knowledge about the Far East, for instance, and of other intellectual traditions continued apace following the conversion of the Ilkhans. The most obvious limitation is the failure of Chinese-style paper money – and hence printing – to establish itself in Iran. But generally, as Allsen remarks in his seminal work, the elusive character of the evidence precludes investigating the question of receptivity or rejection.209 Any bid to ascertain how extensive these transcontinental contacts were, and how far-reaching their repercussions, can elicit only a patchy and incomplete response. One question that requires consideration, but defies an answer, is whether the growing sense of 'Iranian-ness' (below, pp. 325–7) militated against an openness to extraneous ideas and practices. However that may be, in the field of intellectual inquiry we should, I think, be wary of exaggerating what flowed from the interconnectedness of a large part of Eurasia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Of the fact that cultural encounter took place there can be no doubt. What is sometimes less certain is the reality of cultural transmission – of significant impact by extraneous knowledge on the host culture. The dynamic operated at two stages: firstly, in the way in which those responsible for welcoming and translating new works presented them; and secondly, in the dissemination of the translated texts thereafter.

We should begin with historical writing and notice the limited degree to which Rashīd al-Dīn’s successors, both in the later Ilkhanid era and beyond, trod in his footsteps. They borrowed extensively from the Ta’rīkh-i mubārak-i Ghāzānī, in other words Part I of his Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh, the sections devoted to the Mongols, as if they accepted the idea that the whole of Chinggisid history was an integral part of the history of Iran or of Islam. But apart from Banākatī, who incorporated in his work a summary of Part II, they display no interest in Rashīd al-Dīn’s histories of other peoples.210 The qualifications to be made are relevant particularly in the fields of medicine and astronomy, where – in contrast with the arts, for instance – the hegemony of an existing intellectual system militated against innovation from outside.211 The fact that the Tanksūq-nāma survives in only one manuscript suggests that it hardly circulated within the Ilkhanid dominions; we have just a hint that Byzantine physicians were familiar with it.212 Moreover, even Rashīd al-Dīn (and perhaps also the Muslim scholars who worked with him) operated within certain ideological confines. The
Chinese system of medicine, closely bound in with the concepts of two principles (\textit{yin/yang}) inherent in opposing cosmic forces and of the ‘Five Phases’ (\textit{wuxing}), differed fundamentally from the Galenic system in vogue within the Islamic world, which was based on the humours. Recent scholarship on the \textit{Tanksūq-nāma} has demonstrated how Rashīd al-Dīn’s team of experts faithfully reproduced numerous images that they found within their Chinese models but detached them from the distinctively Chinese cosmological system that underpinned those models. As a result, they failed to impart an authentic picture of Chinese medical theory. Central to Chinese practice was the concept of \textit{qi} (‘breath,’‘vital essence’) as emanating from the natural environment and strongly affecting bodily health; the diagrams that the \textit{Tanksūq-nāma} borrowed from Chinese sources were designed to illustrate this process. Yet the \textit{Tanksūq-nāma} seems to have hijacked the material, by translating this Chinese term as ‘blood’ and merely employing the diagrams to present the traditional Galenic view of the circulation of the blood.\textsuperscript{213} The choice made by Rashid al-Dīn’s team of scholars may have been determined in part by the fact that the Mongols themselves reinterpreted \textit{qi} as a life force within the blood.\textsuperscript{214} The failure to engage fully with an alien, non-Muslim tradition of scholarship is still less surprising, given Rashīd al-Dīn’s vulnerability to the charge that his own conversion to Islam was a sham (see pp. 375, 379–80).

At the level of theory, Iranian physicians at large – whether Muslim or Nestorian Christian – remained wedded to their Galenic heritage. But a debt to China is nevertheless discernible in the sphere of pharmacology and therapeutic techniques. The cathartic properties of rhubarb, a plant native to the Gansu (Tangut) region and northern Tibet, were already familiar to the Islamic world of the tenth and eleventh centuries, but its use appears to have intensified during the Mongol era. Cubebs (grown in southern China) and white pepper were also in high demand among Muslim physicians by Rashīd al-Dīn’s time.\textsuperscript{215} On the other hand, it remains to be established precisely what impact Chinese concepts of pulse diagnosis had on existing techniques of pulse-taking within Western Asia.\textsuperscript{216} As Rossabi has emphasized, familiarity with the Chinese literature did not translate into the wholesale adoption of Chinese medical and pharmacological practices: Chinese medicines were used merely to complement some of the existing treatments.\textsuperscript{217}

Parallel conclusions can be reached regarding the Chinese contribution to Muslim astronomy. The members of Ṭūsī’s impressive \textit{équipe} – the ‘Marāgha School’ of astronomers, to use the term coined by the late E. S. Kennedy\textsuperscript{218} – were concerned to resolve the contradictions long seen to be
inherent in Ptolemy’s *Almagest*, which described the supposed uniform circular motion of celestial bodies by means of mathematical models that did not allow for it. But in general, even though they were prepared to iron out inconsistencies and to make emendations to the Ptolemaic planetary model, they remained loyal to the geocentric tradition they had inherited from Ptolemy. Of the Muslim colleagues named in Ṭūsī’s introduction to his *Zīj*, it was Mu’ayyad al-Dīn al-‘Urḍī (d. 664/1265–6) who was responsible for the most revolutionary advances, in his *Kitāb al-hay‘a* (‘Book of Astronomy’) – a work, however, that dates from before 657/1259 (and hence prior to the author’s move from Damascus to Marāgha), when there could have been no question of indebtedness to Chinese astronomical principles. George Saliba has shown that Qūṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī in turn took his model for the movement of the planets (except Mercury) from al-‘Urḍī. Only in the production of calendars, it seems, did Chinese practice have an impact. Despite the strictures of al-Wâbkanawī, Ṭūsī’s *Zīj-i īlkhānī*, incorporating as it did Chinese terminology and a Chinese calendar, continued to be utilized, and served as the model for a series of *zījes* produced in the eastern Islamic world (including the *Zīj-i sultānī* ascribed to the Timurid Ulugh Beg) down into the seventeenth century.

The collaboration that occurred among scholars or artists of widely differing backgrounds varied considerably in its impact. Although the Marāgha observatory had a relatively brief life, being in a dilapidated condition even by the time Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī wrote (c. 1340), the activities of the ‘Marāgha School’ are pivotal by any criterion. Not merely did they contribute to what was a new ‘golden age’ of Islamic astronomy, but their achievements would in turn inform much of the work of Copernicus in the early sixteenth century. But the most fertile collaboration here went on between Muslims rather than between Muslims and their Chinese counterparts. Overall, it does not seem unfair to suggest that some of the contacts we have noticed between representatives of the cultures of Islam and of the Far East are more exciting for the fact that they occurred at all than for any significant or lasting results that they brought in their wake.
MEDIATED SOVEREIGNTY
The Client Muslim Kingdoms

In certain of the sedentary regions of their vast empire the Mongols governed indirectly. They were willing to maintain local princes on their thrones, in return for an acknowledgement of Mongol sovereignty, loyal service and the remittance of a specified tribute. But they were not reluctant to create new dynasties should it prove expedient on fiscal or strategic grounds, as they did in Tibet, where the authority conferred on the Sa-skya abbot in the 1240s and on his nephew in Qubilai’s reign set them apart from the many other local powers and turned them effectively into viceroys.¹ In much the same way, some of the regimes that flourished under Mongol overlordship in the Islamic world were parvenu dynasties that owed their position especially to the conquerors’ favour; the most prominent examples are the Qutlughkhanid dynasty in Kirmān and the Kurtids in Herat. My aim here is not to survey the history of the various client states, which, in relation to south-west Asia at least, has been covered elsewhere,² but rather to illustrate the impact of Mongol overlordship upon subject Muslim rulers. We are, as usual, more fully informed about such local powers in the tracts that came to constitute the Ilkhanate.

The Qipchaq khanate and Central Asia

There is no evidence for the existence of any local Muslim princes within the Jochid territories – counterparts, as it were, of the prolific Riurikid princes in Rus’. Here the two chief sedentary Muslim states had been eliminated. Batu’s armies destroyed the Bulghār polity on the middle Volga in 1237; Khwārazm had come under direct Mongol authority from the time of Chinggis Khan’s invasion. Yet Juwaynī speaks of an unnamed malik of
Khwārazm in the 1230s, presumably appointed by the conquerors (and required to work alongside the Mongol basqaq); he is not heard of again.

More evidence exists for the survival of local rulers in Chaghadaï’s ulus, at least during the first few decades. Juwaynī names Sāyin Malik Shāh as malik of Bukhārā in the late 1230s, and tells us that Möngke installed at Üzkand (probably the town of that name in Farghāna) a son of Arslan Khan of Qayaligh. According to the same author, Chinggis Khan’s ally Sighnāq-tegin (p. 90) ruled at Almaligh until his death in 651/1253–4 and was succeeded by his son; Jamāl al-Qarshī shows the line continuing here – so close to one of the principal centres of Chaghadaï’s ulus – until at least 673/1274–5. Epigraphic and literary evidence reveals other Muslim princes with Turkish names or titles ruling at Talas, Shāsh (modern Tashkent), Khujand, Üzkand and Khotan. Rashīd al-Dīn mentions a certain Malik Naṣīr al-Dīn Kāshgharī, whose annual remittance of funds to Qaidu suggests that he was the local ruler in Kāshghar. It is fair to assume that the rulers of Kāshghar and Khotan, at least, situated as they were in the frontier region between Qaidu and the qaghan’s territories, had difficulty in manoeuvring between the two Mongol potentates: Qubilai ultimately executed Naṣīr al-Dīn Kāshgharī. Otherwise, we do not know what relations such rulers enjoyed with the Chaghadayid khans and with Qaidu, and whether any belonged to dynasties that went back to the pre-Mongol era, apart from the rulers of Almaligh (and even they were of recent date). Although Shabānkāra’ī says that the descendants of a certain ’Alī Khwāja, who had been appointed as malik of Jand at the time of its conquest by Jochi, still ruled there, it is uncertain whether any of the Muslim princely lines mentioned above survived into the fourteenth century. We do know, however, that members of the prestigious Āl-i Burhān, the dynasty of ṣadrs of Bukhārā, who had served the Qara-Khitai (above, p. 58), still held exalted office in Transoxiana in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

The subject principalities in the Ilkhanid lands

In the Ilkhanid territories we know far more about the client dynasties, owing in no small measure to the fact that so many were commemorated in local histories. On the far western fringes of the Mongol world, the Saljuqid state in Rūm, occupying a region that had long attracted pastoral nomads, had survived the crushing defeat at Kösedagh in 641/1243 in an enfeebled condition. At the time of Hülegü’s westward advance in 654/1256 Baiju, as we have seen (p. 126), was ordered to take up his quarters in Anatolia. It was
through Baiju’s good offices that Mu’īn al-Dīn Sulaymān, the son of Kaykhusraw II’s wazir, became seal-keeper (parwāna) to Qilich Arslan IV and the real ruler of the Sultanate for over two decades.11 After the Parwāna’s execution on Abagha’s orders in 676/1277, Saljuq Sultans continued to reign under Mongol control until the opening years of the fourteenth century; though by that date they were shadowy figures and much of their territory had been appropriated by former Saljuq amirs and the chiefs of upstart Türkmen and other groups, of whom the Ottomans are the most celebrated.

Two regimes in Mesopotamia – the short-lived dynasty founded by Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’ at Mosul and the Artuqid branch at Mayyāfāriqīn – were eliminated in 1260–2 as a penalty for revolt. Yet Hülegū immediately conferred Mayyāfāriqīn and, slightly later, Arzan on an officer of the last Ayyubids,12 and further permitted the survival of various dynasties that had demonstrated their loyalty. We are told, interestingly, that he showed compassion for al-Muwaḥḥid ʿAbd-Allāh (d. 692/1293), a son of Tūrān Shāh, the last Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt, who had been left as ruler at Ḥiṣn Kayfā when his father travelled to Egypt to assume the sovereignty in 647/1249 and who now retained his principality through prompt submission13 – the first of a line of subject princes that lasted until its dispossession in the mid-fifteenth century by the Āq Qūyūnlū and was commemorated in a history of the Ayyubids composed a few decades earlier by an anonymous author.14 As we saw (p. 130), the Artuqid prince of Mārdīn, al-Muẓaffar, surrendered his city to Hülegū’s forces following the death of his father al-Saʿīd. This principality survived down to 811/1408, when its last Artuqid ruler exchanged Mārdīn for Mosul with the Qarā Qūyūnlū.15 There also seems to have been a dynasty of hereditary maliks at Isʿird.16

In north-western Iran, the Eldegüzid state in Azerbaijan and Arrān – territories that became the favoured headquarters of the first Mongol military governors, Chormaghun and Baiju, and later of the Ilkhans – had collapsed in 622/1225 under pressure from Jalāl al-Dīn. After his murder in 628/1231, the Mongols restored the Eldegüzid line, installing at Tabrīz first a son of Özbeg named Khāmūsh and subsequently the latter’s son Nuṣrat al-Dīn.17 Other rulers in this region who survived the advent of the Mongols included the Shīrwānshāhs, of whose small state little is known during the Mongol era beyond the monarchs’ names and the fact that Hülegū put to death the Shīrwānshāh Akhsitān in 658/1260,18 and Christian dynasts like the Georgian kings, the king of Lesser (Cilician) Armenia and the various princes in Greater Armenia. In the Caspian territory of Gilān, a problematic region for Mongol cavalry, the petty princes remained effectively independent, defying successive Ilkhanid incursions.19
In southern Iran, certain dynasties remained in place for many decades. Examples are the Salghurids (543–684/1148–1285), of Türkmen (probably Oghuz) stock, in Fārs, the Hazaraspids of Greater Luristān (c. 536–696/ c. 1141–1297), and the ruling dynasty of Kirmān, known to historians as the Qutlughkhanids (c. 623–704/c. 1226–1305). The first two had held power since the time of the Great Saljuqs; other dynasties would even outlast the Ilkhans themselves, as did the atabegs of Lesser Luristān and the Kurdish princes of Shabānkāra. The circumstances in which these southern rulers entered into subjection varied. In Fārs the atabeg Abū Bakr b. Sa’d took the initiative in sending his nephew Tahamtan to Ögödei’s court and undertaking to pay tribute, a step for which (like his neighbour Baraq Ḫājib of Kirmān) he was rewarded with the title Qutlugh Khan but for which he is roundly condemned by Jūzjānī.20 Shabānkāra’ī’s phrasing seems to indicate that the atabeg Quṭb al-Ｄīn Maḥmūd Shāh of Yazd likewise yielded of his own volition.21 Among the tasks that Möngke gave Hülegü was the reduction of the Lurs and the Kurds. In Lesser Luristān the Mongols found an ally to ease the path of submission, just as they had in Sīstān (pp. 90–1): the atabeg Badr al-Ｄīn Mas’ūd, confronted by enemies who enjoyed caliphal backing, reacted by seeking Mongol assistance and acknowledging the qaghan’s overlordship.22 But Shabānkāra, which had sent gifts to Ögödei, later refused to supply troops for the Baghdad campaign and was subjected to a Mongol attack. Its atabeg, Muḥaffar al-Ｄīn Muḥammad, was killed during an investment of his capital by Hülegü’s general Ötegü China early in Ṣafar 658/in mid-January 1260 and the dead ruler’s son Quṭb al-Ｄīn Mubāriz was installed as his successor.23

The acceptance of Mongol overlordship in the south not only promised ample new sources of tribute, derived from the commercial wealth of the coastal regions (see pp. 223–4), but greatly extended the imperial horizons beyond the Persian Gulf. The power of the Salghurid atabeg Abū Bakr (r. 623–59/1226–61) was acknowledged over a vast maritime tract, beginning with the islands of Qays (Kīsh) and Qaṭīf, just off the northern shores of the Gulf, and continuing through Bahrain on its southern side to Kanbhāya (Cambay) in Gujarat in north-western India, where the Muslim mercantile community made the khutba in his name and the Hindu king allegedly accepted a shihna from Fārs and forwarded annually an agreed sum in tribute. According to both Rashīd al-Ｄīn and, a few decades later, Ibn Zarkūb, the atabeg’s authority was recognized in other parts of India also. This doubtless amounted to little more than his mention in the public prayer to indicate the importance that the local Muslim community attached to commercial relations24 (and perhaps, too, the despatch of gifts
by infidel princes eager to promote them); but Abū Bakr’s diplomas styled him grandiloquently ‘Heir to Solomon’s empire, Sultan by land and by sea’. The atabeg’s loose hold on the islands did not go unchallenged; Hurmuz at least was subject to Kirmān. Yet the prestige of such a vassal might be deemed to carry imperial rule into regions far beyond the reach of Mongol cavalry, and the penumbra of the qaghan’s authority (and, from the 1260s, that of the Ilkhan) could thus appear to sweep effortlessly across the waters of the Arabian Sea.

To the east of Khurāsān, in the Indian borderlands, Jūzjānī reveals that various potentates accepted Mongol authority. The first was the one-time Khwarazmian officer, Ḥasan Qarluq, the ruler of Binbān (west of the middle Indus), who acknowledged Ögödei’s overlordship following a Mongol invasion in 632/1234–5; his son and successor, Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad, was similarly a Mongol satellite. Jalāl al-Dīn Mas’ūd, a brother of the Delhi Sultan Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. ILTUTMISH (r. 644–64/1246–66), fled to the qaghan’s headquarters when threatened by his enemies at court and returned with a Mongol army under Sali Noyan, which installed him in Lahore and the western Punjab (in or before 650/1252, in all likelihood). Kūshlū Khan, who governed Sind on the Delhi Sultan’s behalf, travelled in person to Hülegü’s headquarters, requested a Mongol shiḥna and brought a Mongol force into his province in 655/1257. Sultan Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd himself, lastly, is known to have received envoys from Hülegü in 658/1260, as a result of which Sali was strictly instructed not to permit his troops to encroach upon Delhi territory. I have suggested elsewhere that Jūzjānī’s account of this episode is an attempt to camouflage what was in reality an act of submission to the Mongols. For the period that followed, when Jūzjānī had ceased writing, we have only meagre information on these tracts, but Ilkhanid influence here appears to have been short-lived. Although Hülegü executed Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad of Binbān on suspicion of treachery (658/1260), his territory surely passed into the hands of the Negüderi Mongols within a few years, while Lahore and Sind were annexed in the 1260s by the Delhi Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balaban.

New dynasties

Some of the subject dynasties were of very recent date. The Qutlughkhanids were descended from two Qara-Khitai officers formerly in the service of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, Baraq Ḥājib (‘the Chamberlain’) and his brother Khamīd-pūr. At the time of Jalāl al-Dīn’s re-emergence from India in 621/1224, Baraq, who had obtained the title of Qutlugh Khan from the
prince’s half-brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn, had deserted him and was investing the town of Guwāshīr (later called Kirmān), which formed part of Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s appanage. Defying Jalāl al-Dīn also, until obliged to go through the forms of submission, he subsequently gave asylum to Ghiyāth al-Dīn and married the prince’s mother, only to have mother and son strangled when some of his followers alerted Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s suspicions. Baraq Ḥājib obtained from the ’Abbasid Caliph recognition of his authority over Kirmān, with the style of Qutlugh Sultān; but he was sufficiently opportunistic to submit to Ögödei, who confirmed his title of Qutlugh Khan. He offered to conduct a campaign against Sīstān on the Mongols’ behalf and allegedly (and belatedly) forwarded Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s head to the qaghan (632/1235); though in the event he died before his envoys returned from Mongolia.31

The Kurtid rulers of Herat were likewise in some degree a creation of Mongol patronage. In, or just before, 651/1253, the newly enthroned Qaghan Möngke conferred on the founder of the dynasty, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 676/1278), the governorship of Herat, ‘Sīstān’ (probably in its alternative sense of Ghūr and neighbouring districts), Balkh and ‘all that area in the direction of India’.32 Shams al-Dīn’s father, Abū Bakr Kurt (or possibly Abū Bakr-i Kurt),33 is very probably identical with the Abū Bakr appointed by Tolui to rule Herat in 618/1221 alongside the Mongol commander Mengütei as shīhna: both men were murdered in the rising that followed the news of the Khwarazmian Jalāl al-Dīn’s victory at Parwān.34 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad would claim in a petition to Möngke that he governed Ghūr and the stronghold of Khaysār by virtue of a diploma (yarlıgh) from Chinggis Khan himself.35 Yet back in the mid-1220s these districts were under the rule of Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad, who must have been acting on the Mongols’ behalf and who may have been Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad’s maternal uncle.36 Rukn al-Dīn’s own father is alleged by Sayfī to have been ‘Izz al-Dīn ’Umar, one-time governor of Herat for the Ghurids, but is called ‘Uthmān by Jūzjānī, who served Rukn al-Dīn on various diplomatic missions.37 This renders Jūzjānī a more trustworthy source than Sayfī, clearly bent on fashioning grander antecedents for both Rukn al-Dīn and his nephew. But it is uncertain whether Rukn al-Dīn or Abū Bakr was the ‘Rukn al-Dīn Kurt’ of whom Juwaynī tells us that he received a yarligh of some sort from Chinggis Khan.38 In any event, we have no evidence that Shams al-Dīn’s forebears (other than Abū Bakr briefly, perhaps) had exercised authority in Herat itself prior to the 1240s, when he first appears as the city’s ruler.39

It is unclear how the Mihrabanid dynasty came to power in Sīstān following the Mongols’ capture of its capital and their killing of its king, Tāj
al-Dīn Yinaltegin, in 632/1235–6. But the new king, Shams al-Dīn ‘Alī b. Mas‘ūd, who secured oaths of allegiance from the grandees in Ramaḍān 633/May–June 1236 and who claimed descent from the one-time ruling dynasty of the Saffarids, spent just two or three years in subjugating the region before travelling to Ögödei’s court in 636/1238–9 to receive confirmation of his title and possessions. Whatever his origins, he thereby became the Mongols’ own nominee. He was killed by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad of Herat in 653/1255, and his son and successor spent the next decade or more fending off Kurtid encroachments. Sīstān soon escaped from the Ilkhanid orbit, since its malik repelled various Ilkhanid invasions and sent his son to occupy Quhistān, and the fifteenth-century histories of Yazd describe the kingdom as not subject (iḍ) to Ghazan.

The phenomenally extensive grant made to the Kurtid ruler effectively established him as a high-king over a host of lesser maliks throughout eastern Khurāsān. For the Ilkhans, Herat became an especially strategic location. A favourably disposed regime there was necessary in view of the semi-autonomous status of the neighbouring kingdom of Sīstān and, beyond it, the Negüderi (or Qara'unas) Mongols. It was especially vital, moreover, once the Ilkhans were confronted after 664/1266 with a hostile Mongol power in Transoxiana, since the city was the key to the whole of Khurāsān. Successive Chaghadayid invaders had to negotiate their passage through the province by dealing with the Kurtids, as Baraq Khan did in 668/1270. The renegade prince Yasa’ur sought to do the same thing, equally without success, in 718–20/1318–20.

Iran: north and south

A distinction is often drawn between two contrasting zones in Iran: the south, characterized by higher temperatures and less suited to the needs of pastoralists, where regional dynasties retained some authority, albeit now answerable to the qaghan or, later, to the Ilkhan; and the north, where much of the terrain comprised desirable grasslands, where after 1260 the newly installed Ilkhanid regime, vulnerable to attack by its Mongol rivals, established its base and where the powers in existence in Chinggis Khan’s time had largely been swept away. And certainly a parallel suggests itself with the Far East, where the conquerors tolerated and made use of local regimes in the steppe borderlands during what Rashīd al-Dīn labels ‘the age of petty kings (mulūk-i ṭawā’if)’ but suppressed them during the final campaigns against the Jin, while permitting client rulers in non-steppe regions such as Korea and Tibet to survive.
The distinction may be less apposite in the Iranian context, however, for here the Mongols often do not appear to have dispensed with local princes even in the north-west. A malik of Qazwīn makes a fleeting appearance in 642/1244–5; a malik of Qum was put to death in Möngke’s reign by a Mongol commander (who was then executed by Arghun Aqa); and a malik of Hamadān is mentioned in 660/1262 and 694/1295.\(^{45}\) In the context of Arghun Aqa’s governorship and Möngke’s accession, Juwaynī alludes mysteriously to ‘Ṣadr al-Dīn, malik of all Arrān and Azerbaijan’.\(^{46}\) At the instance of hostile elements, he appears to have been supplanted by the Eldegüzid Nuṣrat al-Dīn but restored following Möngke’s enthronement.\(^{47}\) He is in all likelihood identical with the ‘Malik Ṣadr al-Dīn of Tabrīz’ who was active under Hülegū and confirmed in possession of that city on the accession of Abagha. Having fallen under suspicion of harbouring Jochid sympathies in c. 1262, he received a few lashes. His authority was possibly curtailed when Hülegū conferred Arrān and Azerbaijan on his own son Yoshmut;\(^{48}\) but Ṣadr al-Dīn was nevertheless succeeded in 668/1269–70 by his son ‘Imād al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 676/1277–8).\(^{49}\) The subsequent history of these maliks is unknown. Another Ṣadr al-Dīn, malik of Rayy, is said to have been martyred in 671/1273, and a local dynasty of maliks ruling over this territory from their base at Warāmīn by the 1260s survived into the fourteenth century.\(^{50}\) Writing in the twilight years of the Ilkhanate, al-’Umarī was under the impression that Simnān had its own ruler (ṣāhib).\(^{51}\) The Ṣafwat al-ṣafā, composed c. 1358 but retailing anecdotes from as early as the lifetime of Shaykh Zāhid (d. 700/1301), mentions at least one malik, ruling over Khalkhāl, a substantial district, and hence clearly not to be written off as merely some local landowner.\(^{52}\)

In north-eastern Iran, prized by the Mongols, like the north-west, for its ample grazing-grounds, there were similarly a number of local maliks: Ikhtiyār al-Dīn of Abīward, for instance, ‘Umdat al-Mulk Sharaf al-Dīn of Bisṭām, and the malik of Quhistān whose death in 666/1267–8 is mentioned by Ibn al-Fuwaṭī.\(^{53}\) The most favoured of all, it seems, during the early decades were the ispahbadh (military chief) Nuṣrat al-Dīn of Kabūd-jāma, in Māzandarān, and Bahā’ al-Dīn of Su’lūk, in Khurāsān. We saw earlier (p. 90) how the ruler of Kabūd-jāma had benefited from Mongol assistance in retrieving his principality from the dying embers of the Khwarazmian empire. In 630/1232–3 the two men became the first maliks from west of the Oxus, we are told, to make the journey to Ögödei’s court. The gratified Qaghan rewarded them by conferring on Nuṣrat al-Dīn ‘all the territory from the border of Kabūd-jāma to beyond Astarābād’ and making Bahā’ al-Dīn ‘malik of Khurāsān, namely Isfarāyīn, Juwayn, Jājarm, Jūrbad and Arghiyān.\(^{54}\)
Bahā’ al-Dīn was succeeded by his brother Niẓām al-Dīn;55 but of the malik of Kabūd-jāma we hear nothing further. It is possible either that these local regimes came to grief in the confrontation between Batu’s representatives and those of Ögödei and Güyük in the 1240s, as did the malik of Kālyūn (above, p. 121), or that they failed to survive Hülegü’s arrival, his violent clash with the Jochids and the emergence of the Ilkhanate after 1260. We might have equated many of these figures with governors;56 but the position was often hereditary, rendering their status hardly distinguishable from that of the Kurtids or Qutlughkhanids and possibly indicating that the Mongols oversaw the birth of other new dynasties. In any event, whether maliks or governors, they were alike vulnerable to the whims of their overlords.

The burdens and benefits of vassalage57

The Saljuq historian Ibn Bībī reproduces the account by one Shams al-Dīn ‘Umar Qazwīnī of his visit in 633/1236 to the court of ’Alā’ al-Dīn Kayqubād, the Sultan of Rūm. Qazwīnī, a trader in precious stones who had entered Ögödei’s service, carried a yarligh from the Qaghan commending Kayqubād’s just rule but expressing the sinister hope that it would not prove necessary to attack and devastate his territories. In response to the Sultan’s enquiries, Qazwīnī urged him to submit to the Mongols. Their yoke, he declared, was an easy one: they demanded only the annual despatch of fine garments, horses, and gold in small quantities. Kayqubād shortly died (3 Shawwāl 634/30 May 1237); but his son and successor, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw II, sent back Qazwīnī with gifts and a message of submission. Although detained for a few months by the Assassins in northern Iran, the party was able to proceed through the intervention of the Mongol general Chormaghun and to deliver the Saljuq Sultan’s missive.58 But Qazwīnī’s bland assurances could hardly have prepared Kaykhusraw either for Baiju’s onslaught seven years or so later or for the realities of vassalage to the Mongols.

Surviving Mongol ultimatums, of which the majority are addressed to Western European rulers, are generally vague. Güyük dismissed Carpini in 1246 with a letter in which the Pope and ‘the kings’ were summoned to express their submission in person at his court and to hear ‘every command that there is of the Yasa.’59 But the decrees sent to the Koryŏ kingdom between 1232 and 1268 furnish a more detailed summary of the obligations of ‘newly attached states’: the ruler was to forward tribute, send hostages, submit population registers, establish post-stations, raise troops and...
supplies to support the Mongol military effort, appear in person at the
imperial court and accept the presence of a Mongol representative (darugh-
achi or basqaq). Similar stipulations appear in Qubilai’s letter to the king of
Annam (modern Vietnam) in 1267.

Sources that report the arrival of ultimatums in the Near East cite other
specific demands, notably the destruction of fortifications, as in the missives
sent to the Frankish Prince Bohemond V of Antioch in 1244 and to Shihāb
al-Dīn Ghāzī of Mayyāfāriqīn a few years earlier. The latter’s son, al-Kāmil,
would be upbraided (and executed) in 658/1260 for having, inter alia, disre-
garded Hülegü’s command to raze the walls of Āmid. The destruction of
city walls often followed closely on a Mongol military victory or a ruler’s
peaceful submission. Thus the walls and towers of the citadel of Damascus
were demolished when it capitulated in 1260. Waṣṣāf tells us that in accord-
ance with an imperial edict (yarligh), elchīs had travelled throughout Fārs
and had seen to the demolition of all the fortresses except Qal’a-yi Safid,
preserved intact at the atabeg’s request. In Sīstān, whose ruler had recently
waited upon Ögödei, a Mongol commander, flanked by the local malik, saw
to the destruction of the fortress of Ispahbadh in 639/1242. And in Sind,
where Küshlī Khan had submitted, Sali’s forces in 655/1257 dismantled the
walls of Uchch and Multān. According to Simon de Saint-Quentin, the
Mongols further prohibited subject princes from employing contingents of
Frankish mercenaries like those hitherto maintained in Rūm by Kaykhusraw
II – a kind of Saljuqid Varangian Guard.

Subject princes also had to accept the presence of basqaqs, who moni-
tored their activities, conducted the census and forwarded the tribute to the
centre. The number appears to have varied. The Mongols appointed three
shiḥnas (basqaqs) for Mārdīn, and probably made similar arrangements
for each of the petty states in the region; but they also maintained a governor
at Mosul, who had overall responsibility for the Jazīra, at least until 702/1303
when it was transferred to the client ruler of Mārdīn (below, p. 257). Waṣṣāf
refers to basqaqs in the plural when praising the foresight of the
atabeg Abū Bakr of Fārs, who granted them an appropriate residence
outside Shirāz and provided for their needs, but took up his own quarters
close by and prevented any of the populace from going there, so that nobody
might ascertain the subaltern status of his kingdom. On the eve of the
atabeg Saljūq Shāh’s revolt in 661/1263, there were two basqaqs in Fārs,
Oghulbeg and Qutlugh Bitikchi. Both men, together with Qutlugh Bitikchi’s
wife, children and household, were among the first victims of the rising.

We have already noticed the incidence of tribute in kind (p. 111). Figures for such cash sums as were required are sparse. At the point where
submission was demanded in advance, the tribute may well have been set at a relatively low level and to have taken the form of a tenth, as demanded by Batu’s troops on their first appearance before the Rus’ city of Riazan in 1237.73 The fiscal burdens imposed on rulers who yielded of their own volition were lower than those incurred by the recalcitrant. The annual tribute sent to Ögödei’s court by Abû Bakr, the compliant atabeg of Fârs, was a mere 30,000 gold ruknî dinars, a sum that Waṣṣāf dismissively equates with the revenues of the meanest district of Shîrāz; although the atabeg despatched in addition a quantity of pearls and other precious objects.74 A good many princes, however, required some more forceful demonstration of Mongol military might and had to surrender a larger proportion of their wealth. In the wake of the defeat at Kösedagh (641/1243), Kaykhusraw II and his successors were obliged to forward annually to the Mongol army in Mūghān 1,200,000 hyperpera (the hyperperon was the Byzantine gold coin, known also as the ‘bezent’), 500 horses, 500 camels, 5,000 sheep and 500 pieces of silk brocade; the gifts sent in addition were allegedly of the same value or greater.75

Two different episodes highlight the fact that the tribute levels were by no means static. When Hülegü divided the Rûm Sultanate between the brothers ’Izz al-Dîn Kaykāwûs and Rukn al-Dîn Qilîch Arslân sixteen years later, in 657/1259, the aggregate annual tribute was fixed at 2,000,000 (twenty tûmâns, presumably dinars), 500 pieces of silk brocade (nakh) and Damascene cloth (kamkhā), 3,000 hats trimmed with gold filigree, 500 horses and 500 mules:76 some of these quantities coincide with those demanded of their father, but the cash sum had possibly increased and the hats, apparently, had been substituted for the 5,000 sheep (to which the Mongol forces, quartered since 1256 within Anatolia, doubtless enjoyed more direct access).

Somewhat earlier, Ibn Shaddâd describes the arrival at Damascus in 649/1251 of envoys from Bâijû, accompanied by merchants. They brought edicts stipulating the amounts due from al-Nâşir Yûsuf and various other princes: 200,000 dinars each from al-Nâşir and from ’Izz al-Dîn of Rûm; 100,000 each from Bâdîr al-Dîn Lu’lû’ of Mosul, al-Sa’îd of Mârdîn, al-Kâmîl of Mayyâfârîqîn and the ruler of Jazîrât Ibn ’Umar; and 50,000 from the ruler of Huṣîn Kayfâ: these sums, described as ‘claims (ḥawâlāt)’ to be paid to the merchants, presumably indicate the annual tribute. The other princes had allegedly objected that since they made the khûfba in al-Nâşir’s name they could not undertake payment without his leave. Ibn Shaddâd urged al-Nâşir not to comply, on the grounds that in 643/1246 Gûyûg had relieved him of any obligation to pay tribute or supply troops. The relevant document
was located in Aleppo, and Ibn Shaddād was duly sent back with the Mongol envoys and the merchants to explain the position.77

What had transpired here is all the more difficult to grasp because we know nothing of Güyüg’s response to the embassies that al-Nāṣir and others had despatched to Mongolia as a result of the Mongol attack of 642/1244 (see p. 84).78 At first sight, it appears as if the Syrian princes had been duped by empty promises, and that Güyüg, or his lieutenants, had cynically exempted them from the usual burdens in the full knowledge that they could later be browbeaten into furnishing tribute and auxiliary forces. On the other hand, one of the criticisms of Güyüg’s regime was that he had been extravagant and had dissipated imperial resources. Nor was the newly elected Qaghan, Möngke, under any obligation to honour undertakings made by Güyüg (although he did satisfy his predecessor’s creditors: p. 119).

Among the more burdensome requirements was the quartering of Mongol garrison forces. Evidently the Christian King of Lesser Armenia, Het’um I, whom Möngke expressly relieved of this obligation as a reward for visiting his court in person in 1254, had been granted a rare privilege.79 The arrival of tamma troops added significant numbers of pastoralists to the existing nomadic population, which in Fārs, for instance, already comprised the Shabānkāra’ī Kurds and groups of Türkmen and Shūl, or as in Rūm, where the presence of Baiju’s contingents increased the opportunities for friction. And lastly, client princes were obliged to furnish contingents of their own for Mongol expansionist campaigns, for punitive action against rebels and for operations against other Mongol powers. As with Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’ (see p. 135), such service could well harmonize with their own ambitions or antipathies when the target was a rival neighbour or the hated Ismā’īlī Assassins. Shams al-Dīn Muhammad Kurt participated personally in Sali Noyan’s campaigns in India and in those of Hülegü against Berke in the Caucasus.80 The Mongol army that crushed the rebellion of Saljūq Shāh of Fārs in 1263 was strengthened by contingents from Kirmān and Luristān and by ‘Alā’ al-Dawla, atabeg of Yazd, and Niẓām al-Dīn Ḥasan, atabeg of Shabānkāra, at the head of their own troops; Niẓām al-Dīn perished in the fighting and ‘Alā’ al-Dawla died of his wounds.81 Sultan Ḥajjāj of Kirmān and the atabeg Yūsuf Shāh of Greater Luristān accompanied Abagha on campaign in Khurāsān against the Chaghadayid invaders in 668/1270, and Yūsuf Shāh rendered signal service during Abagha’s invasion of Gilān.82 In 698/1299 Sultan Najm al-Dīn of Mārdīn would bring troops and provisions in support of Ghazan’s first invasion of Mamlūk Syria.83 The sources from time to time hint at the inner sentiments of those princes who contributed troops for the Mongol assault on the
Caliphate. Hülegü executed the atabeg Takla of Greater Luristān for expressing too openly his repugnance at al-Musta’ṣim’s murder and the slaughter of Muslims.84 Rashīd al-Dīn tells us that Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, who had sent troops to assist Hülegü at Baghdad, wept when he was ordered to suspend the head of the caliphal general Sulaymān Shāh Ibn Barjam, a friend, from the city walls of Mosul; but he obeyed nevertheless, out of fear for his own life.85

In addition to keeping watch on subordinate princes through the intermediary of basqaqs, the Mongols tried to ensure their loyalty by rearing one of their sons, younger brothers or other male relatives at court and enrolling him in the royal guard (keshig), in much the same way that the sons and younger kinsmen of steppe military aristocrats had been recruited since Chinggis Khan’s rise to power. Thus the atabeg Abū Bakr of Fārs every year sent his son Sa’d (II) and a nephew to Ögödei’s court; Sa’d was a hostage at Hülegü’s headquarters at the time of his father’s death in 659/1261, and was to succeed him for a mere eighteen days, falling ill and dying on the way back to Shīrāz.86 The system was not merely a guarantee of good behaviour. If it failed in that purpose, certainly, the hostage might serve as a replacement for the rebellious ruler. But it was designed in addition to cement the hostage prince into the imperial edifice. More will be said on this subject below.

During the era of the united empire, many rulers expressed their submission to the qaghan through a high-ranking representative or made the long journey to Mongolia in order to do so in person. Carpini found no fewer than ten ‘sultans of the Saracens’ present in the imperial ordo in 1246, on the eve of Güyüg’s enthronement, though regrettably he does not specify who they were.87 We have already noted the despatch of envoys by Sultan al-Nāṣir Yūsuf of Aleppo, the Artuqid prince of Mārdīn and Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, the atabeg of Mosul. In the longer term, naturally, the Mongols were dissatisfied with anything but the presence of the ruler in person. Hülegü excused Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’ on account of his advanced age, but repeatedly demanded that al-Nāṣir Yūsuf should make the journey to his ordo and regarded his failure to comply as a mark of disloyalty. Yet a visit to the qaghan’s headquarters could be a dauntingly protracted affair. Al-Kāmil of Mayyāfāriqīn set out for Möngke’s court in the last part of 650/early in 1253 and arrived back at his capital on 12 Muḥarram 655/30 January 1257:88 he had therefore been absent for over four lunar years, at a time when territorial encroachment by a covetous neighbour like Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’ was an ever-present hazard.

Some vassal princes did not survive the journey. ’Alā’ al-Dīn Kayqubād II, the youngest of the three sons of Kaykhusraw II who ruled jointly over
Rûm, died at some point in the course of a visit to Möngke’s ordo in 655/1257, though at what stage is unclear. According to Ibn Bibi, he was found dead en route in mysterious circumstances by his amirs, and Baybars al-Manṣūri has Möngke enquiring about his death when the party reached his court; Bar Hebraeus charges with his murder the notables nominated to accompany him by his elder half-brother ’Izz al-Dîn Kaykâwuś II; and Ḥamd-Allâh Mustawfî, by contrast, heard that ’Alâ’ al-Dîn had been poisoned by his other half-brother, Ruḵn al-Dîn Qilîch Arslan IV, as he neared Rûm.89 Whatever the truth in this case, no Muslim ruler seems to have been eliminated through the Mongols’ contrivance during such a visit, as Carpini suspected in the case of the Rus’ Grand Prince Iaroslav (1246).90

For all the hazards, a journey to the court of the qaghan (or, subsequently, the Ilkhan) was likely to yield dividends. Mongol rulers particularly esteemed those princes who demonstrated their loyalty in this fashion; and the gesture served to unlock a trove of benefits that might have been denied to the less enterprising vassal. Enrolment among the Mongols’ tributaries was not purely a matter of onerous fiscal and military burdens; it also carried potential advantages. In the first place, it secured, in general, the endorsement of a prince’s status in the form of a tablet of authority (paiza), confirmation or extension of his territorial possessions and even, in certain cases, a sum of money. Such favours were of particular value, perhaps, to the parvenu rulers noticed above. In the case of Shams al-Dîn Muḥammad Kurt of Herat, who obtained all of these benefits from Möngke (for the considerable extension of his territory, see p. 247), the gift was what Thomas Allsen has aptly termed ‘seed money’ and was designed to entrench a loyal subordinate whose power was of recent date.91 Other rewards might include the bestowal of a princess from a prestigious dynasty that had been overthrown. A daughter of the Khwârazmshâh Jalâl al-Dîn whom Chormaghun had sent off to Mongolia at the age of two to be reared at Ögödei’s court, and who had later arrived back in Hülegü’s train, was given in 655/1257–8 to al-Ṣâliḥ Ismâ’îl in recognition of the faithful service of his father Badr al-Dîn Lu’lu’ (himself a slave who had usurped the throne of Mosul).92 To his own detriment, al-Ṣâliḥ was insufficiently gratified by this privilege to maintain Mosul’s tradition of loyalty towards the Mongols.

The Mongol sovereigns also fulfilled a role that might in the past have been exercised by the ’Abbasid Caliph, namely that of arbiter in disputes between their satellites or within a client prince’s family, though unlike the Caliph they were able to enforce their decisions through military power. When al-Kâmil of Mayyâfâriqîn arrived at Möngke’s court in 651/1253 and was embroiled in a quarrel over precedence with al-Muẓaffar, the son of
al-Sa‘īd of Mārdīn, and al-Ṣāliḥ b. Lu’lu’ of Mosul, the Qaghan asked each to describe the region under his authority; al-Kāmil secured a verdict in his favour, primarily, it seems, because his was the largest territory (rather than that he alone of the three was already a ruler). When Rukn al-Dīn Qilich Arslan IV visited his court in 644/1246, Güyük responded by awarding him the throne of Rūm and deposing his half-brother ‘Īzz al-Dīn Kaykāwūs II. Mongol arbitration among rival claimants sometimes led to shared sovereignty or even the partition of a client state. Güyük’s decree by no means put an end to the fraternal quarrels within Rūm, and in 1249 a compromise was reached whereby Kaykāwūs II and Qilich Arslan IV were to rule jointly. Then, in or soon after 655/1257 (and following the death of their youngest brother ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kayqubād), Hülegü divided the Sultanate between Kaykāwūs and Qilich Arslan, much as Güyük had divided the Georgian kingdom between two rival cousins, David IV and David V, in 1246. Authority in Lesser Luristān was twice shared between two members of its ruling dynasty, the first time on Abagha’s orders in 677/1278–9 and on a later occasion by Öljeiṭū. Tegüder Aḥmad, for his part, divided Rūm once more between competing candidates, Qilich Arslan’s son Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw III and his cousin Ghiyāth al-Dīn Mas‘ūd b. Kaykāwūs, freshly returned from a long exile in the Jochid realm.

A prince’s forced detention at Mongol headquarters might give rise to more dazzling opportunities. Afrāsiyāb of Greater Luristān, a hostage at Arghun’s court, obtained the Ilkhan’s āyarlagh appointing him as atabeg in succession to his father Yūsuf Shāh (685/1286–7), primarily, it seems, because of his friendship with the influential noyan Bolod Chingsang; his older brother Aḥmad replaced him as hostage. Baraq Ḥājib of Kirmān had sent his son Rukn al-Dīn Khwājachuq as a hostage to the Mongol imperial headquarters, where the Qaghan Ögödei issued him with a āyarlagh for the succession on his father’s death in 632/1235; he was duly enthroned in Kirmān in late Sha‘bān 633/early May 1236. In this case, the new ruler’s good fortune did not persist. His cousin Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad, whom Baraq Ḥājib had nominated as his successor and who now travelled to Mongolia, was for many years unable to secure a reversal of the decision. But following Möngke’s accession in 649/1251 he was successful. The reason, possibly, was that the new Qaghan saw Rukn al-Dīn as too close to the displaced Ögödeyid regime; Rukn al-Dīn, who had compounded his perceived ambivalence by vainly seeking refuge with the ‘Abbāsid Caliph in Baghdad, was handed over to his cousin for execution.

Grants of additional territory to pliant princes were common. Ögödei’s appreciative response to the arrival at his court of two maliks from Khurāsān
in the 1230s has already been mentioned. In 657/1259 Hülegü conferred Āmid, formerly in the hands of the rebellious prince of Mayyāfāriqīn, on the joint Sultans of Rūm. When al-Muẓaffar of Mārdīn capitulated in 659/1261, Hülegü added to his principality Naṣībīn, Khābūr, Ra’s al- ‘Ayn and Qarqīsiyya. The Artuqid princes of Mārdīn were particularly assiduous in serving Hülegū’s successors. Rashīd al-Dīn tells us that al-Muẓaffar’s younger son and second successor, al-Manṣūr Najm al-Dīn, gained such favour with the Ilkhan Ghazan that he was distinguished above his peers with the grant of a ceremonial parasol (chatr) and a royal diadem, given authority over the whole of Diyār Bakr and Diyār Rabi’ā, including Mosul, and promoted to the rank of Sultan.101

During the brief occupation of Syria by Hülegū’s forces in 1260, the Mongols reinstated Ayyubid princes who had been the victims of aggrandizement by their powerful kinsmen: al-Ashraf Mūsā, whom al-Nāṣir Yūsuf had deprived of Ḥimṣ but whose allegiance to the Mongols would last only until the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt, and al-Saʿīd Ḥasan of Bānyās, who would be executed by the Mamlūk Sultan for supporting the Mongols in that engagement (p. 132). The citizens of Rāwandān had surrendered to al-Mu’aẓẓam Tūrān Shāh, the son of al-Ṣāliḥ Ahmad (on whose death in 651/1253 it had been seized by his nephew, Sultan al-Nāṣir Yūsuf), and the Mongols further entrusted him with ‘Ayntāb, which had likewise been under al-Ṣāliḥ’s rule. His new-found prosperity was short-lived, however, since the Mongol forces retreating from Aleppo in 659/1261 took him with them back east and we know nothing of his subsequent career.102

It is noteworthy that in Syria Mongol openhandedness did not invariably work in favour of Muslim princes, for some Muslim populations were transferred to local Christian potentates. Following al-Nāṣir Yūsuf’s flight, Hülegū rewarded the Armenian King Het’um I and his Frankish son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch (later described by Ibn ’Abd al-Ẓāhir as ‘one of the chief supporters of the Tatars’), by conferring on each of them a tract that their predecessors had lost to the Ayyubids: Het’um received Darbsāk and Ra’bān, and Bohemond various districts in the Orontes valley (and possibly also Lattakiya/Laodicea).103 It was the misfortune of both rulers that these territorial grants brought down upon them the wrath of Baybars, against whom Ilkhanid favour would prove of little value.

**Chinggisid intermarriage with the subject dynasties**104

Dynastic marriage did not play a prominent part in the Chinggisids’ policy towards subject Muslim rulers, in contrast with their practice vis-à-vis the
womenfolk of vanquished dynasties such as the Khwārazmshāhs. The lists of wives and concubines supplied by Rashīd al-Dīn suggest that the khans much preferred to intermarry with the aristocracy of the Turkish and Mongol tribes, with the aim, presumably, of cementing ties with high-ranking military officers. The wives in question were often members of the ruling house of the Qongqurat (the family of Chinggis Khan’s own chief wife Börte), which virtually enjoyed the status of ‘consort clan’. Although the Yuan emperors gave daughters to subordinate kings, unions between male Chinggisids and women from the ruling dynasties of client states were less common. Chaghadai’s marriage to Baraḫ Ĥājīb’s eldest daughter Sevinch Terken, and that of his son (or grandson) Qadaqai to another Kirmān princess, appear to have been unusual, a gesture of distinction, perhaps, towards a ruler who at an early date had taken the initiative in submitting to the qaghan and in damaging the Khwarazmian cause.

In general, the Ilkhanids, of whom we know more than we do of their kinsmen apart from the Yuan, put greater restrictions on intermarriage with their vassals. Their daughters tended to be given in marriage to their Turco-Mongol military officers; only a few Ilkhanid princesses are known to have been bestowed upon local rulers, and Dr Judith Pfeiffer has suggested that such unions were designed to forge political alliances and were more often than not deliberately childless. Hülegū’s successors themselves seldom took partners from the subject Muslim dynasties, choosing their wives either from the ruling families of the Oyirat, Qongqurat and (later) Kereyit tribes or, less frequently, from the ranks of Yuan princesses. Prominent among the few Muslim princesses whom the pagan Ilkhans married were members of the Qutlughkhanid dynasty of Kirmān; we shall notice the complex web of relationships that resulted (below, pp. 259–60). Abagha married Pādishāh Khatun, a daughter of Sultan Ḏū’l-Dīn Muḥammad, and after his death she became the wife of his son Gaikhatu. Her half-sister Ordo Qutlugh was married to the future Ilkhan Baidu, who following her death in the early 1290s wed her niece, a daughter of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Soyurghatmish named Shāh ʿĀlam. The only other case of which we know is Arghun’s wife Saljūq Khatun, a daughter of Rūkn al-Dīn Qilīch Arslan IV, Sultan of Rūm. In addition, Abagha secured the hand of Ābish, the heiress of Fārs, for his brother Mengū Temūr, thus binding the Salghurid realm more closely to the Ilkhanid interest. The total figure for such marriages is surprisingly low: the known wives of Ilkhans included almost as many from Christian ruling houses, like Abagha’s wife ‘Despina Khatun’, the daughter of the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII. This may well be one aspect of the Chinggisids’ policy of maintaining a balance among the
various faiths represented in the empire (see chapter 11), and possibly the balance began to swing in favour of Muslim princesses in the wake of Ghazan’s conversion, since his brother Öljëitü is said to have married a daughter of the ruler of Mārdin.¹¹²

An enhanced role for Muslim princesses?

To what extent was the influence of elite women in steppe society, of which the Qara-Khitai offered the most conspicuous example (see p. 106), replicated at the level of the provincial Muslim dynasties that ruled under Mongol suzerainty? In some measure the respect afforded to high-ranking women had, at an earlier date, been carried over into Muslim territories conquered by recently Islamized groups from the steppe. Saljuqid royal women had their own revenues and personal retinues of slaves; a princess, especially if she had a son eligible for the throne, could often draw upon her personal slaves and links with the military to acquire a preponderant role in government.¹¹³ The exalted status of Terken Khatun, who effectively ruled Khwārazm alongside her son, the Khwārazmshâh Muḥammad b. Tekish (see pp. 60–1), attests to the abiding vigour of this Inner Asian tradition within a Muslim state that bordered immediately on the Qipchaq steppe and was subject to Qara-Khitai overlordship. Both in Delhi in 634/1236 and in Egypt in 648/1250, a coterie of amirs who were predominantly mamluks, and thus of steppe origin, enthroned a female ruler, whose name was mentioned in the khutba and appeared on the coinage.¹¹⁴

Fārs furnishes an example in the person of Terken Khatun, widow of Sa’d II b. Abī Bakr, who ruled briefly on behalf of her infant son Muḥammad (659–61/1261–3).¹¹⁵ But Kirmān, under a dynasty of Qara-Khitai origin, is especially notable for energetic female rulers. Here the Ilkhans were for some years ably represented by Sultan Quṭb al-Dīn’s widow, Qutlugh Terken Khatun,¹¹⁶ whom Hülegü appointed as regent for the late ruler’s young son, Muẓaffar al-Dīn Ḥajjāj; her position was subsequently reinforced by the marriage of her daughter Pādishāh Khatun to the Ilkhan Abagha. Sultan Ḥajjāj grew restless under his stepmother’s tutelage and profited from her absence at Abagha’s ordo, according to Kirmānī, to seek assistance from the Negüderis under ’Abd-Allāh (above, pp. 195, 197). When Qutlugh Terken learned of his machinations, he fled in c. 1275 and made initially for Sistān and then for Delhi, where he was welcomed by Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balaban. He died in Sind towards the end of 690/1291, en route to reclaim his kingdom with an army supplied by the Delhi Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Khaljī.¹¹⁷
After the flight of Ḥajjāj, Qutlugh Terken had to deal with the opposition of another stepson, Jalāl al-Dīn Soyurghatmish, to whom Abagha had given the personal estates (inchū) of his absent brother Ḥajjāj and the command of part of the military. He too rejected the role of docile co-regent and had his own name inserted alongside hers in the khuṭba.118 Through the good offices of Pādishāh Khatun, Qutlugh Terken secured a yarligh forbidding him to meddle in the government; but after Abagha’s death the new Ilkhan, Tegüder Aḥmad (r. 681–3/1282–4), with whom Soyurghatmish was on friendly terms, ordered that they rule the kingdom jointly; she died at Tabrīz while attempting to have the verdict reversed. Soyurghatmish was given in marriage the Ilkhanid princess Kürdüchin (the daughter of Mengü Temür and Ābish of Fārs) and reigned for some years, until he was displaced and executed by his half-sister Pādishāh Khatun, now married to the new Ilkhan Gaikhatu, who had sent her to Kirmān to rule on his behalf (690/1291). Soyurghatmish was avenged only when Kürdüchin profited from Gaikhatu’s death and the accession of Baidu (who had married Soyurghatmish’s daughter) to seize Pādishāh Khatun and put her to death (694/1295). Kürdüchin in turn ruled briefly until Ghazan appointed Muḥammad Shāh, son of Ḥajjāj and his own protégé, as ruler of Kirmān.119

We might have expected the status of the two princesses in Qutlughkhanid Kirmān, at least, to echo Qara-Khitai practice. In Delhi, Sultan Raḍiyya, enthroned by a group of slave commanders of whom two, according to Jūzjānī, were of Qara-Khitai origin, had scandalized clerical opinion by emerging from the harem and wearing masculine attire.120 Royal women in the Ilkhanid empire like the two Terkens and Pādishāh Khatun were possibly not restricted to the precincts of the harem but wielded power from outside it, as Raḍiyya had done. Maria Szuppe’s remark – that ‘the Timurid harem was not a circumscribed place surrounded by high walls but was composed of tents and pavilions’121 – surely applies a fortiori to the accommodation set aside for Ilkhan’s wives and Turkish princesses who were based in the provinces but had a close connection with the Ilkhanid court.122 Yet we cannot be sure whether Qutlugh Terken and Pādishāh Khatun were veiled.123 More certainly, unlike the female Ayyubid regents mentioned below, both these princesses enjoyed the prerogatives of sovereignty, being mentioned in the khuṭba (Qutlugh Terken’s name before that of Ḥajjāj) and on the coins. Whether this was true of Terken of Fārs is unclear, but no coins struck in her name are known.124

One difficulty lies in distinguishing direct instrumentality on the part of the Mongol overlords from what may have been merely traditions of rule carried over from the era of the Great Saljuqs. Another lies in discerning
what precisely did represent a departure from the past. The position of Qutlugh Terken Khatun and later Pādishāh Khatun in Kirmān, or that which the other Terken Khatun enjoyed for a shorter interval in neighbouring Fārs, might be deemed to express an unprecedented degree of emancipation. Yet the two Terkens, at least, received a commission from the Ilkhan to govern on behalf of infant male heirs. And precedents for arrangements of that kind were by no means lacking within the pre-Mongol Islamic world, where the mothers or grandmothers of kings – even within dynasties that were not of Turkish stock – had acted as regents. The most recent examples were to be found among the Kurdish Ayyubids. Dayfa Khatun (d. 640/1242) had governed Aleppo on behalf of her grandson, the young al-Nāṣir Yusuf, from 633/1236, and her niece Ghāziyya Khatun had been regent in Ḥamā for her son al-Manṣūr Muḥammad from 642/1244; though it could admittedly be relevant that both women were the daughters of paramount Ayyubid Sultans.

The basis of Pādishāh Khatun’s authority, however, clearly differed from that of her mother, since at no time did she exercise the regency on behalf of a minor heir. If we can believe Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, it was Gaikhatu’s intention at first that she should rule with the adult Soyurghatmish as her lieutenant (nā’ib); but following his downfall and imprisonment, it seems she ruled alone. The only other instance, within a territory subject to the Mongols, of a Muslim princess being appointed from the outset as ruler in her own right, with the privileges of being named in the khuṭba and on the coinage, comes from Fārs – namely, Ābish, who was herself initially unfit, at the age of five, to govern in person. It is perhaps worth noting that she was a great-granddaughter of Baraq Ḣājib and Qutlugh Terken. When introducing into his narrative her daughter Kürdüchin, who married Soyurghatmish, the local historian Kirmānī writes rapturously of her descent not just from the Chinggisids (through her father Mengü Temür) but from the atabegs of Yazd, from the Great Saljuq Sultan Sanjar and ultimately, through the Kakuyid dynasty (which had ruled in Hamadān, Iṣfahān and Yazd in the pre-Saljuq era), from the legendary Kayanian kings of ancient Iran. It is an impressive pedigree, of precisely the kind that would have resonated with authors of the mid-Ilkhanid era (below, pp. 325–6). Yet, even if the Mongols did indeed esteem august ancestry, Hülegū may have chosen Ābish simply because only female Salghurids survived. But she was promised to his son Mengü Temūr and her appointment could have been designed as an intermediate stage on the road to direct Mongol control (see p. 266). The careers of the princesses Ābish and Pādishāh Khatun followed a different trajectory from the pre-Mongol Islamic pattern;
but we risk exaggerating their significance for gender relations in the Mongol epoch.

Rebellion, intervention and restraint

At times the subjects of a Muslim client ruler profited from Mongol overlordship. Amid the widespread complaints of harshness and rapacity, certain Mongol administrators earned a reputation among Muslim authors for competence and justice. Fārs was fortunate enough to experience government by two of them. Ingiyanu, sent by Abagha in 667/1268–9 as governor with full powers, is described by Waṣṣāf as ‘judicious and shrewd, very strict but fair’. He put in place able officials, and made great efforts to eliminate corruption. These steps were resented by some of his subordinates, whose opportunities for self-enrichment were curtailed. They traduced him to the Ilkhan, alleging that he was dissipating the revenues and aspired to become an independent ruler. He was recalled, and although cleared of the charges he was not allowed to return to his post. His successor, the veteran noyan Sughunchaq, who had been made viceroy (nā’ib) for the whole empire with special responsibility for Fārs and Baghdad, similarly attracts praise from Waṣṣāf and from Ibn Zarkūb for his ability and evenhandedness. He governed Fārs twice, firstly from 670/1271–2 until he accompanied the atabeg Ābish back to the royal ordo in 672/1273–4 to marry the Ilkhan’s brother Mengü Temür, and again from 678/1279–80 until his recall by Abagha in the following year, to face accusations trumped up by his local enemies.131

Although Mongol sovereigns deemed it in their own interests to govern indirectly, some of them betrayed a concern not to countenance tyranny or, conversely, ineffectual rule by local potentates. When the amirs of Fārs arrested the Salghurid Muḥammad Shāh after a reign of only four months in 661/1263 and sent him to Hülegū under guard, with a petition that he was unsuited to rule and thought nothing of shedding innocent blood, the Ilkhan accepted the charges, despite his admiration for the atabeg’s conduct during the recent Baghdad campaign.132 Muḥammad Shāh, spared at this juncture, would be put to death not long afterwards when news reached Hülegū of the killing of his basqaqs by the deposed prince’s brother and successor, Saljūq Shāh.133 On the other hand, Tegüder Aḥmad seems to have tolerated the misgovernment of Muẓaffar al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ṣayyib Shāh of Shabānkāra, whom he saw as a potential ally against Salghurid Fārs; the prince was replaced only after Arghun’s accession.134
Despite the formidable nature of Mongol power in Iran, and the expedi-
ents it employed to guarantee the cooperation of client Muslim princes,
some of them – though they were by no means numerous – were impelled
to revolt. The formal partition of Rūm between the half-brothers
Kaykāwūs II and Qilich Arslan IV created an uneasy situation. Kaykāwūs,
who had already opposed Baiju’s westward advance into Anatolia in 1256
but had been pardoned, again determined to resist following his return from
Hülegü’s Syrian campaign in 658–9/1260–1. He was obliged to flee into the
neighbouring Byzantine empire, from where in 662/1263–4 he appealed for
help to Sultan Baybars. Treated well at first, he was later imprisoned in
Thrace by the Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus, anxious not to antagonize
Hülegü, and was released only in 668/1269–70 by the invading forces of
Mengü Temür, khan of the Golden Horde. Kaykāwūs ended his days in exile
in 677/1278–9 as Mengü Temür’s honoured guest in the Crimea.

Precisely why Saljūq Shāh of Fārs opted to defy his overlord in 661/1263
is far from clear. It may have been in response to letters from Baybars,
mentioned only by Ibn Wāṣil and the Mamlūk sources, inciting the rulers
of Fārs and ‘Lūr’ (either Greater or Lesser Luristān) to rise against the infidel
Mongols. Hülegü reacted sharply to this potential source of support for
the Mamlūk enemy. Mongol and auxiliary forces were sent against Shīrāz,
and Saljūq Shāh perished in the fighting. One consequence of the episode
was that in 662/1263–4 a group of commanders from Shīrāz fled to Egypt
and entered the Sultan’s service. In the wake of the revolt, the only
surviving members of the Salghurid dynasty were the sisters Ābish and
Salgham, the infant daughters of Sa’d II b. Abī Bakr. Ābish was duly
appointed as ruler of Fārs.

Yet another revolt by a Muslim prince against a pagan Ilkhan occurred,
again, around the time of Arghun’s death. The atabeg Afrāsiyāb b. Yusuf Shāh
of Greater Luristān had already spent a year in Sīstān in 688–9/1289–90,
prior to joining the rebel noyan Nawrūz in Khurāsān. The outcome is
unknown, but in 690/1291 Afrāsiyāb, back in his own principality and
disgruntled at the Ilkhan’s failure to transfer to him from Fārs the disputed
region of Kūhgīlūya, sent troops to occupy Iṣfahān; Baidu, its Mongol basqaq,
was put to death. The atabeg dreamed of extending his possessions to include
the entire territory from Hamadān to the Persian Gulf, and even sent an army
towards Darband, which defeated a Mongol force. The revolt was suppressed
by Mongol troops; Afrāsiyāb was taken prisoner but spared by the new Ilkhan
Gaikhatu and confirmed as ruler. He was later put to death by Ghazan in
695/1296, however, for his part in the execution of the basqaq Baidu.
The last rising to be considered here is that of the atabeg Rukn al-Dīn Yūsuf Shāh of Yazd. He had earlier defied Gaikhatu and engaged in the slaughter of Mongols and Muslim supporters of the regime; but the Ilkhan overlooked his offences and confirmed him in his principality. On Ghazan’s accession Yūsuf Shāh omitted to make the customary loyal visit to the Ilkhan’s court, despite the repeated arrival of elchis demanding his presence. At length, Ghazan despatched the noyan Yesüder with 200 horse to bring the atabeg in chains. When Yesüder grossly insulted Yūsuf Shāh’s mother, who had come to intercede for him, the atabeg roused the populace of Yazd against the Mongols, and Yesüder and his forces were defeated and massacred. The approach of a larger Mongol army obliged Yūsuf Shāh to flee to independent Sīstān and thence to Khurāsān, where he was captured. Ghazan ordered his execution.

The proximity of external Muslim powers like the Mamlūk empire and the Delhi Sultanate, or territories effectively outside the Mongol orbit such as Sīstān, which could provide aid or at least refuge, served as a spur to defiance. Moreover, the presence of an ‘Abbasid Caliph in Cairo – al-Mustanṣir bi llāh from Rajab 659/June 1261 and, following his ill-fated campaign against the Mongols later that year, his kinsman al-Ḥākim bi-amr Allāh from Muḥarram 661/November 1262 – gave the Mamlūk Sultanate a strong ideological weapon. Al-Ṣāliḥ Ismā’il b. Lu’lu’, the ruler of Mosul, visited Egypt to enlist Baybars’ help for his revolt against Hülegū, taking back with him a diploma for his territories from al-Mustanṣir, whom he accompanied on the first stages of his expedition. In northern Iraq and the Jazīra, so close to the Mamlūk frontier, allegiances could be fluid. Ibn Shaddād spiced his biography of Baybars with an entire chapter devoted to the prominent Muslims who sought asylum with him from Mongol tyranny. The influx continued after Baybars’ death, as for instance in 680/1281–2, when the ruler of Sinjār abandoned his principality for the court of Sultan Qalāwūn.

Two of the insurrections detailed above arose from the personal frustration of the ruler. Kaykāwūs, who already resented having to share authority with his half-brother, was further provoked by Mongol fiscal exactions. Afrāsiyāb was discontented over the Ilkhan’s failure to honour an agreement; although Waṣṣāf suggests that he saw the Ilkhanid regime as doomed and calculated that good fortune would attend a Muslim rising. What part, then, did Islam play? Given that Yūsuf Shāh flouted the authority of the Muslim convert Ghazan, religious motives are probably excluded; the atabeg’s propaganda nevertheless played upon the fact that Yesüder and his men were infidels. What led him to assert his independence may simply
have been the rapid changes of sovereign at the centre which, coupled with the earlier leniency of Gaikhatu, had surely given an impression of instability and weakness. But only the risings of al-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl b. Lu’lu’ and of Saljūq Shāh, both encouraged by the Mamlūk Sultan at a time when the nascent Ilkhanid state was still fragile, were seemingly inspired by a spirit of holy war.

No other rebel ruler, to the best of our knowledge, suffered such a grisly death as al-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl, who was covered in sheep fat and left out in the hot summer sun, alive, for maggots to consume his flesh; his infant son was cut in two. But if punishment could take drastic form, the Mongols were capable of restraint. Ibn Shaddād describes the interview between Hülegū and the vanquished al-Ḵāmil of Mayyāfārīqīn in 1260. Hülegū reminded him of the ‘yasa of the Mongols’, that up to three offences (dhunūb) were pardoned but that the fourth was punishable by death. Al-Ḵāmil’s refusal to accept drink from Hülegū’s hands at Hamadān heads a list that includes far more glaring acts of insubordination: the failure to demolish the walls of Āmid, to send troops to aid in the Baghdad campaign or to wait upon Hülegū in person.244 Rashīd al-Dīn’s more terse narrative also has Hülegū enumerate al-Ḵāmil’s offences. These details hint at a degree of forbearance, from which al-Ḵāmil had in time ceased to benefit.

Abagha’s confidence in Shams al-Dīn Kurt of Herat never recovered from the malik’s dealings with Baraq during the Chaghdayid invasion, and when Shams al-Dīn was finally persuaded to throw himself on the Ilkhan’s mercy he was incarcerated and poisoned.245 On occasion, however, a vassal prince was put to death without (as far as we know) having shown signs of insubordination. Abagha executed the candidates for the throne of Lesser Luristān and also their rival Tāj al-Dīn Ṭāj al-Ḵāmil ‘Ali Shāh in 677/1278–9.246 Qilich Arslan IV of Rūm was strangled with the bowstring in 666/1267 after hatching a conspiracy to murder his minister, the Parwāna Mu’in al-Dīn. There are no grounds for believing that the Parwāna obtained Abagha’s prior approval for this move; but he enlisted the help of the Mongol military, one of whom obligingly disposed of the Sultan.247 Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw III, whom Tegüder Ahmad had already depose for his links with the Mongol prince Qongquratai but whom Arghun suspected of complicity in the latter’s murder, was strangled with the bowstring in Arzinjān (683/1284).248

In the final analysis, the Ilkhans’ treatment of client states can appear arbitrary and divorced from a ruler’s ability or even loyalty. Marco Polo was under a slight misapprehension when he alleged that the throne of Kirmān did not pass by hereditary right but that ‘the Tartar’ sent out as ruler whomever he wished. Yet his statement contained some truth, since the shifts of
rulership in the province, for fifteen years or so, had not merely followed the fault lines of dynastic antipathies but had mirrored the changes of regime at the centre,\(^\text{159}\) in much the same way as did the provincial governorships that we shall notice in the next chapter.

The spread of direct Ilkhanid authority

For Waṣṣāf it was the enthronement of Ābish – rather than her marriage to Mengü Temür or her death in 685/1286–7 – that marked the falling of the province into the hands of strangers (bīgānagān) and the onset of a decline which had lasted until his own day.\(^\text{160}\) She was in any case absent at the ordo between 672/1273–4 and 682/1283–4, when Tegüder Aḥmad sent her back to Shīrāz as governor in the hope of remedying the chaos in the province.\(^\text{161}\) After another revolt in Fārs in 684/1285, troops were sent to restore order. Ābish, now a widow, was placed in confinement, and thereafter the province was ruled by Mongol governors sent from Azerbaijan. Waṣṣāf’s phrasing was doubtless a euphemism for the intensification of Ilkhanid authority over Fārs. He charges the wazir Sa’d al-Dawla with trying to uproot the regional kings and nobility.\(^\text{162}\) And indeed the final decades of the thirteenth century and the first years of the fourteenth century witnessed efforts to bring outlying provinces under more immediate Mongol control.

Following the execution of the rebel Yūsuf Shāh, Ghazan expelled his son and grandson from Yazd and entrusted the city to the wazir Rashid al-Dīn; according to Naṭanzī, in his day Yūsuf Shāh’s posterity were still living in Yazd and engaged in tilling the soil.\(^\text{163}\) The suppression of the Rūm Sultanate was a more drawn-out affair. Writing of the enthronement of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Mas’ūd II as Sultan in 682/1283, Baybars al-Manṣūrī comments that nothing was left for him but the title; real power lay in the hands of the Mongol representatives (shiḥnas) and their military officers.\(^\text{164}\) But the impression that Ilkhanid control over Rūm intensified under Ghazan is illusory; there was a series of revolts by Mongol noyans in the 1290s.\(^\text{165}\) Mas’ūd had been deposed (697/1297–8) in favour of his nephew ‘Alā’ al-Dīn (Kayqubād III) b. Farāmurz, whom Ghazan in turn dethroned for treasonable activity in 702/1302–3 and removed to Iṣfahān; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, who saw ‘Alā’ al-Dīn in Üjān three years later, describes him as addicted to wine and heavily in debt, although his creditors later released him from his obligations. Mas’ūd II, who was briefly restored, was the last of the dynasty to enjoy the title of Sultan.\(^\text{166}\)

Under Ghazan, whose priority had been the war against the Mamlūkṣ, the people of Shīrāz had allegedly complained that they were neglected for
But Öljeytü’s interests were more focused on eastern Iran. His army reasserted control over Quhistān (706/1306–7). Another expedition that same year enforced the Ilkhan’s suzerainty over Herat, replacing the recalcitrant Kurtid Fakhr al-Dīn with his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn. And as we saw (p. 198), Ilkhanid troops temporarily expelled the Chaghadayids from the Ghazna region. It was reported in Egypt that even Öljeytü’s invasion of Gilān in 706/1306–7 – an ill-starred enterprise inspired, says Qāshānī, by the mockery of the Ilkhan’s Chaghadayid neighbours – was designed primarily to improve communications with Khurāsān. All these initiatives may possibly reflect an ambition on Öljeytü’s part to renew Ilkhanid pressure on northern India, for the first time since Hülegü’s day (above, p. 246); he is known to have despatched an embassy demanding the submission of the Delhi Sultan ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khaljī in 710/1311. In any event, although Öljeytü was no war leader, this burst of energy hardly bears out Bertold Spuler’s dismissive verdict on Ghazan’s successor, resting as it does particularly on Öljeytü’s less aggressive policy towards Syria.

Quhistān was, however, the only one of these territories brought under Öljeytü’s direct authority. Elsewhere, after the extinction of the local dynasty Mongol rule was still exercised at one remove. When in 704/1305 Öljeytü responded to instability in Kirmān by recalling the Qutlughkhanid Quṭb al-Dīn Shāh Jahān and ending the dynasty’s rule, the province was entrusted to a new malik, the outsider Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Burhān, who was allegedly descended from the Ghurids and who would be succeeded by his son. The extravagant expenditure on the court and the many princely establishments required the regime to resort frequently to tax-farming as a means of enhancing its revenues (and avoiding the costs of direct administration), as Ögödei had done in China. A contract (muqāṭa ’a) for the farming of taxes had already been issued for Fārs in 676–7/1277–9, during the interval between Sughunchaq’s two periods as governor. In 692/1293 Gaikhatu entrusted Jamāl al-Dīn Ibrāhīm, ruler of Qays and a wealthy trader with far-reaching connections (see p. 224), with the administration of the tax system in Fārs and the islands for four years in return for a payment of one million dinars (100 tūmān), conferring on him the title ‘Malik al-Islām’ and the right to the triple nawba (a military band outside his residence). At the beginning of 696/late in 1296 Ghazan, impressed by his record, confirmed his right to farm the taxes of Fārs for another ten years and added those of ‘Irāq-i ‘Arab, including Wāsiṭ and Baṣra, for three years. Jamāl al-Dīn owed these favours in part to his friendship with the wazir Šadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālidī Zanjānī, whose execution in 697/1298 exposed him to the intrigues
of his enemies. After two years of demands for large additional sums, a compromise was reached by which they were reduced; but he declined two further invitations to farm the revenues of Fārs.¹⁷⁶

As an instrument of fiscal policy, tax-farming has enjoyed a poor press. Waṣṣaf – admittedly well-disposed towards the Malik al-Islām – testifies to his concern to protect the peasants and townsfolk of the province from the rapacity of Mongol elchis and other officials.¹⁷⁷ In general, however, to judge from Rashīd al-Dīn’s remarks about the low quality of the tax-farmers prior to Ghazan’s reign, the practice surely generated inefficiency and oppression.¹⁷⁸
As we have seen, the Mongol conquerors recruited members of the existing bureaucratic classes within the Islamic world just as they did those of the Jin empire in the Far East. This chapter will examine the relations between infidel Mongol khans, their Muslim ministers and officials, especially those who were in attendance at court and in the ordo, and their non-Muslim servitors. The reader will hardly be surprised to learn that the bulk of the evidence comes from the Iranian lands; we have few data on the internal administration of the Jochid and Chaghadayid realms and sparse information on Muslim functionaries serving at the khans’ headquarters. Admittedly, there is more concerning Muslims of high status within Chaghadai’s ulus than for those who served the Jochids. We know that Chaghadai’s minister Ḥabash ’Amīd was given one of the two daughters of the Khwārazmshāh Jalāl al-Dīn who had fallen to Chaghadai’s lot.¹ His son Sulaymān Beg was later an important bitikchi under Alughu.² Mas’ūd Beg b. Maḥmūd Yalavach served Alughu and Baraq, and from 1271 Qaidu, as finance minister (sāhib-dīwān), an office in which he was followed by three of his sons in succession down to the early fourteenth century. We might have expected from Jamāl al-Qarshī some impression of the working relationship between these ministers and their Mongol masters; but he tells us merely that each of the sons was appointed by Qaidu. According to Waṣṣāf, Baraq at one point ordered Mas’ūd Beg to be bastinadoed for having opposed his plan to plunder Samarqand and Bukhārā (though he did in fact abandon the plan).³ Juwaynī, for his part, describes how Ḥabash ’Amīd took a cruel vengeance on his son-in-law Bahā’ al-Dīn Marghinānī (c. 649/1251), who had temporarily supplanted him as chief minister under the Chaghadayid Yesū Möngke – and did so despite Bahā’al-Dīn’s efforts to
protect his father-in-law during his own ascendancy.\textsuperscript{4} Episodes of this kind serve to prepare us for the careers of Muslim ministers under the Ilkhans.

The Ilkhans (1258–97) and their kinsfolk\textsuperscript{5}

The Ilkhanate inherited from the unitary empire certain characteristics, notably the absence of a fixed pattern of succession and the distribution of appanages to members of the dynasty. As the eldest of Hülegü’s sons (and the most senior Chinggisid prince) present in Iran when his father died, Abagha (r. 663–80/1265–82) was the last Ilkhan to enjoy an unchallenged succession until 1304. Like most of his successors down to Ghazan, he underwent two enthronements, the second consequent upon the arrival of a confirmatory patent of authority from the qaghan. Of the Ilkhans who followed Abagha, only two – Tegüder (who reigned as Sultan Aḥmad, 681–3/1282–4) and Gaikhatu (r. 690–4/1291–5) – were chosen by consensus. In the case of Arghun (r. 683–90/1284–91), Baidu (r. 694/1295) and Ghazan (r. 694–703/1295–1304) the transition was achieved by force and the execution of a vanquished rival, and was merely ratified by the quriltai that followed.\textsuperscript{6} The majority of the reigns were relatively brief, terminated either through violence or by excessive consumption of alcohol (or, in Arghun’s case, medicinal drugs). Hülegü had been the last Ilkhan until 1316, moreover, to be followed immediately by his son. The attempts of Abagha and Arghun to designate a successor failed, and the claims of a more senior relative – articulated in 1282 and 1284\textsuperscript{7} – continued to attract strong support. Not until Ghazan’s death did the transfer of power work smoothly once more. Even then, Öljeitū’s peaceful succession may have been due less to the death of Ghazan’s only son in infancy than to the fact that Arghun and Ghazan had executed so many potential Chinggisid contenders.

The Ilkhans allocated territories not only to sons and close kinsmen but to certain of their wives and concubines, many of whom had their own ordos.\textsuperscript{8} Hülegü granted Khurāsān and Māzandarān to Abagha, and Arrān and Azerbaijan to another son, Yoshmut.\textsuperscript{9} On his accession, Abagha seems to have retained Yoshmut in his position, and to have transferred Khurāsān and Māzandaran to another brother, Tübshin; the latter was subsequently replaced by Yesüder, a son of Hülegü by a concubine.\textsuperscript{10} The eligible members of the new dynasty were soon swollen by immigration, notably in 666/1268 or 667/1268–9, when Abagha’s mother Yesünchin and his stepmothers Qutui Khatun and Öljei Khatun arrived belatedly in Iran from Mongolia, along with Hülegü’s son by Qutui, Tegüder (the future Ilkhan Aḥmad), and a number of junior princes, including Jūshkeb and Kingshū, the sons of Hülegü’s deceased
son Jumughur, and Baidu, son of Hülegü’s son Taraghai. Abagha conferred on Qutui part of the revenues of Mayyafāriqīn; and in 678/1279 he made further provision for this group, confirming Qutui’s share of Mayyafāriqīn, and granting a share of Diyār Bakr and the Jazīra to Öljei, Salmās to Tolun Khatun, Jumughur’s widow, and her sons, and various territories to princes born of Hülegü’s concubines.11 The only such grant by Tegüder Aḥmad that we know of was that of Anatolia to his brother Qongquartai at the beginning of 681/in the spring of 1282.12 On Arghun’s enthronement, there was a fresh allocation of territories. Jūshkeb and Baidu were assigned to Baghdad and Diyār Bakr; Hülechū (a son of Hülegü) and Gaikhatu to Anatolia; Ejei (another son of Hülegü) to Georgia; and Khurāsān, Māzandarān, Rayy and Qūmis were granted to the new Ilkhan’s son Ghazan, with Kingshū as his subordinate.13 Following the executions of Jūshkeb and Hülechū in 688/1289, both Baidu and Gaikhatu continued in their respective stations.14

Such territorial interests and claims on particular revenues would inevitably have given rise to tension among the princes and between them and the bureaucracy. We have no evidence to suggest that any of the Ilkhanid princes had their own deputies within the administration of different Ilkhanid provinces, in the way that various Chinggisids had been represented in widely dispersed regions of the empire prior to the 1260s. We do know, however, that princes could own even high-ranking Muslims as their personal property. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the future Ilkhan Gaikhatu in 685/1286 put to death Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī’s son Hārūn, who he believed had instigated the execution of Majd al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, here described as Gaikhatu’s own inchū.15 The same author has Arghun claim that Abagha had ‘given’ him Malik Fakhr al-Dīn of Rayy.16 Unfortunately, however, the evidence for such proprietary links is sparse.

The first succession dispute arose on Abagha’s death on 20 Dhū l-Ḥijja 680/1 April 1282, followed within a month by that of his brother Mengü Temür, whom Abagha (it would later be alleged) had named as his successor.17 The majority of the Ilkhanids and noyans, headed by the senior princes Hülechū and Qongquartai (Hülegü’s sons) and Jūshkeb and Kingshū, favoured another brother Tegüder.18 But a significant group supported the late Ilkhan’s son Arghun, who governed Khurāsān and whom Abagha, according to some sources, had nominated as his heir:19 Arghun’s brother Gaikhatu, his cousin Baidu, and various noyans who had served his father, notably Buqa (who as an orphan had been raised by Abagha and sought to repay the debt by enthroning Abagha’s son).20 Arghun was induced to back down and acquiesce in his uncle’s enthronement on 13 Rabi’ 1 681/21 June 1282; but his resentment cast a shadow over the new reign.
During the next two years Tegüder Aḥmad alienated enough princes and amirs to swing the balance in favour of his nephew. His youngest brother, Qongquratai, soon fell under suspicion by forming a close friendship with Arghun, a circumstance to which the Akhbār, Bar Hebraeus and Rashīd al-Dīn ultimately ascribe Qongquratai’s arrest and execution; Waṣṣāf, on the other hand, seems to give credence to reports that Qongquratai was conspiring to usurp his brother’s throne. At the time of Arghun’s open rebellion in 683/1284, Jūshkeb was still sufficiently trusted to represent the Ilkhan’s interests in Diyār Bakr; but, in an episode that Rashīd al-Dīn does little to elucidate, Arghun contrived to transfer him to Baghdad and to place him there in charge of his own ordo, with the result that Tegüder Aḥmad lost confidence in Jūshkeb’s loyalty also. Even at the point of the Ilkhan’s downfall, the succession was far from clear-cut. Although Buqa passionately pressed Arghun’s claims, his brother Aruq supported those of Jūshkeb while the noyan Tegene supported those of Hülechū, now Hülegū’s only surviving son; at one point Buqa felt compelled to pose as an advocate of Hülechū’s candidacy. Tegüder Aḥmad’s execution on 26 Jumādā I 683/10 August 1284 was prompted by a report that Jūshkeb and Hülechū were in revolt against Arghun at the head of their forces. Hülechū in the event consented to Arghun’s enthronement; but according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Jūshkeb and his brother Kingshū were still at that moment planning to resist.

Arghun’s reign, like his uncle’s, thus began in an atmosphere of profound distrust. In time he grew estranged from Buqa, to whom, primarily, he owed the throne and who was driven to plan a revolt. A number of princes – Hülechū, Jūshkeb, Kingshū and Qara Noghai (son of Yoshmut) – and several noyans, including Aruq, were implicated; in Rashīd al-Dīn’s account, Buqa secretly offered the sovereignty to Jūshkeb. Although Jūshkeb divulged the conspiracy to the Ilkhan, even this failed to win Arghun’s trust. A few months after the executions of Buqa and Aruq, when Jūshkeb had been sent back with honour to Diyār Bakr, the Ilkhan learned that the prince’s heart was ‘not right’, and had him executed in Jumādā I 688/June 1289. The news prompted Buqa’s former officer Nawrūz to revolt in Khurāsān, and Hülechū and Qara Noghai, charged with being in league with him, were put to death in Ramaḍān 688/October 1289; their infant sons were also killed. Waṣṣāf says that thirteen other members of the Chinggisid dynasty were executed as a result of the court of inquiry (yarghu) that followed.

Arghun died on 7 Rabī’ I 690/10 March 1291. Ghazan’s name had appeared with Arghun’s on the coinage, suggesting that he was the designated heir. But in the event it was Arghun’s brother Gaikhatu who succeeded him, aided by the unwillingness of the only other candidate, his cousin Baidu, to accept the
sovereignty. Gaikhatu was duly enthroned on 24 Rajab 690/23 July 1291. Waṣṣāf says that the shamans (qāmān), asked by the new Ilkhan why his predecessor had ruled such a short time, blamed Arghun’s taste for bloodshed. Gaikhatu clearly took this to heart, since his clemency makes a sharp contrast with Arghun’s reign. Taghachar and the other noyans who had taken control during Arghun’s final illness were, with one exception, spared; a conspiracy to enthrone Anbarchi (a son of Mengü Temür) was similarly overlooked. When Baidu insulted him while drunk, Gaikhatu simply had his cousin placed in confinement and accepted his apology the next morning. But his forbearance was counterproductive: Baidu now felt so insecure that he put himself at the head of a group of dissident noyans, again led by Taghachar, who overthrew Gaikhatu. The Ilkhan was captured and killed, though apparently without Baidu’s knowledge or consent (6 Jumādā I 694/24 March 1295).

Baidu had initially intended to replace Gaikhatu with Ghazan, Bar Hebraeus’ continuator tells us, but after Gaikhatu had been killed and the winter season slowed Ghazan’s progress from Khurāsān, he allowed his supporters to enthrone him instead. Baidu’s reign lasted less than seven months. Ghazan, freshly reconciled with the rebel noyan Nawrūz, who had prevailed upon him to embrace Islam, moved against the Ilkhan. The two sides engaged in fruitless negotiations before a confrontation occurred. Baidu, deserted, like his predecessor, by Taghachar, who went over to Ghazan, was captured and executed on 23 Dhūl-Qa’dā 694/4 October 1295.

Muslim ministers at the centre and in the provinces

At the head of the bureaucracy stood the wazir or chief minister – frequently, as head of the finance department (dīwān), entitled šāhib-dīwān like his precursors before the Mongol conquest. A number of provinces had their own administrative framework, which mirrored that at the centre and was similarly headed by a šāhib-dīwān. This was naturally the case with client states such as Fārs, Kirmān and Saljuq Anatolia, where the ruling dynasties survived and the local ruler’s wazir was now seen as the Ilkhan’s representative. But it is also true of Baghdad and the ‘Abbasid territories, which were treated as a province distinct from the Iranian lands to the east, and of Khurāsān (including Māzandarān, Ṭabaristān and Quhistān), possibly reflecting the lapse of time since its conquest and its status as (often) the seat of the Ilkhan’s eldest son.

In the earliest phase of Mongol rule in Iran, the conquerors’ chief Muslim ministers and officials hailed from Central Asia, Khwārazm and Khurāsān. We do not know the background of Sayf al-Dīn Bitikchi, who accompanied
the campaigns against the Assassins and the Caliph and is called by Juwaynī ‘supreme minister’ (ṣāḥib-i a’zam) and by Rashīd al-Dīn ‘administrator of the realm’ (mudabbir-i mamālik); he may be identical with ‘the amir Sayf al-Dīn’ who had conducted an inquiry at Beshbaligh on Möngke’s behalf into the alleged plot by the Uighur idaq-qut against the Muslims. Whatever his origins, he was one of a number of grandees tried and executed in Muḥarram 661/November–December 1262, for reasons which Rashīd al-Dīn does not specify but which were clearly linked to the breach between Hūlegū and the Jochids.

The Juwaynīs, members of a long-established bureaucratic family that claimed descent from al-Faḍl b. al-Rabī’ (d. 207 or 208/c. 823), wazir to the Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, are the most celebrated Khurāsānī servitors of the early Ilkhanate. Although Shams al-Dīn’s brother, the historian, has left us some account of his own career under Arghun Aqa in Khurāsān and his entry into Hūlegū’s service in 654/1256, we have no evidence regarding the activities of Shams al-Dīn himself prior to his emergence as finance minister for the whole empire (ṣāḥib-dīwān al-mamālik) with full powers in 661/1262. Rashīd al-Dīn puts into the mouths of Shams al-Dīn’s enemies a hint that the Ṣāḥib-dīwān had done the veteran Arghun Aqa (and other amirs) some major disservice, possibly by curtailing his power throughout the Ilkhanate. It looks, nevertheless, as if Arghun Aqa, who died near Tūs in 673/1275, had retained at least some nominal authority in Khurāsān. Shams al-Dīn was executed on 4 Sha’bān 683/16 October 1284, after the overthrow of Tegüder Aḥmad. He had held the office of Ṣāḥib-dīwān for a longer time than would be vouchsafed to any of his successors, Rashīd al-Dīn included.

In Khurāsān, the wazir ‘Izz al-Dīn Ṭāhir Faryūmādī, who originated from a town in the Juwayn district, belonged to a family claiming descent from the Tahirids, who had ruled Khurāsān in the ninth century. From the fact that he is said to have enjoyed the power to ‘bind and loose (al-ḥall wa l-‘aqd)’ we may infer that his authority was considerable. Having served first Arghun Aqa and then Hūlegū, and seen his appointment renewed on Abagha’s accession, he remained in office until his death in 676/1277–8, when he was succeeded by his son Wajīh al-Dīn. The latter was executed by Arghun on 20 Dhū l-Qa‘da 685/7 January 1287. But his son, Nizām al-Dīn Yahyā, was briefly wazir of Rūm under Ghazan; a grandson, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Hindū, became wazir at a later date, and two other members of the family would serve as mustawfī of the empire in the early fourteenth century.

In Baghdad, despite the execution of several caliphal officials, there was initially a marked continuity in the personnel within the civil administration. Ibn al-‘Alqamī, the Caliph’s wazir, was retained as wazir in Baghdad (a
circumstance which doubtless fed the rumours that he had betrayed al-Musta’ṣim), and on his death three months later, at the onset of Jumādā II 656/early in June 1258, Hülegü conferred this position on his son ’Izz al-Dīn Abū l- Faḍl (who died after only a brief interval). Fakhr al-Dīn Ibn al-Dāmghānī, the Caliph’s finance minister (ṣāḥib-diwān), was among others confirmed in office, although he would be put to death in Rajab 658/June–July 1260 on the charge of having released from prison a member of the ’Abbasid line. Ibn al-Dāmghānī’s two short-lived successors were both of Arab stock, but thereafter continuity with the ’Abbasid era was broken.41 In 657/1259 the financial administration was entrusted to the Persian ’Ala’ al-Dīn Juwaynī, who already describes himself in his Ta’rīkh-i jahān-gushā as auditor (mustawfī); al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi’a records his appointment as ṣāḥib-diwān in Iraq and employs that title for him thereafter.42 Juwaynī, whose sphere of responsibility was extended in 672/1273–4 to cover Tustar (Shustar) in Khūzistān,43 retained the position for over two decades, until his death in 681/1283, when he was succeeded by his nephew, Shams al-Dīn’s son Hārūn.

During the reigns of Hülegü and Abagha, personnel from ’Persian Iraq’ (’Irāq-i ’Ajam) grew increasingly prominent. Notable among them were men from Qazwīn and Yazd. A Qazwīnī had been tutor to the Qaghan Möngke and his brothers, and the qadi of the city had played a part in inciting the imperial court against the Ismā’īlī Assassins (see p. 126).44 The fierce competition between these newcomers and the established Khurāsānī group goes some way towards explaining the vicissitudes of the early Ilkhanid era. After the fall of the Juwaynīs, most of those who held the highest civil offices originated from ’Irāq-i ’Ajam: from Qazwīn (Ḥusām al-Dīn; Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī) or Zanjān (Ṣadr al-Dīn Khālidī). We still encounter Khurāsānī functionaries, such as Jalāl al-Dīn Simnānī and his brother Sharaf al-Dīn Mukhlīṣ (the father of the celebrated sufi shaykh ’Alā’ al-Dawla), whose grandfather had served as wazir to the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad.45 But the period from 1288 is also the age of the arriviste. The years between Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī’s downfall in 683/1284 and the conversion of Ghazan witnessed a relatively rapid succession of finance ministers, although the first five years were dominated by the noyan Buqa (below, pp. 283–4). Shams al-Dīn’s immediate successor as finance minister was Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī Qazwīnī, who was removed in 685/1286 and sent off to govern Anatolia. He was followed by Jalāl al-Dīn Simnānī, who had been in attendance on Arghun in Khurāsān and had earned the Ilkhan’s confidence. Nevertheless, he lasted only two years, until the beginning of Jumādā II 688/late June 1289, when Arghun appointed as wazir Sa’d
al-Dawla, a Jew from Abhar.\textsuperscript{46} Sa’\textasciiacute;d al-Dawla, who had previously doubled the tax receipts from Baghdad and now proved able, within less than two years, to make good the deficiencies of previous decades and recoup enormous sums for the government, is by no means the most celebrated among Ilkhanid wazirs, but he was almost certainly the most efficient.\textsuperscript{47} According to Wa\textasciiacute;ṣṣāf, in advance of Arghun’s death Sa’\textasciiacute;d al-Dawla secretly contacted the late monarch’s son Ghazan, then governing Khurāsān, in the hope of securing protection against his enemies, headed by the noyan Taghachar.\textsuperscript{48} Yet this failed to save him; Sa’\textasciiacute;d al-Dawla was put to death just a week before Arghun’s death. We are not told who followed him in office, and the next wazir to figure in the sources is Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālidī Zanjānī, appointed by Gaikhatu in Dhū l-Ḥijja 691/November 1292.\textsuperscript{49} It was at his persuasion that Gaikhatu in 693/1294 adopted Chinese-style paper money (chao; Pers. chāw). This proved an economic disaster and the notes had to be withdrawn after only a few months.\textsuperscript{50}

On Baidu’s accession in 694/1295, the wazirate was conferred on Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Ali b. Muhammād b. Manṣūr Dastjīrdānī, who had been ṣāḥib-dīwān in Baghdad since his appointment by Sa’\textasciiacute;d al-Dawla in 688/1289 and in that capacity had ably seconded Baidu’s preparations for revolt.\textsuperscript{51} Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālidī Zanjānī, whose expectations of being retained as wazir by Baidu had been disappointed,\textsuperscript{52} was therefore instrumental in bringing over to Ghazan’s side Taghachar, Choban and others among Baidu’s supporters.\textsuperscript{53} Yet his hopes of the wazirate under Ghazan were likewise cheated, a slight for which he never forgave Nawrūz.\textsuperscript{54} Precisely what transpired is obscure, but the solution appears to lie in a passage found only in the Paris manuscript of the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh, where we read that, as Ghazan had promised, Ṣadr al-Dīn was made ṣāḥib-dīwān following the promotion of Nawrūz as viceroy. Not long afterwards, Ṣadr al-Dīn must have been dismissed, as we learn from Wa\textasciiacute;ṣṣāf.\textsuperscript{55} He was replaced by Sharaf al-Dīn Mukhlīṣ Simnānī, whom the Ilkhan had earlier appointed as ṣāḥib-dīwān in Baghdad, since Rashīd al-Dīn describes Simnānī subsequently as ṣāḥib-dīwān of the Ilkhanid empire and records his dismissal in turn towards the end of 695/in September–October 1296 in favour of Dastjīrdānī.\textsuperscript{56} Dastjīrdānī occupied the wazirate for little more than a month before being put to death on 28 Dhū l-Ḥijja 695/27 October 1296 on the charge of being party to the disaffection of Nawrūz.\textsuperscript{57} Only at that juncture, on 1 Muḥarram 696/30 October 1296, three days after Dastjīrdānī’s execution, did Ṣadr al-Dīn become wazir, for the third time.\textsuperscript{58} His tenure of office was short-lived, however; he was found guilty of embezzlement and executed on 21 Rajab 697/4 May 1298.\textsuperscript{59} He and Dastjīrdānī were the last Ilkhanid wazirs to have served an infidel monarch.
The Ilkhans, their Muslim ministers and their historians

Waṣṣāf’s image of Hūlegū’s reign is epitomized in his statement that this was the ruler who ‘kindled the fire of the Mongol conquest and lit the daybreak of foreign domination’, and under whom the Şāḥib-diwān Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī remained steadfast in his efforts on behalf of the Muslim community. He takes a more positive view of Abagha, perhaps on the grounds that the new ruler showed much greater favour to Shams al-Dīn. The Ilkhan’s name is frequently coupled with the epithet ‘the Just (al-‘ādil)’, and Juwaynī, Bayḍāwī, Rashīd al-Dīn, Waṣṣāf and the author of al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi’a all comment on this aspect of his rule, the last adding the Ilkhan’s concern to rehabilitate the country. Bar Hebraeus, praising his wisdom and clemency, adds that Abagha was loved by all his subjects. As Jean Aubin points out, the fact that Abagha’s reign is uniformly celebrated for its peace and prosperity can hardly be discounted as mere rhetoric; he links it with the service of two markedly able men, the Mongol noyan Sughunchaq and the Şāḥib-diwān Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, and their close and harmonious cooperation.

On the other hand, Waṣṣāf tells us how Abagha once tormented the Şāḥib-diwān by offering him on the point of his knife meat that was forbidden (ḥaram) in Islamic law; Shams al-Dīn, then at a particularly critical stage in his fortunes, was obliged to eat it. The Ilkhan afterwards told his intimates that had Shams al-Dīn refused he would have used the knife to put out one of the minister’s eyes. Abagha clearly had his flaws. Perhaps his reputation for justice was due to the fact that the Şāḥib-diwān was able – or so it seems – to deflect him from the occasional act of bloody vengeance, as in Herat, for instance, which had negotiated with Baraq in 668/1270, or against the Anatolian countryside in 676/1277, following Baybars’ invasion of that region. Conceivably, the Ilkhan’s justice was also in some measure a posthumous attribute, dating from a time when the reign came to be set against the extravagance and ruthlessness of Arghun and the unbridled sensuality of Gaikhatu. Not for nothing did Waṣṣāf, describing Baidu’s accession, refer back to the auspicious (maymūn) era of Abagha. But the way in which he hails the enthronement of Tegüder Aḥmad, with a thinly disguised hint that the previous period had been a time of terror and villainy, may better convey his true feelings.

Waṣṣāf’s sympathy for Tegüder Aḥmad is manifest: he was ‘just of heart’. Waṣṣāf depicts in frank terms the extravagant generosity that marked the Ilkhan’s enthronement (as confirmed by Bar Hebraeus), and says at another point that he lacked any talent for rulership. But unlike Rashīd al-Dīn, who
says only that Tegüder Aḥmad ‘claimed to be a Muslim’, Waṣṣāf has no reservations about the faith of the new Ilkhan, who was ‘adorned with the necklace of Islam’, even (or so he alleges) abstaining from wine. He speaks glowingly of the rejoicing among the Muslim population at Tegüder Aḥmad’s accession, and credits him with a raft of measures that fulfilled the requirements of Islamic law. We shall examine more fully the conflicting testimony on Tegüder Aḥmad’s reign, and the contrast with that about his great-nephew Ghazan, in chapter 13.

The author of al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi’a describes Arghun as a just monarch who was compassionate towards his subjects. Waṣṣāf enters a more qualified verdict. He tells us that the Ilkhan was averse to bloodletting at the outset, expressing repugnance at the slaughter of so many animals for consumption at a feast, but had then succumbed to a taste for bloodshed under the influence of Sa’d al-Dawla. Waṣṣāf heard from a subsequent wazir, Ṣadr-i Jahān (Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālidī Zanjānī), that Sa’d al-Dawla had persuaded Arghun to claim the status of a prophet and found a new religion, to prepare a fleet with which he might seize Mecca, and to install idols in the Ka’ba, a project mentioned also by Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī (perhaps ultimately relying on the same source). In this last context, there is evidently some confusion with an abortive project dating from the last years of the reign: launching ships on the Red Sea in order to take the Mamluks in the rear. Both Waṣṣāf and the continuator of Bar Hebraeus describe Arghun himself as bitterly hostile towards Muslims, to the extent that he forbade their recruitment to the staff of the finance department (dīwān) and even their admission to the imperial ordo. This is simply at variance with what we know of Arghun’s appointments to high office and his friendly relations with (among other Muslims) Ḥālī al-Dawla Simnānī; it is difficult enough to imagine that such a restrictive policy was adopted even during the paramountcy of Sa’d al-Dawla, whom we know, in any case, to have worked alongside Muslim colleagues. The misunderstanding doubtless reflects merely the unprecedented authority in Tājik affairs enjoyed by the infidel Mongol noyans, Buqa and his brother Aruq, and a widespread sense of exclusion that sprang from Sa’d al-Dawla’s promotion of his close kindred and other Jews to high office. Stories of the kind relayed by Ṣadr al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf may owe less to the facts than to the hostility both of Muslims and of Mongol noyans towards the Jewish wazir.

Bar Hebraeus’ continuator depicts Gaikhatu as reluctant to accept the throne and as preferring to remain in Rūm, where he had been governor for the previous six years, an assertion seemingly borne out by the new
sovereign's swift return to Anatolia and the delay in his enthronement until Rajab 691/June 1292.79 Gaikhatu’s munificence, which for Waṣṣāf exceeded that of any Mongol ruler since Ögödei,80 appears to have been merely an expression of his indolence. Once enthroned, Gaikhatu is said to have paid no heed to the business of government but to have been intent on his own pleasure. A few authors have no compunction about mentioning his insatiable sexual appetites, to which the children of the noyans and amirs often fell victim and which are summed up in Waṣṣāf’s scurrilous but pithy quasi-epitaph: ‘At length sovereign rule in turn presented to him his heart’s desire, viz. the backside.’81 By contrast, the description of Gaikhatu’s successor Baidu by Bar Hebraeus’ continuator suggests a stronger, more restrained and not unappealing character. The Ilkhan appears as no slave to lust, endowed with humility and somewhat naive; it is noteworthy that Baidu was allegedly unwilling to entrust anyone with the entire administration of his realm, which might argue the uncommon inclination towards a hands-on approach to government.82 Rashid al-Dīn, writing of course under Baidu’s victorious rival, gives no space to any positive attributes, does not allocate Baidu a chapter of his own (however brief), and omits even to acknowledge that he occupied the throne.83

Let us turn to the wazirs. All our principal sources hold up Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī as a shining exemplar to his successors, perhaps indicating his skill at mediating between the pagan Ilkhans and their subjects.84 Decades later, Nakhchivānī praised his achievement in balancing the books.85 Beginning with Waṣṣāf, who lauds Shams al-Dīn’s actions on behalf of the people of Shīrāz and who visited the wazir’s grave during a visit to Tabrīz in 692/1293, most authors speak of his execution as martyrdom.86 Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, out of partisanship, no doubt, for his own kinsmen from Qazwīn who were the Juwaynīs’ rivals, says nothing of the brothers’ tribulations in his account of the reigns of Abagha and Tegüder Aḥmad. Yet even he acknowledges that Shams al-Dīn had no equal; he further calls him a martyr, albeit according the same status also to the wazir’s late enemy Majd al-Mulk. Possibly he believed the charge of peculation against Shams al-Dīn but not that of poisoning Abagha.87

We might have expected Sa’d al-Dawla’s regime to be the object of universal execration. Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, who had never forgiven him for encompassing the death of his uncle Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī, says that although he appeared prudent Sa’d al-Dawla was in reality treacherous and malevolent.88 Waṣṣāf, admittedly likewise no friend of Sa’d al-Dawla, clearly resented and deplored the fact that authority over the entire Muslim population of the Ilkhanate was in the hands of a Jew. That certain Mongol noyans
were closely associated with Sa’d al-Dawla and shared his fate does not prevent Waṣṣāf from portraying the wazir’s death as an occasion of rejoicing for Mongol and Muslim alike. And yet Waṣṣāf readily admits Sa’d al-Dawla’s fiscal capacity. What is more, he concedes that the reforms which Sa’d al-Dawla persuaded Arghun to sanction were inspired in part by a desire to ameliorate the lot of the Ilkhan’s subjects as a whole. This verdict is corroborated by Kirmānī. While denouncing the wazir for the deaths of prominent Muslims, he admits that otherwise Sa’d al-Dawla governed justly and that he refrained from oppressing the common folk. It is worth noting also that Ibn al-Fuwaṭī extols the administrative and fiscal abilities of Sa’d al-Dawla’s deputy, the mustawfī ’Īzz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Jalāl al-Dīn ’Ubayd-Allāh Tustarī.

The next two wazirs are the subject of widely conflicting verdicts. According to Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, Jamāl al-Dīn Dastjirdānī was an outstandingly competent administrator. Waṣṣāf, on the other hand, is contemptuous of the way in which Dastjirdānī, during Gaikhatu’s reign, repaid the generosity of Ṣadr al-Dīn Khālidī Zanjānī, his benefactor, and accuses him of embezzling the sum of one hundred tūmāns (1,000,000 dinars). Al-Ḥawâdith al-jāmi’a depicts Ṣadr al-Dīn in turn as a rapacious tyrant who enforced the use of chao and then, after its abolition, doubled the land-tax (kharāj) as Dastjirdānī had done, compelled the people to pay the qubchur, increased the tamgha and maximized fines and other burdens. Kirmānī too points to Ṣadr al-Dīn’s desire to make changes in the affairs of state and to harass the grandees, and his irresistible efforts to maximize revenues by encroaching on the people’s wealth. He speaks of the chao as just one of the reprehensible measures taken during his time in office – though without specifying the rest. Clearly what rankled for these authors was the losses suffered by many folk through the introduction of the paper currency, followed by the wazir’s strenuous efforts to recoup the royal finances. Both Waṣṣāf and Bar Hebraeus’ continuator, recounting Ṣadr al-Dīn’s first tenure of the wazirate, make it clear that he was as inordinately extravagant as his master Gaikhatu.

Yet Waṣṣāf is unstinting in his praise of Ṣadr al-Dīn, recounting the latter’s ordeals in 1296 with a heavy heart and a plethora of metaphor, and clearly puts no credence in the charges that later led to his execution. Ṣadr al-Dīn is at one point even credited with a decisive role in Ghazan’s conversion and with securing from the future Ilkhan an undertaking to end the reprehensible practice whereby the offspring of those executed forfeited their inheritances. Another well-wisher is Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī – possibly in some degree because Ṣadr al-Dīn, although a native of Zanjān,
had resided in Qazwīn.100 While admitting that Ṣadr al-Dīn was overly generous and later became addicted to intrigue and evil conduct, especially in his false accusations against Nawrūz, he describes him as initially a man of honour and of unrivalled ability.101 Ṣadr al-Dīn took firm measures to remedy the damage done to communications by the upheavals of the previous months, when official couriers (elchis) had exceeded their rights by requisitioning mounts from the populace and the yam system had been thrown into disarray. Because the qubchur had been levied on towns in ‘Irāq-i Ḥāj, moreover, many of the inhabitants had fled their homes; in Qazwīn it was impossible to hold the public Friday prayers. Ṣadr al-Dīn doubled the tax receipts by relieving the towns of the qubchur and substituting the tamgha.102 This judgement should be set alongside the strictures in al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi’a and Kirmānī’s Nasā’im, though we cannot know whether it represents a fairer appraisal of the wazir’s policies.

In comparison, Rashīd al-Dīn’s remarks about his predecessors are strikingly tepid. He alludes only briefly to Sa’d al-Dawla’s ability and mentions his deputy ’Izz al-Dīn al-Tustarī simply in order to record his execution.103 He imputes no laudable motives to Sa’d al-Dawla and says little of his achievements, no doubt from a desire to direct attention exclusively towards Ghazan’s (and his own) attempts at reform – and perhaps also to distance himself from a fellow Jew who had not converted to Islam. It is possibly for the first reason, too, that Rashīd al-Dīn downplays the measures enacted by Sa’d al-Dawla’s successors, denying that either Sharaf al-Dīn Simmānī or Ṣadr al-Dīn Khālidī Zanjānī had succeeded in boosting the receipts of the treasury.104 Rashīd al-Dīn may have harboured mixed feelings about Ṣadr al-Dīn. Whereas his stories about the abuses remedied by Ghazan contain comments on Ṣadr al-Dīn’s corruption and chicanery and a damning indictment of the wazir’s gullibility and wastefulness, which had emptied the treasury,105 his account of Ṣadr al-Dīn’s end suggests that he admired the man, and indeed he mentions that they had earlier been on good terms.106 In any event, the evidence of other sources indicates that both Sa’d al-Dawla and Ṣadr al-Dīn had been concerned to eliminate precisely the abuses – such as the oppression of the people by elchis and ortaq merchants – which Rashīd al-Dīn highlights when recounting the state of affairs prior to Ghazan’s accession. This throws into relief the problematic nature of the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh: that Rashīd al-Dīn’s position as a prominent actor on the Ilkhanid stage both afforded him an unrivalled overview of events and imbued him with the kind of antipathies and insecurities that characterized the majority of his fellow wazirs.
In the era of the Great Saljuqs and the Khwārazmshāhs, civil functions had for the most part been kept separate from those of the military; it was unusual for the wazir to exercise military authority, although not unknown. Ann Lambton suggests that in the early Ilkhanid era the wazir underwent something of a demotion. In the first place, his competence was for a time restricted to the sphere of finance and taxation; and secondly, in contrast with his Saljuqid predecessors he no longer took part in military expeditions except when accompanying the monarch. But we should note that in 676/1277 the Ṣāḥib-dīwān Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, whom Abagha had despatched to Anatolia on what was clearly a policing expedition, returned by way of Darband and ‘Lagzistān,’ where he and two noyans who accompanied him secured the submission of tribes, we are told, that had hitherto remained uncowed. Lambton may well be right, however, to see Gaikhatu’s conferment of a division of 10,000 horsemen upon Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālidī Zanjānī as an indication that the wazir had ceased to command his own private army.

In the early decades of the empire, apart from a brief interval in Qubilai’s reign (p. 110), civil and military functions were undifferentiated. In Ilkhanid Iran too the Mongols did not, it seems, draw the distinction between civil and military office that we tend to take for granted. The crucial distinction, rather, lay between the Mongol/nomadic military population and the mass of the sedentary Persian (Tājīk) subjects. Qāshānī describes Öljeitü, at his enthronement in 1304, as entrusting ‘the cherig [army] and the Mongol ulus (charīk-u ulūs-i mughūl)’ to the great amirs Qutlugh Shāh and Choban, while committing the arable lands (sawād) at the heart of the realm, and the Tājīk peasantry (raʿāyā), to the joint wazirs Rashīd al-Dīn and Saʿd al-Dīn Sāwajī. This perhaps explains the manner in which our sources persist in speaking of ‘Muslims and Mongols’ even after the adoption of Islam. Up to a point, therefore, one might agree with Lambton that under the early Ilkhans there was ‘a strongly marked dichotomy between Mongols and Turks, on the one hand, who were in effect the military class, and Persians, that is, non-Mongols on the other.’ Yet the conventional distinction between ‘men of the pen (arbāb-i qalam)’ – that is, Persian (Tājīk) bureaucrats – and ‘men of the sword (arbāb-i sayf)’ is, paradoxically, less valid for Mongol Iran than for the preceding period.

Symptomatic is the authority enjoyed by the viceroy (nāʿīb) to the monarch. The sources are liable to confuse us, since they sometimes speak of the wazir himself as nāʿīb – by which they appear to mean, most
frequently, deputy to the viceroy. The sense of hierarchy that this conveys is itself significant, and according to a mid-fourteenth-century administrative handbook it found spatial expression in the ordo, where the princes and military commanders occupied the more prestigious station, to the right of the monarch, while the wazir and the officials of the diwān were encamped to his left. It was natural that the wazir, overseeing the sedentary population, should be subordinate to the viceroy, whose chief concern was the militarily more important nomadic element. The two applications of the term nā‘īb must be kept in mind.

Under Hülegü we hear nothing of the viceroy; he first emerges into the light at Abagha’s accession. According to the contemporary author Bayḍāwī, the pivot (madār) of Abagha’s regime was the noyan Sughunchaq, who was his viceroy and governor with full powers (nā‘īb-i ū wa-ḥākim-i muṭlaq) and had a special responsibility for Baghdad and Fārs; Waṣṣāf says that he held ‘the office of viceroy and administrator of the empire (rāh-i nīyābat-u ḥukumat-i mamālik)’. On his accession Tegüder Aḥmad confirmed Sughunchaq as nā‘īb. We are told that in time the new Ilkhan paid little heed to either Sughunchaq or the other veteran noyan, Shiktür (son of Ilüge of the Jalayir tribe), though he continued to treat them with honour; but just prior to the final debacle in 683/1284, Sughunchaq still enjoyed considerable importance. After Arghun’s accession, as a former supporter of Tegüder Aḥmad who had also worked closely with Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, Sughunchaq must have fallen from favour and withdrawn into the background, since he is not mentioned again until Rashīd al-Dīn baldly reports his death under the year 689/1290. Following Gaikhatu’s accession in 690/1291 and his return to Anatolia, Shiktür was given the rank of viceroy with full powers (niyābat-i muṭlaq) throughout Iran, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, or, in Waṣṣāf’s words, entrusted with ‘the government of the empire, the role of viceroy and the administration of the affairs of the army (ḥukumat-i mamālik-u rāh-i nīyābat-u dānistan-i mašāliḥ-i charīk)’. He had the use of the imperial red seal (āl-tamgha).

What is especially striking about the Ilkhanid era – and marks a more conspicuous departure from the pattern under previous regimes – is that the overlap between civil and military authority occurs in both directions. On two occasions after 1284 there is a discernible extension in the powers given to the Mongol nā‘īb. Although Aubin regards Dimashq Khwāja as the first (and last) Mongol amir to head the wazirate (1325–7), Rashīd al-Dīn ascribes that office to two leading Mongol commanders – each currently serving as viceroy – at a much earlier date. The first, during the years 683–7/1284–8, was Buqa, who had been instrumental in Tegüder Aḥmad’s
overthrow and Arghun’s accession; the second, for the first two years of Ghazan’s reign, was Nawrūz (son of Arghun Aqa), who had effectively put him on the throne. Of Buqa, who rose to power immediately following the downfall of Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, Rashīd al-Dīn tells us that ‘the diploma (yarligh) for the wazirate of the empire’ was issued in his name and that he enjoyed unrestricted control of all state affairs. Waṣṣāf does not call Buqa ‘wazir’, but confirms that he enjoyed absolute authority throughout the territory from the Oxus to the borders of Egypt, and that he was in charge of the affairs of the imperial troops (charīk-i buzurg), the court and the princes and princesses; no document was valid without his seal. Nawrūz for his part is said to have been granted in 1295 the rank of ‘amir and wazir of the whole empire and ulus from the banks of the Jayhūn (Oxus) in the east as far as the limits of Syria and Egypt’. We might note that the contemporary Syrian authors al-Birzālī and al-Jazārī similarly call Nawrūz wazir.

Admittedly, Buqa and Nawrūz, as kingmakers, merited an especially privileged status in the Ilkhanid administration. But can we conclude with assurance that the authority of these two Mongol commanders exceeded, for example, that of Sughunchaq, referred to above, or that conferred (briefly) by Gaikhatu on Shiktür? The title certainly does not mean that they exercised directly all the functions associated with the wazir’s office. Buqa does indeed appear to have had immediate oversight of financial matters, at least until not long prior to his fall, when the dīwān and the registers (daftar), we are told, were removed from his residence and his nominees in the dīwān were dismissed. During the short time that was left to him early in Arghun’s reign, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī offered to act as Buqa’s deputy (nā‘ib). His successor in the wazirate, Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī Qazwīnī, is expressly called Buqa’s nā‘ib; but he did not have custody of the seal, which was held by Buqa’s henchman, ‘Ali tamghachi, the governor of Tabrīz. As viceroy, Nawrūz too managed financial affairs (māl); Dastjirdānī, then holding the office of šāhib-dīwān, is described as his nā‘ib, although his department was under the immediate supervision of Nawrūz’s brother Ḥājjī Narin, who had custody of the imperial seal.

That the boundaries between the spheres of competence of the higher bureaucrats and of the Turco-Mongol military were at times blurred should not surprise us. From the beginning the nucleus of Mongol administration had lain in the imperial household guard and it had remained there since (however much the administration had mushroomed). As Charles Melville has shown, leading Muslim ministers were progressively incorporated in the Ilkhan’s guard, even though its membership was still largely Turco-Mongol. Thus the Mongol noyan Qutlugh Shāh, in conversation with
Rashīd al-Dīn, reminded him that they were members of one and the same guard (keshig).  

Nor is consistency to be expected either from the responsibilities implied by different offices or from the terminology of our sources. To what extent, if at all, did the powers of the nā’ib outstrip those of the ‘chief amir’ (Pers. mīr-i mīrān, Ar. amīr al-umarā, Tu. beglerbegi; or, to use the early fourteenth-century designation, amīr-i ulūs, ‘amir of the ulus’)? Ilüge appears to have filled this latter office under Hülegū; his son Shiktür occupied it at Gaikhatu’s accession; and Gaikhatu conferred it on another of Ilüge’s sons, Aqbuqa (the ancestor of the Jalayirid dynasty), at the time of Shiktür’s demotion as viceroy. The fact that when Taghachar was briefly beglerbegi under Baidu in 694/1295 he was given control of the finances (māl), the realm (mulk) and the troops (charīk), according to Waṣṣāf, might imply that the positions of viceroy and of chief amir were at times almost indistinguishable. They may even have been identical. For what it is worth, the Shu‘ab-i panjgāna calls Buqa amīr al-umarā, and the Hawādith al-jāmi‘a explains this as the equivalent of Buqa’s Chinese title chingsang. Under Ghazan and Öljeitū, Qutlug Shāh, whom Abū l-Fidā explicitly calls Nawrūz’s successor, is variously titled ‘chief amir’ and nā’ib in the sources.

From Arghun’s reign onwards, we also encounter a series of ‘absolute wazirs’, to use a term coined by Aubin. The first of these was Sa‘d al-Dawla. Waṣṣāf tells us that Arghun trusted himself to Sa‘d al-Dawla in every detail, and likens the noyans and amirs, in his day, to ‘lifeless pictures, disembodied names and futile talismans’. According to the Syrian author al-Yūnīnī, Sa‘d al-Dawla exercised completely arbitrary authority over the government, while al-Dhahabi says that he had gained ascendancy over Arghun’s mind and directed him at will. So too, when appointing Šadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khalīdī Zanjānī in 691/1292, Gaikhatu issued a yarligh forbidding the princes, princesses and amirs to interfere in matters of state or finance or to bring complaints against the new wazir. Subsequently, the Ilkhan further empowered him to replace all amirs and basqaqs throughout the empire and prohibited princes or noyans from issuing grants of land or income without the wazir’s leave. During his second term of office, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Šadr al-Dīn rose considerably in power following Nawrūz’s execution late in 696/in the summer of 1297 and was given the imperial red seal (āl-tamgha).

The period between Abagha’s death and Ghazan’s reign, then, appears to have been one of improvisation as regards the respective powers conceded to Mongol and Tājik amirs. It should be stressed, nevertheless, that during the era of the pagan Ilkhan – and indeed down to 699/1299–1300 – no
Tājīk rose so far as to be viceroy to the monarch. The first to be so termed in the sources, possibly, is Sa’d al-Dīn Sāwajī, whom Ghazan appointed in that year, according to Waṣṣāf, as wazir and nā’ib. Rashīd al-Dīn, who places Sa’d al-Dīn’s appointment as wazir two years earlier, at no point describes him as nā’ib, though he does report that in Dhū l-Qa’dā 700/ August 1301 Ghazan entrusted him with the red seal (tamghā-yi āl) and made him head of the dīwān. At the very least, therefore, Sa’d al-Dīn seems to have enjoyed the same privileges as Ṣadr al-Dīn Zanjānī. It may be, however, that Waṣṣāf is merely using the term nā’ib of Sa’d al-Dīn in its less exalted sense – that of deputy to the viceroy, namely Qutlugh Shāh, who was viceroy or ‘chief amir’ under Ghazan and Öljeitū (above).

The appointment of viceroys with powers that extended into the wazir’s sphere of competence has implications for the common assumption that the Mongols were uninterested in the day-to-day administration of their dominions. As David Morgan has suggested, they were probably more involved than has been thought. Not so, necessarily, their monarchs. Rashīd al-Dīn asserts that prior to Ghazan the government was for the most part carried on by amirs and wazirs, and that the rulers, free of administrative concerns, spent their time largely in hunting and pleasure. He further makes what might appear to be a veiled criticism of Abagha, allegedly prevented by his ‘lofty-mindedness and regal magnificence’ from enquiring as to the whereabouts of horses and weaponry for which corrupt officials had issued bogus receipts. Remembering the propensity of bureaucrats to accentuate their own importance by minimizing the sovereign’s executive activity, we might be sceptical. Yet other testimony supports Rashīd al-Dīn’s verdict, echoed as it is a few decades on by one of al-’Umarī’s informants. The fact that under the sybaritic Gaikhatu the real sovereign was the wazir Ṣadr al-Dīn places no strain on the imagination. But Arghan had hardly displayed any greater appetite for rulership. Waṣṣāf’s statement that he made over to Buqa ‘whatever, apart from the name of khan, was requisite for the practice of sovereignty and the execution of orders and prohibitions’ does not conjure up the image of a monarch for whom close supervision of the government was a priority.

**The growth of a homogeneous ruling elite?**

One of the most obvious aspects of the change of regime was that the new sovereigns of Iran and Iraq spoke a language unintelligible to their Muslim subjects. Nor during the era of infidel rule, as far as we can see, did they trouble to learn Persian or Arabic. Whereas Qubilai, despite only a minimal
acquaintance with Chinese, had the imperial princes instructed in the language, and there is some evidence that from the reign of the Qaghan Buyantu (Renzong, 1311–20) onwards the Yuan emperors could read and even, to some extent, speak Chinese,\textsuperscript{154} we are less well informed about the Ilkhans. Arghun is expressly said to have had no knowledge of the Persian script.\textsuperscript{155} In the course of a possibly overblown list of Ghazan’s accomplishments (above, pp. 236–7), Rashīd al-Dīn makes out that his royal master was familiar with several tongues, specifying Arabic, Persian, Hindi, Kashmiri, Tibetan, Chinese and ‘Frankish’ (Latin?), and adding that he knew ‘something of each of the rest’. But we might note that Ghazan, even so, is here said to have employed Mongol terminology (\textit{ba-ṭīlāḥ-i mughūlān}) in his conversations with the learned.\textsuperscript{156} On one occasion we find him addressing Nawrūz (a rare example of a Mongol noyan who knew Persian) in Turkish.\textsuperscript{157} According to al-Ṣafadī, Ghazan spoke Persian with Rashīd al-Dīn; but he did not reveal that he understood most of what was said in Arabic in his presence.\textsuperscript{158} If this is true, it would explain why an interpreter was present when Ghazan met with a deputation from Damascus in 699/1299 during his first invasion of Syria.\textsuperscript{159}

Juwaynī’s derisive allusions to the Uighur script highlight the fact that the administration was to some extent conducted in an unfamiliar idiom. If Muslim bureaucrats wished to enhance their career prospects, they now had to master at least one new language and script, since scribes in the imperial chancery generated documents in several. Not for nothing did the conquerors, presiding over a multicultural empire, prize the services of language specialists.\textsuperscript{160} Even the Nestorian clergy elected in 1281 the Önggūt monk Markōs as the Catholicos Yahballāhā III – despite his total ignorance of Syriac, their liturgical language – primarily because he knew Mongolian and was familiar with Mongol customs and administrative methods.\textsuperscript{161} Any stigma attached to knowledge of the Uighur script had faded, it seems, a generation or so after Juwaynī wrote, because representatives of more illustrious Muslim families were taking the trouble to acquire it. Certainly they learned to speak Mongolian, in which the wazir Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Zanjānī is said to have reached a high level of competence.\textsuperscript{162} According to Qāshānī, Öljēitū’s leading noyan, Choban, complained to his colleague Irenjin that Tājīk ministers were now able to gain access to the Ilkhan during the night without first consulting a Mongol amir, as required to do in the days of Hūlegū and Abagha.\textsuperscript{163} This may mean that Öljēitū knew Persian; but the ministers probably spoke Mongolian.

Others aimed for a still more impressive repertoire. Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī says of his fellow citizen Iftikhār al-Dīn Muḥammad
that he exerted himself to become proficient in the Mongol and Turkish languages and script (evidently the Uighur script), to the extent that he translated works of Persian literature into both. The fact that Sa’d al-Dawla already knew Turkish and Mongolian, through having resided for some years in Baghdad, doubtless recommended him in Arghun’s eyes – and perhaps spurred on Muslim rivals to similar attainments. Qāshānī lists among the attainments of Malik Fakhr al-Dīn of Rayy and Warāmīn (d. 707/1308) his familiarity with six languages and three scripts (Mongol, i.e. Uighur; Persian; and kufic). Ibn al-Fuwaṭī’s biographical dictionary includes a number of Muslim officials who had allegedly mastered Mongolian, Turkish and even, in two cases, Chinese.

We might be tempted to interpret the spread of linguistic skills among the Ilkhans’ Tājīk servitors – or, for that matter, knowledge of Persian on the part of Nawrūz and a few other Mongols – as indicative of a burgeoning integration within a diverse ruling class; and the same could be said of the presence of both Mongol noyans and Persian-speaking wazirs in the keshig. We read of Muslims who served as ‘wazirs’ to Mongol noyans. Yet it is important to keep these circumstances in perspective. The Ilkhan’s reliance on a multifarious range of servitors did not necessarily make for their assimilation, though that may well have begun after Ghazan’s acceptance of the faith. Choban’s complaint, as cited above from Qāshānī, reveals that the authority of Tājīk ministers had been more circumscribed under the first two Ilkhans than it was by Öljeitū’s reign. But its significance is that Choban and (probably) Irenjin were nostalgic for those bygone days; and in the years immediately preceding Ghazan’s accession, there was still no doubt as to which group ruled and which group was expected to obey. The extraordinary authority conferred on the Tājīk Majd al-Mulk in 679/1280 (below) provoked widespread amazement. In 694/1295, when Ghazan was en route for Tabrīz, the noyan Mulai, as commander of the keshig for that day, used his whip on the wazir Ṣadr al-Dīn Khālidī Zanjānī for venturing to address the new Ilkhan without having dismounted – a piece of effrontery that may further have cost Ṣadr al-Dīn his office. This tells us something of the primacy of Mongol etiquette, which was plainly no respecter of persons. Nevertheless, the Mongol noyan and Tājīk amir did share one characteristic: their vulnerability to the sovereign’s caprice.

The perils of high office

In 1299, following a series of executions under Ghazan, Waṣṣāf observed, with uncharacteristic clarity, that:
it is a reprehensible trait and common defect in the Mongol temperament and disposition that lieutenants (nuwwāb) and wazirs will never find security from the stroke of judicial condemnation and punishment; that the claims of fifty years' service finally terminate in disgrace; and that, through the promptings of mischief-makers and disparagement by the envious, good offices are consigned to oblivion.173

The Juwaynīs (had they still been alive) would assuredly have endorsed this verdict. With sound reason did the Şāḥib-diwān Shams al-Dīn, in the testament he drew up just before his execution, forbid that his younger offspring be allowed to pursue an administrative career.174 Civil administrators were frequently caught up in the rivalries within the dynasty. Moreover, the private fortunes that leading ministers were able to accumulate readily provoked jealousy and antipathy, and the Juwaynī brothers had repeatedly been obliged to defend themselves against the accusations of their rivals for the last two decades of their lives.

From the outset the regime ensured not only that its Muslim servitors should be balanced by Mongol officers but also that each appointee should serve as a counterweight to another. This made for a complex division of power, as for instance at Baghdad. Here 'Alā’ al-Dīn Juwaynī governed alongside (and under the watchful eye of) the shīḥna 'Ali Bahādur. Initially Juwaynī also had to share authority in Iraq with 'Imād al-Dīn 'Umar b. Muḥammad Qazwīnī, who had been (or still was) deputy (nā‘ib) to the Mongol military commander, Qarabuqa;175 according to al-Dhahabī, Juwaynī succeeded 'Imād al-Dīn, which suggests that the latter had been the senior partner.176 And as governor of the city during Abagha’s reign he would be subordinated to the noyan Sughunchaq, who had particular responsibility for Baghdad and Fārs.177 The shīḥna himself might be required to share authority with a Mongol colleague (nökör) – Tükel Bakhshi, for instance, nominated as shīḥna of Baghdad in 661/1263, with Hushītai.178

This distribution of authority exacerbated the tensions and the dangers. In 659/1261 'Alā’ al-Dīn’s colleague 'Imād al-Dīn Qazwīnī and the shīḥna 'Alī Bahādur jointly complained to Hülegū about him; 'Alā’ al-Dīn was arrested on a charge of embezzlement and sentenced to death, but reprieved, probably at his brother’s instigation. In the following year (661/1263) Shams al-Dīn secured the execution of both the accusers on the very same grounds.179 Qarabuqa, who succeeded 'Alī Bahādur as shīḥna of Baghdad, forfeited his position a year later when he failed to make good his accusations against 'Alā’ al-Dīn.180 Shams al-Dīn himself would face a similar threat from the late 1270s, in the person of Majd al-Mulk Yazdī (formerly
'Imād al-Dīn Qazwīnī's deputy in Baghdad), who repeatedly sought the downfall of both brothers by accusing them of peculation. For some years Shams al-Dīn benefited from a harmonious working relationship with the viceroy Sughunchaq, who aided him in repelling these attacks. But in 679/1280 Abagha appointed Majd al-Mulk as comptroller (mushrif) and as Shams al-Dīn's partner in the fiscal administration of the Ilkhanid empire 'from the Oxus to the gates of Egypt'; according to the Akhbār-i mughūlān, the Ilkhān assured the new minister that Majd al-Mulk's enemies were his own and guaranteed him his protection. This extraordinary appointment is explicable only by the desire to rule through division. Nor did it end Majd al-Mulk's intrigues. Eventually, early in Tegüder Aḥmad's reign, when a paper was found implicating him in sorcery, Majd al-Mulk was handed over to the mob, who tore him to pieces.

A minister might on occasion be held responsible for the death of a monarch. Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī's rivals accused him of poisoning Abagha (and perhaps Mengü Temür as well), and their arguments appear to have convinced Arghun. Rashīd al-Dīn himself would go to the scaffold in 718/1318 on the charge of having poisoned Öljeitü. Sa’d al-Dawla, who had taken charge of medical care for the dying Arghun, was exposed to the accusation, at best, of remissness and, at worst, of having poisoned him. But in general those who sought to forge a career for themselves at the expense of the leading grandees of the realm resorted to one of two charges: embezzlement of the Ilkhan's revenues and intrigue with the Mamlūk enemy.

The expenditure of the Ilkhans on the court and the numerous members of the dynasty was extraordinarily high, and they were in constant need of additional revenue. Hülegū's capture of a whole series of cities had brought into the treasury enormous wealth, of which part of the booty from Aleppo, according to Waṣṣāf, still lay to hand during Tegüder Aḥmad's reign. But if we are to believe Rashīd al-Dīn, those resources had been either purloined by the guards or dissipated by Tegüder Aḥmad in order to buy support, and the wealth amassed by Arghun was misappropriated after his death by amirs and courtiers. Anyone who undertook to replenish the treasury within a short space by raising tax yields, or whose calumnies could bring a fallen minister's fortune into the royal coffers, was therefore sure of a hearing. Various figures fell victim to the charge of embezzlement and the Ilkhān's own impecuniousness. Accused by informers of misappropriating funds, Iftikhār al-Dīn Qazwīnī bankrupted himself by paying 500,000 dinars to avoid a confrontation in court; he died in poverty two years later (678/1279–80). The Juwaynīs are the most conspicuous examples, since
their long tenure of office enabled them – or could be seen to have enabled them – to accumulate larger fortunes than anybody else. Instead of amassing coin or specie, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī had invested his entire fortune in landed estate (amlāk), which on his execution became the Ilkhan’s property (inchū).¹⁸⁹ His brother ‘Alā’ al-Dīn evidently did not take this precaution. In Abagha’s final year, the enormous sum of three million gold dinars was extorted from him at the prompting of Majd al-Mulk, and his tormentors subsequently tried to extract a further 1,300,000;¹⁹⁰ although these losses were made good when ‘Alā’ al-Dīn was restored to favour under Tegüder Aḥmad. Later, embezzlement would be among the grounds for the execution of Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālīdī Zanjānī.¹⁹¹

Treasonable contact with the Mamlūks was usually a less well-founded charge than misappropriation of funds; but it possessed a seductive plausibility in an era when the Ilkhans were infidels and the rival court in Cairo posed as the potential saviour of the Islamic world. Already, on the fall of Baghdad, a number of prominent Muslims had fled from Iraq into the Mamlūk dominions. We saw in the previous chapter how Baybars wrote to some of the Ilkhan’s principal vassals to encourage them to revolt, and how the sons of Bard al-Dīn Lu’lu’ took part in the doomed expedition of Baybars’ puppet Caliph al-Mustanṣir to Iraq. In 662/1264 Hülegū lost a trusted lieutenant when Jalāl al-Dīn, the son of Mujāhid al-Dīn Aybak, the last Caliph’s ‘Lesser Dawâtdâr’, raised a force of almost 1,500 Qipchaq horsemen under the pretext of recruitment for the war against the Jochids in the Caucasus, but then absconded with them to Egypt. The Akhbār-i mughūlān tells us that Hülegū’s chagrin at this setback brought on the illness that killed him.¹⁹² Prominent Muslims continued to flee to the Mamlūk realm during the remainder of the century.¹⁹³ As a result, the Ilkhans were on the alert for further acts of betrayal. Correspondence with the Mamlūks was among the accusations against both Juwaynī brothers, and a similar suspicion cost Jamāl al-Dīn Dastjirdānī his life in 695/1296.

Life for the highest-ranking Muslims under the pagan Ilkhans was therefore far from easy (nor, for that matter, would it be any more comfortable under their Muslim successors).¹⁹⁴ The death or overthrow of an Ilkhan exposed leading officials to grave danger. Although, following the elimination of Tegüder Aḥmad, Arghun allowed Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī to return to court, he had evidently not forgotten the charges against the Ṣāḥib-dīwān, and Juwaynī too was executed only a few months later. In Ṣafar 690/February 1291 a coterie of Mongol notables headed by Taghchār did not even wait for Arghun’s death to eliminate Sa’d al-Dawla and his associates, but tried and executed them while the Ilkhan was incapacitated by his final illness.
It is a testimony to the vulnerability of the Ilkhans’ chief ministers (both before and after the conversion to Islam in 1295) that, as Ḥamd-Allâh Mustawfî takes care to point out, only one wazir – Tâj al-Dîn ’Āli Shâh, at the remarkably late date of 724/1324 – is said to have died of natural causes. Yet the interval between demotion and execution varied considerably. Whereas Jalâl al-Dîn Simnânî was put to death in mid-Rajab 688/August 1289, less than two months after his removal from office, his predecessor Fakhr al-Dîn Mustawfî Qazwînî remained at large for perhaps as long as four years. Two incumbents, Jamâl al-Dîn Dastjîrdânî and Ṣadr al-Dîn Aḥmâd Khâlîdî Zanjâni, did not merely survive their first dismissal, but lived to occupy the wazirate again (in Ṣadr al-Dîn’s case, twice). Sharâf al-Dîn Mukhliṣ Simnânî, removed in 695/1296 for the second time, just before Dastjîrdânî’s execution, was sent off in 698/1299 to be governor of Fârs. We are not told how long he retained this position, and it is possible that he died naturally; if so, Tâj al-Dîn ’Ālî Shâh’s record was unique only among incumbent wazirs.

The Ilkhans’ chief ministers naturally sought to buttress their position by installing their sons, other kinsmen and allies in key positions in the provinces. Of Shams al-Dîn Juwaynî’s sons, two were singled out for office and distinction. Bahâ’ al-Dîn Muḥammad received the governorship (hukûmat) of Iṣfahân, Yazd and most of Ḥirâm-i ‘Ajâm on Abagha’s accession; Waṣṣâf saw Bahâ’ al-Dîn’s death in Sha’bân 678/December 1279, before he reached the age of thirty, as presaging the decline of his father’s affairs. The other son, Sharâf al-Dîn Hârûn, honoured in 670/1271–2 with the hand of a daughter or granddaughter of the last ’Abbasid Caliph al-Musta’ṣim, followed his uncle ’Alâ’ al-Dîn as governor of Baghdad. Jalâl al-Dîn Simnânî is said to have promoted his kindred. In early Sha’bân 688/late August 1289 Sa’îd al-Dawla distributed a number of provinces to his close relatives and other Jewish functionaries: Baghdad and Iraq to his brothers Muhadhîhb al-Dawla and Fakhr al-Dawla, Diyâr Bakr to another brother Amîn al-Dawla, and Fârs to Shams al-Dawla. Waṣṣâf comments sardonically that only the presence of Ghazan and Gaikhatu in Khurâsân and Anatolia respectively prevented him from allocating these territories also to his ‘ignorant kinsfolk (juhhâl-i aqribâ). On first attaining the dignity of wazir, Jamâl al-Dîn Dastjîrdânî, similarly, conferred the governorship of Baghdad and Iraq on his brother ’Imâd al-Dîn Îrân Shâh, of whose good government Ibn al-Fuwaṭî speaks highly. Such relatives and confederates usually shared the chief minister’s fate.

Changes of sovereign, and the shifting fortunes of major figures at the centre, were reflected in the provincial administration. Baghdad, which
successive wazirs were careful to allot to trusted relatives and about which we learn so much from *al-Ḥawādith al-jiang’a*, may serve as an example. In 683/1284, after the Juwaynīs’ fall, Arghun installed a new regime under the overall supervision of Buqa’s brother Aruq. *Tümsege was appointed as shihna, in which capacity he made Sa’ld-Dawla his deputy (nā’ib) and chamberlain; Majd al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. *Ali Ibn al-Athīr, ‘Ala’ al-Dīn Juwaynī’s former deputy, was made his colleague and Sa’ld-Dīn Muẓaffar Ibn al-Mustawfī Qazwīnī comptroller of finances (mushrif).204 In the following year Sa’ld-Dīn was replaced by Tāj al-Dīn ‘Alī b. *Jukaybān.205 These functionaries belonged to the party that had opposed the Juwaynīs. But Aruq soon manifested a strong desire to surround himself with his own nominees, whom Hend Gilli-Elewy has identified as one-time supporters of the Juwaynīs. He executed Majd al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, Sa’ld-Dīn Muẓaffar and Tāj al-Dīn ‘Alī, replacing the last-named as mushrif with Nāṣir al-Dīn Qutlugh Shāh, the son of a servant (bandazāda) of ‘Ala’ al-Dīn Juwaynī.206 Then in 687/1288, on Arghun’s dismissal of Aruq,207 a fresh group of officials was despatched to Baghdad, comprising Ordo Qaya as military commander and Baidu Sükürchi as shihna, with Sharaf al-Dīn Simnānī as malik and Sa’ld-Dawla as auditor (mustawfī).208 On Sa’ld-Dawla’s meteoric rise to the wazirate (688/1289), steps were taken to remove Aruq’s appointees. Qutlugh Shāh, who had remained in the city as a bitikchi, was among those hauled to Tabrīz and executed; he may have been among the bitikchis who, in Rashīd al-Dīn’s version, had supposedly obstructed the efforts of the new regime to increase the revenues.209 Sharaf al-Dīn Simnānī, at one time Sa’ld-Dawla’s superior in Baghdad, had already been dismissed as ṣāhib-diwān of Iraq.210

The Juwaynī family seems to have been especially unfortunate, as the object of a virtual purge over the few years following Shams al-Dīn’s execution. Four of his sons were put to death not long after their father. In 685/1286 Aruq executed another son, Hārūn, only seven days after the death of his wife.211 Three years later, as part of the purge of Aruq’s appointees, Arghun – or perhaps, rather, Sa’ld-Dawla – had ‘Ala’al-Dīn’s son Manṣūr and all Shams al-Dīn’s remaining sons put to death, with the exception of one who was safely absent in Abkhazia.212 Sa’ld-Dawla’s own downfall in 690/1291 was the signal for the brutal execution of his two brothers in Baghdad.213 But not all the officials who shared his fate were Jews: they included his Muslim deputy, the mustawfī ’Izz al-Dīn-i Jalāl (‘Izz al-Dīn Muḥammad Tustarī).214 Dastjirdānī’s nā’ib in Baghdad did not long survive the deposed wazir’s execution in 695/1296.215 So too Şadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālidī Zanjānī was followed to the scaffold in 697/1298 by
his brother, the chief qadi Quṭb al-Mulk (Quṭb al-Dīn), and their cousin Qiwām al-Mulk.\(^{216}\) There were, however, occasional exceptions to this pattern. Although Saʿd al-Dawla’s execution was even accompanied by a pogrom against the Jewish community at large, Waṣṣāf sees fit to mention that his kinsman Shams al-Dawla, who had earned a good name through his beneficent administration in Shīrāz and his respectful treatment of Muslim notables and ‘ulama, suffered no such reprisals but was retained in office under Gaikhatu.\(^{217}\)

The bureaucracy lacked any esprit de corps, and Tājīk solidarity did not, apparently, extend beyond the kin group (or, at most, beyond the ranks of those originating from the same city). ‘Ala’ al-Dīn Juwaynī’s deputy in Baghdad, Majd al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, is found among those who interrogated him in 680/1281 at the instigation of Majd al-Mulk.\(^{218}\) The fact that Amīr ‘Ali Tamghāchī (governor of Tabrīz), Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī and Ḥusām al-Dīn the hājīb owed their advancement in Abagha’s reign to Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī did not inhibit them from working on Buqa to desert him and bring about his fall under Arghun.\(^{219}\) Dastjīrdānī was brought down when Shaykh Maḥmūd Dīnawārī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Khālīdī Zanjānī ‘enticed’ a number of persons to inform against him.\(^{220}\) Ṣadr al-Dīn gained an unequalled reputation for intrigue against other figures in the Ilkhanid administration. He and his brother reportedly forged letters to incriminate Nawrūz, and he traduced Qutlugh Shāh and Nurin.\(^{221}\) Even when the execution of a Muslim official was ordered by the monarch, he might meet his end at the hands of his Tājīk rivals and accusers; in that eventuality, his fate was usually no less cruel than if he had been executed by the Ilkhan’s Mongol officers.

Mongol noyans too were embroiled in these struggles within the bureaucratic class. What mattered in the turbulent politics of the Ilkhanid court was not so much ethnicity or religious affiliation (though there is unambiguous evidence of rivalry between Muslim and Christian officials) as the close links that had often formed between Mongol and Persian grandees.\(^{222}\) In his vendetta against the Juwaynīs, Majd al-Mulk had the patronage of the noyan Yesū Buqa; in time, he also gained the backing of Taghachar, Ordo Qaya and Joshi.\(^{223}\) Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī enjoyed the friendship of Buqa right down until that noyan abandoned him during the early months of Arghun’s reign.\(^{224}\) Saʿd al-Dawla owed his rise to the patronage and cooperation of Ordo Qaya.\(^ {225}\) Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālīdī Zanjānī began his career as deputy to Taghachar and retained links with him right down until Ghazan’s reign, but it was the noyan Aqbuqa who helped him to attain the wazirate in 691/1292.\(^ {226}\) Some Muslim functionaries perished when a noyan
with whom they had been closely associated began to lose favour or was brought low. All three officials – Ḥusām al-Dīn Qazwīnī, Jalāl al-Dīn Simnānī and Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī – who served as Buqa’s deputies and secretaries (ba-niyābat-u kitābat) in the provinces were executed under Sa’d al-Dawla: Qazwīnī, accused of a shortfall in the tax yield from Fārs, at the end of 687/beginning of 1289; Simnānī, who was suspected of conspiring with Buqa against the Ilkhan but had temporarily been spared, in mid-688/1289 (after which, says Rashīd al-Dīn, Sa’d al-Dawla rose still higher); and Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī, whom Sa’d al-Dawla believed to have designs on the wazirate, in 689/1290. Dastjirdānī’s fate signalled Ghazan’s growing alienation from the wazir’s patron Nawrūz.

Conversely, prominent Mongols sometimes shared the fate of bureaucratic allies and protégés, for the Mongol establishment was itself a prey to faction and allegiances were as fluid as among the Tājīks. To take one example, a party comprising Buqa, Taghachar, Joshi, Qunchuqbal and Doladai Idechi, described as ‘guards (kazīktānān, i.e. members of the keshig) and attendants of Abagha Khan’, had supported Arghun’s claims in 681/1282, and had participated in his revolt against his uncle two years later. Ordo Qaya, who had been associated with Taghachar as early as 1280, likewise appears among Arghun’s party. But during the new reign fissures appeared within their ranks. First Buqa’s arrogance provoked the hostility of his former allies, who were joined by Toghan and Sulṭān Idechi. Then, following Buqa’s downfall and the rise of Sa’d al-Dawla, there was a further split among the confederates: Ordo Qaya had already worked closely with Sa’d al-Dawla, to whom he, Joshi and Quchan became principal aides. In 690/1291 Taghachar and his supporters put Joshi and Quchan to death just hours after Sulṭān Idechi, with whom they had also fallen out; they then arraigned and executed Ordo Qaya along with Sa’d al-Dawla. An Ilkhan’s downfall, moreover, could prove every bit as fatal for Mongol commanders as for Tājīk ministers. Aqbuqa, who had remained loyal to Gaikhatu to the end and had been arrested by Baidu’s supporters, was executed later during Baidu’s campaign against Ghazan; his brother Shiktür was put to death around the same time. Neither Taghachar nor Nawrūz survived long into Ghazan’s reign: Taghachar, having betrayed one master too many, was sent off to Rūm on some pretext and killed en route; Nawrūz, of whom Ghazan grew increasingly wary, was goaded into insubordination, fled east, and was handed over by the malik of Herat to Ghazan’s general Qutlugh Shah for execution.

The foregoing catalogue of careers prematurely terminated should therefore caution us against imagining that Tājīk servitors were singled out as the particular targets of Ilkhanid caprice. Mongol grandees (and the
word \textit{nuwwāb} in Waṣṣāf’s above-quoted passage may well refer to them) were no less likely to lose favour and be put to death; they were vulnerable to the same (sometimes fabricated) charges as were Muslim officials – and charges brought by Muslims. The Tājik lawyer ‘Abd al-Mu’min took the lead in accusing Aruq of misappropriating royal revenues in Baghdad, and Ṣadr al-Dīn Khālīdī Zanjānī convinced Ghazan that Nawrūz was secretly in league with the Mamlūk Sultan.\textsuperscript{235} On a rough estimate, of the forty-one men whose executions are mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn in his chapter on Arghun, sixteen belonged to the Turco-Mongol aristocracy: among them were Buqa, five of his sons and his brother Aruq, and the princes Jūshkeb, Hūlechū and Qara Noghai.\textsuperscript{236} Totals based on Waṣṣāf’s history would be still higher. A yet greater number of Mongol princes and noyans perished, each year on average, however, under the Muslim Ghazan, whereas the Tājik casualties of the reign were fewer: taking into account, again, only those reported by Rashīd al-Dīn, the victims numbered seven princes of the blood, thirty-one noyans and ten Tājik officials.\textsuperscript{237} The incidence of executions within the Mongol and Tājik elite appears to bear no relation to the current Ilkhan’s religious alignment.
There can be no doubt that the subjugation of a vast proportion of the Dar al-Islam by the Mongols was a traumatic experience for Muslims. It was not simply that the conquests were often attended by extensive destruction. Nor was it necessarily acts of tyranny that rendered the new rulers objectionable. The fact that they ruled from tents did not mark them off from their Saljuq predecessors either, since these monarchs had likewise practised what has been termed ‘an extramural kingship’. What mattered primarily, rather, was that the Mongol ruling elite were not Muslims. The majority of the conquered territories in the east listed by Jūzjānī (see p. 19) were now under infidel rule for the first time since their reduction by the Arab Muslims in the seventh and eighth centuries. Only for Transoxiana and (to a lesser extent) Khwārazm was this no new experience; and there the yoke of the infidel Qara-Khitai had been a light one in comparison to what now confronted Muslims.

Muslim populations experienced Mongol rule as alien or oppressive in five respects in particular: (1) the importation of unfamiliar religious traditions that could not be reconciled with the Islamic dispensation; (2) the imposition of taxation that had no sanction in the Shari‘a; (3) the prohibition, in certain cases, of canonical Islamic practice or the enforcement of steppe customs that were contrary to it; (4) the appointment of non-Muslim personnel to higher administrative office; and (5) the even-handed treatment of all faiths (effectively entailing, therefore, a demotion of Islam from its previously commanding position). Since some attention was given in chapter 4 to the taxation system, I shall examine this topic relatively briefly and devote more space to the rest.
Alien religious traditions and Mongol pluralism

In the eyes of their Muslim subjects, the Mongols were polytheists, lacking any valid revelation or scriptures and (in contrast with the Qara-Khitai) untouched even by Chinese cultural norms. Their cultic practices fell into the category commonly termed, in our own day, ‘shamanistic’. Intent though they were on sharing the world only with vassal peoples, they also had to share it with a plethora of spirits, often malevolently inclined. They sought to protect themselves through the veneration of ancestors, most frequently represented by images (ongghod) made of felt and stationed at the entrance to the tent. The ‘religious specialist’ – the shaman (Mo. böge; Tu. qam) – was tasked with the care of these images, so that no offence might be given to the ancestral spirits. He also had to propitiate other spirits – those of the forests, rivers and mountains – with the same end in view. Human activity was accordingly regulated by certain taboos. It was necessary, for instance, to avoid treading on a threshold and to refrain from washing in running water or from washing garments by day during the spring and summer months; this latter prohibition sprang from the steppe nomads’ belief that such activities offended the spirits of the water, who retaliated by causing thunderstorms and lightning strikes which killed humans and livestock.² The shamans’ responsibilities included entering into trances in order to receive guidance from the spirit world, foretell the future or interpret dreams; healing the sick; and influencing the weather, that is usually bringing on snowstorms, hailstorms or rainstorms by means of a magical stone (the technique known in Turkish as yad or yat).³

Although ‘heaven’ (Tenggeri) was seen as a source of power and success (not least the power and success of the Mongol sovereigns), Mongols did not worship it: this was not the heaven of the Muslims or Christians, but simply denoted the sky and the atmosphere.⁴ Nor – despite a tendency by scribes in the Mongol chancery, or Christian and Muslim writers, to render Tenggeri by Deus, Allāh or Khudā (see below, p. 374, for instance) – did the term represent the God of the great monotheistic religions. As Carpini perceived, Mongol cultic practice related to conditions in this world, and had nothing to do with the salvation in a future life towards which those religions were directed.⁵ Like earlier steppe societies, the Mongols conceived of the afterlife simply as a continuation of life on earth, and buried goods with the dead; though Hülegü was the last Chinggisid in Iran known to have been interred with live slaves.⁶

With the expansion of their dominions, the trust that the Mongols placed in shamans was extended to holy men of other faiths. In Juwayni’s
words, the ‘learned and pious’ within each confession were singled out for especially honourable treatment, on the grounds that all religions represented alternative paths ‘to the court of God’. From Möngke’s reign at least, certain officials were given particular responsibility for the affairs of ‘imams, sayyids, ascetics (fuqarā’), the Christians and the holy men (ahbār) of every faith’. Various impulses underlay such benevolence. One was a desire to use them as intermediaries with the conquered population: ‘Have you won over the common people for me?’, Chinggis Khan had written to the Daoist adept Changchun. Another purpose was that they should make use of their perceived expertise in magic to pray for the longevity, health and good fortune of the qaghan and the imperial family. When the Ilkhan Gaikhatu fell ill early in 691/1292, the Muslim ‘ulama and imams, the Christian monks, the Catholicoi and bishops, and the Jewish elders were assembled and ordered to pray for his recovery. Chinggis Khan and his dynasty evinced a strong interest in any means of prolonging life; it is no accident that physicians like Sa’d al-Dawla and Rashid al-Dīn could rise so high in the administration.

In return for their prayers, holy men were effectively granted *darkhan* status, that is, they were not registered in the census and were exempted from forced labour, military service and payment of the *qubchur*, the capitation-tax (although any economic activity in which they engaged was taxed). These privileges were not, apparently, extended to the Jewish and Zoroastrian religious establishments, in all likelihood because neither faith had the good fortune to be a religion of state; but they applied to the Muslim scholar, imam, qadi and shaykh, and even to the sayyid, just as to the Christian monk and cleric or to the Buddhist priest (Tu. tüyin, from Ch. *daoren*, ‘man of the path’) and monk (Tu. bakhshī). It is worth noting, incidentally, that the new dispensation may have made no significant difference, in fiscal terms, to Christian clergy and monks, since there is evidence that the Saljuqs of Iran and Anatolia – influenced, no doubt, by their own steppe background – had exempted them from the *jizya*, the poll-tax paid by subject non-Muslims (dhimmis: see below). Unfortunately, however, we know too little regarding the Christians’ position in Iran during the turbulent Khwarazmian interlude preceding the Mongol invasion, to be able to reach a judgement.

The privileging of the ‘holy men’ within certain confessions is to be distinguished from the freedom of worship extended to all religious groups (conditional, of course, on political obedience). Chinggis Khan, who himself, from Juwayni’s vantage point, adhered to no faith, had promulgated a yasa that his descendants should not favour one religion over
any other. In territories formerly under Muslim rule this policy meant an end to the subordinate position of the dhimmis – Christians and Jews. That was bad enough; but it also entailed something still more obnoxious to Muslims, the patronage and practice of idolatry – that is, of Buddhism, a faith not represented in Iran, at least, since the ninth century and one whose devotees were emphatically not among the ‘People of the Book’ (ahl al-kitāb), namely Christians and Jews living under Muslim regimes. Rubruck, who enquired of the Muslims at Qayaligh about this, to him, hitherto unknown religion, reports that they were scandalized and refused to discuss it. Yet there was evidently some dialogue between representatives of the two faiths, since ‘Alā’al-Dawla Simnānī is known to have triumphed in a debate with Buddhist monks; and later, recalling his experiences during Arghun’s reign, he identified several points on which Buddhists and Muslims were close to one another and recognized that bakhshīs who had attained enlightenment viewed idolatry as a sin. Juwaynī felt able to give a brief but not totally unappreciative account of Buddhist doctrine.

Buddhists appear to have migrated into the Ilkhanate in significant numbers from China, the Uighur and Tangut territories, Tibet and Kashmir following the Mongol conquest; many of them may have come from the appanages that Hülegū and his brothers held in Tibet. He and his immediate successors, who placed great confidence in Buddhist priests and monks, commissioned the construction of Buddhist pagodas, of which the earliest seems to have been at Labnasagut, close to the Ilkhān’s summer quarters at Alatagh. The future Ilkhans Gaikhatu and Ghazan were both reared in a Buddhist milieu. Gaikhatu was given the Buddhist name Īrinjīn Dūrjī (Tibetan Rin-chen rDo-rje, ‘jewel diamond’). While governor of Khurāsān, Ghazan, who in infancy had been entrusted to a small group of Buddhist monks, set up pagodas in Khabūshān (Qūchān). The remains of rock-cut Buddhist complexes have been identified in the vicinity of Marāgha and of Qongqur Üleng (the site of the later capital, Sulṭāniyya), both settlements that functioned as royal residences. Hülegū favoured the bakhshīs for their skills in alchemy, and his chief wife, the Nestorian Christian Doquz Khatun, proved unable to wean him off this dependence to the day he died. His grandson Arghun, who enthusiastically supported them, died as the result of a life-prolonging drug prepared for him by a bakhshi from India. Rashīd al-Dīn reports that untold sums of money had been spent on the numerous alchemists who thronged to Arghun’s court from far and wide.
Uncanonical taxation

To recapitulate briefly what was said earlier about taxation: within the Dar al-Islam the Mongols retained all but one of the canonical taxes in existence at the time of the conquest: the *kharāj*, or tax on agricultural yields (or where appropriate, the *ʿushr* or tithe), and the *zakāt*, the obligatory payment of a percentage of one's income in alms. The exception was the *jizya* (below). But the conquerors also introduced new taxes over and above the existing ones. Disregarding for the moment the *qalan*, the significance of which is obscure but which, in certain contexts, meant some kind of obligatory labour service, two more specific Mongol imposts can be identified: the *tamgha*, or tax on commercial transactions; and the *qubchur*, which originally denoted the occasional levies made on the nomads' livestock but from the accession of the Qaghan Möngke was also, confusingly, applied to a head-tax on the Mongols' sedentary subjects (see pp. 112–13).

However objectionable as a tax not sanctioned in Islamic law, the *tamgha* at least would have appeared rather more familiar to the conquered Muslims, since Muslim princes had intermittently raised revenue from such sources until strident denunciation by scholars and jurists, or a pressing need to cultivate their subjects' good will, obliged them (often temporarily) to discontinue the expedient. The Ilkhans too were flexible: during a visit to Baghdad in 672/1273–4 Abagha issued instructions for a reduction of the *tamgha* and the removal of other burdens on the populace. The *tamgha* appears to have been levied on the Ilkhan's various territories at different stages, since we are told that it was first introduced in Anatolia in 676/1277.

The *qubchur*, however, bore a distressing resemblance to the *jizya*, the poll-tax traditionally collected from the ‘People of the Book’ or ‘Protected Ones’ (dhimmis). Juwayni spoke of the Khwārazmshāh's resentment of the *jizya* (clearly tribute) due to the Qara-Khitai, and Ibn Naẓīf had employed the term, no doubt as one of opprobrium, for the taxes the Mongols imposed on newly conquered Transoxiana. It is perhaps because of this association that the *qubchur* came to epitomize pagan oppression and figures especially prominently among the laments of Muslim writers, notably the poet Pūr-i Bahā. Like the *jizya*, the *qubchur* was payable by all adult males other than priests, monks and other ‘religious’; and an encyclopaedic work composed in the mid-fourteenth century indicates that it was levied (at a special rate, perhaps) on craftsmen (*qubchūr-i muhtarifa*). In Iran the *qubchur* would survive the adoption of Islam by the Ilkhan Ghazan (see pp. 365–6).

During the early decades of Mongol rule, at least, taxation was relatively unsystematic, so that we read of ‘extraordinary’ or ‘occasional’ levies
(‘awāridāt), which were frequent and haphazard. Combined with the other imposts listed above, they made for an extremely heavy burden and imperilled the peasants’ livelihood. It can hardly have consoled them that, if Juwaynī is to be believed, the nomads too were accustomed to pay such extraordinary contributions, as they did the qubchur, without complaint.30 ‘Awāridāt were commonly the recourse of fiscal officers like Sharaf al-Dīn, who was under pressure to meet a predetermined sum for the revenue and whose conduct during Arghun Aqa’s governorship in the 1240s is described by Juwaynī. But from the same author’s account of the situation at Möngke’s accession, it appears that these exactions were to be laid partly at the door of official couriers (elchis) and of ortaq merchants who had entered into contracts with members of the dynasty – both alike groups who felt entitled to take whatever they needed or wanted from any region on their route.31 Here taxation merged with oppressive measures of other kinds, namely the seizure of goods by elchis and the attendants of administrative officers, the drafting of animals for the yam (the relay network) or for the conveyance of elchis, and the billeting of troops. This situation was still prevalent in the Ilkhanate at Ghazan’s accession; at any rate Rashīd al-Dīn catalogues these abuses and draws attention to Ghazan’s efforts to eradicate them. What we have to bear in mind in this context, however, is that such impositions were no new phenomenon, having been the practice under Muslim dynasties such as the Saljuqs.32

Attempts were made to remedy the situation. In Transoxiana, under Mas‘ūd Beg’s administration,33 and in northern Iran, early in the Qaghan Möngke’s reign, we are told that ‘awāridāt were prohibited. But it is far from certain that the improvement was more than temporary. The Ḥawādith al-jāmi’a describes repeated efforts to extort large sums from Baghdad. In 677/1278–9, having received an order to raise 50,000 dinars from the city and its dependencies by way of an ‘aid’ (musā’ada), the governor, ’Alā’ al-Dīn Juwaynī, set about the task in an allegedly violent and tyrannical manner.34 Four years later it was Arghun, the future Ilkhan, smarting from his failure to be elected on his father’s death, who oppressed the city in this fashion.35 Then, at the onset of 687/1288 the noyan Ordo Qaya and Sa‘d al-Dawla arrived in Baghdad, demanding the surrender of all decrees (farāmin) and patents (paizas).36 In the wake of the disastrous experiment with paper currency in 693/1294, the wazir Ṣadr al-Dīn Khālīdī Zanjānī took extraordinary measures to remedy the parlous state of the royal finances, doubling the land-tax (kharāj), extracting the qubchur, and increasing the rates of the tamgha.37 And when, later that year, Baidu’s adherents made an attempt to confiscate the wealth of Gaikhatu’s appointee Sükürchi, the citizens of Baghdad were caught in the crossfire.38
The term *′awāridāt* is also used for specific taxes that were simply demanded far too frequently. Rashīd al-Dīn says that under Ghazan’s predecessors provincial governors had exacted the *tamgha* two or three times annually from the towns and a *qubchur* as often as twenty or thirty times in one year, and that the need to maintain and provision visiting *elchi* had served as a pretext for levying it yet again. Ghazan, we are assured, was determined to reform the taxation system in order not to grind down his subjects. The reforms, of course, were in all likelihood inspired, and were undoubtedly to be implemented, by Rashīd al-Dīn himself; and it is worth bearing in mind David Morgan’s warning that legislation is better evidence for the existence of the problem than for its remedy and that one of Ghazan’s chief ministers may not be the most reliable source for the removal of these practices. Sayfī describes how in 716/1317 Yasa’ul, the governor of Khurāsān, imposed a special levy of 300,000 dinars on the population of the province to celebrate the marriage of his daughter. In the following year an Armenian manuscript colophon complains of arbitrary taxes levied on Christians and ‘Tājiks’ alike by marauding Mongol bands. It seems that Ghazan’s reforming edict had changed little.

**The clash between Islamic norms and steppe customary law**

The advent of infidel rule also made itself felt in the sphere of law. Muslim client princes or officials could now find themselves subject to a Mongol court of inquiry (*yarghu*), which adjudicated disputes and investigated cases of sedition or peculation. It was doubtless of little moment that Mongols too fell within its competence. What was of salient importance was that the law administered by the *yarghu* was not the Shari’a. We should not exaggerate the novelty, or the harshness, of this situation: Muslim rulers had long administered a secular form of justice, commonly referred to as *siyāsa*; but its sentences had at least been pronounced by Muslims and could be (and frequently were) challenged by Muslim jurists. Those *yarghus*, admittedly, that heard cases relating to disputes within the client state of Kirmān seem to have attended to local law and custom. The paragraphs that follow, however, will examine the ways in which non-Muslim law jeopardized in particular the very practice of Islam.

The pluralist attitude of the Mongols has often been seen as a precocious religious tolerance; and this image might easily be deemed to find support in our sources. In the eighteenth century Edward Gibbon could salute Chinggis Khan as a precursor of enlightened despotism:
The Catholic Inquisitors of Europe, who defended nonsense by cruelty, might have been confounded by the example of a Barbarian, who anticipated the lessons of philosophy, and established by his laws a system of pure theism and perfect toleration.46

True, conditions of worship for the conquered Muslims were in some respects more favourable than for their co-religionists in Western Europe after 1311, when the Council of Vienne would prohibit even the call to prayer by the *mu'adhdhin*.47 Muslims may have fled in great numbers before the Mongol conquerors to preserve their lives or movable property; but unlike twelfth-century Ḥanbalī Muslims living in the Nablus region under Frankish rule,48 those who remained did not have to choose subsequently whether to emigrate as a religious duty in order to fulfil the proper requirements of Muslim worship. Although mosques may have been burned or otherwise damaged during the Mongol campaigns, they were not deliberately destroyed or turned into churches, as had transpired in some of the cities taken over by the crusaders. The Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, for instance, was not – as one Frankish source claims – converted into a church at the instigation of Bohemond VI of Antioch, who had accompanied Kedbuqa into the city in 1260.49

Nevertheless, the new masters of Asia did not simply permit the observance of all faiths without let or hindrance. Certain laws (Mo. *jasagh*; Ar.-Pers. *yāsā*) promulgated by Chinggis Khan, and reissued by his successors, fall into two categories: they enforced steppe custom or prohibited practices that contravened it. Some of these impinged in no uncertain manner on Muslim religious observance. It is bizarre that many historians since Gibbon have become so fixated on the idea of Mongol ‘toleration’ (not uncommonly equated with indifference) as to ignore completely the incompatibility between such edicts and the untrammeled practice of the Islamic faith.50

Let us take the sphere of marriage as a doorway into steppe custom that is known to have been imposed in some degree on the Mongols’ sedentary subjects. Various infidel members of Hülegü’s line (the Ilkhans Abagha, Arghun, Gaikhatu and Baidu, and Abagha’s brother Mengü Temür) married Muslim princesses (see pp. 259–60). In each of these instances the union was already contrary to the Shari’a, as marriage to an infidel was forbidden.51 And such marriages could lead to further breaches. It was as Mengü Temür’s widow that in 685/1286–7 the Salghurid princess Ābish, albeit an upright and orthodox Muslim, was buried ‘in the Mongol fashion’, as Waṣṣāf informs us, with gold and silver vessels full of red wine alongside her in the grave.52
The Mongols practised levirate marriage, whereby a widow could be married to her late husband’s son by a different wife, to his younger brother or to a more junior kinsman (e.g. the son of a younger brother, but not of an older one). Observed among the steppe peoples for several centuries past, it was viewed as falling within the category of law and not just that of custom, since Rashīd al-Dīn expressly says that Hülegū inherited the wives of his father Tolui (including the celebrated Doquz Khatun) ‘in accordance with the yasa’ (ba-rāḥ-i yāsāq). Levirate marriage was sometimes used in relation to client dynasties as a vehicle for maintaining imperial control, as when one of Chinggis Khan’s daughters married three princes of the Önggüt ruling dynasty in turn.

There is evidence that the Mongols sometimes enforced the levirate on their subjects at large. In Yuan China it was imposed on Han Chinese in general – and also, we should note, on Muslims resident in China – for a brief period (1271–6) during Qubilai’s reign. Here it may reflect not merely a concern for the economic interests of the husband’s family, but also the principle that the son or younger brother should inherit all the dead man’s assets so as to be able to meet also his military and tax obligations; and indeed the measure coincided with the final military push against the independent Song dynasty in the south. But elsewhere in the non-Muslim world, the known cases involved the higher levels of society – a princely couple in Christian Rus’, for example, in 1246.

Marriage to a widowed stepmother was expressly forbidden in the Shari’a. Insofar as the sources show the practice being observed in the Muslim territories under Mongol rule, the persons involved are usually infidels – members of the imperial dynasty and of elite Mongol families. But in one case, certainly, the Mongol noyan was a Muslim. In addition, there is some limited evidence that high-ranking Muslims were on occasion expected to observe the levirate during the era of infidel rule in both the Jochid dominions and the Ilkhanate. Pādishāh Khatun, of the Qutlugkhanid dynasty in Kirmān, became the wife first of Abagha and then of his son Gaikhatu; on the latter occasion, Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī describes the union as ‘in the Mongol fashion’ (ba-rāḥ-i mughūli). When the exiled Saljuq Sultan of Rūm, ’Izz al-Dīn Kaykāwūs, died in the Crimea in 677/1278–9, his host Mengü Temür, khan of the Golden Horde, put pressure on the dead prince’s son Mas’ūd to marry his Mongol stepmother Örbei Khatun. Mas’ūd, who found such an innovation (bid’a) repellent, saw no alternative to emigration and took ship for Anatolia and the Ilkhan’s dominions. But his stepmother, unwilling to be parted from him, soon followed in his wake and was received with honour at Abagha’s court; and
Masʿūd had married her, possibly on Abagha’s orders, by 681/1282.63 Since the lady was a daughter of the late khan Berke, both parties to this marriage were almost certainly Muslims.64

In contrast with both the Christian and Confucian traditions, Islamic law did not object to other forms of levirate marriage as it did to union with a stepmother, and we might note that Muslim princes in the pre-Mongol era had occasionally married the widow of a brother or an uncle.65 But union with a widowed sister-in-law nevertheless appears to have been frowned upon. When mentioning how Hülegü in 662/1264 ordered the daughter of the vanquished rebel, Saljūq Shāh of Fārs, to be married to the prince Nuṣrat al-Dīn Ibrāhīm of Shabānkāra, brother and successor of Niẓám al-Dīn Hasanūya (who had just been killed), Waṣṣāf says that it was in accordance with ‘the Mongol yasa’. This may possibly imply that she had been married, or at least promised, to Niẓám al-Dīn; Waṣṣāf also appears to imply that the yasa was relevant specifically because Niẓám al-Dīn had perished while fighting in the Ilkhan’s service (dar kūch-i īlkhānī), which raises an interesting distinction in this context. Describing how the princess, after Nuṣrat al-Dīn’s death (664/1266), was married to a third and a fourth brother in turn, Waṣṣāf clearly expresses his repugnance, terming it unlawful wedlock (izdiwāj-i maḥram).66

Of the rulings that forbade certain practices because they conflicted with nomadic custom, two, potentially, bore down especially hard upon Muslims. The prohibition of washing in running water touched directly upon the Muslim ablutions (ghusl). In this connection, a story about the Qaghan Ögödei must have been widespread, since it is relayed (independently) by both Juwaynī and Jūzjānī. The Qaghan was out riding with his brother Chaghadai – always portrayed as an uncompromising upholder of Mongol law – and saw a Muslim performing his ablutions in a stream. Knowing that Chaghadai would demand the death penalty, Ögödei postponed judgement, privately instructed the Muslim to pretend that he was searching for a silver ingot (bālish) that he had dropped, and had an ingot placed in the stream during the night. When the case came before him the next morning, he had the ingot retrieved, and pardoned the Muslim on the grounds that his purpose had not been to contravene the yasa and that poverty had forced him to put his life at risk; the man was even presented with ten more ingots from the Qaghan’s own treasury, though he had to give a written undertaking not to repeat the offence.67

The other yasa in this category prohibited the Muslims from slaughtering animals by slitting the throat, and required them instead to employ the Mongol method, which involved cutting open the breast and squeezing
the vital organs. Muslims, as members of the *semuren* class (see p. 223), had enjoyed considerable favour in the early years of the Yuan. In an edict of 1280, however, the Qaghan Qubilai forbade Muslims and the 'Protected People' (in this context, presumably, Jews) in China to slaughter animals in their usual manner; slaves were encouraged to denounce masters who infringed the edict, and were promised their freedom in reward. Muslims were additionally forbidden to practise circumcision, to marry their relatives, or to recite the five prayers each day. According to both Rashīd al-Dīn's account and the Chinese sources, Qubilai's clampdown on Muslims was sparked off by the refusal of some Muslim merchants visiting his court to eat the meat he offered them, on the grounds that it was carrion. But in all likelihood it was inspired more by political than by religious considerations – a reaction against the prominence of Muslims in the administration in recent years, designed to head off a possible revolt by the dynasty's Chinese subjects and perhaps to send a message to the newly conquered Song territories in particular.

Be that as it may, Qubilai's edict referred to an earlier proclamation by Chinggis Khan himself, who had allegedly told the Muslims: 'You are our slaves, yet do not eat our food. How is that right?' Here again there is a close linkage between the question of diet and the prohibition of the Muslim slaughter-ritual, which according to Juwaynī dated back to the early days of the empire. Now on this question the Mongols may not have been uniformly rigorous. Kirakos describes how in the 1230s the Mongol general Chormaghun gave a banquet for the vassal Armenian prince Avag and his entourage, comprising both clean and unclean meat. They rejected it; but far from exploding with rage, Chormaghun ordered that they be given food that was acceptable to them. It is, of course, possible that what was at issue here was the type of food rather than the method of killing.

Certain of Chinggis Khan's progeny, however, evidently took this matter rather more seriously. Although Jūzjānī's grim depiction of Chaghdaī's unyielding animosity towards Islam and its devotees is exaggerated (below, p. 319), he speaks of Muslims among Chaghdaī's subjects (*qabā'il*) being unable to practise the slaughter-ritual or even to recite the daily prayers, a detail strikingly reminiscent of Qubilai's later edict. This particular yasa is the subject of another of Juwaynī's stories about Ögödei's clemency. A pagan Qipchaq Turk who had followed a Muslim home from the bazaar reported him to the authorities for slaughtering an animal in his own house behind locked gates. The Qaghan concluded that the Muslim had not contravened the yasa, but that the Qipchaq had; the Muslim was spared and the Qipchaq was executed. The impression left by Ögödei's verdict is that only those
who performed the ritual openly were guilty of an offence. It is confirmed by what we are told of Qubilai’s clampdown on the Muslims in China. Rashid al-Din, who reproduces the gist of the Qaghan’s edict, tells us that Qubilai’s Christian adviser ‘Īsā Kelemechi and other ‘troublemakers’ took advantage of the Qaghan’s decision and introduced a supplementary order (yarlig) that no Muslim was to slaughter a sheep even within his own house, on pain of death. This detail, like the story about the Qipchaq informer, makes little sense unless we assume that the original enactment applied only to the public performance of the ritual.

Three problems emerge in the context of these enactments. (1) Were they really designed to apply beyond nomadic society, to the conquered sedentary populations? (2) Do our sources confuse law (yasa) with custom (yosun)? And (3) where, and for how long, were such decrees enforced? It will be as well to tackle the first two questions together. Ann Lambton, pointing out that in Iran the Mongols made no attempt to abolish the sharī courts, took the view that they did not try ‘to impose upon the subject population Mongol customary law to the exclusion of sharī law’. Professor Aigle has argued that the term yasa applied to matters to do with government and the military, whereas yosun denoted purely steppe tradition, and that Muslim authors – in contrast with outside observers such as Carpini – fail to distinguish them. In her view edicts relating to the security of Mongol rule, the maintenance of the yam, military discipline and so on were of universal application, whereas steppe custom was enforced on the subject populations only insofar as it bore on these important matters or where infraction risked incurring the anger of the spirits in the vicinity of the qaghan’s court. She points out that we should have heard more on the subject from Muslim authors had steppe customs been enforced on the Mongols’ Muslim subjects en masse.

We must remember, however, that of our principal Muslim authors Juwaynī visited the Mongolian homeland, while Rashid al-Din was for some years the Ilkhan’s chief minister and, in addition, relied closely for much of his information on oral testimony from the Ilkhan Ghazan and the high-ranking Mongol noyan, Bolod Chingsang (who had himself left China during the clampdown on Muslims) – neither of them likely to have been prey to the confusion posited by Aigle. If such a confusion existed, it could have arisen precisely from the Mongols’ enforcement of steppe custom, yosun, as law, yasa – which is what the phrasing of both Juwaynī and Rashid al-Din suggests was occurring. Admittedly, the yasas that Juwaynī specifically lists in his passage on Chinggis Khan’s edicts all relate to the sphere of state interests and military organization (above, pp. 115–16); so too do
those referred to in documents from Yuan China. But on the other hand, this is not true of the yasas regarding water or the slaughter of animals that are mentioned by Juwaynī, and repeated by Rashīd al-Dīn, in connection with Ögödei’s clemency. Although these anecdotes are all set in the vicinity of the Qaghan’s mobile encampments, Juwaynī states that for a time even in Khurāsān nobody dared to contravene the yasa prohibiting the slaughter of animals in accordance with the Shari’ā. To suggest, as does Aigle, that the prohibition was directed at Mongols, to prevent them from imitating the Muslims, is to ignore Juwaynī’s explicit statement that Muslims were obliged to eat carrion.

Earlier (pp. 92–3) we saw how the Mongols required those co-opted into the military – whether Uighurs, Kitan, Chinese or Muslims – to accommodate themselves, in some degree, to Mongol norms of dress or coiffure; there is evidence that Qubilai imposed these requirements on the ‘commoners’ and officials of the Song empire. The question arises, therefore, whether such personnel were also expected to conform to other Mongol customs. The reign of Ögödei – that supposedly benign and easy-going ruler – offers a particularly striking example, when the Qaghan ruthlessly punished a forest people, the Oyirat, for sanctioning marriage within the tribe, in defiance of the Mongols’ own custom of exogamy.

Let us turn to the third question: the duration of these prohibitions. Qubilai’s edict of 1280 asserts that the proscription of the Muslim slaughter-ritual had been discontinued since Güyük’s reign (which perhaps suggests that Juwaynī’s adulation of Möngke could have sprung from more than mere sycophancy). Yet that same edict also claims that Hülegü had reissued the enactment in Iran, commanding Muslims to eat the food of the Mongols; and the Armenian historian Grigor Aknerts’i may well preserve a muddled recollection of this when he alleges that the founder of the Ilkhanate ordered the Muslim population to eat pork. We have no other indication, however, that this particular yasa was imposed on the Ilkhans’ Muslim subjects. The evidence for the enforcement within Western Asia of yasas in this second category all comes from the early decades of Mongol rule, before 1265. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Abagha on his accession both declared Hülegü’s yasas inviolate and at the same time decreed that all groups were to retain the customs and usages (rusūm-u āyīn) of their forefathers, possibly this hints at a partial relaxation of Hülegü’s policy. On the other hand, we noticed earlier (p. 277) Waṣṣāl’s anecdote in which Abagha sadistically teased the Şāhib-dīwān Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī by offering him unclean meat. But rather than having any more general application, this unedifying tale is designed to illustrate Shams al-Dīn’s long-suffering character, and perhaps
otherwise points to nothing more than the vulnerability of a high-ranking Muslim administrator in an era when Iran was still under infidel rule.

The evidence at our disposal allows us to reach some tentative conclusions. Firstly, we know that the Mongols required some degree of cultural conformity from at least certain categories of their subjects, and this might on occasions have included the levirate. Secondly, the scope of some of the yasas directed against Islamic practice, at least, appears to have been more restricted than we have been led to believe: a distinction was made, for instance, between the public and the private performance of the Muslim slaughter-ritual. Thirdly, Mongol implementation of yasas that forbade particular Islamic practices or enforced conduct inimical to Islam may have varied from one region of the empire to another (perhaps between agrarian and pastoralist areas) and at different times (depending on the regime’s current assessment of its own strength). The era of Chaghadaü’s rule in Central Asia (and possibly adjacent parts of Khurāsān) and the seven-year oppression of Muslims in Qubilai’s China doubtless represented the nadir of Muslim fortunes. It is difficult to see how either the prohibition of the slaughter-ritual or the ban on washing in running water could have been enforced in areas where relatively few (or no) Mongol troops were stationed. If the impulse was primarily to avoid offending the local spirits, moreover, the need was possibly seen as less pressing within regions of sedentary culture. And in any case, fourthly, the enforcement of these customs-turned-edicts may well have been discontinued in Western Asia (for ordinary Muslims at least) following the accession of Möngke and have resurfaced in Iran, temporarily, under Hülegü.

The competition for office and influence: Sunnī Muslims, Shi’īs and dhimmis

The conquests of Chinggis Khan and his successors brought into the Dar al-Islam a great many administrative personnel from their eastern territories – Kitans, Chinese, Tangut and Uighurs – who were not Muslims and who could not be expected to favour Muslims and still less to implement the Shari’a. Both in its structure and in its techniques, the administration was now a pastiche derived from a number of non-Muslim as well as Muslim traditions. With the consolidation of their rule in Iran, and particularly in the wake of Hülegü’s invasion, the Mongols came to place greater reliance upon members of the indigenous Muslim bureaucratic cadre, men like Bahā’ al-Dīn Juwaynī, whose father had been šāḥib-dīwān to the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad b. Tekish, and his two more famous sons, Shams al-Dīn and
Muslims undeniably had access to higher stations in the Ilkhanid administration than were open to Han officials in Yuan China, where the traditional civil service examinations were discontinued and the scholar-gentry were debarred from the top offices. But on the other hand even within the ranks of the Ilkhanid bureaucratic class (sometimes termed *diwanis*) Muslim officials did not monopolize preferment. They were obliged to share power, to some extent, with those who belonged to rival faiths, principally Shi’is and representatives of the *ahl al-dhimma*, or – from the Muslim perspective – to no faith at all.

The advent of the new rulers offered enhanced opportunities to the Sunnī Muslims’ enemies. An incidental remark by Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī reveals that the Shi’is were already working to promote their own interests at Chormaghun’s headquarters when he was still in Khurāsān (and probably, therefore, not much later than 1230), and that a leading Sunnī scholar from Qazwīn was impelled to travel there and vanquish them, allegedly, by means of rational argument in the general’s presence (possibly a reference to the earliest known religious disputation held under Mongol auspices).88

We have seen how the Shi’i Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī was able to obtain high office under Hülegü. The Armenian bishop of Arzinjān, Mar Ḥasiyā Sargis (d. 675/1276), who enjoyed great favour with Abagha, was believed to exercise a baneful influence at the Muslims’ expense.89

Christian access to administrative positions was not totally unprecedented within the Islamic world, but it was now more common at the local level in Iraq and Mesopotamia. When the Mongol general Sandaghu took Jazīrat Ibn ’Umar in 660/1262, he placed a Christian in command.90 During the reigns of Abagha and Arghun the governorship of Mosul seems to have passed to and fro between Christian and Muslim. Raḍī’ al-Dīn Bābā, scion of a distinguished Qazwīnī family and malik of the city from 660/1262, was replaced some years later by a Christian named Mas’ūd. He subsequently accused Mas’ūd and the *shihna* Yoshmut of embezzlement and secured their dismissal and his own reinstatement; but when the matter was investigated he was unable to prove his case and was himself executed in 679/1280–1.91 When Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā completed his book *al-Fakhrī* in 701/1302, the governor of Mosul (on behalf of the Muslim convert Ghazan, we might note) was Fakhr al-Dīn ’Īsā, another Christian.92 Although no Christian rose to the apex of the bureaucracy, as wazir of the Ilkhanid empire, the Jew Sa’d al-Dawla held this exalted position for the last two years of Arghun’s reign, from 1289 to 1291.

Some of the opprobrium directed at the Mongols’ servitors comes from members of long-established official families like Juwaynī, whose dismissive
remark about those of humble birth, employed for no better reason than their knowledge of the Uighur script (pp. 110–11), was aimed as much at upstart Muslims like Sharaf al-Dīn Khwārazmī as at infidels.93 Bar Hebraeus declares that the Mongols made no distinction according to birth, religion, or even ability, merely appointing to office anybody who gave a large enough bribe.94 If we can trust the picture that Rashīd al-Dīn draws of conditions under Ghazan’s predecessors, countless pedlars and other nobodies (he singles out Jews for mention alongside Muslims) borrowed money with which they bribed officials into giving them receipts for bogus expenditure, or which they invested in fine clothes and mounts in order to present an appearance of wealth and secure a lucrative tax-farm.95 Yet the Mongols undoubtedly esteemed accomplishments other than proficiency in the Uighur script or superficial affluence. Familiarity with the Mongols’ approach to government was another important qualification: Kirmānī says that Arghun’s wazir, Jalâl al-Dīn Simnānī, was well versed in the principles of their customs and laws (yūsūn-ū yāsā).96 The Chinggisids’ interest in alchemy, divination and medicine,97 too, opened up avenues of advancement for those who could demonstrate the relevant skills: Kamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, for example, who had been an attendant (farrāsh) at the ‘Abbasid court and who came to exert such a strong influence over Tegüder Ahmad.98 The most famous of the Ilkhanid wazirs, Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh Hamadānī, who first rose to prominence as a cook (ba’urchi) in the service of the Ilkhan Gaikhatu, was similarly no representative of the Persian bureaucratic tradition but, like Sa’d al-Dawla, a physician by calling (though unlike him a convert from Judaism).99

The equitable treatment of all faiths

The edicts discussed above might have rendered it easy for Muslims to see the conquerors as anti-Muslim, much as the requirement, for example, that foreign envoys bow down to an image of Chinggis Khan was interpreted by Christian observers as pressure to deny their faith.100 But the Mongol sovereigns, in fact, were neither anti-Christian nor anti-Muslim. Their openness to the techniques demonstrated by religious ‘experts’ of whatever confessional tradition meant that they frequently showed favour towards Muslims along with the rest. There is evidence that the Ilkhans’ Mongol servitors played a part in upholding awqāf (sing. waqf), pious foundations endowed by Muslims for charitable purposes. A waqf document drawn up at Kirşehir in Anatolia in 670/1272 bears the names of a large group of Mongol officers and dignitaries, who undertook not to interfere with the foundation, on
pain of being struck by the punishment of the ‘Eternal God’; and a Mongol noyan is found endowing a sufi lodge near Ardabil in 692/1293. Members of the imperial dynasty likewise patronized sites associated with the major world religions, Islam included, and Muslim divines shared in their generosity. Juwaynî speaks warmly of the munificence of Môngke’s mother Sorqaqtani, a Nestorian Christian, in giving alms and gifts to Muslim imams and shaykhs and endowing a madrasa in Bukhârâ; though we know that her generosity extended to Buddhists and Daoists. Similarly Waṣṣâf describes Orqina, regent of Chaghadai’s ulus from 649/1252 to 658/1260 and an ‘idolator’ (presumably a Buddhist), as favourable towards Islam and Muslims.

Even-handedness of this kind, ironically, fostered the conviction that an individual ruler was especially well-disposed towards a particular faith. The Armenian writer Step’anos Orbelian, who apostrophized Hülegü and Doquz Khatun as the equals in piety of Constantine and his mother Helena, was by no means alone in his enthusiasm; other Eastern Christian writers spoke effusively of Hülegü’s affection for Christians. The impression can only have been reinforced by the first Ilkhan’s own efforts to point to Christian influences on himself and even on Chinggis Khan (below, p. 350). It is possible also that the triumph of Islam in the Ilkhanate after 1295 prompted Christian writers like Orbelian to look back with nostalgia on the preceding era as a golden age. In the late thirteenth century the apparent Christian leanings of various Ilkhanid queens inspired popes and Western missionaries with the notion that they might facilitate the conversion of their husbands. Such hopes were illusory. Years earlier, Rubruck had commented derisively on the sanguine expectations aroused among the different religious groups by the qaghan’s desire that each of them should pray for him: ‘He believes in none of them . . . And yet they all follow his court as flies do honey, and he makes them all gifts and all of them believe they are on intimate terms with him and forecast his good fortune.’

His narrative furnishes a vivid picture of the situation at Môngke’s court, where representatives of rival faiths jostled for favour and influence. Whether or not Mongol sovereigns deliberately encouraged such competition in order to divide and rule, this was undeniably the outcome.

We should distinguish the Mongols’ patronage of holy men of all confessions, and the attitudes that underlay it, from policy in its other aspects. As we have seen, they employed in their administration anybody with talents that could be useful to them, including both Muslims and recruits from hitherto despised minorities, a situation neatly (if somewhat acidly) summed up by Bar Hebraeus. But that did not mean that they evinced any greater favour
towards those minorities than towards Muslims. To read Christian sympathies into the appointment of, say, a Christian as governor of predominantly Muslim Mosul is to lose sight of Rubruck’s observation that the Mongols set ‘Saracen’ officials over Rus’ precisely because its people were Christians.\textsuperscript{108}

Caution is especially necessary in the Ilkhanid context where, in a unique constellation of circumstances, the troops of client Christian kings – those of Georgia, Imeretia and Lesser Armenia – took part in Mongol campaigns and the non-Mongol powers with whom the Ilkhans were in conflict were well-nigh exclusively Muslim. Hülegü may well have spared the Christian inhabitants of Baghdad in 1258, but in 1260, as we saw (pp. 168–9), those of Aleppo may have perished alongside the Muslims; and the Christians of one city who offended him by sheltering their Muslim fellow citizens shared their fate.\textsuperscript{109} He was furious, moreover, that the Armenian troops in his army had set fire to the chief mosque in Aleppo, and had many of them put to death.\textsuperscript{110} Nor should we confuse domestic with foreign policy. When the Dominican Riccoldo da Montecroce describes Arghun as ‘the worst of men, given to every kind of villainy, though a friend to the Christians’,\textsuperscript{111} he is not of course referring to the Ilkhan’s relations with his Christian subjects so much as his assiduous quest for an alliance with the Latin West against their mutual enemies, the Mamlûks.\textsuperscript{112}

The early Ilkhans were no exception to the pattern of behaviour observable in other Mongol sovereigns. Samuel Grupper’s thorough study of Ilkhanid Buddhism is marred, in my view, by the assumption that it betokened an exclusive commitment. As he himself rightly points out, Buddhist teaching does not frown upon the retention of practices acquired from a previous faith.\textsuperscript{113} The evidence suggests that the Ilkhans readily availed themselves of this licence, since their Buddhist sympathies by no means precluded a marked interest in other religions. Thus Abagha, for instance, celebrated the onset of Easter with the Christian community at Hamadân in Dhû l-\textit{Hijja} 680/March 1282, just a few days before his death.\textsuperscript{114} It is striking that Arghun, for all his Buddhist leanings and his reputation for hostility towards Muslims, attended Muslim festivals. When he arrived in Tabrîz towards the end of Rama\textsuperscript{ḍ}ân 688/early in October 1289, he ordered four pulpits to be erected for the ‘Īd festival and summoned the qadis, imams and the entire populace. The festival prayer was conducted with great pomp, and the qadis and the preacher (\textit{khaṭīb}) were rewarded after the ceremony was over.\textsuperscript{115} The pagan Ilkhans also visited the shrines of Muslim saints to invoke their help, particularly when on campaign. Abagha is said to have done so near Râdkân in 668/1270, en route to do battle with an invading Chaghadâyid army from Central Asia; in 683/1284 Arghun
himself prayed at the shrine of Shaykh Bāyazīd at Biṣṭām for victory over his uncle and rival, the reigning Ilkhan Tegüder Aḥmad; and Ghazan, early in his career, is shown frequenting a number of shrines in Khurāsān, including those of Shaykh Bāyazīd, of the Imam ‘Alī al-Riḍā at Ṭūs (Mashhad) and of Shaykh Abū Saʿīd b. Abī l-Khayr at Mayhana. And yet, whatever signs of favour individual Ilkhans might display, Muslims under Mongol rule now found themselves reduced to parity with Christians and Jews, who had hitherto enjoyed the status of second-class citizens in accordance with the venerable Covenant of ’Umar. The newfound equality of all faiths was especially conspicuous with regard to taxation and religious buildings. It entailed, firstly, the removal of the discriminatory jizya, the poll-tax traditionally levied on non-Muslims; although its abolition may have been delayed in tributary Muslim states, since Āqsarā’ī mentions bewilderment that the tax was nowhere mentioned in the diploma brought to Rûm for the new wazir, Fakhr al-Dīn Mustawfī Qazwīnī, early in Arghun's reign. In the second place, whereas the Covenant of ’Umar permitted only the restoration of churches and synagogues that had been damaged or demolished, the Mongols allowed Christians to build completely new religious edifices. From the 1230s the influential Nestorian monk Simeon Rabban-ata was instrumental in the construction of churches even in predominantly Muslim towns such as Tabrīz and Nakhchiwān. New churches would emerge also in Marāgha, Irbil and Baghdad during the early Ilkhanid era. Rashīd al-Dīn's suggestion that Hülegü, at least, permitted this under the influence of his Nestorian wife, Doquz Khatun, is suspect; the Ilkhan would surely have done so anyway, in view of Chinggis Khan's injunction to his descendants. Thirdly, Christians were now able to ring their church bells – again in defiance of Islamic law – and Muslims who reacted by removing and destroying the bells risked execution by the Mongol authorities, as in the Crimean town of Solghat in 1287. And lastly, some Muslim properties were reassigned to the Christian religious establishment. In newly captured Baghdad, the Nestorian Catholicos took over the palace of the Greater Dawātdār and certain other properties, including a Muslim hospice (ribāṭ) for women, and replaced the Islamic inscriptions with Christian texts. This rise in Christian fortunes prompted a thirteenth-century poet to lament that in Baghdad the Cross was now raised over the pulpit (minbar).

One further notable expression of a world-view that lumped together all faiths was the conquerors' handling of the delicate issue of awqāf. Awqāf continued to exist under Mongol rule and to be free of tax – in Juwaynī's words, 'excused and exempt (muʿāf-u musallam)'; though it is possibly
significant that in the treatise on finance which he addressed to Hülegü or Abagha, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī felt the need to stress the undesirability of encroaching on waqf property. One of Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-ʿUmarī’s informants would assure him that neither Hülegü nor his successors had misappropriated waqf land; the poor condition of some of these foundations was blamed instead on their overseers; and in an ode dedicated to ʿIzz al-Dīn Tāhir Faryūmadī, wazir of Khurāsān, in 669/1270, the poet Pūr-i Bahā lambasted one particularly unsuitable administrator (mutawallī). For Ann Lambton, however, al-ʿUmarī drew an unduly favourable picture: in her view, there was no policy of general and deliberate expropriation, but she adduced instances of its occurrence from the early fourteenth-century authors Waṣṣāf and Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī. Indeed, Waṣṣāf goes so far as to say that in his day (namely, the reign of the Muslim Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd) the majority of the awqāf in the Ilkhanate were in a state of ruin and their revenues had been misappropriated; while Nakhchiwānī writes of the confusion that had overwhelmed waqf affairs.

Nevertheless, even discounting the incidence of outright expropriation, the arrangements made for the administration of awqāf rode roughshod over the sensitivities of the Sunnī Muslim majority. Following Hülegü’s conquest of Iran and Iraq, his adviser Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī – a Twelver Shīʿī, we should recall, but also the author of various treatises expounding the doctrines of the hated Niẓārī Ismāʿīlīs – was given responsibility for all awqāf throughout the Ilkhanate. Ṭūsī appointed deputies in every province who forwarded to him 10 per cent of the income from pious foundations, with a view to the upkeep of his observatory at Marāgha, and he allegedly used his position to benefit the Shiʿa in particular. His sons, likewise Shiʿis, would succeed him. After a brief interval during the reign of Tegüder Aḥmad (see below, p. 367), the youngest, Fakhr al-Dīn Aḥmad (d. 700/1301), was put back in general charge of the awqāf on Arghun’s accession in 1284. From what Waṣṣāf tells us of the regime of the infidel Ilkhan Gaikhatu a decade or so later, Muslim charitable foundations were once again under the jurisdiction of the chief qadi, but by the time Ghazan invaded Syria in 1299 another of Ṭūsī’s sons, Aṣīl al-Dīn Ḥasan, was in charge of the awqāf. He may have been replaced on Öljeytü’s accession, but Aṣīl al-Dīn appears once more in his former office a few years later, when he was in conflict with Öljeytü’s powerful wazir Sa’d al-Dīn Sāwāji. Aṣīl al-Dīn apparently retained his position until his death on 17 Dhū l-Ḥijja 716/2 March 1317, since his representatives were removed only in 719/1319–20.

Still more unpalatable, however, was the fact that from Hülegü’s time the revenues of Islamic awqāf were made available for pious purposes within
the Christian and Jewish communities, at least until the reign of the Muslim convert Tegüder Ahmad (681–3/1282–4).  

It hardly matters whether the reverse was also true, since the religious foundations of the dhimmi minorities were likely, on average, to be less wealthy. We can discern the implementation of parallel measures during the brief Mongol occupation of Syria in 658/1260. In Rabī‘ I/mid-March, Hülegü had entrusted the administration of all awqāf in Syria, Mosul and the Jazīra to the newly appointed Shāfi‘ī grand qadi, Kamāl al-Dīn ʿUmar al-Tiflīsī. Kamāl al-Dīn was replaced two months later as grand qadi of Syria by Muḥyī al-Dīn Yaḥyā Ibn al-Zakī, and it is to his period in office that we should refer an episode which is described by an early fourteenth-century polemicist. Here we read how a Christian dignitary complained to Hülegü that all awqāf were run by the Muslims, who used them for their own profit, and how in response Hülegü sent back with him in Ramaḍān/August, less than a month before ʿAyn Jālūt, an edict (farmān) authorizing him to appropriate one-third of Muslim pious foundations. We lack other detailed evidence on measures of this kind.

But the stark contrast with the traditional duty of Muslim rulers regarding awqāf suggests a general policy of levelling-out, by promoting the interests of the religious minorities at the expense of the Islamic establishment. ʿImād al-Dīn ʿUmar Qazwīnī – praised for devoting the revenues of awqāf in Baghdad, immediately after its conquest, to the stipends of Muslim ulama, jurists and sufis – may have been one of a minority.

According to Juwaynī, even when Mongol princes and grandees personally adopted a particular religion, they still complied with Chinggis Khan's injunction, avoiding all fanaticism and treating all faiths on equal terms. Thus Batu's son Sartaq, who embraced Christianity, issued decrees that exempted not merely churches from taxation and forced labour but also mosques and their personnel. Likewise symptomatic of this restraint is the conduct of Hülegü's Nestorian general, the Naiman Kedbuqa, in Damascus in 1260. A Syrian author whose family resided there at the time tells us that Kedbuqa refrained from making his Christian sympathies obvious, out of deference to Chinggis Khan's edict. Yet in practice, of course, this was small comfort to the Muslim populace. When, later that year, an edict arrived from Hülegü officially granting the Christians freedom of worship, they engaged in all manner of excesses, publicly processing with the Cross through Damascus and splashing Muslims and their mosque with wine (and this during the holy month of Ramaḍān); and the sorely tried Muslims, on remonstrating with the Mongol commander of the citadel, not only failed to obtain redress but were thrown out. Small wonder that Ibn Wāṣīl transmits a rumour of the Christians' intention, in the event of a
Mongol victory over the Mamlūks, to have all mosques demolished and to do the Muslims great injury. Hysteria, possibly; but it surely seemed that the proper order of things had been completely inverted.

**The perceived threat to Islam under the new dispensation**

How great a shock infidel conquest dealt to Muslim sensibilities may perhaps be gauged from various tales that depict Muslims as the butt of derision from their enemies within other confessional traditions, notably Christians and Buddhists, or that portray those same enemies seeking to use their influence with the Mongols in order to bring about the downfall of Islam. The most striking story of all is supplied by Juwaynī, who tells us of a plot by Salindi, the *iduq-* *qut* of the Uighurs, and certain of his nobles to massacre all the Muslims in Beshbaligh and its neighbourhood, to loot their property and to enslave their offspring. The episode (or at least the trial and execution of the guilty parties) is dated to 650/1252–3 and is linked with the efforts of Ögödei’s line to overthrow Möngke. It appears both at a very early point in Juwaynī’s narrative and also much later, in the context of Möngke’s accession. The proposal is alleged to have come from Bala Bitikchi, an officer of the regent Oghul Qaimish (and thus representing Möngke’s opponents) who had been sent to Beshbaligh and had there been offered 50,000 men should they be needed. The news of Möngke’s accession (doubtless his second enthronement in the Onon-Kerülen region in 649/1251) is said to have arrived only after the plot had been hatched. The whole story is mystifying. The fact that the *iduq-qut*, his associates and Bala all confessed under torture hardly inspires confidence. Granted, Salindi may well have favoured the claims of Ögödei’s line over Tolui’s and have been prepared to assist them militarily. But as a context for the plan to kill a large number of Muslims, this is simply inadequate; the account reads like something concocted after the event by the new Qaghan’s party (or at least by Juwaynī’s informants at Möngke’s headquarters) in order to garner Muslim support.

Many of Juwaynī’s tales, as we have noticed, are among a series of anecdotes designed to illustrate the generosity and clemency of the Qaghan Ögödei and his sympathy towards Muslims. In one story a party of Chinese players stages a drama for the Qaghan in which an aged man with a turban is dragged behind a horse’s tail in order to convey the straits to which Muslims have been reduced by the Mongol conquests. On ascertaining their purpose, Ögödei has all manner of Muslim manufactures produced, contrasts them with the allegedly inferior products from China, and points out that whereas the poorest Muslim owns many Chinese slaves there are no Muslim slaves in
the houses of Chinese grandees. At another point, a Muslim unable to repay a debt of four silver ingots (bālish) to a Uighur noble is threatened with public punishment unless he apostatizes and becomes an idolator; when in his predicament he appeals to the Qaghan, the creditors are punished and the Muslim is given a Uighur wife and house and 100 bālish. In yet a third tale, an Arabic-speaking renegade (az munkirân-i din tâzî-zabâni) appears before Ögödei and claims that in a dream Chinggis Khan has told him to instruct the Qaghan to kill the Muslims because they are evil. His fraud is exposed when, in response to Ögödei’s enquiry, he confesses to an ignorance of Mongolian, the only language known to Chinggis Khan; whereupon the Qaghan has him executed. This tale even reached independent Delhi, since Jūzjānī relates it in very similar terms; although here the trickster is said to have been an idolator (tūyin, namely a Buddhist) who has been coached by Chaghadai, and Ögödei spares his life. Jūzjānī’s notice on Chaghadai accuses him of constantly urging the Qaghan to exterminate the Muslims.

Of Güyüg, who had allegedly been reared by the Nestorian Christian Qadaq, Juwaynī says that he showed great favour towards Christians and that no Muslim dared raise his voice against them during his reign. Jūzjānī has a fund of tales relating to this sovereign who, in contrast with his father, enjoyed the reputation of being especially hostile towards Islam and whom the idolator priests (tūyinān), we are told, constantly incited to persecute Muslims. In one, a tūyin prevails upon Güyüg to issue an edict for the castration of Muslims throughout the Mongol dominions so that they might in time become extinct. As he leaves the imperial court, he is attacked by one of the Qaghan’s fierce dogs, which tears off his genitals and kills him, thereby intimidating Güyüg, with the Mongols and other idolators present, into abandoning the project. In another anecdote, the tūyins, in conjunction with the Christians, demand a public debate with a Muslim imam on the respective merits of the three faiths. When the imam’s arguments prove too powerful for them, the tūyins require him to perform the call to prayer and the genuflections; and while he and his fellow Muslims are thus engaged, the idolators, with Güyüg’s encouragement, harass them by knocking their heads against the ground. The imam, in no way daunted, leaves for home only when he has completed the prayers. That night God avenges the Muslims by visiting a fatal disease upon the Qaghan.

The events described tend to be set in regions where Muslims were in a minority, rather than in territories where Islam was long-established. Stories of a different kind, however, have come down to us, testifying to conflicts between the Muslim majority and the newly emancipated dhimmi communities within the heartlands of Islam, where Muslims now found that the
protection of the Islamic state had been withdrawn. In a tale picked up by Marco Polo, the Christians of Samarqand remove a stone that belongs to the Muslims in order to build a new church and the Muslims demand it back; in this account, victory goes to the Christians by virtue of a divine miracle.\textsuperscript{159} When, after the fall of Baghdad, the Christians of Takrit asked for protection against their Muslim neighbours, the Mongol force that arrived in response killed several Muslims; though it is worth noting that the greater number of the Christians in turn were massacred when a Muslim brought to light the fact that they had made off with Muslim property and kept it hidden from the Mongols.\textsuperscript{160} Bar Hebraeus relates how in 1274 the Muslims of Irbil obstructed a bid by the Nestorian Catholicos to hold a public procession on Palm Sunday, even though the Christians were escorted by Mongol troops.\textsuperscript{161}

Clashes of this order may well have been common. One obvious context was that of apostasy from Islam. Specific information regarding conversions to Christianity is meagre. The Armenian historian Step'anos Orbelian casually lets slip that his mother had at one time been a Muslim but had converted;\textsuperscript{162} but such occurrences had long been relatively commonplace in the wake of princely marriage alliances. Nevertheless, we might well wonder how many apostatized from an impulse to sever links with the hitherto dominant faith. Bar Hebraeus speaks of an uproar in Baghdad in 1268 when the Nestorian Catholicos sought to baptize a Muslim from Takrit; the Catholicos, removed from danger by the governor 'Ala' al-Dīn (the historian Juwaynī), was obliged to transfer his residence to Irbil.\textsuperscript{163} There are more references, however, to reprisals following conversions to Islam. The execution by the Nestorian Catholicos of a Christian who had embraced Islam provoked a rising in 663/1264–5 in Baghdad; the Catholicos himself escaped injury only by seeking protection from 'Ala' al-Dīn Juwaynī, who sent Mongol troops to suppress his fellow Muslims.\textsuperscript{164} When in 1274, however, a monk near Mosul turned Muslim under the influence of a Muslim mistress and the local Mongol commander arrested him (perhaps for fornication rather than apostasy) at the instigation of his fellow monks, the angry Muslim populace were able to force the erstwhile monk's release.\textsuperscript{165} Jūzjānī, on the authority of a sayyid from Samarqand, tells a story concerning a young Christian of that city who converted to Islam. His former co-religionists complained to a visiting Mongol commander with Christian sympathies, who put pressure on the youth to renounce his faith, first through persuasion and then with threats; the new convert steadfastly resisted and was accordingly martyred. The Muslim community of Samarqand thereupon conveyed a petition to the camp of the Mongol prince Berke (himself a Muslim convert); and he avenged the dead man by
sending ‘a body of Turks and important Mongols [who were] Muslims’ with orders to slaughter the Christians. This was done, Jūzjānī tells us, when they were at worship, and their church was demolished.166

Whatever historical reality (if any) underlies these various tales, and regardless of whether they end on a propitious note, their importance is that they testify to a profound sense of insecurity among the Muslim subjects of the infidel Mongol regime – an insecurity that was by no means unknown in regions containing a majority Muslim population. In the circumstances, we might well ask how Muslims were able in time to come to terms with the advent of a militarily superior infidel power and its violent reduction of enormous tracts of Islamic territory.

The rule of the infidel: legitimation, acceptance and appropriation

To this question the answer can only be partial and specific. We have little insight into the views of the great majority of the Mongols’ Muslim subjects and can only extrapolate from the minority who expressed their sentiments in writing. The dilemmas confronting them were how to balance loyalty to the ruler with loyalty to the Muslim community (and increasingly, in the case of authors within the Ilkhanate, to Iranian culture); how to reconcile the harsh realities of infidel rule with the traditional norms of Islamic society; and how also, perhaps, to present those norms to pagan Mongol rulers in the most appealing fashion.167 As Johan Elverskog has emphasized, we should recognize the diversity of Muslim responses to infidel Mongol rule and the plurality of impulses that lay behind them.168

To the Shiʿa, for whom no regime had possessed legitimacy since the death of Ḥusayn in 60/680, the end of the Abbasid Caliphate may have been welcome. Shiʿi communities at Najaf, Kūfah and Ḥilla took the initiative in offering submission to Hülegü even before Baghdad had fallen.169 But for Sunnī Muslims the elimination of the Caliphate, which to them had represented the ultimate source of political legitimacy for over five centuries, was a heavy blow. Patricia Crone suggests that ‘the sources are not exactly brimming over with grief’.170 Nevertheless, Ibn Wāṣil, for one, felt that Islam had suffered no greater or more appalling catastrophe than the destruction of the Caliphate.171 Ibn al-Fuwaṭī refers repeatedly to what had transpired in 1258 as ‘the Event’ (al-waqʿa or al-wāqiʿa; at one point al-wāqiʿat al-ʿuzmā, ‘the Major Event’),172 though we cannot know whether he had in mind primarily the fate of the Abbasids or the sack of Baghdad.

Yet even for Sunnīs the absence of an Imam as the nominal head of the entire Islamic community after 1258 may have been primarily symbolic. In
the fourteenth century the Sunnī writer Ibn Jamā‘a (d. 733/1333), who attached no weight to the Mamlūk regime’s shadow-caliph in Cairo, would write as if legitimacy belonged to whoever seized power and the lack of authority delegated by an Imam was immaterial; the Sultan was now the khalīfa and was accordingly the link between God and the community.173 During the two centuries prior to 1258, in any case, political theory had come to downplay the role of the Imam in favour of that of the Sultan.174 The eleventh-century scholar Abū l-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī had envisaged the lack of an Imam in his treatise Ghiyāth al-umam fi iltiyāth al-ẓulam (‘Aid to Nations Shrouded in Darkness’).175 And if the Caliphate had in some measure encapsulated the unity of the Islamic world, that unity continued to find other expressions, notably a common socio-religious discourse, a transregional network of institutions of learning and the annual pilgrimage (ḥajj) to the holy places.176 Indeed, since the Mongol threat had prevented the pilgrimage from leaving Iraq for ten years after the death of the Caliph al-Mustanṣir in 640/1242,177 expectations centred on the Caliph may in any case have diminished sharply under al-Musta‘ṣim.

In the first decades following the appearance of Chinggis Khan’s troops in Western Asia, at least, the Mongols were seen as harbingers of the ‘Last Things’. The view may have persisted for longer than we might have expected, since those who saw them in such a light included not only Jūzjānī (above, p. 19) and his near-contemporary ‘Awfī, who had both sought safety in India, but Jamāl al-Qarshī, writing in 702/1303 under a Central Asian Mongol regime that was still pagan.178 It is possible that this perception of the Mongols encouraged the appearance of messianic figures in the conquered Muslim territories in the early decades. One example – and the most notorious – was the plebeian Maḥmūd Tārābī, who amassed an extraordinarily large following and effectively took over Bukhārā in 636/1238–9 before his death in an engagement with Mongol forces. Although the two principal accounts of this rising – in Juwaynī’s work and in al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi‘a – differ in certain details, including even the leader’s name, they concur that he dressed as a sufi, claimed magical powers, and was seen as fulfilling a messianic role.179 The early Ilkhanate witnessed a spate of unsuccessful revolts by such figures: the qadi Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn Ibrāhīm, who rose in 663/1265 against the Mongol-backed Salghurid regime in Fārs, claiming to be the Mahdī;180 a self-styled prophet in Tustar who claimed to be Jesus, releasing his followers from performing certain of the daily prayers, and whom ‘Alā‘ al-Dīn Juwaynī executed in 672/1273–4;181 and two successive agitators in the Hilla region in 684/1285–6 who each made himself out to be the Mahdi’s representative.182 But the precise linkage
between messianic agitation and infidel rule remains elusive. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when rule by non-Muslims was a thing of the past, similarly saw the rise of millenarian movements, notably the Sarbadārs in Khurāsān and the Musha’sha’ in Khūzistān, and some of their ideas may even exhibit a continuity with those of extremist groups in the Umayyad era six or seven centuries earlier.¹⁸³

Conquest by the infidel and the heightened insecurity that ensued, it has been suggested, nurtured the spread of sufism, as many Muslims turned their backs on the world and sought consolation in mystical pursuits.¹⁸⁴ It might seem highly likely, at least, that the advent of infidel rulers would have encouraged sūfī shaykhs to eschew government service; and certainly Ibn al-Fuwaṭī’s biographical dictionary includes a few men who jettisoned office and became ascetics – though whether out of repugnance at serving an infidel ruler, we are not told.¹⁸⁵ The best-known example is Shaykh ‘Alā’ al-Dawla Simnānī (d. 734/1334), who repented of having fought against the Muslim Tegüder Aḥmad in 1284 and sought to abandon Arghun’s headquarters for a life of scholarship and contemplation (though Arghun allowed him to do so only in 686/1287–8).¹⁸⁶

The unprecedented growth in the number of shaykhs and sufis during the Mongol era served the need of ordinary folk for protection against widespread hardship, insecurity and oppression.¹⁸⁷ Sources relating to the lives of shaykhs sometimes show them mediating between the Mongols and their Persian subjects. We might hesitate to take at face value the evidence of the Ṣafwat al-ṣafā of Tawakkulī Ibn Bazzāz that Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn Ardabīlī (d. 735/1334) frequently fulfilled this role. But Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, writing in the shaykh’s lifetime, assures us that his close relations with the Mongols had enabled him to restrain them from oppressing the people.¹⁸⁸ To what extent these interventions occurred before the Mongols’ conversion, we cannot know; and in any case none of the numerous other saints listed by Ḥamd-Allāh for the Mongol period is given credit of that kind.

The conquerors themselves may have been by no means totally impervious to the question of acceptance – or acceptance, at least, by those of whose services they stood in need. We have already observed (p. 299) Chinggis Khan’s concern whether the Daoist Changchun had won over the common people on his behalf. When the city of Aleppo fell in 1260, the call to prayer was rapidly restored and the khuṭba and the Friday prayers were re-established.¹⁸⁹ And if we can trust Ibn al-Ṭiqtāqā, writing forty years later, Hūlegū summoned the ’ulama following the capture of Baghdad and asked them for a ruling whether a just infidel king was preferable to an unjust Muslim Sultan. They replied, predictably (but perhaps dimly recalling
stories about the Qara-Khitai), in the affirmative. We might expect Ibn al-Ṭiqtāqā, a Shi‘ī of course, to have reacted differently from the Sunnī majority to the downfall of the ‘Abbasids; and he voices elsewhere his conviction of the subject’s duty to respect and honour the ruler, without specifying that the ruler in question should be a Muslim. But one implication of the story is that Hülegū was conscious of the need for his regime to be acceptable to at least some Muslims in the freshly conquered city. In this connection, we should bear in mind a point well made by Charles Melville: that the Ilkhans, like the Mamlūk regime with its tame Caliph in Cairo, were the heirs (if in rather a different way) of the ‘Abbasid Caliphs.

The difficulty often lies in knowing whose voice we hear. Take the coinage. The Mongols of Iran – or at least their Muslim moneyers – attempted to legitimize their rule by incorporating Islamic legends on the coins. In the early decades, some of those minted under Chinggis Khan and under Möngke bore the shahāda, the Islamic profession of faith. In the period immediately following the sack of Baghdad and the murder of the ‘Abbasid Caliph, which will have thrown the alien character of Mongol rule into particularly sharp relief, Hülegū’s dinars bore the Qur’ānic verse:

Say, ‘God, holder of all control, You give control to whoever You will and remove it from whoever You will; You elevate whoever You will and humble whoever You will’ (Qur’ān, iii, 25).

The question remains open whether this initiative had originated with Hülegū himself.

As for the literati among the Ilkhans’ Muslim subjects, it is worth noting that Ibn al-Fuwaṭī’s biographical dictionary sought to integrate the Mongols into a world defined by Islamic cultural norms and that Ibn al-Kāzarūnī even made Hülegū out to be a Muslim. ’Alā’al-Dīn Juwaynī has attracted particular attention. It used to be received wisdom that he harboured an exclusively grim view of the Mongols but, as an official in Hülegū’s train, was compelled to mask his feelings when writing the Ta’rīkh-i jahān-gushā. He accordingly adopted an almost impenetrably ornate style, characterized by frequently opaque quotations from the Qur’ān and from the early eleventh-century epic Shāh-nāma of Firdawsī, and took refuge in an interpretation of the Mongol conquests as a punishment inflicted by God upon an erring Islamic community, a retribution against which resistance was futile.

In his citations from the Qur’ān, however, as Michael Weiers has recently shown, Juwaynī did not simply set out to depict the Mongol conquests as willed by God and as the instrument of divine severity. He did that, certainly,
and most clearly in the doxology with which his history opens. But his purpose went further, to bring out the beneficial consequences of the invasion. In treating of the overthrow of the Ismā’īlī Assassins, for example, he sought to craft an image of the Mongols as agents of the holy war and as deliverers of Islam (p. 24). The results of his efforts are sometimes less than felicitous, as when Juwaynī makes the best of the dispersal of enslaved Muslims across Asia by rejoicing at the proclamation of Islam in distant regions that had hitherto lain outside its orbit, or asserts that many of Chinggis Khan’s edicts are in accordance with the Shari’ā. But by the careful juxtaposition of citations, often ordered as if they formed part of a single verse, Juwaynī sought to anchor the events he described more securely in Islam’s most sacred text – in Michael Weiers’ phrase, to ‘Quranize and Muslimize the history of Chinggis Khan and the Mongols’. The message that Juwaynī is attempting to convey by these means is clear: that already the Mongols could be seen as monotheists and hence virtually Muslims. A hint of this appears at the very outset, when he observes that God is loved alike by the ‘lovers of truth and depraved idolators’ and when he speaks of Islam and infidelity alike ‘treading His path’ and expressing His oneness.

At this distance, Juwaynī’s efforts to depict the Mongols as monotheistic bulwarks of orthodox Islam seem almost as forlorn as his remark that Muslims martyred by the conquerors had been relieved of the burdens acquired during a life of security and ease. But there was another side to the propaganda mounted on the pagan conquerors’ behalf. It has been suggested that we are entitled to speak of a ‘project’ to nurture an assimilation of the Ilkhans with their territories and subjects. They could be viewed as the latest sovereigns to reign over the entire land of Iran (Īrān-zamīn). Juwaynī’s Taʾrīkh-i jahān-gushā stood at the beginning of the era in which New Persian triumphed over Arabic as the preferred language of historical writing in Iran. For Bayḍāwī, whose Niẓām al-tawārīkh, though cast as a general history, was essentially a history of Iran, Abagha was king of Iran (clearly including Iraq) and Rūm; for Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī the ‘land of Iran’ was still larger, extending from the Oxus to Anatolia. This was the territory of the Sasanian empire (227–651 C.E.), not that of the later Safawid, Qājār and Pahlawī dynasties or of today’s Islamic Republic. The notion of Iran had been largely in eclipse since the Arab Muslim conquest in the seventh century, but it gained fresh life from the destruction of the Caliphate in 1258 and from what has been termed the ‘relative disenfranchisement of political Islam’. Thomas Allsen has drawn attention to Juwaynī’s use of the concept of farr (‘[royal] splendour’; Old Pers. kh’arənah), which had strong associations with ancient Iranian kingship, to refer to the majesty of both Chinggis Khan and Möngke.
Nor were these tactics confined to the realm of the book. The historian's brother, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, chief minister to the Ilkhans from the early 1260s until his execution in 1284, was instrumental in encouraging Abagha to begin (by 670/1271) the construction of a new palace incorporating the ruins of the ancient palace and Zoroastrian fire-temple at Shīz in Azerbaijan, a locality that became known as Takht-i Sulaymān. On the walls of the temple, as we learn from Arabic geographical literature of the tenth and eleventh centuries, were representations of the wonders of creation: the heavens, the stars and the earth, symbolizing the universal monarchy of the kings of Iran. The splendour of the palace was perpetuated by the descriptions in the Iranian national epic, Firdawsi's *Shāh-nāma*.

The *Shāh-nāma* expressed a cyclical conception of the historical destiny of Iran, in which each fresh cataclysm led to a new stage of creativity. Assadullah Melikian-Chirvani has shown how Juwaynī's citations were designed to integrate the Mongol rulers into this Iranian historical cycle. Chinggis Khan – viewed as a 'Turk' like his Mongol subjects and other peoples of the eastern steppes (see above, pp. 52, 68) – is repeatedly portrayed as Afrāsiyāb, the chief protagonist of Tūrān and the enemy of Iran's Kayanian monarchs. And yet, in a passage that may have been absent from Firdawsi's text and interpolated during the heyday of Turkish dynasties like the Qarakhanids and the Saljuqs, Afrāsiyāb's own ancestry linked him to the Kayanians. As we saw (p. 53), elements of the Afrāsiyāb myth had taken root within steppe society well before the Mongol era.

When Abagha and Tegüder Aḥmad constructed the palace of Takht-i Sulaymān in Azerbaijan, on the site of the ancient centre of Iranian kingship, such action by Afrāsiyāb's progeny might have been construed as an intolerable affront to Iranian *amour-propre*. As prominent servitors of the Ilkhans, however, the Juwaynī brothers were able to preside over the incorporation of verses and themes from the *Shāh-nāma* on the palace murals, some of which are still visible. Melikian-Chirvani points to the way in which such texts evoke Firdawsi's notion of 'worshippers of God' (*yazdān-parastān*) as present in Iran even in the pre-Islamic Kayanian era – a concept that Juwaynī the historian had possibly embraced under the influence of the Suhrawardī sufi author Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī and which could be applied in turn to the pagan Mongols. Indeed, a frieze that probably dates from Tegüder Ahmad's reign seems to suggest that, with the accession of this convert to Islam, Kaykhusraw – Afrāsiyāb's slayer in the *Shāh-nāma* – has overcome Afrāsiyāb a second time.

Mongol rulers had their own ideology, of course: that Chinggis Khan and his dynasty had obtained Tenggeri's mandate to rule the world. But although his descendants, even after the dissolution of the empire, maintained a
staunch attachment to that principle, they must have become aware that it exerted no strong appeal beyond the confines of the steppe peoples. As a mounting proportion of the Chinggisid territories came to comprise regions of sedentary culture, so it was necessary to broaden and diversify the ideological foundations of Chinggisid sovereignty. It remains a moot point to what extent the early Ilkhans themselves responded to this exigency by recourse to the idea of Iran and to what extent it reflects the thinking, rather, of their Persian ministers and historians. It is arguable that the efforts of the Juwaynīs and others of the Muslim elite to devise fresh ideological bases for the regime should be seen as one arm of the Ilkhans’ own propaganda. The claim in Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī’s Nuzhat al-qulūb (c. 1340) that Abagha entered ‘enthusiastically’ (bā ḫāl) into the task of restoration at Takht-i Sulaymān, indicates that the Ilkhan at least endorsed the equation with Iran’s former monarchs, even if we assume that the choice of murals was exclusively the work of his Persian minister.

In any event, the ‘project’ should be seen not merely as a response to the destruction of the universal Caliphate but as a reaction to the sundering of the unitary Mongol empire – both of them events that to a degree loosened the ties binding Iran to a much wider world (even though the Ilkhans until 1295 continued to derive legitimacy from the qaghan’s diploma). A parallel offers itself with the Mongol regime in the Far East, where Qubilai, as we noticed, was the first Chinggisid qaghan whose title did not command recognition throughout the Mongol dominions. Through the final elimination of the Song, however, he became also the first sovereign in almost three centuries to reign over the whole of China. Influenced by Chinese intellectuals at his court, he set Mongol rule on a new basis, by posing as a Chinese emperor in the Confucian tradition and taking for his dynasty the name Yuan (‘origin’). But he was equally ready, at the instance of his Tibetan adviser, the ’P’ags-pa Lama (Sa-skya Paṇḍita), to draw upon Buddhist concepts and allow himself to be portrayed as the Bodhissatva of wisdom and as universal emperor (chakravartin).

Muslim authors’ identification of the Ilkhans with Iran would naturally gather pace after 1295; Azhdari’s Ghāzān-nāma, written c. 1360 and modelled on Firdawsī’s epic, presents Ghazan’s conversion as the beginning of a new era in Iranian history. And as we shall see, the perspective of Juwaynī the historian would be developed further by Rashīd al-Dīn, narrating the history of Ghazan’s pagan forebears, whom he depicts firmly, and without warrant, as monotheists (pp. 374–5 below). It is not unlikely that by Rashīd al-Dīn’s day ideas of this kind had exerted an impact on the conquerors themselves and played a part in their acceptance of Islam.
If, during the early stages of the Mongol conquests, the invaders appeared to have dealt Islam a hammer-blows and to have afforded fresh hope and opportunities to its enemies, it nevertheless emerged fairly rapidly that their presence was by no means devoid of positive effects. Even Jūzjānī, for whom they were a harbinger of the ‘Last Things’ and whose history regularly invoked curses on them, took comfort from the fact that he could conclude it with an account of Berke, the contemporary khan of the Golden Horde and a convert to Islam.1 Juwaynī too alluded to the conversion of several princes of the imperial dynasty; and the pattern was being replicated at the lower levels of Mongol society, for the number of their followers and servitors who had embraced Islam, he tells us, was beyond calculation.2 What neither writer could know was that within less than 100 years Islam would be the religion of all the Mongol rulers of Western Asia.

Before we proceed, some general observations are in order. Professor Devin DeWeese has challenged us to examine our own underlying assumptions when we discuss religious conversion and to ask more fruitful questions of the sources than have often been posed in the past.3 Specifically, he directs our attention towards: those who mediated Islam to the Mongols (whether as visitors or as representatives of the local subject population); the targets of Islamization4 (the rank and file among the nomads, as well as just the Mongol rulers); the perceived attractions of religious change (for instance, economic advantage, social and cultural prestige, political legitimation, social integration and access to the specialized knowledge associated with religious ‘brokers’); and the diverse ways in which religious change might be manifested and articulated. Islamization should be seen, he
reminds us, as ‘an incremental process whose parameters constantly shifted, rather than as a discrete step accomplished once and for all by an act of royal conversion or state support’. Elsewhere, notably in his groundbreaking book Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde, DeWeese has highlighted the usefulness of ‘mythological’ accounts of a ruler’s conversion – notably the story of Özbek’s conversion in the relatively late account of Ötemish Ḥājji, written in Khwārazm in the 1550s and dedicated to its Jochid (‘Arabshahid) ruler – on the grounds that they illustrate how the event came to be understood by later generations and thereby themselves mark an integral phase in the process of Islamization.

**Defining conversion to Islam**

What do we mean by ‘conversion to’ or ‘the adoption of’ Islam? To quote Michael Lambek (writing on a different geographical context):

> the word ‘conversion’ is problematic insofar as it implies converting ‘from’ as well as ‘to’; insofar as it privileges an immediate, virtually instantaneous, uni-directional, and distinct shift in self-identification over a gradual change . . .; insofar as it privileges a private, subjective experience over a collective process; and insofar as it privileges rationalised ‘beliefs’ over ritual orders.

The suggestion advanced several years ago by Professor Richard Bulliet for the early generations of converts in the core Muslim territories – that formal conversion was less significant than social conversion, ‘involving a movement from one religiously defined social community to another’ would require qualification for the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Mongols, but it nevertheless contains an element of truth as applied to them also. The formulation coincides with the phenomenon termed ‘communal or group conversion’ by Professor Nehemia Levtzion. In this case, ‘Islam was adopted by ethnic groups in their own milieu, while maintaining their own cultural identity. There was hardly a break with past traditions, and pre-Islamic customs and beliefs survived’. In a similar vein, David Parkin argues for the substitution of the word ‘conversion’ by ‘acceptance’ on the grounds that the former term ‘presupposes a shift from one to another unambiguously defined religion’; ‘acceptance’ of Islam, by contrast, ‘does not mean the abandonment of a pre-existing cosmology’. Adhesion to pre-Islamic norms might persist for some generations. By way of illustration, we might note evidence that at the time of the First Crusade (1096–9) the Saljuq Turks – usually identified
as staunch proponents of Sunnī Islam – had still not discarded the practice of burying grave-goods with their dead.\(^{11}\)

In examining conversion, we might find ourselves dealing with a shift in practice as much as, or perhaps rather than, a change of creed.\(^{12}\) Indeed, over half a century ago Alessandro Bausani opined that becoming a Muslim is in large measure not a matter of inner conviction at all.\(^{13}\) It would, of course, be crass indeed to ignore the observable fact that people sometimes adopt a religion because they find themselves able to assent to some of its tenets (although attachment to doctrines may, equally, postdate conversion). In any event, as has been pointed out in the medieval Christian context, historians have access only to the text recounting conversion and to interpretations of the experience; the experience itself is irretrievable.\(^{14}\) DeWeese has drawn attention to the fact that within Inner Asian societies, specifically, we might well expect economic or other ‘materialistic’ motives to play a part in the acceptance of Islam, for the very reason that traditional Inner Asian religious practice was so often bound up with matters of prosperity and health. In noticing the historian’s tendency to label individual conversions as ‘nominal’, moreover, he argues that such implicit disparagement is inappropriate in the Islamic context, given the distinctively Islamic approach to the formal and the external. The emphasis is on a change of status rather than a change of heart or belief, and even a ‘nominal’ conversion – one prompted, for instance, by an eye to economic or political advantage – is seen as opening the way for God to operate within the believer.\(^{15}\) It is fruitless to write off a conversion of this kind as ‘partial’ or ‘insincere’, since we occupy no vantage point that enables us to judge the wholeheartedness of Mongol rulers who accepted Islam. All too often such judgements are predicated on views of conversion – revolving around a profound inward change – that owe more to Western Christian expectations and experience\(^{16}\) (and ultimately, no doubt, to a Pauline template). The attitude of the Roman Church to the Christian neophyte, and indeed the Christian life, in the Middle Ages did not, perhaps, differ as profoundly as we might think. Popes were undeniably exercised that the transition for new converts should not prove too difficult, as emerges from a letter of Nicholas IV in 1291 to the future Ilkhan Öljeitü (then in the Christian phase of an unusually complex religious history), urging him not to make any alteration in his attire or his diet, for fear of provoking opposition from his people.\(^{17}\)

There was, however, a sharp difference between Christianity and Islam at this level. Within the Christian world spiritual authority was vested in a priesthood – and a priesthood increasingly subject, from the late eleventh century onwards, to the Pope and a growing ecclesiastical bureaucracy
centred on Rome. From the early thirteenth century, moreover, these institutions stood behind an Inquisition, tasked with seeking out and punishing heterodoxy. It is easy to overstate the intrusive nature of priestly authority and the degree to which the ordinary Christian might find his/her conduct under scrutiny; but the point is that no parallel institutional structure existed within Islam. To determine what was licit or illicit within Islam was left to consensus (ijmā’), which is to say that in practice it was the responsibility of the ‘ulama to reach unanimity on the issue in question by interpreting the Qur’ān and the Prophet’s recorded conduct (sunna). But on a great many matters the ‘ulama – that loose, informal and far-flung network of scholars – were inclined to disagree, especially in view of the growth of four distinct schools (madhāhib; sing. madhhab) of Islamic law since the ninth century. In other words, the institutional apparatus was lacking that might have dictated what was truly Islamic and what was not. (This is not to say that anything could pass muster as consonant with Islamic practice. The remarriage of a widow to a son of her dead husband, for instance, was frowned upon in Islamic law; so too was the marriage of a Muslim woman to an unbeliever.)

The adherents of rival faiths were naturally prone to disparage the methods of their Muslim adversaries and to question the genuineness of the conversions they effected. All that is required to become a Muslim, as Riccoldo da Montecroce observed in the 1290s, is to recite the shahāda, the profession of faith. For Riccoldo, this explained his lack of success in preaching for some years the Christian message in the Ilkhanate. Islam (he suggested) was an easy religion to observe: unlike Christianity, it made no moral demands upon its followers, with the result that the Mongols were readily won over.

Riccoldo was right about the shahāda, of course. But that was merely the first step. It might have been accompanied by some conspicuous gesture registering the change of religious allegiance. Traditionally circumcision fulfilled this role. Bar Hebraeus’ continuator claims that by 1295 the Mongol population of the Ilkhanate had all converted and had been circumcised, and Mīrzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt says explicitly that the eastern Chaghādayid khan Tughluq Temūr had himself circumcised when he converted in (though more probably after) 748/1347–8. But circumcision is not mentioned by an early fourteenth-century author when describing the conversion of a number of Mongols through an otherwise unknown shaykh and preacher called Ibn al-Hawwārī (and incidentally summing up what for him constituted acceptance of Islam). ‘They repented at his hand,’ he says, ‘and they began to pay zakāt [the compulsory alms-tax] and to perform their prayers diligently.’
Bar Hebraeus’ continuator speaks as if the converted Mongol population had been well instructed in the ablutions, the fasts and other Islamic practices.\(^{23}\) And when Baybars al-Mansûrî described the Turco-Mongol womenfolk captured in the Qipchaq steppe following Noghai’s defeat and death in 699/1299–1300, who were then sold in Mamlûk Egypt by slave-traders and embraced Islam of their own free will, it was enough for him that they performed the prayers with care and enthusiasm.\(^{24}\)

Observance in the strict sense will surely have varied from one recent convert to another. It might simply have entailed more or less regular attendance at the public Friday prayers in a congregational mosque; it might further have involved the private performance of the five daily prayers (ṣalawât; sing. ṣalât), or the keeping of the fasts, or the regular recital of verses from the Qur’ân; or it might have included none of these practices. But what is important is that our sources tend to focus on what the convert did (or was expected to do), rather than on what he or she believed (or was required to believe).

They clearly set no little store by the convert’s outward appearance. Thus Ghazan donned the turban in Muḥarram 697/November 1297, according to Rashîd al-Dîn, well over two years after pronouncing the shahâda. In a slightly more detailed (and more florid) account of this episode, Waṣṣâf adds that the amirs and courtiers were made to adopt dress appropriate to the faith and that it was forbidden for any Tâjîk to wear the Mongol hat (kulâh), by which he doubtless meant the sarâghîch, the characteristic head-gear with turned-up brim (and trimmed with fur, in the case of those of higher rank).\(^{25}\) Of the 120,000 Chaghadayid Mongols who allegedly followed Tughluq Temûr in embracing Islam, we are told that they ‘shaved their heads and became Muslims’.\(^{26}\) Under his grandson, the Chaghadayid khan Muḥammad (d. c. 1416), any Mongol who refused to wear the turban allegedly had a nail driven through his head.\(^{27}\) And only a few years before Tughluq Temûr’s accession, Janibeg, khan of the Golden Horde, is said to have ordered his troops to don turbans (‘amâ’îm) and cloaks (farajiyât).\(^{28}\) His father Özbeg, according to al-Ṣafadî, had ceased to wear the traditional Mongol hat, the sarâqûj (sarâghîch), and everything else that was customary.\(^{29}\) Evidently what was involved in each instance was the discarding of Mongol attire and the distinctive Mongol coiffure which, as we have seen, some of the empire’s subjects had been obliged to adopt during the early imperial epoch (pp. 92–3). It served to signal the move from one community into another – or, rather, participation in two overlapping communities, since entry into the second by no means superseded membership of the first.
The choice of Islam

Why Islam? Muslims were an overwhelming majority among the Ilkhan’s subjects in Iran and Iraq. Within the Jochid and Chaghadayid khanates the most advanced regions, in cultural and economic terms, were Muslim-dominated: Khwārazm and Bulghār in the one case, Transoxiana in the other. In a broader context, the thirteenth-century Mongols may well have seen Muslims as having access to a range of skills that they themselves rated highly – whether commercial and fiscal expertise, administrative aptitude and experience, medicine, or access to the numinous. Astrology particularly comes to mind. Rubruck, meeting the English Franciscan Roger Bacon in Paris, told him that had he known a little of the stars the Mongols might have given him a warmer welcome, but that they despised him because he was ignorant of astronomy. Hülegü had established a team of astronomers at Marāgha, largely composed of Muslims, and he may have taken a keen interest in their activities (see pp. 228, 236). Or we might think of healing. The fact that an account transmitted by the twelfth-century geographer al-Gharnaṭī, but very probably derived from indigenous tradition, ascribes the conversion of the Bulghār ruler to a Muslim who had cured the illness of the ruler and his wife reminds us of the great value that steppe societies placed on healing skills. Admittedly, there were also Christians and Jews in Mongol Asia who possessed the requisite accomplishments (especially in medicine) and who in many cases themselves found employment with the conquerors; but the simple fact was that Muslims outnumbered them by far.

Muslims were especially closely associated with trade, which the Mongols, like earlier steppe powers, greatly prized. We should recall that at least two Muslim merchants, Ḥasan and Jaʿfar, were to be found among Temüjin’s entourage in distant Mongolia as early as 1203 and that fostering commerce was a high priority for the Chinggisids. There is evidence that traders had played an important role in the conversion of the Uighur qaghan to Manichaeism in the eighth century, and it has recently been argued that the Volga Bulgars had adopted Islam in the early tenth century, not – as hitherto thought – as a reaction against the Judaism of their Khazar overlords but in order to improve conditions of trade with their chief commercial partners in Khwārazm and Samanid Transoxiana. To recognize the impact that reports of royal conversion to Islam might have on commercial interests in the Mongol era, we have only to recall Rubruck’s report that Muslims en route to Batu’s headquarters from Anatolia or Iran visited Berke’s encampment with gifts, or the statement by Ibn Faḍl-Allāh
al-‘Umarī that the accession of the Muslim convert Tarmashirin as khan of Chaghadai’s ulus triggered an influx of Muslim merchants from Mamlūk Egypt and Syria into Transoxiana in the 1330s (above, p. 218).

It is accordingly easy to assume that the Mongols’ adoption of the faith in the three westernmost Chinggisid states was all but inevitable. Yet we need to bear in mind that in embracing one of the universal faiths earlier steppe sovereigns had sometimes been guided by very different considerations. The Khazar ‘king’ had converted to Judaism in the mid-ninth century, possibly as a means of reducing the religious influences emanating from either of his powerful southern neighbours, the Christian Byzantines and the Muslims of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate; while the Uighur qaghan may have adopted Manichaeism in 762 as a way of asserting his people’s cultural independence of Tang China and perhaps, too, their separateness from the Qarluq enemy to the west.35 For both potentates, in other words, the choice may have been a means of preserving a distinctive identity, in relation either to hostile neighbours or to a prominent group among their subjects. It has been proposed that in north-west Asia (where Muslims were by no means the most numerous element in the mid-thirteenth century) one of the motives of the Jochid khan Berke in adopting Islam was to ‘draw a line’ between his own ulus and that of the Qaghan Qubilai, whom he did not recognize.36 This is implausible, given the early date at which Berke’s Muslim credentials are attested.37 But it may have been precisely the desire to distance himself from the majority of his Chinese subjects that determined Qubilai to single out for particular favour not the home-grown Chinese variety of Buddhism but the tantric Buddhism of Tibet;38 and the marked attachment of Hülegü and his successors to Tibetan Buddhism might suggest that the early Ilkhans were guided by a similar motive. It was not necessarily the case, therefore, that the Chinggisid princes of Western Asia would succumb to an impulse to adopt the cultic beliefs and practices of the Muslim majority. Realpolitik could instead have dictated moving in a completely different direction.

**Mongol tradition and the rhetoric of proselytism**

In 1323 a Franciscan missionary in Kaffa wrote to his superiors in Western Europe:

> Despite being pagans, they esteem steadfastness – that all should remain in the sect to which their parents latterly adhered – and deem it to be a mark of inconstancy to abandon it, whether Christian or otherwise.39
The writer appears to have been unconscious of the inherent contradiction (what, then, had enabled the parents to adopt religious practices to which their own forebears had not adhered?). Nor is his statement easy to harmonize with the multiple religious allegiances of the Ilkhan Öljeitü, successively Buddhist, Christian, Sunnī Muslim and Twelver Shi‘ī. The friar may, of course, have had in mind nothing more than the Mongols’ known attachment to the cosmological beliefs and cultic practices of their ancestors. But we find a vaguely parallel observation in a letter of 1320 from another Franciscan, operating in Bashkiria. Here the local ruler, ‘infected with Saracen error’, is said to have acknowledged that he would have become a Christian had the friars only arrived sooner, but that it was shameful for princes, having adopted one faith, then to desert it lightly for another. An easy admission, and perhaps the fact that one can (with difficulty) imagine a modern householder employing towards any salesperson. Yet it may tell us something about Mongol attitudes.

With one exception, the sources give no direct indication of the arguments deployed to win over a Mongol ruler. The exception is the unusual conversion of Öljeitü to Shi‘ism. As is evident from both a contemporary orthodox writer and later Shi‘ī authors, one powerful argument used here related to the fact that in the eyes of the Shi‘a the imamate belonged exclusively to the Prophet’s direct descendants, whereas Sunnīs in 40/660 had been content to elect as the fifth Caliph Mu‘awiyah (the first of the Umayyads), who was merely a member of the Prophet’s tribe, and the ‘Abbasids (who had supplanted the Umayyads in 132/750) were descended not from Muḥammad but from his uncle. Given that the sole qualification for sovereignty resided in Chinggis Khan’s progeny, the Shi‘a could claim that their loyalties were analogous and that the Sunnīs had chosen to give their allegiance to the equivalent of a mere noyan. The parallel was drawn, Qāshānī tells us, by the amir Taramtaz in the course of a public disputation in Öljeitü’s presence. Such reasoning, already employed by the Shi‘īs in their dealings with Ghazan, had inspired his devotion to the descendants of the Prophet (the ahl al-bayt) and was in turn the root of his policy of building a house for sayyids (dār al-sādāt) within each of the major cities.

In other cases, where the Islam on offer was of the Sunnī variety, we are much less well informed. Given the remark of the Franciscan quoted above, we can surmise that those who sought to introduce the faith to the nomads emphasized the congruence of its nature and teachings with ideas current in steppe society. It is possible that one expedient was to present the Mongols to themselves as monotheists already on the verge of accepting the true faith. The testimony of Ibn Batṭūta that Shaykh Badr al-Dīn Mandānī
pleased the Chaghadayid Köpek by claiming that the khan’s name was mentioned in the Qur’ān might well represent a distorted reference to this tactic.43 We noticed how in his history Juwaynī endeavoured to craft an image of the conquerors as monotheists ripe for conversion (p. 325 above); and a striking echo of this same perspective comes from the Yuan empire at the time of the outlawing of the Muslim slaughter-ritual and circumcision in China in the 1280s. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Qubilai, on allegedly learning of a Qur’ānic verse that prescribed death for polytheists, issued orders for the execution of a Muslim divine. Qadi Ḥamīd al-Dīn Sābiq Samarqandī deftly defused the situation: ‘You are no polytheist,’ he assured the irate Qaghan, ‘because you write the name of God (khudā) at the head of your edict (yarligh).’44 The context, of course, is far removed from proselytism (and admittedly the Qadi was under intense pressure to make some conciliatory utterance). Yet it implies that Muslim scholars felt at home with the reasoning that Juwaynī had adopted two decades or so previously. As we shall see in chapter 13, Rashīd al-Dīn’s history would portray Ghazan’s ancestors as steadfastly monotheistic.

We should in passing note the sizeable obstacles to embracing the faith where steppe-dwellers were concerned. One was the problem of the Muslim ablutions, which involved infringing the taboo against washing in running water. As far back as the tenth century Ibn Faḍlān had observed that pagan Turks imposed a fine on visiting Muslim merchants who performed their ablutions, and that the traders therefore discontinued the practice as long as they were in the steppe.45 Given their attachment to steppe tradition, the objection is at least as likely to have weighed with the Mongols. What we do not know, of course, is whether those who carried the faith to them played down such requirements. Another tradition, the burial of Mongol khans in a secret and inviolable precinct (qoruq), was at odds with the Islamic tradition of building a mausoleum over a ruler’s sepulchre and perhaps also establishing there a sufi hospice (khānaqāh).46 And again, it was surely difficult to reconcile the cult of the shrines of Muslim saints – already by the late thirteenth century a significant element of devotional practice in both the metropolitan and the peripheral areas of the Dar al-Islam – with the strong taboo against contact with the effects or the tombs of the dead (see p. 113).

That said, we should be on the alert for conceptual affinities that may have given Islam an edge over its competitors in Western Asia at least. The idea of submission – the essential meaning of the term islām – was by no means foreign to Mongol political thought. As Igor de Rachewiltz has pointed out, the correspondence between the subjection of all other peoples, which was itself an extension of the Mongols’ personal submission to
Heaven, on the one hand, and the submission of every human creature to the one God, on the other, may have held a strong appeal for those already engaged in the creation of a universal empire. This merits further investigation, though it admittedly leaves unexplained the failure of Islam to make significant progress within the Yuan dominions.

If we are to understand the victory respectively of Islam in Western Asia and of Buddhism in the east, one last point needs to be made. As I have suggested elsewhere, that triumph may have lain in the fact that both stood in a distinctive relationship to other faiths. When a Buddhist account of c. 1290 makes Möngke declare that Buddhism was to other religions what the palm was to the fingers of the hand, it may well tell us less about the Qaghan’s own sentiments than about the way Buddhists sought to portray the dharma. Buddhism and Islam, each in its own way, claimed to subsume its competitors: Islam, by representing a later and more complete revelation than Judaism or Christianity; Buddhism, by being the original matrix from which other religious traditions, notably Daoism, had emerged.

**Precedence in conversion: Mongol rulers or their Mongol subjects?**

Accounts of the adoption of Islam by a Mongol khan – that of Berke, for example, as supplied by Mamlûk authors – readily give the impression that he was immediately imitated by the majority of his Mongol subjects. But DeWeese rightly advocates that we jettison the familiar ‘top-down’ model favoured by our sources, and be alert to the possibility that royal acolytes might have trodden in the footsteps of many of the Mongol amirs and a large section of the Mongol military at least as frequently as providing an example for them to follow. On this scenario, the ruler’s conversion marks less some inward reorientation (though that cannot be completely discounted) than a decision publicly to comport himself as did large numbers of his subjects, in order to harness their loyalty.

What facilitated the spread of Islam among the ranks of ordinary Mongols – as it did, for instance, in parts of China (where the qaghans themselves were never converted to Islam) – was the Muslim diaspora over which the conquerors presided. In the passage alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, Juwaynî further commented that the faith was penetrating to regions of the world where it had never previously been represented. In some measure, this phenomenon was linked with the forced deportation of skilled elements from among the conquered Muslim populations of Transoxiana and Iran (see p. 173). Even in those cities where the slaughter was extensive, the Mongols spared craftsmen and artisans, and transported
them to other localities, in some cases as far as Mongolia and northern China. Praising Ögödei's favour towards Muslims, Jūzjānī mentions the construction of mosques in the Tangut country, China and (so he says) Tibet, and the appointment of Muslim commanders to strongholds in the east. By that time Muslim troops, too, were being deployed in the Mongols’ service across an enormous expanse of territory. Juwaynī’s brief account of the assault on Eastern Europe in 1241–2 reveals Muslims in the invading army, in numbers large enough for Batu to require their prayers for victory over the Hungarians at Mohi.

The implantation of Muslims in far-flung regions nurtured social and economic ties between Muslim and infidel at a local level. No less significant, however, was the dispersal of Mongols over a vast area as garrison forces, *tammachis* – that is, on a permanent footing, as we have seen (pp. 82, 104). In many regions they must have constituted a minority alongside the Muslim military who had been drafted into the Chinggisids’ service. A large proportion of those Muslims would have been Turks and thus not far removed, in terms of culture and lifestyle, from the Mongols themselves. In addition, Mongol amirs and their troops might often be quartered in relatively close proximity to sedentary Muslim communities, as in parts of Transoxiana in the 1320s.

The impression that Juwaynī gives of widespread Mongol conversion to Islam is reinforced by a near-contemporary visitor to the empire from the Christian West. In 1248 the Dominican Friar Simon de Saint-Quentin, who had recently formed part of a papal embassy to the Mongol general Baiju in the Transcaucasus region, commented that Islam was spreading rapidly within the Mongol military. The Mongol regime, he noticed, permitted the practice of every faith, provided obedience was forthcoming in all respects. Accordingly the tenets of Islam were proclaimed five times daily in the hearing of the troops, and the Muslims made great efforts to win over the soldiery to their own ‘faithless’ religion (although we are not told that the new converts were mainly Mongols, as opposed to indigenous Christian auxiliaries, for instance). We have to envisage the possibility that the experience of being uprooted from their homeland to an alien and far-distant environment loosened (even if it by no means entirely dissolved) the ties that bound members of the Mongol military to the steppe society in which they had been reared; it undermined their attachment to ancestral traditions and made them receptive to new socio-religious influences. An episode described by Ibn Shaddād is no doubt relevant. He tells of the arrival in Mamlūk Damascus from Anatolia in 675/1276–7 of two Mongol commanders, the brothers Sögetei...
and Ja’urchi. They were Muslims, and their brother, who was an infidel (kāfir), had demanded a share of their wealth, on the grounds that they were enjoying a life of ease in towns whereas he and his men were on active service; they did as he asked, but subsequently, on the advice of the Parwāna Mu’in al-Dīn, they killed him and fled to Syria to escape the Ilkhan’s vengeance.⁵⁷ The inference to be drawn is that urban life had brought Sögetei and Ja’urchi into the Islamic fold.

In other words Islamization, at one level, was part of a broader process of acculturation. The Mamlūk author Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umarī commented that the Mongols of the Pontic-Caspian steppes had undergone just such a process in becoming absorbed by the Qipchaq.⁵⁸ He also speaks of intermarriage and social intercourse in Iran between Mongol and Persian families. Whether this dated back prior to Ghazan’s conversion, we are not told. Ghazan’s decree forbidding Tājīk Muslims to wear traditional Mongol headgear (p. 332 above) – an indication that some had been doing so – reminds us that acculturation could work in two directions. But several decades earlier Jūzjānī had written of intermarriage between Mongols and Muslims further east, allegedly on Ögödei’s express orders, and Waṣṣāf claims that the Jurma‘ī Mongols of Kirmān had intermarried with the local population prior to 677/1278–9.⁵⁹ We might plausibly speculate that the spread of Islam encountered fewer obstacles among the Ilkhanid Mongol rank and file than among the Mongol nobility sequestered at the imperial court (though seasonal migrations might bring the court itself into closer contact with urban life: see pp. 207–8), and that it began earlier in Anatolia, for instance, than elsewhere in south-west Asia.⁶⁰ The claim, put into Ghazan’s mouth by Rashīd al-Dīn, that most of the Mongol soldiery in Iran aspired to become landowners and engage in farming could indicate that by 1300 acculturation was far advanced;⁶¹ though Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī only rarely speaks of a Mongol population cultivating a district.⁶²

By the same token, resistance to Islamization might be expected among the more traditionalist-minded who equated it with the abandonment of time-honoured steppe norms. It has been noticed more than once that the Mongols were strikingly slow to adopt the culture of their Muslim subjects at a number of levels. John Masson Smith has argued that the purpose of Ghazan’s distribution of iqtā’s among the troops was not the rejection of pastoralism for agriculture but the rearing of larger and stronger mounts for military campaigns⁶³ – doubtless an aim that secured it the backing of the military leadership. But given the comparative rarity of the term iqtā’ in sources other than the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh (and in cases where the grantee is
not a Muslim client prince or refugee Mamlūk officer), Reuven Amitai suggests that Ghazan’s measure remained a dead letter.64

Let us briefly examine the progress of Islam within the three western khanates, beginning with the Jochid territories. The fact that Simon de Saint-Quentin’s direct experience was confined to the Mongols under Baiju’s overall command, and the recent extension of Batu’s authority over Baiju and his troops (see above, p. 121), indicate that Islam was making rapid progress in a region that effectively lay within the sphere of influence of the Golden Horde. It comes as no surprise that Ötemish Ḥājjī’s relatively late account preserves an echo of Berke obtaining the dignity of khan on the back of a groundswell of Muslim military support.65 Striking confirmation of this picture emerges within fifteen years or so of Simon de Saint-Quentin’s visit. According to a letter of 661/1262–3 from Berke to the Egyptian Sultan, as cited by the Mamlūk author Baybars al-Manṣūrī, several Mongol commanders from the Jochid ulus and the rank and file in their armies had accepted Islam. They included not only ‘the tümen that was sent to Khurāsān’ (possibly those under Quli’s command) but in addition ‘all those who had gone forth with Baiju’.66 There may well be some connection here with the fact that Baiju’s advisers, as Eljigidei’s Christian envoys had assured King Louis IX in 1248, were ‘Saracens’.67 According to the Egyptian author al-Nuwayrī, Baiju had asked to be washed and buried in the Muslim fashion.68 Authors writing in Muslim India report the influx in the 1260s of Mongol refugees – also, we must assume, former Jochid soldiery who had been part of the above-mentioned tümen from Khurāsān and were now fleeing to avoid massacre by Hülegū’s troops. They are described as ‘neo-Muslims’ (naw-musulmānān), but we cannot be sure that they had embraced the faith prior to their arrival,69 since a group of Negüderi Mongol amirs formerly under the command of the Chaghadayid prince ‘Abd-Allāh (see pp. 195, 197), who entered the service of the Delhi Sultan with their troops almost thirty years later, in 691/1292, are said to have pronounced the shahāda at that juncture, possibly as a precondition.70

Like Jochi’s ulus, that of Chaghadai suffers from a dearth of indigenous narrative sources (with the qualified exception of Jamāl al-Qarshī down to the early years of the fourteenth century). To judge by their names (by no means an infallible guide to religious allegiance), a number of Ögödeyid and Chaghadayid princes were already Muslims by the beginning of the fourteenth century.71 Moving on one generation, Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī heard that the majority of Tarmashirin’s people (qawm, which must refer to the nomadic population) imitated him in becoming Muslims.72 But Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umarī confirms that there were Muslims among the khan’s
amirs and troops before he issued orders for them to adopt the faith, and on the basis of nomenclature Professors John Woods and Michal Biran have each suggested that there was a strong Muslim presence within the Mongol elite by Tarmashirin’s time. Even in the eastern tracts of the ulus, where the faith had made less progress than among the Mongols of the western half and where Tughluq Temür’s adoption of Islam was allegedly imitated by 120,000 Mongols (above, p. 332), Mīrzā Ḥaydar tells us that the head of his own tribe, the Dughlāt amir Tülek, had secretly embraced Islam three years prior to Tughluq Temür.

More ample evidence exists for the Ilkhanate, where the widespread conversion of the Mongols almost certainly preceded the adoption of Islam by the Ilkhan Ghazan. Here again we must recall the presence of acculturating circumstances. Ghazan’s father Arghun was the first Ilkhan to have been born in Iran (near Baylaqān, in Arrān, in 660/1261, according to Rashīd al-Dīn) rather than in the eastern Asiatic steppe, and by 1295 Mongol troops had been domiciled in Iran for approximately four decades. Rashīd al-Dīn represents Ghazan as having not merely brought with him all the amirs but as also having caused the entirety of his troops to become Muslims following his own conversion, while Waṣṣāf sets at more than 200,000 the number of ‘stubborn polytheists (mushrik-i mutamarrid)’ – presumably Mongols – who embraced Islam on a single day. Nevertheless, these statements are, at the very least, grossly misleading. Writing around this very time, Bar Hebraeus’ continuator tells us that all the Mongols in Iran had already become Muslims – a view echoed (probably before 1295) by Riccoldo da Montecroce. Even if such claims are in turn exaggerated, they provide a healthy corrective to the testimony of Ghazan’s historians. On the basis of a close examination of Mamlūk as well as Ilkhanid sources, Professor Charles Melville has demonstrated that one incentive behind Ghazan’s conversion was the existence of Muslim Mongols in significant numbers within the ranks of his own military following and among the supporters of his rival Baidu. We might be justified in assuming that Baidu himself, who at his accession had been swift to proclaim that Islamic awqāf should preserve their exempt status and who accepted Islam, according to Step’anos Orbelian, merely at the prompting of his military commanders, was acting under a similar impulse.

None of this is to deny, incidentally, that the Islamization process within the ranks of the military was slow and fitful. Well into the reign of Öljeitü, we encounter what looks like a surprising ignorance of the tenets of the new faith. In the wake of a dispute between rival Muslim schools in the Ilkhan’s presence, the Mongol general Qutlugh Shāh allegedly protested...
against adopting Islam and derided Muslim sects for permitting marriage with a daughter or a sister. His outburst has more than once been taken to indicate a deeply flawed acquaintance with Islam. But it is conceivable that he had acquired a vague knowledge of the Zoroastrian practice of consanguineous marriage and had failed to notice that this relatively small constituency within Iran followed a totally different religion. Alternatively, of course, he may simply have intended to parody social customs of which he disapproved. (It is noteworthy that on occasion the Ilkhanid Mongols’ great enemy, the Sunnī theologian and jurist, Ibn Taymiyya, resorted to precisely this tactic when he accused one of his opponents of pronouncing incest lawful.) Presumably what Qutlugh Shāh had in mind – and misrepresented – in this case was endogamy, upon which the Mongols traditionally frowned and which Qubilai in 1280 had temporarily prohibited among Muslims in China. It is also worth noting that Qutlugh Shāh objected to Islam on the grounds that it was an old (kuhna) religion and that it was divided into several sects (qism) – evidently an affront to those reared in the belief that the Mongols’ triumphs rested above all on their unity.

Appealing to Muslims beyond the borders

Royal converts may not simply have been conscious of the presence of Muslims among their own Mongol subjects; they may have sought also to court an external Muslim constituency. The most obvious example is the Ilkhan Ghazan, whose adoption of the title Pādishāh-i Islām acknowledged the need to outbid his Mamlūk enemies (and their puppet ’Abbasid Caliph) for the leadership of the Islamic world. By the same token, the assumption of the title ‘Sultan’ by Noghai’s son Cheke in the western half of Jochi’s ulus in or soon after 696/1296–787 could have been designed to win over Muslims in the service of his father’s enemy, the khan Toqto’a.

Two other instances from the Golden Horde are especially intriguing. In Berke’s case, we cannot fail to be struck by a convergence between religious affiliation and a radical shift in foreign policy – involving as it did a rapprochement with an external power, directed against a Mongol kinsman (pp. 150–1). From 660/1262 Berke sought to reach an understanding with the Mamlūks of Egypt and Syria against their common enemy in the Ilkhanate. In these diplomatic exchanges he would make play of the fact that Hülegü had killed the ’Abbasid Caliph al-Mustaṣim. It should be noted, however, that one of his objections was Hülegü’s infringement of the ‘Yasa’, either by withholding Berke’s share of the spoils from Iraq or by failing to consult his kinsmen (‘aqa and ini’) in advance, and this suggests that he
saw no incongruity in combining Islam and the observance of Mongol law. And we have seen (p. 142) that Berke took three years to respond to the Caliph's death, which can only have been a secondary element in the dispute. Perhaps what occurred in 1262, in reality, was that a Mongol potentate exploited a shared religious allegiance in his dealings with an external power once changed circumstances rendered it desirable; he may in any event have conceived of Baybars as his subordinate (see p. 191). Comparable is Hülegü's opening contact with the Catholic West in 1262 and couching his message, to some extent, in a Christian idiom while also reiterating the traditional message of world-dominion. This is not to deny, however, that Berke's commitment to Islam appears to have been considerably stronger than any leanings on Hülegü's part towards Christianity.

A possible parallel in the conduct of the next Muslim khan, Töde Mengü, has attracted less notice. Letters from the Mamlûk Sultan's envoys in the Qipchaq steppe had already reached Egypt in Rabī' I 681/June–July 1282, bringing news of Mengü Temür's death (in Rabī' I 679/July 1280) and the new khan's accession (in Jumādā I 680/August–September 1281). Importantly, however, there is at this stage no reference to Töde Mengü as a Muslim. The khan announced his conversion to Sultan Qalāwûn only several months later. In an embassy that arrived in Jumâdâ II 682/August–September 1283 and comprised two jurists (fuqahā') from the Qipchaq, he claimed to have established the laws (sharâ'i) of Islam, asked Qalâwûn to give him a Muslim name, and requested standards from both the Sultan and the puppet 'Abbasid Caliph in Cairo, under which he might wage war against the enemies of the faith. It is surely significant that the interval had witnessed the death of the Ilkhan Abagha (20 Dhū l-Hijja 680/1 April 1282) and the enthronement of the Muslim Tegüder Aḥmad (13 Rabī’ I 681/21 June 1282). The new Ilkhan, who had (as he assured Qalâwûn in a letter dated Rabī’ I 682/June 1283) notified the Jochids of his own conversion, had also opened negotiations with Cairo on a fresh basis. The ineffectiveness of Tegüder Aḥmad's overtures, and indeed the precariousness of his rule, were not yet apparent when Töde Mengü announced his adhesion to Islam. In deciding to adopt the faith – or at least in communicating the decision to Qalâwûn – Töde Mengü was conceivably seeking to outflank the Mongols of Iran lest the new Ilkhan were on the verge of a diplomatic success. It is not impossible that Töde Mengü additionally had an eye to the predominantly Muslim populations in those regions of north-western Iran on which the Jochids harboured designs. For the khan of Batu's ulus to proclaim his adhesion to Islam would neutralize the danger that these Muslims might be more easily reconciled to Ilkhanid rule following the
accession of Tegüder Aḥmad than to the prospect of conquest by the Jochids.

To say that Mongol rulers travelled in the wake of the Mongol rank and file within their dominions, or felt the further need to cultivate Muslims beyond their frontiers, is not to dismiss royal conversions as mere opportunism. But it does furnish one possible context for the decision to adopt the majority faith of their subjects. Another such context was social intercourse with Muslims of one kind or another, to which we now turn.

The agents of conversion

We cannot of course dismiss the possibility that converts within the Mongol military played a more direct role in the conversion of their monarch. This is certainly true of the Mongol khan about whose adoption of Islam we are best informed. Ghazan's acceptance of the faith owes a great deal to the intervention of his principal adherent, the formerly rebel noyan Nawrūz, a son of Arghun Aqa and a Muslim who was in addition the husband of Ghazan's aunt. According to Waṣṣāf, in 694/1295 when Nawrūz offered his submission and the two men were reconciled, he had stipulated that in return for his own guarantee of lifelong service the prince should swear the strongest oaths to become a Muslim and to do all in his power to promote Islamic laws; and Ghazan did so.93 We are fortunate to possess an account of Ghazan's formal adoption of Islam on 2 Sha'bān 694/17 June 1295, by Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ḥamūwayī, who was present and with whose guidance the new Ilkhan recited the profession of faith. He tells us that prior to the ceremony Ghazan alluded to a promise he had given previously to embrace Islam.94 It seems that thereafter Nawrūz continued to visit Ghazan every morning and instructed him in the teachings of the Qur'ān.95

What part did the ‘religious class’ have in leading Mongol khans, their kinsfolk and their followers towards Islam? We saw (above, p. 49) how at one time the Islamization of the Turks in the pre-Mongol steppe was ascribed, on inadequate grounds, to Muslim holy men, often referred to as sufis and shaykhs. The evidence for their role in the conversion of the Mongols, however, is more substantial, though scattered across a range of sources and usually expressed in vague terms. Ṣadr al-Dīn's father, Shaykh Sa’d al-Dīn Muḥammad Ḥamūwayī (d. 651/1253–4), for instance, is credited with conversions among the occupying Mongols in northern Iran.96 Amitai cites an example of a sufi shaykh who had acquired a Mongol following later in the century.97 The encyclopaedist Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-’Umarī, writing for a court that was in regular contact with Jochi’s ulus,
learned that Berke had accepted Islam as an adult in Bukhārā at the hands of the celebrated Shaykh Sayf al-Dīn Bākharzī, while returning from Mōngke’s enthronement in 649/1251–2; the historicity of the visit to Bukhārā is confirmed by Jamāl al-Qarshī. Although we have no information as to how Töde Mengü came to accept Islam, Mamlūk sources are agreed that when he resigned as khan in 1287 it was in order to spend the remainder of his days with sufi shaykhs.

We have only meagre information about individuals who were responsible for imparting a desire for, and knowledge of, Islam to those Chaghādāyids who converted. Ibn Bāṭṭūṭa transmits a brief anecdote from which it is clear that Shaykh Badr al-Dīn Mandānī was on good terms with Köpek. Qāshānī, writing almost a generation earlier, says that it was at Badr al-Dīn’s hands that Köpek’s distant cousin and rival Yasa’ur had accepted Islam, and credits him with dissuading Yasa’ur from sacking Khujand and Bukhārā in 716/1316, prior to his flight from the Chaghādāyid khanate into Khurāsān. In view of the fact that Yasa’ur’s appanage within Transoxiana is known to have been near Samarqand (p. 188), it was there, in all likelihood, that he had adopted Islam. Clearly the shaykh was a man of some standing and influence in Transoxiana; but whether he was instrumental in the conversion of Köpek’s brother and eventual successor, Tarmashirin, we cannot know. Al-’Umarī writes of ‘the learned imams and God-fearing shaykhs of that country’ who seconded Tarmashirin’s efforts to instil Islam into his troops, took advantage of their compliance and made haste to preach the faith among them. Ibn Bāṭṭūta links Tarmashirin with two Muslim teachers: Shaykh Ḩasan, whom he describes as the khan’s relative by marriage and who is not mentioned in other sources, and Shaykh Ḥusām al-Dīn Yāghī of Uṭrār, who gained a name for himself by refusing to accept gifts or office from Tarmashirin and even rebuked him for arriving late for the Friday prayer, though we should note, incidentally, that neither is credited with bringing the khan to Islam.

In Mirzā Ḥaydar’s narrative, Tughluq Temür received Islam at the hands of Shaykh Arshad al-Dīn, the son of Shaykh Jamāl al-Dīn. The father had made a profound impression on him during an earlier encounter in the Āqsū region, obtaining the khan’s promise that he would accept Islam when next they met, but had meanwhile died and bequeathed to Arshad al-Dīn the task of bringing Tughluq Temür to the faith. Haydar describes as reliable his source for this tale, a descendant of Jamāl al-Dīn named Mawlānā Khwāja Ahmād, though he admits that contemporary Mongols were unfamiliar with any of the details.

There is, then, no shortage of evidence for the instrumentality of sufi shaykhs in the conversion process. But the terms ‘sufi’ and ‘shaykh’ could...
have a variety of connotations and spanned a broad spectrum of individuals. At one pole stood ‘respectable’ figures, enjoying proximity and access to Muslim elite circles. It was by no means uncommon for scholars to be classed also as mystics or ascetics, like the figure hailed by Ibn al-Fuwaṭī as ranking among ‘the outstanding sufis and superior ‘ulama’, or the afore-mentioned Ḥusām al-Dīn Yaḥṣī, described as both a jurist (faqīh) and an ascetic (zāhid). At the other extreme were dervishes (fuqarā’; sing. faqīr), frequently termed qalandars, who renounced the world, donned outlandish (or indeed scanty) attire, and were associated with itinerancy, poverty, self-mortification and social deviancy. They frequently disregarded the Shari’a, neglecting the five daily prayers and the Ramaḍān fast, drinking wine and consuming hashish; they aroused the hostility of Muslim princes, who viewed them as socially subversive.

Now the alleged attraction of antinomian sufis or dervishes to the Mongol conquerors stems in large measure from an imagined similarity with the shamans traditionally prominent in steppe culture, which would thereby (it is argued) have encouraged the new masters of Asia to lend greater credence to their Islamic message. It must be said that one of the earliest encounters between dervishes and a Chinggisid prince did not augur well for such fruitful contact. During the Mongol advance on Syria in 1259–60, Hülegü enquired about a qalandar group near Harrān, and on learning from Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī that they were among the superfluous elements on earth he had them slaughtered. Twenty years or more later, the Mongols were still renowned, it seems, for their harsh treatment of qalandars.

Reuven Amitai has argued persuasively that, despite the evidence linking the Mongols and their rulers with sufis, the sufi/shaman model does not withstand close scrutiny, on two counts. Although, in the first place, the activities of the more antinomian sufis and of the Mongols’ shamans may indeed present a superficial similarity, the two groups were concerned with widely differing aspects of life: not least, where the orientation of the sufi was towards the rejection of this world, the shaman’s activities were directed towards obtaining a greater share of its benefits. Secondly, Amitai points out, the sufis known to have enjoyed influence with the Ilkhans were in any case of the more respectable sort – precisely those elements, in fact, that had nothing in common with the shaman. Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Ḥamuwayī, for example, who was closely associated with the Ilkhan Ghazan’s formal acceptance of Islam (above, p. 344), was primarily a scholar, a collector of hadīth, and his reputation as a sufi was in large measure a ‘hand-me-down’ from his father Sa’d al-Dīn Muḥammad. Devin DeWeese, too,
notes that the religious figures who attended the courts of thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Mongol rulers, and to whom contemporary sources ascribe some importance in royal conversions, are more often jurists and scholars than dervishes.\textsuperscript{113}

The affiliations of Tegüder Aḥmad, as Dr Judith Pfeiffer has shown, present a rather different picture from those of his great-nephew Ghazan. When confronted by the rising of his nephew Arghun in 683/1284, he asked Bābī Ya’qūb, leader of a group of qalandars in Arrān, to intercede with God on his behalf.\textsuperscript{114} The circle around the Ilkhan comprised both antinomian dervishes like Īshān Minglī, a disciple of Bābī Ya’qūb,\textsuperscript{115} and more sober figures like Shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, at whose hands, Jean Calmard proposed, Tegüder Aḥmad had accepted Islam.\textsuperscript{116} But both alike participated in ecstatic dancing (\textit{samā́}) sessions together with the Ilkhan himself. What inspired Tegüder Aḥmad, suggests Pfeiffer, was the need for an alternative source of legitimation beyond membership of the \textit{altan orugh}, namely access to those who mediated contact with the spiritual world.\textsuperscript{117}

Earlier we noted Islamic practices to which pagan Mongols would have objected, notably those associated with the burial place of the dead. But when Ibn Baṭṭūṭa passed through the Chaghadayid khanate in the 1330s, he was told that in the past even infidel Mongols, attracted by the miracles occurring at the supposed tomb of Qutham b. al-ʿAbbās near Samarqand, had been accustomed to visit the shrine in order to gain a blessing.\textsuperscript{118} When and why had Mongol attitudes begun to shift? In the present state of our knowledge this question cannot be resolved. Possibly, however, the sufis’ function could appear akin to that of the guards traditionally stationed close by the graves of Mongol princes. It is also likely that sufi shaykhs were seen as combining two mediatory roles: they fulfilled the task of the shaman in propitiating the spirits of the dead, and at the same time introduced the Mongols to the novel idea that the deceased could work miracles.

Yet Amitai’s central point is undoubtedly valid. What carried greater weight with the Mongol sovereigns, probably, was not some superficial resemblance to their own shamans but specific skills to which they themselves attached considerable value – in this case the magical and thaumaturgical activities that were in vogue in some sufī circles.\textsuperscript{119} Shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, for instance, was well versed in the practice of alchemy, and to this, we are told, he owed his ascendancy over Tegüder Aḥmad.\textsuperscript{120} Of course, whether or not they enjoyed any success among the imperial dynasty, less sophisticated Muslim ascetics may well have been effective in spreading the faith at grass-roots level. Two Western Christian observers close at hand – the Dominican Guillaume Adam, later Archbishop of Sulṭāniyya, writing in
c. 1317, and the Franciscan missionary active in Bashkiria in 1320 – were both of the belief that within the Golden Horde territories Islam’s progress was spearheaded by faqīrs; Adam was even under the impression that the Mamlûk Sultan sent such dervishes to the Jochid lands every year as a matter of policy.\textsuperscript{121}

In general, admittedly, we have to entertain the possibility that an active role in the conversion of high-ranking Mongols came to be ascribed posthumously, and usually much later, by his followers to a sufi shaykh who had won for himself a reputation as the founder of a major network (silsila). DeWeese’s comment, ‘[i]t may be that the role of Sufis in “royal” conversion as recounted in later sources is somewhat exaggerated, reflecting the social position of Sufis in the age of the sources rather than the age of the conversion,’\textsuperscript{122} is surely apposite. But even this scenario does not necessarily preclude the possibility that an individual shaykh’s achievement in bringing a Mongol prince to Islam lent him, his shrine and his descendants a prestige that would in turn contribute to the emergence of a fully fledged sufi order in subsequent generations.\textsuperscript{123}

What of other means whereby the Mongols were brought to Islam? In contrast with the material recording the Ilkhan Ghazan’s adoption of the faith, we have only meagre contemporary testimony regarding Jochi’s offspring, the first Chinggisids to accept Islam. As we have seen, there is solid evidence to connect Berke’s formal profession of faith with Sayf al-Dīn Bākharzī (though no mention is made of his two brothers, Berkecher and Bora/Muḥammad, also converts to Islam).\textsuperscript{124} Jūzjānī, on the other hand, tells us that Berke was born during the conquest of Khwārazm by his father Jochi, who determined that his son should be reared as a Muslim; the boy was weaned by a Muslim foster-mother, was taught the Qur’ān in Khujand and later circumcised and, on reaching adolescence, was entrusted with any of the troops at his father’s headquarters (lashgargāh) who were Muslim.\textsuperscript{125} Professor Jean Richard reconciled these traditions by suggesting that Bākharzī simply required Berke to make a public demonstration of the faith that had been instilled in him since childhood. But his ingenious argument – that Berke’s mother was the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad’s daughter, Khān Sulṭān or Sulṭān Khatun, who is known to have been one of Jochi’s wives and had been instructed by the qaghan, according to Nasawī, to rear her offspring as Muslims\textsuperscript{126} – can no longer stand. István Vásáry identified certain elements in the source material as accretions to the ‘historical’ facts, pointing out that Jūzjānī’s chronology is itself flawed, since Mamlûk envoys who visited Berke’s ordo in 663/1264–5 gave his age as fifty-six (which in turn precludes his having been born during the conquest of Khwārazm or
to a daughter of the Khwārazmshāh).\textsuperscript{127} It seems that Jochi’s role in Jūzjānī’s version of events is at best overstated, and at worst deeply suspect.

It perhaps goes without saying, nevertheless, that Mongol princes born of Muslim mothers were likely to be reared in the faith: a later example was the Chaghādayid khan Naliqo’a, an energetic proselytizer whose mother was a princess from the Qutlugkhanid dynasty of Kirmān.\textsuperscript{128} But one vehicle that has not, to my knowledge, been mooted for the inculcation of Muslim sympathies is fostering in infancy. Jūzjānī’s ideas (or perhaps those of his informant) concerning the role of the foster-mother in Berke’s conversion may well owe less to the particular historical reality of the khan’s childhood than to older steppe Turkic \textit{topoi} relating, for example, to the first Muslim ruler of the Qarakhanid dynasty (just as in the more fully developed version supplied by the fifteenth-century \textit{Shajarat al-ātrāk}, Berke refuses his mother’s milk until she converts to Islam, an embellishment clearly borrowed from the legend of Oghuz Khan).\textsuperscript{129} The currency of such tales within the Islamic world was surely due to the popular notion that the child imbibed particular qualities and sympathies from the woman who suckled it.\textsuperscript{130} Nevertheless, these stories point us towards the relationship between the children who shared the ministrations of the same wet nurse.

Much of the evidence for the centrality of the institution of \textit{kükeltash} (‘foster-brother’) in Turco-Mongol society comes from the sixteenth-century works of Bābur and Mīrzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt. But Vásáry has highlighted instances also of thirteenth-century Mongol rulers bestowing office and rewards on those to whom they were thus connected, and the relationship was clearly of some moment in the eyes of Rashīd al-Dīn.\textsuperscript{131} Its potential importance in the context of conversion is neatly encapsulated for us in his notice on Qubilai’s grandson Ananda, the only Chinggisid prince in the thirteenth-century Yuan dominions known to have become a Muslim.

Ananda, whose appanage lay in the Tangut region, had been entrusted to a Muslim from Turkestan called Mihtar Ḥasan the \textit{aqtachi} (equerry) and weaned by Ḥasan’s wife. On this account, Islam had ‘taken firm root in his heart’; Ananda had learned the Qur’ān and his devotions absorbed much of his time. He had further converted to Islam the majority of the 150,000 Mongol troops under his command. Complaints from one of Ananda’s noyans, Sartaq, reached his cousin, the Qaghan Temür (r. 1294–1307), who had the prince imprisoned when he refused to recant his faith and to worship in idol temples. Subsequently, however, in c. 1296, he was released at the instigation of one of Temür’s wives and restored to favour. Rashīd al-Dīn says that Mihtar Ḥasan’s sons and grandsons all now held exalted rank, and that even the hostile Sartaq had become a Muslim.\textsuperscript{132}
Professor Ruth Dunnell is sceptical about the part played by Ananda’s Muslim foster-mother in his acceptance of Islam. But unlike Jūzjānī’s notice regarding Berke, Rashīd al-Dīn’s account just hints at the role of the foster-family in reinforcing the influence of a Muslim wet nurse and providing a pool of support for the adolescent/adult convert. We may accordingly have here another paradigm for the adoption of Islam, as an alternative to the appeal of the shaykh. None of this excludes the likelihood that the would-be convert later, in adulthood, made some formal and public acknowledgement of his new faith, perhaps, like Berke, in the presence of a Muslim ʿālim or shaykh.

**Pluralism and false reports of conversion**

In chapter 11 we saw how Mongol attitudes towards the numinous led khans and their lieutenants to be open to the techniques employed by all religious ‘experts’ and to show equal favour to all faiths, granting privileges to the ‘religious class’ within each confession and patronizing Muslim shrines and other holy places. On occasion, moreover, a Mongol khan – perhaps seeking common ground with one group or another – voiced sentiments that indicated sympathy towards a particular faith, as when Hülegü, according to Bar Hebraeus, informed the patriarch that Christians had visited his grandfather Chinggis Khan and had taught him their religion, or when he privately revealed to the Dominican David of Ashby his desire for baptism and told the Armenian Vardan that he had been a Christian since birth. We know of no such revelations apropos of Islam; but just as zealous Western missionaries trumpeted tendentious reports of conversions, so too our Muslim sources are quite capable of misinterpreting acts of largesse. While writing realistically of Batu’s disinterested stance in religious matters, Juwaynī nevertheless assures his readers that Möngke showed greater favour towards Muslims than towards the representatives of other faiths, perhaps because the future Qaghan, his brothers and his cousins had allegedly been tutored by Iftikhār al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Naṣr Qazwīnī. Jamal al-Qarshī, al-Yūnīnī and the late fifteenth-century historian Mīr Khwānd all independently credit Qaidu with the same partiality. Some writers went still further. Jūzjānī, writing in distant Delhi, transmits reports from ‘trustworthy informants’ that both Ögödei and Batu had secretly adopted Islam. He makes Berke, attending Möngke’s enthronement, predict that the days of infidel rule are numbered and has the new Qaghan himself utter the *shahāda* – a piece of wishful thinking by any standard. Mongol administrators, too, were sometimes thought
to have adopted Islam. For Juwaynī, the Uighur Körgüz, governor of Khurāsān, had embraced the faith shortly before his death. The Christian Kirakos transmits a similar rumour about Körgüz’s successor, Arghun Aqa (d. 673/1275); it finds no echo in Muslim sources, though Arghun Aqa’s son Nawrūz would prove heavily committed to the Muslim interest.

We should distinguish four levels of conduct on the part of Mongol rulers: firstly, marked (though not exclusive) favour towards Muslim personnel and Islamic charitable foundations (awqāf; sing. waqf), of the kind likely to prompt the misconceptions described above; secondly, adoption of Islamic practices at a personal level; thirdly, enforcement of the Shari’a, involving the downgrading of rival faiths; and fourthly, a move beyond this, to active persecution of their adherents. Even within the third category we might still distinguish between the wholesale reimposition of the jizya and exemption from the tax for priests and monks (corresponding to what had been their position as regards the qubchur or their status under certain pre-Mongol dynasties like the Saljuqs). There is a final point to be made in this context. Anything more than the personal adhesion of a Mongol ruler risked undermining the pluralism demanded by Chinggis Khan’s edict. This meant that whatever provisions of the Shari’a might or might not be implemented, the raising of Islam to the status of the dominant faith – and the concomitant demotion of other faiths – ran counter to Mongol tradition. It is important that we bear this in mind in the next chapter.
This chapter will focus in particular on a number of Mongol khans about whom we are better informed, who have been the subject of controversy, or whose conversion is handled in a contradictory fashion by our sources. I shall also investigate the ‘official’ outworkings of royal conversion: what changed in its wake (and what did not), with special reference to the implementation of Islamic law. Or, to put it another way, in what respects did the adoption of Islam entail a break with the past? In all this, I should stress that it is not my intention to distinguish between ‘genuine’ or ‘whole-hearted’ conversions, on the one hand, and ‘insincere’ or ‘partial’ conversions on the other. Nor can we yet speak in terms of the establishment of Islam as an ‘official state religion’.1 But it is, in my view, legitimate to distinguish convert rulers who courted the risk of insurrection by Turco-Mongol noyans through trying to reassert Islamic norms, or just through exhibiting a preference for Muslim amirs, from those who were content simply with a greater or lesser degree of personal observance. This bears directly on the pace of Islamization, which has often been equated with the adhesion of a ruler to Islam – and hence treated, misleadingly, as if it were a single definitive moment in history.

The Jochids: From Berke to Özbeg

Whether or not he had been reared a Muslim (see p. 348), the adult Berke took Islamic practice seriously. According to Juwaynî, the meat served in Môngke’s encampment to celebrate the new Qaghan’s election had been slaughtered in the Muslim fashion out of deference to Berke.2 Rubruck heard that Berke forbade the consumption of pork in his own camp (though
his phrasing suggests that the prince made himself out to be a Muslim, rather than stating categorically that he was). He also says that visits to Berke’s court by Muslim traders and envoys bearing gifts had occasioned friction with his brother Batu.\(^3\) Stories illustrating the khan’s championship of Islam reached Delhi in time for Jūzjānī to include them in his history in 1260. Mamlūk ambassadors who visited Berke’s court a few years later reported that he had a Muslim wazir named Sharaf al-Dīn Qazwīnī and that he was attended by a Muslim holy man (\textit{faqīr}) from al-Fayyūm in Egypt, called Shaykh Aḥmad al-Miṣrī, towards whom he showed great respect. But their description of the khan’s appearance mentions that beneath a \textit{sarāqūj}, the Mongol cap, he wore his hair in braids around his ears; it is clear, therefore, that he had retained the traditional Mongol hairstyle.\(^4\) We might wish we knew half as much about other Chinggisid converts to Islam.

Yet despite the fact that contemporary sources give Berke an instrumental role in the spread of Islam in the Qipchaq khanate and that two of his brothers were also Muslims, the new faith does not appear to have been strongly implanted among the Jochids.\(^5\) When Berke died in 665/1267, his immediate successor, a grandson of Batu named Mengü Temūr, was an infidel; the next khan, Mengü Temūr’s brother Töde Mengü (r.680–6/1281–7), adopted Islam, only to be followed by two non-Muslim rulers. It is during the reign of the second of these, Toqto’a (690–712/1291–1312), and the hegemony of his distant cousin Noghai further west, that we first glimpse traces of religious confrontation in the Jochid ulus. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Noghai’s daughter Qiyaq became a Muslim at some point following her marriage to Yailaq, the son of Salji’udai Küregen by a Toluid princess, and the brother of one of Toqto’a’s wives. Her husband is described as a ‘Uighur’, so presumably a Buddhist, and his family were hostile to the conversion and treated her with disrespect; she therefore appealed to her father, who in turn demanded redress from Toqto’a, to no avail.\(^6\) Later, Rashīd al-Dīn is more explicit that Salji’udai brought about the rift between Toqto’a and his powerful kinsman.\(^7\) It is noteworthy that Noghai had announced his own conversion to Islam in a letter to the Mamlūk Sultan Baybars in Muharram 669/August 1270.\(^8\) But this did not prevent him from sending the Ilkhan Arghun the gift of a relic of the Buddha in 687/1288;\(^9\) and his wife (confusingly also called Yailaq) allegedly accepted baptism in 1287 from the Franciscans in the Crimea.\(^10\) The fact that at least one Western European source claims Toqto’a as a baptized Christian (without, however, regarding Noghai as a Muslim)\(^11\) very probably reflects the over-optimism of Western missionaries; and indeed Muslim authors mention almost in the
same breath Toqto’a’s devotion to sorcerers and bakhshīs (either Buddhist
monks or shamans), his even-handedness and his personal favour towards
the representatives of Islam. All this renders it likely that Toqto’a was an
exponent of the traditional pluralism. The precise part played in the conflict
by religious affiliations therefore remains uncertain.

From the reign of Toqto’a’s nephew Özbeg (712–42/1312–41), Islam
became entrenched permanently as the religion of the Golden Horde khans.
Özbeg’s name would come to be inextricably entwined with the advent of
the faith; in his reign, it has been pointed out, Sarai took on the appearance
of a genuinely Muslim city. He dealt ruthlessly with opposition, killing a
number of ‘Uighurs, namely bakhshīs and sorcerers (al-saḥara), which
suggests that he encountered (or anticipated) resistance from both Buddhist
monks and shamans. He is also said to have encompassed the deaths of
scores of Jochid princes who had rejected his demand to embrace Islam. This
helps, incidentally, to explain why Özbeg was able to transmit the
throne of the Jochid ulus to his sons, rather as the parallel measures taken
by the childless Ghazan in Iran had ensured the succession of his brother
and nephew (above, p. 270).

But although Özbeg’s own commitment to Islam and his efforts to
spread the faith attracted the notice of several contemporary Muslim
observers, both in the Ilkhanate and in the Mamlūk realm, we should be
wary of overstating the case. Interestingly, the later Mamlūk historians,
beginning with Ibn Duqmāq (d. 809/1406–7), tell us that despite the clash
between Islamic teaching and the levirate Özbeg married Bayalun, at one
time the wife of his father Toghrilcha (and then of his uncle and prede-
cessor Toqto’a), thanks to the intervention of a Muslim jurist who justified
the union on the grounds that Bayalun’s previous husbands were infidels
and the marriages therefore had no validity in Islam (we find the same
rationale expressed in connection with the Ilkhan Ghazan: below,
p. 364). Nor should we be misled by Muscovite chroniclers writing in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Islamic faith of the Tatar
khans loomed much larger for Orthodox ecclesiastics as a barrier between
medieval Rus´ and its overlords, and when Özbeg’s execution of Prince
Mikhail of Tver’ (for disloyalty) in 1318 would be construed as nothing less
than an act of Muslim fanaticism. Although Guillaume Adam heard that
the Mamlūk Sultan had persuaded the khan to order the confiscation of all
church bells, the Franciscans active in Özbeg’s dominions in the years
1320–3 seem to have been quite unaware that he was a Muslim; they express
hopes of converting him to Christianity, and speak as if the policy of reli-
gious pluralism was still operative. The privileges that he renewed for
them in 1314 not only included the customary permission to preach and exemption from taxes (in return, as usual, for their prayers) but also flew in the face of the Islamic dispensation that obtained elsewhere, since they were authorized to ring their bells and even to build new churches. It is a measure of the limited distance travelled in Özbeg’s reign that the sources attribute a more pronounced role in the Islamization process to his son Janibeg, who is said to have destroyed idol temples and who was hostile to the Franciscan mission; he also circumscribed the fiscal exemptions of the Orthodox Rus’ clergy. Significantly, perhaps, a sufi work begun in Özbeg’s reign and completed under Janibeg describes the son as ‘learned in the law and religion of Muṣṭafā’, a compliment that it withholds from the father.

Regarding the course of Islamization in the eastern Jochid territories, the so-called Blue Horde, presided over by Orda’s line, we are lamentably ill-informed. István Vásáry has demonstrated that Mubārak Qocha did not reign in the early fourteenth century, as previously thought, but should be assigned to the late 1360s; he was consequently not the first of these rulers to bear a Muslim name. According to Naṭanzī, the khan Īrazān (720–45/1320–1 to 1344–5) built mosques, madrasas and sufi hospices in the towns along the lower reaches of the Sīr-daryā – the earliest Blue Horde khan to be associated with such activity; and Thomas Allsen suggests that Islam gained a foothold among Orda’s descendants as a result of their acquisition of this region (above, p. 189). The fact that in Naṭanzī’s account Īrazān was enthroned at Özbeg’s behest might indicate that he was already a Muslim prior to his enthronement.

The Chaghadayids: from Tarmashirin to Tughluq Temür

In Central Asia, just as in the Jochid dominions, there were likewise ‘false dawns’ before Islam took firm root among Chaghadai’s line. Chaghadai’s great-grandson who reigned under the unmistakably Muslim name of Mubārak Shāh (c. 664/1266) is a shadowy figure; his successor Baraq (d. 670/1271–2) is said to have adopted Islam (with the laqab of Ghiyāth al-Dīn) only towards the very end of his reign. Thereafter, we have to wait until the early fourteenth century for further Muslim converts among the khans. During his brief reign (c. 707–8/c. 1308–9) Naliqo’a, whose mother was a Muslim princess, ‘engaged in laudable efforts to spread the practice of the faith’ and with this in view annihilated some of Du’a’s amirs and attempted to uproot Du’a’s line as well. Under his successor, Du’a’s eldest surviving son Esen Buqa (r. 709–c. 720/1309–c. 1320), we encounter fresh signs of religious tension, when the khan’s brother Köpek
accused Yasa’ur (a great-nephew of Naliqo’a) of restraining his colleagues from devastating Khurāsān during the Chaghadayid invasion of 715/1315, out of partiality for his fellow Muslims. Yet we have no grounds for believing that Yasa’ur’s enemies were hostile to the faith. Köpek’s own reign (c. 720–6/c. 1320–6) earned him a reputation among Muslims for justice, and he enjoyed good relations with the shaykh Badr al-Dīn Mandānī.

We are relatively well informed about the Muslim convert Tarmashirin (r. c. 731–5/c. 1331–4), the sixth and last of Du’a’s sons to occupy the throne. This is due to the fortuitous circumstance that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visited his court in c. 1333 and the fact that his reputation extended as far as the Mamlūk empire, where Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-’Umarī mentions the khan’s conversion in his great encyclopaedia and al-Dahabī included in the Ta’rikh al-Islām an obituary of Tarmashirin that al-Ṣafadī then copied into his two biographical dictionaries. Prior to his overthrow, Tarmashirin would flee towards Ghazna, and his lieutenant in the region, Boroldai, is called his close confidant and a ‘lover of Islam and the Muslims’ by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. Boroldai, who was accompanied by a group of shaykhs when the Moroccan traveller met him at Parwān in c. 733/c. 1333, is credited with constructing mosques and madrasas in Ghazna. Since we have only hazy indications of the date of Tarmashirin’s conversion, which Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-’Umarī places ‘since 725’ (1325), and can be certain of nothing more than that he ascended the throne as a Muslim, it is possible that he had embraced the faith not in Transoxiana but south of the Oxus, when based at Ghazna in or after 726/1325–6.

Tarmashirin clearly did a good deal to earn a reputation as a pious, just and orthodox ruler and a self-conscious Muslim. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa retails various anecdotes that illustrate the khan’s respect for, and deference towards, Muslim divines. According to al-Dahabī/al-Ṣafadī, he abrogated forbidden imposts (mukūs: doubtless the tamgha and possibly other non-Islamic taxes), a move evidently linked with the fact that, as Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-’Umarī tells us, his territories became a magnet for Muslim merchants from as far afield as the Mamlūk empire, who returned home full of his praises. Soon after Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s departure, however, Tarmashirin was confronted by the rebellion of his nephew, Buzun, and was intercepted en route for Ghazna and put to death (735/1334). There followed a number of brief reigns, some of them turbulent. Of these, ’Alī Sulṭān (r. 740–1/1340), a descendant of Ögödei, was the first of an uninterrupted series of Muslim khans – that is, in the western half of Chaghadaī’s ulus, roughly comprising Transoxiana.

In the previous chapter, some attention was given to the role of sufis in bringing Mongol khans to Islam. But as the example of the Ilkhan Tegüder
Ahmad shows, certain khans were themselves drawn to dervish practices – though precisely how unorthodox we are not told. From Transoxiana, Devin DeWeese draws attention to the puppet ruler Kābul Shāh (r. 767–9/1365 or 66–1367 or 68), who was installed by Temūr’s ally (and later rival) Amīr Ḥusayn and who prior to his accession had been living in retreat as a sufi ‘from fear of the afflictions of the age’; Naṭanzī apostrophizes him as ‘a saint by nature and a qalandar by habit’. DeWeese accordingly suggests that withdrawal from the world in this fashion was a useful ploy for princes who sought to stay alive amid the intrigues and bloody conflicts of the military aristocracy.35

Yet what we know of the Mongol attitudes to sources of numinous power indicates that for Chinggisid princes the life of a Muslim ascetic could have stemmed from motives other than political quietism. Khalīl Sulṭān, who reigned in Central Asia jointly with Qazan in the years 742–5/1341 or 42 to 1344 or 45, is problematic. Since Ibn Baṭṭūta (who does not mention Qazan) calls Khalil a son of Yasa‘ur, he is just possibly identical with Juki, the only other son of that prince known from the narrative sources. But some of the details of Khalil’s exploits given by the Moroccan traveller are plainly fantastic, while hagiographical works that refer to his association with the sufi Bahā’ al- Dīn Naqshband (d. 791/1389) and are the only sources to call him a dervish, refer to him as ‘Khalīl Ātā (‘father’), suggesting a rather more senior figure. In any event, Khalil was evidently no recluse.36 A slightly earlier instance of royal asceticism from Chaghadaï’s ulus, however, is more clear-cut. Two late fourteenth-century Latin accounts of the martyrdom of the Franciscan missionaries in Almalīgh in 1340 refer to its instigator, the above-mentioned ‘Alī Sulṭān, as a Saracen religious’ (quidam religiosus saracenus) and as a faqīr (falcherius).37 As both terms reveal, this Mongol prince had likewise become an ascetic – not, it seems, in order to distance himself from political life but actively to participate in it with the enthusiastic backing of the local Muslim populace. If, then, for Kābul Shāh the sufi’s garb would provide a refuge, for ‘Alī Sulṭān – in need of additional legitimacy, we might suppose, as the first of Ögödei’s line to reign in Central Asia since the collapse of Chapar’s hegemony – it was a passport to rulership with Muslim support (as indeed it may have been for Khalil). Not that in either case the khan-sufi’s religious credentials afforded him any long-term insurance: ‘Alī Sulṭān was overthrown very soon after the anti-Christian pogrom, while Kābul Shāh in turn was supplanted within a few years of his enthronement.38

Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umarī, writing only a year or so prior to ‘Alī Sulṭān’s accession, had already heard that the Chaghadaïd Mongols were the most
zealous of Muslims and the most scrupulous in distinguishing the lawful from the forbidden. Not long before, Ḩamd-Allāh Mustawfī had credited Tarmashirin with greatly strengthening Islam in his territories. The comments doubtless applied to Transoxiana. Islam had made much less progress even a generation or so after Tarmashirin in the more easterly tracts (‘Mughalistān’ or ‘Jata’), where Buzun’s rebellion had its roots, and where, according to the Ta’rīkh-i Rashīdī (952/1546) of Mirzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt, the majority of Mongols ‘entered Islam’ only in the early fifteenth century, during the reign of Muḥammad Khan (above, p. 332). At a date given as 748/1347–8 by this relatively late source, Mughalistān – more pastoralist and more conservative – chose its own khan, Tughluq Temūr (d. 764/1363), purportedly a grandson of Du’ā, whose principal residence was at Āqsū and who became a Muslim at some point during his reign; his descendants held power until the late seventeenth century. Ḥaydar’s date virtually coincides with the overthrow (747/1346–7) of Qazan, the last effective khan of the entire ulus, by the Qara’unas noyan Qazaghan, first of a series of Turco-Mongol amirs who acted as de facto rulers of the western half. Tughluq Temūr’s enthronement seemingly reflects an unwillingness on the part of the eastern noyans to accept khans installed by a western counterpart – much as the amirs of Khurāsān in 736–7/1336 chose their own Ilkhan, Togha Temūr, in opposition to the nominees of Shaykh Ḥasan-i Buzurg (the future founder of the Jalayirid dynasty) in Iraq. But whether an antipathy towards Islamization played a part in their decision, we cannot say.

Ḥaydar describes Tughluq Temūr as a foundling enthroned by the historian’s own remote forebear, the Dughlāt amir Bolodchi (Pūlādchī), and as the son of the khan Esen Buqa (d. c. 720/c. 1320) by a concubine. Out of jealousy, the khan’s chief wife had married off the pregnant mother to an amir, the chamberlain (shira’ul) Dukhtui; and after giving birth to Tughluq Temūr the woman bore her new husband a son also. But historians writing well over a century earlier make the prince instead the offspring of a younger son of Du’a, Emil Qocha; the genealogical work, Mu’izz al-ansāb (830/1426–7), alleges that Emil Qocha’s widow had married Dukhtui (here Duqtui) and given birth to Tughluq Temūr (no other child is mentioned), so that the boy was reported to be Dukhtui’s son. This may, of course, be no more than a derogatory rumour spread on behalf of the rival (and upstart) Timurid dynasty. But in view of the question attaching to the khan’s pedigree, which Ḥaydar palpably glosses over, DeWeese is surely right to suggest that Tughluq Temūr’s adoption of Islam had its roots, inter alia, in the need for an additional source of legitimacy.
Haydar is at great pains to identify Tughluq Temür’s conversion as a landmark in the history of Islam in Chaghadai’s ulus. His treatment of the subject is a salutary reminder of how the Islamization of a region could be rewritten over the space of two centuries. Writing when the passage of time had clearly inflated Köpek’s good will towards Islam, he claims that khan too as a convert, only then to dismiss Baraq and Köpek alike on the grounds that the proper practice (rushd) of Islam failed to take root during their reigns.50 Furthermore, he does not merely neglect to mention either of the other Muslim khans who had ruled in the eastern half of the khanate, namely Ḍūlī Sultan (1340) and Muḥammad b. Bolod (741/1340–1);51 he also makes no reference whatsoever in this context, strikingly, to Tarmashirin, who undeniably reigned for a time over the entire ulus of Chaghadai and whose Muslim credentials were unimpeachable. Michal Biran rightly points out that Tarmashirin’s conversion (which could, in the eyes of posterity, have led into a cul-de-sac) failed to become the theme of conversion stories in the eastern territories because it was eclipsed within a few decades by that of Tughluq Temūr;52 but equally this optical illusion is itself in some degree the work of Ḥaydar, whose own dynasty, we should recall, had been closely linked by intermarriage with Tughluq Temūr’s progeny for some generations.53 We cannot rule out the possibility, of course, that he had in mind the conversion only of Mughalistān, since by his day Transoxiana had long since ceased to be subject to Chaghadai’s line.

Writing in c. 738/1337–8 and relying on recent information from the Mongol world, Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-'Umarī at one juncture sets the Chaghadayid khans and the qaghans in the Far East apart from the Ilkhwans and the Jochid khans, on the grounds that the two former rulers observed Chinggis Khan’s yasa more rigorously; and later in the work he repeats that the Mongols of Jochi’s ulus no longer adhere to the yasa.54 Now these comments are somewhat unexpected. Modern historians of the Mongols are more prone to lump together the Ilkhwans and the Yuan emperors, partly in view of their shared Töluid descent and partly on the grounds that – in contrast with their Jochid and Chaghadayid kinsfolk – they both presided over territories with a well-established sedentary economy and had access to a richer range of cultural resources.55

**Yasa versus Shari’a**

How, then, can we best interpret al-'Umarī’s remark? We should note that the most frequent charge against Mongol khans who had converted to Islam (though by no means confined to them, admittedly) is that they had
abandoned the ‘yasa of Chinggis Khan’; it was an accusation levelled, notably, at both Tegüder Aḥmad and Tarmashirin. The phrase might have been taken to denote an entire written code of law, the so-called ‘Great Yasa’ (pp. 114–16). It is by no means improbable, however, that the term yasa is here being used of single edicts concerned with discrete matters – that Mongols of the ‘old guard’ who opposed Muslim khans were appealing to individual enactments or, to put it another way, charged the ruler with undermining the whole Mongol world order by dint of disregarding one particular edict. Tegüder Aḥmad’s offence, for instance, was probably the execution of his brother Qongquratai without a hearing by the princes; Tarmashirin too is charged with the death of a brother, though indirectly, by handing him over to the kindred of a man he had unjustly killed. I suggest, however, that the particular yasa at issue in certain of these disputes is the celebrated injunction by the great conqueror that his descendants should favour no one religion over any other but should treat all alike even-handedly. Given the importance of dynastic solidarity in Chinggisid ideology (above, p. 124), the avoidance of religious partisanship could itself be viewed as central to Chinggis Khan’s precepts. In the present context, we should recall that the implementation of this yasa in territory formerly under Muslim rule meant an end to the subordinate position of the dhimmis – Christians and Jews – and an end, for example, to the jizya, the discriminatory poll-tax they had paid since the Umayyad era; it also made possible the revival of Buddhist practices.

Now Tarmashirin was not content with assuming Islam personally, performing the prayers five times daily, as Mamlūk authors assure us he did. They tell us that he further imposed the Shari’a and ‘abandoned the [Mongol] laws’. He is also said to have tried to impose Islam on his amirs and soldiery, to have required the performance of the daily prayers and the surrender of one-fifth (khums) of the spoils of war, and even to have forced the Mongols to engage in cultivation. We are told nothing directly of his conduct towards the Buddhists. But he allegedly gave preferment to Muslim amirs and treated their infidel counterparts harshly, shunning, threatening and dismissing them. All this testimony indicates that he sought to promote Islam to a preponderant position within the state (and echoes a charge earlier levelled at Tegüder Aḥmad: see p. 366); though he did not, admittedly, try to eliminate large numbers of his kinsfolk, as Naliqo’a had intended to do or as did Özbeg in the Jochid lands. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa heard that Tarmashirin was overthrown because he had failed to visit the eastern regions of the khanate annually and convene there an assembly of grandees as his predecessors had done – in keeping, allegedly, with Chinggis
Khan’s yasa. If this neglect of the eastern territories was relevant, it was doubtless (a) because the Mongol notables there, for the most part non-Muslims, especially lost out as a result of the khan’s Islamizing policy and (b) because they expected to be consulted on such a momentous change of direction through the traditional quriltai.

What we know of Buzun’s brief reign appears to support this interpretation of his uncle’s reign. Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-ʾUmarī merely describes the condition of the ulus under Buzun as chaotic (mutakhabbatṭan), which helps to explain the large-scale exodus of Muslim notables (including Tarmashirin’s offspring) from Transoxiana into the Delhi Sultanate in the mid-1330s. But Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī, in the prologue to his Zafar-nāma, says that Buzun lacked the outward appearance of Islam (az ḥulya-yi islām ʿārī būda), and the Shajarat al-atrāk claims that the troops he led against his uncle were still given to polytheism and error (shirk-u ẓalālat). Ibn Baṭṭūta, who learned of Buzun’s revolt after arriving in India, describes him as a Muslim but one tainted in faith and of evil conduct, who oppressed Muslims – a characterization for which his source can only have been Muslim refugees from Transoxiana and which may well hint that the new khan had assumed the Muslim mantle primarily in order to undermine support for Tarmashirin. What is especially noteworthy is that, according to Ibn Baṭṭūta, Buzun allowed Christians and Jews to rebuild their places of worship (kanāʾis). We can reasonably infer not just that Tarmashirin had withheld permission for rebuilding but that the edifices in question had been destroyed as part of his implementation of the Shari’a; they were in all likelihood relatively new constructions, forbidden in Islam. Buzun had fallen back on the more traditional policy of pluralism.

Buzun enjoyed power for only a matter of months before being overthrown by another nephew, Changshi (r. 736–7/1335–7), who was murdered and supplanted by his brother Y esün Temür (r. 737–40/1337–9 or 40). According to both Naṭanzī and Rashīd al-Dīn’s anonymous continuator, Changshi set up transportable idol temples in his camp, while Naṭanzī even claims that at the instigation of Buddhist monks (bakhshīs) he had images painted in all the mosques throughout the ulus. The fact that Changshi (whom al-ʾUmarī mentions as the current khan and whom we can therefore associate with the firm adherence to the yasa) also permitted Franciscan missionaries to build a church in Almaligh, and that this establishment likewise flourished under Y esün Temür, may indicate that these rulers too were seeking to redress the balance. Y esün Temür in turn was displaced by the Muslim ʿAlī Sulṭān, who, as we saw, instigated the martyrdom of Franciscan missionaries in Almaligh. His reversion to the
Islamizing policy of Tarmashirin (in a gesture probably intended to evoke the memory of his Muslim predecessor, he assumed the same laqab, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn), but in a more extreme form and in the eastern, still more conservative half of the ulus, could well explain why he was vouchsafed an even briefer reign. The policy did not outlast him, it appears, since in the very next year a party of Franciscans, envoys of Pope Benedict XII en route to China, were able to preach openly in Almaligh.71

The Ilkhanate: from Tegüder Aḥmad to Öljeitü

Let us now turn to the Ilkhanate. Hülegü, Abagha, Arghun and Gaikhatu were all pagans. The first Ilkhan to identify himself with the Islamic faith was Tegüder, a younger son of Hülegü who reigned briefly under the style of Sultān Aḥmad (r. 681–3/1282–4). Baidu (r. 694/1295) is described as a convert to Islam from Christianity by Eastern Christian sources, who presumably had no reason to misrepresent the situation. Ghazan (r. 694–703/1295–1304), who adopted the name Maḥmūd, can therefore be regarded as the third Muslim Ilkhan. Although later Shi‘ī writers made out that Ghazan was a Shi‘ī, the most that can be said is that he was devoted to the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt; see below).72 His brother and successor Öljeitü (r. 703–16/1304–16) had been successively a Buddhist, a Nestorian Christian and a Sunnī Muslim (could this have been a highly idiosyncratic interpretation of the even-handedness required by Chinggis Khan’s yasa?); but he was a Twelver Shi‘ī from at least 709/1310, when he began issuing coins with a distinctively Shi‘ī message. It is by no means certain that he returned to Sunnī Islam before his death.73 Yet the last significant Ilkhan, Abū Sa‘īd (r. 716–36/1316–35), was undeniably a Sunnī.

Ilkhanid sources question the depth, and even the authenticity, of the faith of the first two Muslim Ilkhans (the attitude of Mamlūk authors will be considered later). Partly for this reason, perhaps, and also because from 1295 Iran’s Mongol rulers were consistently Muslim, posterity has tended to associate the real beginnings of Islamization with Ghazan’s accession. Bar Hebraeus’ continuator, dismissing Baidu’s conversion as only half-hearted and designed to rally Muslim support, says that he never observed the ablutions and the fasts.74 Rashīd al-Dīn alludes to his patronage of the Catholicos, priests and monks, which cost him the support of the Shaykh al-Islām Maḥmūd Dinawarī.75 Tegüder Ahmad’s Islam attracts rather more comment. Rashīd al-Dīn casts doubt on his faith with an ambiguous phrase (da’wā-yi musulmānī mīkard) meaning either that he prayed in the Muslim fashion or that he merely claimed to be a Muslim.76 It is noteworthy too that in the
second recension of his *Nizām al-tawārīkh* (likewise written, we should recall, under Ghazan) Bayḍāwī, who at least mentions Tegüder Aḥmad’s marked favour towards Islam and Muslims, contents himself with the noncommittal statement, ‘They say he was a Muslim.’77 In his *Ẓafar-nāma*, Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, who was indebted for his information to the son of one of Arghun’s adherents, says that Tegüder Aḥmad had little knowledge of the faith and was intent only on pleasure.78 It was no part of these authors’ brief to depict Tegüder Aḥmad as a wholehearted convert or even to describe his pro-Islamic measures.79 For Bayḍāwī and Rashīd al-Dīn to have done so would be to detract from the role of their own sovereign – the first of the Ilkhans, in Rashid al-Dīn’s words, who ‘compelled the people to practise good conduct and . . . avoid evil’.80 No less importantly, it would also have thrown into relief the somewhat inconvenient fact that the first Muslim convert to occupy the Ilkhanid throne had been brought low by Ghazan’s pagan father. Rashīd al-Dīn does not even mention Islam as an issue in the revolt that led to Tegüder Aḥmad’s overthrow.81

The newly converted Mongol rulers carried over certain of their ancestral traditions into their Muslim religious practice. It was perhaps merely a natural diplomatic precaution for both Ghazan and Öljεitü to continue to refer to God as ‘Tenggeri’ rather than as ‘Allāh’ in their correspondence with the Christian West;82 more surprising is the retention of ‘Tenggeri’ on a Uighur edict of Abū Saʿīd, alongside a phrase invoking ‘the power of the people of the Prophet Muḥammad’.83 The monumental tomb built for Öljεitü near Sulṭāniyya did not face in a south-westerly direction, towards the *qibla* at Mecca, but was aligned on a north-south axis, in accordance with the traditional steppe requirement that the entrances to encampments and tents and the conduct of shamanistic ritual should be oriented towards the south.84 We do not need, in my view, to take as significant evidence Öljεitü’s later remark, allegedly addressed to a Mamlūk envoy in 704/1304–5 and transmitted by him to Ibn al-Dawādārī’s father, that Ghazan had been a Muslim only on the surface. It may be one of the chronicler’s fabrications, designed to enhance his father’s importance; or, if it was indeed authentic, the Ilkhan may have wished merely to distance himself from his brother to further his own diplomatic aims.85

But the evidence for Ghazan’s syncretism – the retention of practices and ideas from his pre-Muslim phase – is more plentiful than for his brother and his nephew. On a progress through western Iran early in 702/the autumn of 1302, Ghazan presided over a decidedly pagan Mongol ceremony in a locality that he had previously visited during Nawrūz’s rising, when his fortunes hung in the balance. On this occasion, he gave thanks,
asked God for assistance in the future and made various pious resolutions; but the amirs then tied strips of coloured cloth to a tree, and all those present spent time dancing around it in a manner reminiscent of the action of Ghazan’s distant ancestor Qutula in similar circumstances. Rashīd al-Dīn depicts the Ilkhan as praying in the Muslim fashion on this occasion, but makes no comment on an episode he may have found embarrassing. It was natural, again, for Ghazan to retain some of the ideas acquired during his Buddhist phase. At least, that best explains the quaint detail in the same author’s account – that this monarch, who within a single month in the first year of his reign ordered the execution of no fewer than five of his own close kindred (not to mention thirty-eight amirs), was unwilling to counteract the death even of a fly that had fallen into his food. Among Ghazan’s pious foundations, too, were shelters in which birds might nest and feed during the winter, and it has been proposed that these too reflect precepts imbibed from the Buddhist tradition.

Nor did either royal acolyte reject the yasa regarding marriage to his father’s wives other than his own mother. Following his seizure of the Ilkhanid throne, Ghazan was set upon marrying Arghun’s widow Bulughan Khatun. According to the Mamlūk encyclopaedist al-Ṣafadī, an accommodating Muslim jurist pronounced Ghazan’s marriage to the lady to be lawful, on the somewhat specious grounds that she had not been married to Arghun in Islamic law; Ghazan, this author informs us, would have discarded his new faith had he not been permitted to take her to wife. Rashīd al-Dīn glides over the marriage to Bulughan with palpable haste. It is also noticeable that our sources possibly express their disapproval (see above, p. 306) by keeping silent about the levirate character of other unions contracted by both Ghazan and Öljeitü: Ghazan’s marriage to Dondi of the Jalayir tribe, one of the widows of his uncle Gaikhatu; and Öljeitü’s marriages to Eltüzmish, at one time the wife of his grandfather Abagha, and to Günjūshkeb and Bulughan Khurāsānī, two of Ghazan’s widows (although Qāshānī is at least candid about the levirate nature of the third). As we saw (p. 354), in the Golden Horde the Muslim khan Özbeg would contract just such a marriage. Evidently the privilege/duty was one that royal converts would not surrender lightly and to which Mongol khans were still attached over a century after official acceptance of Islam (see below, pp. 391–2).

All this relates to the manner in which the two rulers comported themselves as individual converts. But their governance, too, fell short of traditional Islamic requirements. What is at issue here is emphatically not the jettisoning of every practice traditionally observed in the pagan steppe.
Take, for instance, the seasonal migrations of the court. We should hardly have expected Ghazan to abandon immediately the transhumant lifestyle favoured by his ancestors, and it is clear that he did not\textsuperscript{94} – any more than had the Muslim Saljuqs. Nor should we anticipate the abandonment of court protocol of the kind not observed by Muslim sovereigns. Early in 1303 the Nestorian Catholicos found Ghazan and his court celebrating the Mongol new year;\textsuperscript{95} and the regime continued to employ for official purposes, alongside the Muslim calendar, the twelve-year animal cycle by which the steppe peoples had long dated events. Rather than reviewing the persistence of norms of this kind, however, we are considering aspects of what might be called public state policy.

Admittedly, Ghazan’s servitors made strenuous efforts, from early in his reign, to depict the newly converted Ilkhan’s mission as the renewal of Islam by deliberately evoking the memory of the ‘Abbasid revolution (which, like Ghazan’s march to seize the throne from Baidu, had begun in Khurāsān) and making use of black banners reminiscent of those unfurled by Abū Muslim in Khurāsān at the onset of the rising in 747.\textsuperscript{96} It was no accident that Waṣṣāf wrote of Nawrūz as a second Abū Muslim.\textsuperscript{97} Nor is it too far-fetched to suppose that Ghazan (or his entourage) saw the advantage of posing as the heir of the defunct ‘Abbasid Caliphate, both with an eye to Muslim support within the Ilkhanate and as a direct challenge to the puppet ‘Abbasid in Cairo whose diploma furnished the Mamlūk Sultan with legal title to rule. We might note that Rashīd al-Dīn, doubtless aware of these aspirations and concerned as usual to cocoon his royal master with superlatives, denies that any Caliph or Sultan had ever achieved such great things as Ghazan.\textsuperscript{98}

The reality differed somewhat from the ideological posture. Take, for instance, the fairly limited reform of taxation. Waṣṣāf refers in abstract terms to the fixing of the qubchur and the kharāj (that is, as part of a policy of removing unpredictable ad hoc levies),\textsuperscript{99} but Rashīd al-Dīn tells us significantly more. The qubchur, in Muslim eyes the most offensive of the Mongol taxes, was not abolished, as has sometimes been suggested. Although reference is made in a (presumably) earlier edict of Ghazan to qubchur as due both from the peasants and from the troops,\textsuperscript{100} the text of his edict dated early in 703/late summer of 1303, which provided for the grant of iqṭā’s to the military, claims that the Ilkhan had discontinued the traditional levy of animals (qūbchūr-ī mawāshi) from the Mongol nomads (ūlūs-ī mughūl). But it expressly envisaged that the qubchur would be exacted as before from the peasants, who were henceforth to render it to the iqṭā’-holder.\textsuperscript{101} An administrative manual dating from Öljeitū’s reign shows
that *qubchur* was then still being levied on the non-nomadic population (*raʿāyā*).\(^{102}\) We shall examine in the next section a still more glaring failure to break with infidel Mongol policy in the longer term.

Ghazan appears to occupy a position midway between Berke and Tarmashirin, since his adoption of Islam provoked resistance during the early phase of the reign (in contrast, as far as we know, with Berke), but he was successful in crushing it (like Özbeg, and in contrast with Tarmashirin). Reuven Amitai hypothesizes that what enabled the Muslim Ghazan both to take the throne and to retain it, in contrast with his great-uncle, the Muslim Tegüder Aḥmad, was that in the intervening period many of the ‘old guard’ among the Mongol high command had died or grown old, yielding place to the representatives of a younger generation who were increasingly touched by Islam and Muslim culture.\(^{103}\) This may well be part of the explanation. Or, again, a relatively large number of princes of the blood were executed during the early years of the reign (see pp. 296, 364). Was it simply that Ghazan (like Özbeg) eliminated so many potential leaders of resistance to Islamization? This too may be relevant. I want to propose, however, that Ghazan’s success – and Tegüder Aḥmad’s failure – sprang also from a difference in the degree to which they allowed their faith to determine their conduct of the government. This is best illustrated by their respective attitudes towards the dhimmis.

**Muslim Ilkhans, the Buddhists and the People of the Book**

In this context, we are in a better position to compare Ghazan with Tegüder Aḥmad, since we have comments by several witnesses on the relevant policies of both men. It has to be admitted that the evidence regarding Tegüder Aḥmad’s measures is contradictory.\(^{104}\) We can begin by dismissing the exaggerated assertions by the Armenian Hayton of Gorighos, eager to promote a Western alliance with the Mongols. Not merely did he claim that Tegüder Aḥmad had all Christian churches destroyed, prohibited Christian worship and banished Christian religious; he further imputed to Tegüder Aḥmad a ludicrously extreme antipathy towards Christians, to the point that in his negotiations with the Mamlūks the Ilkhan allegedly proposed to give all the Christians in his territories a choice of Islam or beheading.\(^{105}\) So too we can ignore the equally extraordinary claim of Step’anos Orbelian that Tegüder Aḥmad aimed to extinguish Christianity and convert all nations to Islam.\(^{106}\) In all probability, Tegüder Aḥmad’s real offence lay, as Arghun’s adherent Aruç asserted, in promoting Muslims at the expense of other groups\(^{107}\) – a charge reminiscent of that levelled at Tarmashirin half a century later (above, p. 360).
Yet even discounting such tendentious statements we are confronted with two markedly different perspectives on Tegüder Aḥmad’s reign. On his accession, according to Waṣṣāf, the Ilkhan gave orders that Christian monasteries (dayrāh) and (Buddhist) idol temples be turned into mosques. Bar Hebraeus, on the other hand, assures us that during his brief tenure of the throne the Ilkhan was especially merciful towards Christian priests and monks, issuing decrees that exempted them and their churches and monasteries from all taxation; in his ecclesiastical history he further says that Tegüder Aḥmad allowed him to erect new church buildings. Yet in his first letter to the Mamlūk Sultan Qalāwūn, Tegüder Aḥmad claimed to be implementing the Shari’a, a statement hardly compatible with this last remark by Bar Hebraeus; and al-Ŷūnīnī was under the impression that he required the dhimmis to wear distinguishing garments and reimposed the jizya on them. It was natural that the Ilkhan, endeavouring to convince Qalāwūn that he could have no objection to submitting to a fellow Muslim monarch, should have exaggerated his pro-Islamic measures. But there is much in these various versions of events that remains obscure. Were Buddhists, who were not a ‘People of the Book’, to be compelled to embrace Islam? And was Tegüder Aḥmad merely decreeing the conversion of Christian edifices that had once been mosques, appropriated in or since 1258? In the present state of our knowledge, these questions cannot be answered.

One important step that Tegüder Aḥmad certainly took concerned Islamic awqāf. Supervision of awqāf throughout the empire was transferred to Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. The Ilkhan separated the proceeds of Islamic awqāf once more from the maintenance of Christian and Jewish pious foundations, requiring that they should be spent on the purposes originally specified by the benefactors; the salaries of Christian and Jewish physicians and others were now made the responsibility of the state treasury. Tegüder Aḥmad referred to the measure both in a proclamation to the people of Baghdad, which announced a return to the conditions of the ‘Abbasid era, and in his first letter to the Mamlūk Sultan, where the Ilkhan stressed that the revenues of awqāf were now being reserved for such beneficiaries as had been stipulated by the founders. These changes at least remedied what Muslims would have seen as a major grievance.

At first sight, it is difficult to reconcile Bar Hebraeus’ testimony regarding Tegüder Aḥmad’s favour towards Christians with the history of the Nestorian Catholicos Mar Yahballāhā, which speaks of persecution. Underlying it was hostility towards the Catholicos himself, harboured by some Muslims in the Ilkhan’s circle and fanned by two ambitious Nestorian
prelates. It is noteworthy that Tegüder Aḥmad temporarily confiscated the Catholicos’ residence (namely the house of the Greater Dawātdār, which Hūlegū had granted to one of Yahballāhā’s predecessors: see p. 315). Mar Yahballāhā was accused of favouring the Ilkhan’s nephew Arghun, and was further charged with calumniating Tegüder Aḥmad in a letter to the Qaghan Qubilai, on the grounds of his adoption of Islam. But when the letter that the Catholicos had indeed sent was intercepted in Khurāsān, it was found to contain nothing incriminating whatsoever; the Ilkhan thereupon restored the patents that had been confiscated from him, and readmitted him to favour.\textsuperscript{115} We should recall that Mar Yahballāhā and Šawma had arrived in Iran from the Yuan dominions in 1281 on pilgrimage, with a commission from Qubilai to return with one of the Qaghan’s garments that they had dipped in the Jordan and placed upon the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{116} Yahballāhā’s letter was doubtless merely reporting, and explaining, their failure to proceed beyond the Ilkhan’s territory. But Tegüder Aḥmad’s misapprehensions were natural. Elements within the Ilkhanid hierarchy did write to complain about his policies to Qubilai, who appears to have supported Arghun’s claim to the throne.\textsuperscript{117} And in any event Tegüder Aḥmad and his entourage would have been highly sensitive regarding the Qaghan’s reaction to the accession of a Muslim Ilkhan at the very time when Muslims in China were subject to severe disabilities (see above, p. 307).

Let us return to Ghazan. In contrast with his short-lived predecessor Baidu who, despite his adoption of Islam, continued to favour Christians,\textsuperscript{118} Ghazan inaugurated his reign with a persecution of non-Muslims – albeit briefly in the case of the People of the Book. Rashīd al-Dīn tells us that following his adoption of Islam the Ilkhan ordered the smashing of all Buddhist images (aṣnām) and the demolition of all pagodas (butkhānahā), Zoroastrian fire-temples (ātashkadahā) and other places of worship (muʿābid) that had no place on Islamic soil. Indeed, Ghazan personally took part in the destruction of Buddhist images. The pagodas became mosques and colleges,\textsuperscript{119} and the bakhshīs were obliged to become Muslims. It became clear, however, that many of the forced converts were only nominally Muslim and were at heart still attached to their infidel beliefs. After an interval, therefore, Ghazan decreed that any of them who so wished should emigrate to India, Kashmir, Tibet or their place of origin. Those who remained in his territory were to play the hypocrite no longer, since this sullied the true faith; they were encouraged to take up residence on the site of the now ruined temple built by Arghun and live off alms. Should the Ilkhan, however, learn that any new pagodas or fire-temples had been
erected, those responsible would be executed. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī says that Ghazan had some bakhshīs killed, but whether this occurred at the outset or as the penalty for later recidivism we are not told. Rashīd al-Dīn puts into Ghazan’s mouth a summary of his policy towards the bakhshīs. Although it was evident that the latter had no (real) knowledge, it was necessary for kings, for the sake of social solidarity (taʾāṣṣub), to preside over a diversity of subject groups, among them those that lacked understanding (here a somewhat unflattering analogy is drawn with animal husbandry); but they were not to practise idolatry or commit any other offence. Even against the background of wholesale destruction of Buddhist places of worship, this is a quite remarkable concession to be imputed to a Muslim monarch.

Policy towards Christians and Jews followed a slightly different and more complex trajectory. During the final campaign against Baidu, Nawrūz had despatched orders to Tabrīz for the destruction not merely of fire-temples but also of churches. At the entreaty of King Hetʿum II of Lesser Armenia, who on his way to Ghazan’s court had intervened to protect Rabban Ṣawma’s church at Marāgha, the new Ilkhan, it seems, modified these measures to the demolition/conversion only of ‘the houses of images’, namely Buddhist temples. Subsequently, however, when Ghazan had arrived in the vicinity of Tabrīz, he decreed that churches and synagogues should be destroyed also, that the jizya be imposed on Christians and Jews, and that they should wear distinguishing apparel (ghiyār). This was the situation when Bar Hebraeus’ continuator ceased writing in 1296. The Christians may have suffered a heavier blow in Baghdad, where their fortunes were a more emotive issue in the one-time city of the caliphs (and, as we saw, the propaganda of Ghazan’s supporters had deliberately evoked memories of the ’Abbasid revolution). They were forced to surrender once again the house of the Greater Dawātdār and in addition a hospice (ribāṭ) lying opposite, which they had turned into a mausoleum for their leaders. Reports reached Damascus in 695/1295–6 that in Baghdad the dhimmis were even being compelled to pay the arrears of jizya due since the death of the Caliph al-Mustaʿṣim (a flagrant injustice, if true, since the raison d’être for the tax was protection by the Islamic state, and no such state had existed in Baghdad since 1258).

The Ilkhan’s own part in these events is unclear. We need, perhaps, to distinguish between Ghazan’s edicts, orders issued without the Ilkhan’s sanction by Nawrūz, and the excesses of local agents and the mob; we also have to separate the resumption of erstwhile Muslim property, the reimposition of the jizya, and physical persecution. According to Stepʾanos Orbelian, Ghazan had denied to King Hetʿum any knowledge of the attacks,
which he ascribed to Nawrūz; he further issued orders that Christians and their churches were to suffer no harm and that all should be free to practise their religion in peace. Yet in Dhū l-Qa‘da 694/September–October 1295 the Ilkhan himself had been witnessed taking part in the destruction of churches in Tabrīz. Clearly Nawrūz was the principal instigator of the ordeal (although we do not have to accept Orbelian’s claim that his programme included the circumcision of priests), and Ghazan may have been anxious at first not to alienate his powerful lieutenant. 

In any event, this oppression had ended by the time of Nawrūz’s fall from grace, capture and execution in 696/1297. A Syriac text gives the duration of the persecution as six months; the author of al-Hawādith al-jāmi‘a, who links it with the agitation of the ignorant among the common people, says that the measures, including the wearing of distinctive dress, lasted for only ‘[some] months (shuhūran)’. Thereafter the jizya was no longer levied on Christians, at least. And protection for Christians was once more on offer. When a mob wrecked the remaining churches in Tabrīz in 697/1298, Ghazan was furious and had some of the perpetrators punished. It was possibly to reinforce this stance that the Nestorian Catholicos was repeatedly an honoured guest in the royal ordo in the period 1297–9, and that Ghazan in turn stayed with him in Marāgha for three days in 1300. Mar Yahballāhā’s biographer was thus able to write that although the Ilkhan had changed his faith, his good disposition towards Christians had undergone no alteration. Evidently Ghazan had by this juncture reverted to the traditionally pluralistic stance of the Ilkhans and other Mongol rulers. If Qāshānī is to be believed, in 702/1302–3 Ghazan, scandalized by a riot in Baghdad in which an ’Alid was killed, cited with approval Chinggis Khan’s alleged view that Islam was the best of faiths but that Muslims were the worst of religious communities – a view which, he said, he had earlier dismissed as wrong! But the story has an apocryphal ring.

Professor Michael Weiers ascribes the abandonment of discrimination against Christians in part to the exigencies of the struggle with the Mamlūks, since by 1298–9 Ghazan, like his father, was seeking the assistance of the Latin West. The coincidence may be significant. Yet respect for Chinggisid tradition would surely have necessitated the reversal of policy in any case. What we can say is that the conversions of both Ghazan and Öljütitü were an awkward circumstance for those who sought to bring about Western European collaboration with the Ilkhan. There is no evidence that the Pope and Western monarchs were ever informed that they were negotiating with Muslim potentates against the Muslim Mamlūks, and the subject of Ghazan’s conversion was handled in a markedly clumsy manner by Hayton.
of Gorighos, who makes out that not long after his accession Ghazan conceived an aversion for Muslims and began to honour and favour Christians instead – no more than wishful thinking on Hayton’s part and manifestly a confusion of domestic with foreign affairs. Certainly the stance Ghazan adopted in the latter years of his reign, whatever his motives, owes less, if anything, to traditional Islamic formulations of the proper relationship between the faithful and the dhimmi than did the actions of Tegüder Aḥmad. Hayton, however, in his eagerness to win the West’s confidence, conveys the impression that the policies of Tegüder Aḥmad and of Ghazan were diametrically opposed.

A more likely, though still partial, reason for Ghazan’s shift in policy (perhaps also for the less obvious compromise with the bakhsheh) may be that his activities and those of Nawrūz had not gone unopposed, despite Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī’s assurance that all the Mongols in Iran had become Muslims. A conspiracy involving a group of princes and amirs was hatched soon after the Ilkhan’s accession, while Nawrūz was still at the helm. The goal was to enthrone in Ghazan’s place Söge (or Süge), the son of Yoshmut and hence a senior prince of the dynasty, but there was also a cultural-religious dimension. On this Rashīd al-Dīn maintains a silence discreet to the point of blandness. Waṣṣāf, however, says that the plotters intended to turn ‘all the mosques of the land of Islam back into places of [pagan] worship and cells for bishops and monks’. The word ‘back’ (bāz) is significant; they had in mind, it seems, only buildings that had recently become mosques after confiscation from other religious communities, and wished, in other words, to reinstate the old pluralism. Although the plot miscarried and Söge and his confederates were executed, it may nevertheless have induced Ghazan to reconsider.

Ghazan’s brother and successor Öljeitü – whom Yahballāhā’s biographer describes as harbouring ‘a kind of hatred of the Christians’ and who required them once more to wear the girdle as a distinguishing mark – has been credited with presiding over a pronounced and more lasting deterioration in their condition. Yet even he, after levying the jizya on them in 1306–7, was induced to exempt first clergy and monks from payment in 1308 and then Christians at large. His retreat may reflect the possibility that having espoused Twelver Shi’ism (though not, officially, until 709/1310) he was sensitive to the need to harness the support of other minorities also. This was not the case under Abū Sa’īd (r. 716–36/1316–35) – an orthodox Sunnī and the first Ilkhan, we should note, to have been born a Muslim and to have been given a Muslim name at birth (and one, incidentally, who was sufficiently acculturated to write a good Persian hand, to compose Persian
verse and to play Muslim music). In 1320 or 1321 news reached Egypt that Abū 'īd had caused the churches in Baghdad to be demolished and that those in the vicinity of Tabriz had been destroyed or converted to mosques; it is unclear whether these measures had been inspired by similar developments in Cairo, or the reverse. It was only in Abū Sa‘īd’s reign, apparently, that the classical Islamic regime was restored and the jizya reintroduced permanently; and this, when well over thirty years had passed since the death of Tegüder Aḩmad and over two decades since Ghazan’s accession.

**Rashīd al-Dīn, Islam and the Mongols**

In studying the conversion of Ghazan, we cannot fail to be struck by the tone of the ‘official’ history (and our principal internal source) produced by his wazir Rashīd al-Dīn. Rashid al-Dīn, as we saw earlier (p. 362), contrives to give the impression that Tegüder Aḩmad was no true Muslim, and goes to considerable lengths to depict Ghazan as the first Muslim Ilkhan. But the partisan manner in which he narrates the events of 694/1295 emerges most conspicuously in his concern to deny that Ghazan had come over to Islam through the influence of any amir or shaykh (as the majority of the people, he admits, suspected) or that the young Ilkhan was less than sincere in his new-found faith. The persuasions of Nawrūz, which appear to have been crucial (above, p. 344), and perhaps the role of Shaykh Şadr al-Dīn al-Ḥamuwayī also, are thus minimized. At another point we are assured that even while presiding over the construction of Buddhist temples in Khurāsān in Arghun’s reign, Ghazan had inclined more and more towards the true faith; his conversion thereby takes on the colours of a slowly flowering internal conviction.

Rashīd al-Dīn is also concerned to stress Ghazan’s devotion to the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt). In his sleep Ghazan was twice visited by Muḥammad, accompanied by his son-in-law, the fourth Caliph, ‘Alī, and his sons, the Prophet’s grandsons Ḵasan and Ḥusayn; Muḥammad made the Ilkhan embrace all three and instituted a brotherhood between them. This special relationship was the source of Ghazan’s success and the root of his devotion to the Prophet’s descendants, though Rashīd al-Dīn is also careful to mention that the Ilkhan had not thereby ceased to acknowledge the stature of the Prophet’s Companions (Anṣār). Ghazan may have imbibed this attachment, incidentally, from Şadr al-Dīn al-Ḥamuwayī, who had been instrumental in his conversion and whose father appears to have held quasi-Shī‘ī beliefs.
Rashīd al-Dīn’s markedly differing treatment of Ghazan and his great-uncle must be seen in the light of his conception of the broader historical role of his Mongol masters. As he phrased it somewhat grandiloquently, after mentioning the first arrival of Mongol armies in Muslim territories, ‘the mature judgement of God had decreed that the balm for that agony should be the very [conversion to] Islam of the peoples who were responsible for the affliction, in order that the perfection of the glorious divine power and the effectiveness of the eternal decree be manifest, explained, understood and certified to all mankind’. God had raised up, moreover, a line of powerful and illustrious khans and sovereigns (headed by Chinggis Khan’s forebear Tūmenei) as part of his preordained purpose, and their memory would persist for ever because of the existence of their descendant Ghazan Khan, who was ‘the sun of the firmament of that lineage and the light of the totality of that dynasty’. Ghazan had strengthened the faith and nurtured its devotees; he had revived every requirement of the Shari’a and Islamic custom that had fallen into disuse and had suffered damage at the hands of infidels and polytheists. What is more, Rashīd al-Dīn adds subsequently (with pardonable exaggeration), he brought all the Uighurs, Mongols, fire-worshippers and idolators into the circle of Islam.

Rashīd al-Dīn’s perspective differs noticeably from that of Juwaynī nearly half a century before. This is not just a product of the fact that the Mongol rulers whom Juwaynī served were still infidels and Rashīd al-Dīn’s Ilkhanid masters were recent converts to Islam, which undoubtedly made it easier to write as he did. Up to a point he is content to follow in Juwaynī’s footsteps. In the preface to Ta’rikh-i mubārak-i Ghāzānī, Part I of the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh, he takes up one of the earlier author’s themes by observing that the irruption of the Mongols had been God’s preordained punishment of the Muslims, who had succumbed to slackness and discord (fatratī- u ikhtilāfī) and deviated from the path of the law. And in Rashīd al-Dīn’s view the divine purpose in bringing the Mongols upon the Islamic world had been (in the longer term) to strengthen Islam, in such a fashion and to such an extent that the faith would spread throughout the world and no polytheist would dare to impugn it – a sentiment that, in some measure, likewise echoes Juwaynī.

But certain passages in Rashīd al-Dīn’s work put a somewhat different gloss on the first advent of the Mongols under Chinggis Khan and the early decades of Mongol sovereignty, and represent a quite remarkable advance on Juwaynī’s rationale. The rulers swept away by the Mongol armies were tyrants, exhibiting the disposition of Pharaoh and the conduct of Ḍāḥḥāk, and each living by the motto ‘I and no other’; whereas Chinggis Khan’s
rule, by contrast, had brought justice and beneficence to their former subjects.161

It is in his presentation of the religious beliefs of Ghazan’s ancestors that Rashīd al-Dīn parted company most obviously with Juwaynî. God had indeed chosen apt instruments for His purpose, since the Mongols were God-fearing monotheists (muwahḥid-u khudāshinās).162 At one point Rashīd al-Dīn draws a sharp distinction – a groundless distinction, it must be said – between the purportedly monotheistic Mongols and idolatrous and polytheistic (but-parast-u mushrik) peoples such as the Uighurs and others who had been drafted into the Chinggisid armies and administration.163 This image of monotheism is repeatedly reinforced in the sections on Chinggis Khan and his descendants, in two ways. First, Rashīd al-Dīn makes pagan Mongol princes pray to God for success. At the pagan ceremony in 1302 which evoked that held by Qutula (above, p. 364), Bolod Chingsang tells Ghazan how Qutula had ‘prayed to the Ancient God’ (bā khudā-yi qadīm munājāt kard) for victory over his enemies.164 Chinggis Khan himself is made to pray to ‘the Great God (khudā-yi buzurg), creator of Tājīk and Turk’, for vengeance on the Khwārazmshāh.165 In the account of the campaign against the Keler (Hungarians) in 1241, Batu ascends a hill to ask God (ḥaḍrat-i ḥaqq taʾālā) for victory, just as his grandfather had done.166 It is instructive to juxtapose these last two passages with the corresponding sections in the work of Rashīd al-Dīn’s source, Juwaynī, who tells us that Chinggis Khan and Batu prayed for victory, but not to whom – or to what – they prayed.167 Similarly, in Rashīd al-Dīn’s account of the celebrated act of self-sacrifice by Tolui, the prince prays to the ‘Eternal God’ (khudā-yi jāwīd) to take him in place of his sick brother Ögödei, a plea that resulted in his own death.168 There is no suggestion of prayer – or of God – in the treatment of this episode in the ‘Secret History’, where we are told simply that Tolui substituted himself by drinking water over which the shamans had recited their incantations for the Qaghan’s recovery.169

The second means that Rashīd al-Dīn employs is to put into the mouths of his protagonists explicit denials of Mongol polytheism and idolatry. One such instance we have already noticed, namely Qubilai’s clampdown on Muslims in the Yuan territories, when Qadi Ḥamīd al-Dīn assuaged the Qaghan’s anger by assuring him that he was no polytheist on the grounds that the name of ‘the Great God’ appeared at the head of his edicts (p. 336). The other instance relates to the efforts made by Qubilai’s successor Temūr to induce the Muslim convert Ananda to abandon his faith and worship idols (p. 349). Ananda steadfastly resists this pressure. ‘Our fathers,’ he declares, ‘were all monotheists (muwahḥid). They recognized God (khudā)
as One and worshipped Him. It was undoubtedly as a reward for that sound belief that the Ancient God (khudā-yi qadīm) granted them the entire face of the earth... At no time did they ever bow down to an idol.¹⁷⁰

Set against what we learn of the Mongols’ traditional religious ideas and practices from the ‘Secret History’ and other sources, these passages in the Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh assume a considerable significance. Even if we accept the notion that the Mongols themselves, in the early decades of the post-conquest period, had begun to assimilate Tenggeri to the one God worshipped by the majority of their subjects in Western Asia, we can still discern here a deliberate effort by Rashīd al-Dīn to project that equivalence back into the era of Chinggis Khan and his forebears and to discount the rest of traditional Mongol cultic observance. How can we account for it? We saw earlier (pp. 325–6) how Ilkhanid historians sought to situate their new, infidel rulers within the ancient Iranian historical tradition. The distinctive view of the monotheism of Ghazan’s ancestors purveyed in Rashīd al-Dīn’s history seems to reflect a desire to appropriate and locate them within an Islamic historical framework. In comparing the Ilkhanate with China, where the early qaghans were depicted as chakravartinrajas (and their Yuan successors allowed themselves to be assimilated to Bodhisattvas and to find a place in the Buddhist canon), Thomas Allsen observes that ‘no attempt was made ... to transform, retroactively, the Il-qans into Muslim rulers’.¹⁷¹ Strictly speaking, that is true; but it looks, nevertheless, as if something not far short of a parallel exercise was under way in Iran. Where Juwaynī had been ready to describe Chinggis Khan as one ‘adorned with no faith and following no religion (mutaqallid-i hīch dīn wa-tābi’-i hīch millat nabūd)’,¹⁷² Rashīd al-Dīn seeks to identify the paganism of Ghazan’s forebears as verging on the true faith.

Rashīd al-Dīn had a complex and difficult task before him. What he was also doing, as he sought to put Ghazan’s Islamic faith beyond question, was shoring up his own position against the manoeuvrings and calumnies of jealous rivals who challenged the genuineness of his own relatively recent conversion from Judaism¹⁷³ – a group that included the distinguished scholar Quṭb al-Dīn Shirāzī.¹⁷⁴ And the claims made on Ghazan’s behalf, of course, not only represented an appeal to the loyalty of the Muslims of the Ilkhanate; they also furnished a basis for requiring the submission of Muslims in the Mamlūk empire – and constituted a retort to the propaganda that the rival regime in Cairo sanctioned against an Ilkhan whose conversion could be dismissed as hollow or, at best, imperfect.¹⁷⁵ At the same time, for all his emphasis on the strength and sincerity of Ghazan’s Islam, Rashīd al-Dīn felt obliged also to reassure Mongols cast in a more
traditional mould that the Ilkhan had upheld the yasa and custom of the Mongols even as a child, and did so still – as if there were in fact no incongruity here.

Whatever the mixture of impulses that underlay it, Rashīd al-Dīn’s treatment of the religious stance of Ghazan’s forebears is no isolated phenomenon. Even before this, the Baghdad historian Ibn al-Kāzarūnī had relayed a spurious account of Hūlegū’s conversion to Islam, which would later find its way into al-Dhahabī’s obituary of the first Ilkhan and al-Ṣafadī’s al-Wāfī bi l-wafayāt.177

Rashīd al-Dīn set the tone for historians of the next generation, who conveyed the impression that Chinggis Khan and Hūlegū had been but a step away from Islam. Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, in his Zafar-nāma (but not, interestingly enough, in the Ta’rikh-i guzīda), put into Hūlegū’s mouth a speech that expressed a sense of acting on behalf of the true God; in sending troops to protect the shrine at Najaf, Hūlegū had become the ‘friend of ’Alī and Ḥusayn’; and as he progressed around Baghdad following its capture, he often uttered the name of God (yazdān).178

Chinggis Khan himself was a particular focus of distortion. For Shabānkārā’ī, Chinggis Khan’s wisdom and his friendship with God were such that he would have had the status of a prophet had he only been a Muslim.179 Not much more than a decade before Rashīd al-Dīn wrote, the wazir Sa’d al-Dawla had supposedly persuaded Arghun that he had inherited the mantle of prophethood (nubuwwa) from Chinggis Khan.180 In view of the bitter antipathy towards Sa’d al-Dawla, we cannot be certain how much credence to give this story, which is linked, as we saw (p. 278), to an alleged project to set up idols in the Ka’ba and to found a new religion. But the notion of Chinggis Khan as a prophet was current outside the Mongol world. Ibn Wāṣil had already observed that his status in Mongol eyes was tantamount to that of a prophet.181 In a tale cited by the Mamlūk encyclopaedist al-Nuwayrī, a Jew instructed the young Temüjin that if he dedicated himself to God he would enjoy an exalted position like Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad, and the future conqueror thereafter devoted himself to asceticism. The story carries undertones of Abrahamic monotheism tinged with Islamic practice; rather than representing a bid by al-Nuwayrī himself to explain Chinggis Khan’s success, it could well have originated with Ilkhanid envoys to Cairo and thus, as Reuven Amitai suggests, may reflect the syncretistic views of Mongols in the process of Islamization.183 Ideas of this kind, which involved a rewriting of the great conqueror’s career, may have been current within the Mongol high command in Ghazan’s day, since the Ilkhanid general Qutlug Shāh was said to have assured the Syrian
jurist Ibn Taymiyya, outside Damascus in 699/1300, that Chinggis Khan had indeed been a Muslim.184

The Islam of Ghazan, his generals and his minister: the view from outside

It was natural that the Islamization of the Ilkhans and their servitors should meet with disbelief in the territories of their Mamlûk enemies. A number of Mamlûk historians mention Tegüder Aḥmad's Islam – although the latter's announcement of his faith in his first letter to Qalāwūn (681/1282) elicited a certain scepticism (perhaps, in part, because accompanied by the customary requirement to submit).185 Regarding Ghazan's conversion, however, Mamlûk writers – apart from those who had access to Shaykh Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Ḥamuwayī's account – are more ambivalent.186 And in the era of Ghazan and Öljeitü, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) issued three juridical pronouncements (fatāwā; sing. fatwā) on the status of the Ilkhans and their troops. The first and third of these date from the immediate aftermath of Ghazan's first invasion of Syria (699/1299–1300); the second, from some time after Öljeitü's conversion to Shi’ism in 1309.187

For the Mamlûk regime the situation in 1299–1300 was parlous. The young Sultan al-Ḥāṣir Muḥammad had fled back to Egypt following his ignominious defeat in the field at Wādī al-Khaznadār, the Mamlûk garrisons had evacuated the country and Ghazan's forces had pushed as far as Gaza, meeting disturbingly meagre resistance from the Muslim populations of cities like Damascus.188 Ibn Taymiyya, who asserted the duty of Muslims to fight even against those who claimed to be of the faith but neglected a single one of Islam's prescriptions,189 had his own axe to grind. Not only was it necessary to encourage the Muslim populace to stand firm in support of al-Ḥāṣir Muḥammad. It was also vital to counter the propaganda that Ghazan had mounted in advance of and during the campaign. The Ilkhan had obtained a fatwā from the 'ulama condemning the Mamlûk troops who had attacked Mārdīn on the grounds that they had violated Muslim women and drunk wine in mosques – and this during the month of Ramaḍān.190 Just how damaging reports of these outrages may have been for the standing of the Mamlûk government is clear from the fact that no less a figure than its ally Abū l-Fidā, the Ayyubid Sultan of Ḥamā, believed them.191 Moreover, Ghazan's decree guaranteeing the security (amān) of the inhabitants of Damascus in 699/1299 contained a justification of his invasion and a statement of his own credentials as the head of the Islamic community.192 Some prominent Mamlûk figures, headed by Sayf
al-Dīn Qipchaq al-Manṣūrī, had already deserted to the Mongols prior to Ghazan’s invasion.\textsuperscript{193} There is evidence that Syrian Muslims and Mamlūk troops accepted the Ilkhan’s conversion as genuine and were reluctant to fight him; al-Dhahabī writes of the circulation in Damascus, prior to the Mongols’ entry, of reports of their mild treatment of their enemies, and the Mamlūk Sultan’s own letter to Ghazan, written in 701/1301, betrays a keen awareness of the danger.\textsuperscript{194} The backdrop to all this may well have been, in part, the efforts to place Ghazan in the tradition of the ‘Abbasids (above, p. 365).

Ibn Taymiyya had participated in a Damascene delegation to the Mongol headquarters and had been received in audience both by Ghazan and by his two wazirs, Rashīd al-Dīn and Sa’d al-Dīn Sāwajī, in late Rabī’ II 699/mid-January 1300.\textsuperscript{195} He thus had the opportunity to observe at first hand precisely how Islamic was the comportment of the Ilkhan and his entourage. According to al-‘Umarī, he accused Ghazan to his face of breaking his word, in contrast (allegedly) with his infidel forebears Hülegü and Abagha.\textsuperscript{196} As for the Ilkhan’s faith, Ibn Taymiyya did not, it appears, see much that might have reassured him. In his fatāwā he skilfully combined an acknowledgement of the genuinely Islamic beliefs or conduct of the new converts with a strong emphasis on the essentially un-Islamic practices that they had carried over from their pagan past. Thus the Mongols might pronounce the shahāda if required and might exalt the Prophet’s name; they might observe the Ramaḍān fast; but they were seldom seen to pray. No mu’ādhdhin or imam was to be found among the ranks of the invading Mongol army; nor did they pay the canonical alms-tax (zakāt).\textsuperscript{197} He accused them of outrages against Muslim women even in the mosques of Damascus and Jerusalem during the campaign of 1299–1300 and of burning down the mosque at al-‘Uqayba,\textsuperscript{198} thereby levelling much the same charge as Ghazan had brought against the Mamlūk forces. The Mongols’ prime commitment, insisted Ibn Taymiyya, was not to Islam, but to the expansion of the empire of Chinggis Khan: anybody who submitted to them became their friend, even though he were an infidel; anyone, conversely, who refused them obedience was therefore their enemy, be he the best of Muslims.\textsuperscript{199} Their troops included Christians such as the Georgians and Armenians (a charge already advanced in the Mamlūk Sultan’s letter), not to mention renegades.\textsuperscript{200} The Mongols obeyed Chinggis Khan’s precepts (amr), which originated in his own opinion and whim (bi-ʒannihī wa-hawāhi), in preference to those of the Qur’ān. Citing ‘the greatest of their leaders’, Ibn Taymiyya claimed that they placed Chinggis Khan on a level with the Prophet, regarding Muḥammad and the Mongol conqueror as equally a sign (āya)
from God and the seal of the prophets.\textsuperscript{201} The equation receives short shrift: Chinggis Khan was no more than ‘king of the polytheists’ (\textit{malik al-mushrikin}) and his Yasa was the very antithesis of Islam.\textsuperscript{202}

Among Ibn Taymiyya’s numerous strictures, we should note one that is especially relevant to the earlier discussion of Ghazan’s regime, namely the Ilkhan’s failure to exact the \textit{jizya} from the dhimmis and to require their humiliation (\textit{ṣaghār})\textsuperscript{203} – possibly intended as a riposte to Ghazan’s \textit{aman} for Damascus, in which the Ilkhan had implicitly claimed to be levying \textit{jizya} on the \textit{ahl al-dhimma}.\textsuperscript{204} The Mongols showed equal favour, said Ibn Taymiyya, towards People of the Book and idolators, making no distinction among the savants from each community. He further drew attention to the prominence of freethinkers (\textit{zindiq}), heterodox Muslims (‘\textit{Bāṭinīs’}, ‘\textit{Rāfīḍs’) and Jews within the Ilkhanid establishment, claiming that they pretended to be Muslims and naming specifically the Shī‘īs Ibn al-‘Alqāmī (whose betrayal of the Caliph in 1258 Ibn Taymiyya evidently accepted as authentic) and Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī.\textsuperscript{205} ‘Their principal wazirs’, among others, likened Islam to the Jewish and Christian religions on the grounds that each of them represented a path towards God.\textsuperscript{206} The charge could not express more succinctly the Mongols’ traditional attitudes in religious matters.

The Mamlūk historians of the 1320s and 1330s accept Rashīd al-Dīn’s Islamic faith at face value.\textsuperscript{207} Not so Ibn Taymiyya: it was Rashīd al-Dīn, as the Ilkhan’s wazir and as a convert from Judaism, whom he singled out for particularly strident denunciation. Rashīd al-Dīn was ‘a philosophizing Jew’, who had retained his Jewish beliefs and philosophical ideas even after his entry into Islam.\textsuperscript{208} This ‘heretical and hypocritical rogue of a wazir (\textit{wazīr hādhā l-khabīth al-mulḥid al-munāfiq})’ had turned his back on neither Judaism nor Christianity; nor had he required their adherents to accept Islam.\textsuperscript{209} He gave preferment to the worst Muslims rather than the best, with the result that the office of chief qadi was occupied by whoever was closest to freethinking, heresy and unbelief.\textsuperscript{210} The grounds for these charges are located among the wazir’s own writings. Professor Michot has pointed to the way in which certain of Ibn Taymiyya’s remarks misrepresent statements in Rashīd al-Dīn’s theological work, \textit{al-Tawḍīḥāt}. Whether Ibn Taymiyya had read it is unclear; more probably, he rested his case merely on the accusations lodged by Rashīd al-Dīn’s detractors at some point early in the reign of Öljeytū.\textsuperscript{211} Some of the polemic, however, appears to derive from themes found in the \textit{Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh}. Indeed, Ibn Taymiyya’s characterization of Chinggis Khan as a latter-day Pharaoh or Nimrod\textsuperscript{212} sounds like a conscious inversion of Rashīd al-Dīn’s own comparison, cited
above (p. 373), between such legendary tyrants and the Muslim rulers brought low by the conqueror’s forces.

* * *

To trace the Islamization of Mongol rulers – not to mention the rank and file of ordinary Mongols – is perhaps an elusive goal; and each of the case studies surveyed in this chapter illustrates a historiographical problem. Overall, I have tried to examine the means by which Mongol rulers came to Islam and the range of possible motives, and to highlight the difficulties confronting royal converts who sought to impose their new faith on their infidel followers and to re-establish the Shari’a. Charles Melville is surely right when he suggests that ‘religion itself was a far less divisive issue for the Mongols than it was for the Persian bureaucrats and historians’. What may have appeared outlandish to the Mongols, nevertheless, was not that their subjects should observe the precepts of Islam (with the proviso, of course, that they did not infringe the customary law of the steppe), or even that they themselves and their rulers should do so as individuals, but rather that they should be required to live within a polity governed by Islamic principles. The especially objectionable element in such a polity was that it entailed abandoning one particular yasa of Chinggis Khan’s, namely the refusal to discriminate between the religions of the Mongols’ subjects. The evidence we have suggests that for this reason the re-establishment of Islam was a fitful and halting process in Ilkhanid Iran even for two decades or so after 1295 and perhaps over a longer period in the other western Mongol khanates. In their relations with their non-Muslim subjects, Muslim Ilkhans – and perhaps some of the other monarchs examined in this chapter – proved reluctant in the medium term to fulfil the traditional duties of a Muslim ruler. They were obliged to move slowly; indeed, they may not have wished to do otherwise, regardless of the sentiments of those who had introduced them to their new faith. Newly converted Muslim khans encountered opposition, not because they had converted on a personal level, but insofar as they endeavoured to restore Islam to its paramount position within the state and to implement Islamic law. Those monarchs who survived, and who made the biggest contribution to the Islamization process, did so by promoting the new faith only gradually, by stages. They were also prepared to clear the path by pruning drastically the family tree, an expedient on which Naliqo’a determined just before his overthrow, and from which Tegüder Aḥmad and Tarmashirin apparently shrank, but which both Ghazan and Özbeg embraced in no uncertain terms.
Any mid-thirteenth-century Muslim observer, called upon for a pronouncement about the Mongols, might readily have echoed the words of the fugitive from Bukhārā quoted by Juwaynī: ‘They came, they sapped, they burnt, they slew, they plundered, and they departed.’ And indeed, until some twenty or so years ago, most historians of the Mongol empire would probably have been content with a similar verdict: the Mongols simply inflicted destruction on the flourishing urban societies of Western Asia and bequeathed to the Islamic world nothing of value. More recent historiography, however, inclines rather towards the judgement of Rashīd al-Dīn:

What event or circumstance in these times has been more important than the beginning of the reign of Chingiz Khān, to be able to designate a new epoch?

Admittedly, Rashīd al-Dīn was writing over four decades later than Juwaynī, under (and, no less importantly, for) a Muslim Ilkhan; and the rhetorical question is followed, even here, by statements about Chinggis Khan’s career of conquest rather than by laudatory comments on the blessings of Mongol rule. But a great many scholars would now agree that the world changed profoundly in the wake of those conquests, and not, in every respect, for the worse.

Some of the consequences of the Mongol subjection of large parts of the Islamic world have already been examined: the efforts by Mongol rulers to remedy the damage inflicted by the campaigns and by the inter-Mongol wars (chapters 6 and 7), the transfer of skilled personnel and significant
population groups within their dominions, and the deliberate fostering by the conquerors of commercial and cultural exchanges (chapter 8). This chapter is concerned with longer-term processes that resulted from the Mongols' campaigns of conquest, and which fall under two heads. The more direct legacy of infidel Mongol rule was the survival of what might be termed a ‘Mongol imperial culture’, which was itself an amalgam of Mongolian and Turkic culture with elements selectively borrowed not just from the Muslims but from other subject peoples like the Chinese and Tibetans. This involved new Chinggisid concepts of legitimacy; new (not necessarily Mongolian) techniques of government; and a persistent, if increasingly nebulous, allegiance to Mongol customary law (the ‘Yasa’). Other consequences of the Mongol expansion were indirect and unintended: the strengthening of external Muslim states through immigration from Mongol-occupied territories; the spread of the Islamic faith (both through the transplantation of Muslims from Central and Western Asia and through the conversion of the Mongols themselves or of non-Mongol subject elements); and the emergence of new Muslim ethnicities. We shall examine, lastly, the most controversial of the Mongols' supposed bequests to posterity, namely the integration of the whole of Eurasia (including the entire Dar al-Islam as far west as Spain) within a single disease zone, as starkly demonstrated in the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century.\(^3\)

**Legitimation by Chinggisid descent**

The idea which had been embraced by the Mongols and, to some extent, their subjects since at least the second quarter of the thirteenth century, that only members of the family of Chinggis Khan were entitled to sovereignty and the title of khan, was destined to endure for several centuries. It was not confined to the Dar al-Islam, of course. After the expulsion of the Mongol regime from China by the native Ming dynasty in 1368, Chinggisid rule continued in Mongolia, where the last Yuan Emperor withdrew at the head of at least part of his military establishment, and his progeny (with the occasional brief interruption by a non-Chinggisid) reigned under the dynastic style of ‘Northern Yuan’ until the Manchu conquest in the seventeenth century. But this was a mere shadow of Chinggisid power in the region during the era of Qubilai; tribes such as the Oyirat (the nucleus of the future Zhungar confederacy) fell away and by 1400 had established their autonomy and their military capacity to challenge the Northern Yuan. The charismatic properties of Chinggisid descent proved more robust and more durable in the Islamic territories at one time under Mongol rule. In
destroying the Caliphate, Hülegü had removed what was, in the eyes of Sunnī Muslims, the ultimate source of political legitimation, and it seems that Chinggisid blood, somewhat paradoxically, came partly to fill the void following the Mongols’ conversion.4

During the middle decades of the fourteenth century, genealogical crises within the ruling dynasty would plunge all three western khanates into prolonged strife. In the Chaghadayid state, the downfall of the last of Du’a’s sons, Tārmashirin (735/1334), threw open the succession to competitors from the lines of both Chaghadai and Ögödei. In the Ilkhanate the very next year, the death of Abū Sa’īd, the last male descendant of Arghun, without a male heir unleashed a period of conflict in which not only Hülegū’s wider progeny but even one prince of Arigh Böke’s line and another descended from Chinggis Khan’s brother Jochi Qasar contended for the throne.5 And in the Jochid dominions, lastly, the extinction of the lines both of Batu after 1360 and (apparently) of Orda a little earlier would allow the posterity of their brothers, chiefly those of Shiban and Toqa Temür,6 to bid for the headship of either ulus and would thus give rise to a ‘Time of Troubles’ that involved several rival khans reigning simultaneously, each with his own sphere of influence, and lasted well into the fifteenth century.

In Central and Western Asia in the middle decades of the fourteenth century, effective rule passed from the khans into the hands of amirs, as it did in Chaghadayid Transoxiana after 1347, in the eastern Chaghadayid territories (‘Mughalistān’ or ‘Jata’) for two decades after c. 1365, in the moribund and fractious Ilkhanate after 1335 and, intermittently, in the strife-torn Jochid ulus after 1360. And yet even at this time the power-brokers at least felt constrained to govern through phantoms of Chinggisid descent and to forge marriage links with the imperial dynasty.7 The one exception was the Dughlāt amir Qamar al-Dīn, who in the late 1360s and 1370s did not, apparently, nominate a puppet khan but sought to usurp the throne of Mughalistān himself, only to encounter considerable opposition from his peers.8 The Chinggisid monopoly of sovereignty survived for the shortest time in Iran. Togha Temür, who held sway in Khurāsān until his death in 754/1353 and was acknowledged for a few years also in Anatolia, is usually considered the last of the Ilkhans,9 though a puppet Chinggisid khan seems to have reigned as ‘Ghazan II’ until 758/1357 in north-western Iran.10 The 1380s witnessed the last gasp of Chinggisid legitimacy in the one-time Ilkhanate, when Togha Temūr’s son Luqmān ruled in Astarābād as the client of the warlord Temūr (‘Tamerlane’).11 But over three decades earlier, powerful amirs had turned into de jure rulers: the Chobanids in Azerbaijan;
the Jalayirids in Iraq (and shortly in Azerbaijan also); the Injuids in Fars; and the Muzaffarids in Yazd, Kirmān and, later, Fars. We might note, however, that both the first two dynasties were of Mongol stock; and that the Jalayrid Shaykh Uways (d. 776/1374), whose ancestry included more than one Ilkhanid princess, stressed his connection to Chinggis Khan and his role as reviver of the Chinggisid legacy.12

Temür – the most successful amir to carve out a career for himself in the era of Chinggisid semi-eclipse – seems to have thought in terms of bringing four successor-states under his authority by casting as his clients the khan of the Golden Horde, the eastern Chaghādayid khan and a son of the last Ilkhan, and even by humbling Ming China, against which he was marching at the time of his death in 807/1405.13 In dividing his empire among four heirs, he may consciously have taken Chinggis Khan as his model.14 But although Temür began his career as a freebooter, very much as had Chinggis Khan, he bore scant resemblance to his exemplar. Born in Kish (Shahr-i Sabz), in Transoxiana, he belonged to a Turco-Mongol tribe, the Barlās (Barulas), and was as much a product of sedentary as of nomadic culture. In contrast with Chinggis Khan and his immediate successors, he based his power on sedentary regions and was content to exercise indirect authority over the steppe. No Chinggisid, Temür was always known by the title of ‘amir’ or ‘great amir’ and styled in the sources ‘Gūrkān’ (Mo. kūregen, ‘son-in-law’), on the grounds that he had married a daughter of the Chaghādayid khan Qazan (d. 747/1346–7) and had subsequently taken other wives from the Chinggisid dynasty. He further took care to secure Chinggisid princesses for certain of his sons and grandsons, who were in turn styled Gūrkān, and Chinggisid descent was an important criterion in his choice of successor.15

None of this is to deny that Temür drew on other sources of legitimacy, including a special destiny vouchsafed by Heaven, conveyed through the conjunction of the planets Venus and Jupiter and encapsulated in his title šāhib-qirān (‘Lord of the Auspicious Conjunction’).16 A no less important element in his self-presentation was his role as a protagonist of Islam – and in this respect, of course, he differed most markedly from Chinggis Khan. Not that the attempt to juxtapose good Muslim credentials with traditional Mongol ideology was new by Temür’s time: the Chaghādayid prince Yasa’ur had attempted to do so in Khurāsān,17 and the Ilkhans Tegüder Ahmad and Ghazan had both sought the submission of Mamlūk Egypt on this same basis (above, p. 377). But Temür went further. The inscription on his tomb in the Gūr-i Mīr at Samarqand would allege that he was descended from the fourth Caliph, ‘Alī, thus combining – to quote
John Woods – ‘the two most powerful notions of dynastic legitimacy current in post-*Abbasid, late Mongol Iran and Central Asia.*’ It has been argued that Temür’s readiness to adapt and supplement the Chinggisid tradition in this way contributed to its survival by instituting a new model to be followed by later dynasties.

As a commoner, Temür, who did not even belong to the senior branch of the family that produced the chiefs of the Barlās, could not reign, but was obliged, like his precursors Qazaghan and Amīr Ḵusayn, to rule through Chinggisid khans. Just as he would instal Luqmān in Astarābād, so Temür was content to place a protégé, Toqtamish (descended from Jochi’s son Toqa Temür), on the throne of the Golden Horde in c. 1378, to accept the homage of the Chaghadayid Khīḍr Qocha in Mughalīstan in 1389, and even to support a pretender from the Northern Yuan against the Ming. In the heartland of his dominions, Transoxiana, he ruled through the khans Soyurghatmish (771–90/1370–88) and his son Sulṭān Maḥmūd (790–805/1388–1403), both descendants of Ögödei. Since Temür claimed on occasion to be redressing the dispossession of Ögödei’s line by their Toluid cousins, it has been proposed that his choice of Ögödeyids was designed to buttress his universalist programme of restoring the thirteenth-century empire. Although their status in relation to Temür’s Chinggisid clients elsewhere in Western Asia is far from clear, these Ögödeyid khans were no mere marionettes: Soyurghatmish seems to have played an active role in some of Temür’s campaigns, while Sulṭān Maḥmūd distinguished himself by capturing the Ottoman Sultan Bāyazīd at the battle of Ankara in 804/1402.

Whether Sulṭān Maḥmūd was replaced at his death soon afterwards, we do not know, but Temür’s descendants felt strong enough to dispense with the khans and to reign de jure. The institution of khan may well have begun to look redundant only months after Temür’s own death, since his grandson Khalīl Sulṭān enthroned as khan in Samarqand not a Chinggisid but a Timurid – an infant great-grandson of Temür, Muḥammad Jahāngīr, to whose father’s memory the local military were strongly attached (but whose paternal grandmother was, no less importantly, of Chinggisid stock). Shāh Rukh (d. 1447), who reigned from Herat, did without a Chinggisid and himself took the imperial titles of qaghan and sultan. And although we read of a khan whom Shāh Rukh’s son Ulugh Beg deposed and sent from Transoxiana to fight the eastern Chaghadayid Ways Khan in c. 1429, he is not mentioned by Timurid authors and the historicity of the episode has been questioned on the grounds that it is found only in the comparatively late account of Ḫaydar Dughlāt. An unidentified khan is nevertheless said
to have been enthroned in Samarqand around the time of Ulugh Beg’s own downfall in 1449. This is the last occasion on which we hear of a nominal Chinggisid khan in the Timurid dominions.

Developments in Timurid ideology may have helped to push traditional regard for Chinggisid lineage into the background. Neither of Temür’s panegyrists who wrote in his lifetime had supplied the year of his birth; they may not even have known it. But twenty years or so later, Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī made out that Temür was born in the year 736 (1335–6), the very year that had witnessed the death of the last effective Ilkhan, Abū Sa’īd, and the progressive fragmentation of his territories among a number of dynasties that were neither Chinggisid nor even, for the most part, ethnically Mongol. By this means Yazdī sought to fashion some kind of providential continuity with the Ilkhanid era. More importantly, in the prologue (muqaddima) to his Ẓafar-nāma, Yazdī grafted Temür’s thirteenth-century forebear, Qarachar of the Barulas, onto Chinggis Khan’s ancestral line, making him descend from Qachulai, the younger son of Tūmenei and the brother of Chinggis Khan’s great-grandfather Qabul Khan. In addition, he fabricated a written compact between Qabul Khan and Qachulai, whereby sovereignty was to pass to the former and administrative and military responsibilities to the latter. According to Yazdī, Chinggis Khan had produced this covenant from the treasury, where it had been housed for some generations, and had confirmed it with a fresh enactment: he then entrusted his son Chaghadai to the guardianship of Qarachar, allegedly Qachulai’s descendant, who was to wield administrative and military authority within Chaghadai’s ulus. The document was lost, we are told, during the turbulent reign of the Ögödeyid ’Alī Sultan.

No pre-Timurid source substantiates Yazdī’s extraordinary claims. True, the author of the ‘Secret History’ and Rashīd al-Dīn had given the Barulas/Barlās a common ancestor with Chinggis Khan, though by a different line of descent, only Rashīd al-Dīn tracing the tribe’s lineage back to Qachulai, and in neither case had Qarachar been included in the genealogy. Both authors had named Qarachar as one of Chaghadai’s commanders of a thousand, but the ‘Secret History’ makes Chinggis Khan attach to his son a completely different noyān, Kököchős. An earlier Timurid writer, Temür’s court historian Niẓām-i Shāmī, had fallen short of portraying Qarachar in such terms: while asserting that Chinggis Khan had entrusted Chaghadai to Qarachar’s care, he merely emphasized Qarachar’s high rank within the ulus.

It is important to notice that when drafting his prologue Yazdī, for all his efforts to inflate the prominence of Temür’s ancestry, still felt obliged to
find a place for the dynasty’s progenitor in the imperial Mongol line. At this juncture, to dispense with such links altogether was evidently neither possible nor desirable. But by the time he came to compose the main part of his Zafar-nāma Yazdī was ready to go considerably further. John Woods has pointed out how he omitted all but one of the allusions to Temür’s shared ancestry with Chinggis Khan found in his muqaddima; and how he consciously reworked all the episodes in Shāmī’s Zafar-nāma that involved the nominal Chinggisid khans Soyurghatmish and Sulṭān Maḥmūd, deleting any reference to them, in order to foster the impression that Temür exercised sovereignty in his own right. The development of the Timurid legend reached full fruition in the early eighteenth century, when the author of the Kunūz al-a’ẓam (‘Treasures of the Mighty One’), writing in Uzbek Bukhārā, dispensed with Temür’s ancestry prior to Qarachar Noyan, as if the link with Chinggis Khan was no longer deemed necessary. In this work the great majority of the Chaghadayid khans are portrayed as brutal tyrants and Temür as God’s instrument in the preservation and revival of Islam.

In the Jochid and eastern Chaghadayid worlds the hold of Chinggisid legitimacy was undeniably firmer and lasted longer without adaptation and with minimal interruption. After the bid by the Dughlāt amir Qamar al-Dīn to dominate the eastern half of Chaghadai’s ulus had been frustrated by Temür’s successive attacks, the throne passed to Khīḍr Qocha, a supposititious son of Tughluq Temür. Under Khīḍr Qocha (d. c. 1399), who fended off Temür by dint of submission, the eastern Chaghadayid territories regained a degree of stability and even profited from the problems of the Northern Yuan to expand to the east. His descendants, who in the early sixteenth century succeeded in wresting direct control of Kāshghar and Yārkand from Mīrzā Ḥaydar’s Dughlāt kinsfolk, continued to rule until they were dispossessed in the 1670s by the ‘Black Mountain’ (Qarataghliq) Khwājas, a branch of the Naqshbandi sufi order, with the backing of the formidable Zhungar Mongol confederacy. The non-Chinggisid (and non-Muslim) Zhungar khans now replaced the Chaghadayids as the real rulers of ‘Mughalistān’. For almost two decades after 1359 the sprawling Jochid territories were disputed among a number of ephemeral khans; during this period real authority in the regions west of the Don was in the hands of the amir Mamai. In the wake of his overthrow by Toqtamish in or soon after 1380, power was again largely vested in a Chinggisid khan. Nevertheless, Toqtamish (d. 1407) – thanks to his defiance of his benefactor Temūr – exercised unchallenged rule for less than fifteen years. By the early fifteenth century the Pontic-Caspian steppelands were once more the scene of internecine conflict
between Toqtamish and his numerous sons, on the one hand, and rival Jochid khans backed first by Temür and his successors and then by the regional strongman Edigü (d. 1419), on the other. Eventually, during the second quarter of the century, the Golden Horde fragmented into five competing political entities: the ‘Great Horde’, which became the nucleus of the khanate of Astrakhan on the lower Volga; the khanate of Kazan on the upper Volga; the khanate of the Crimea; the Noghay confederacy east of the Volga, founded by Edigü’s sons; and the ulus of Jochi’s son Shiban still further east. This last polity in turn soon split into a khanate of Tiumen (in western Siberia) and the fledgling Uzbek khanate founded by Abū l-Khayr (d. 1468); well before 1500 the Uzbeks in turn had forfeited a good deal of their steppe territory to the nascent Kazakh confederacy, whose khans were descended not from Shiban but from his brother Toqa Temür.

All these fissiparous political entities, with the exception of the Noghay horde, were ruled by khans of Jochi’s line; and the Jochids were on the whole remarkably retentive. Of the westernmost polities, the ‘Great Horde’, following a crushing defeat in 1480 at the hands of the rising power of Muscovy under Ivan III, was taken over by the Crimean khan Minglī Girei in 1502; and Kazan and Astrakhan went down before Muscovite attacks under Ivan IV (‘the Terrible’) in 1552 and 1554 respectively. But the khans of the Crimea would remain a power to be reckoned with, albeit under nominal Ottoman protection, right down to the conquest by Catherine the Great in 1783. To the east, Kazakh khanates survived until their absorption by the Russians early in the nineteenth century.

The most spectacular signs of Chinggisid resilience, however, date from the opening years of the sixteenth century, when two branches of Jochi’s line descended from Shiban each achieved a considerable triumph. First the Uzbeks, headed by Muḥammad ‘Shībānī’, who had revived the empire of his grandfather Abū l-Khayr, ousted the last Timurids from Transoxiana and Khurāsān. Muḥammad’s defeat and death in battle with the Safawid Shāh Ismā’īl I near Merv in 916/1510 meant the loss of Khurāsān, but did not prevent his kinsmen consolidating their rule over territories that extended from Tashkent to Balkh. This ‘Chinggisid restoration’, as it has been termed, saw the re-establishment of a fairly methodical appanage system and of the seniority principle in the choice of the supreme khan. Then, within a few years, two of Muḥammad’s distant cousins, descended from Shiban through a prince named ‘Arab Shāh, took over Khiva (Khwārazm) from the Timurids. In 1007/1599 the Shibanid Uzbeks gave way to another Jochid line, descendants of Toqa Temür who had fled from Astrakhan at the time of the Muscovite conquest in 1554 and taken refuge in the Uzbek dominions.
Toqatimurids (at one time called the ‘Janids’ or ‘Astrakhanids’ by historians) reigned over Transoxiana and territories south of the Oxus from their two centres of Bukhārā and Balkh until c. 1750 and 1737 respectively, while the ‘Arabshahid line in Khiva too survived until 1727; during the years that followed, the puppet khans were frequently Toqatimurids.39

The appeal to some kind of legitimacy through links with Chinggis Khan died hard. It is worth noting that the post-Chinggisid (and post-Timurid) dynasties who held sway in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – the Manghits in Bukhārā from 1756 and the Qongrat (< Qongqurat) in Khiva from 1804 – were sufficiently conscious of the attractions of Chinggisid blood to manufacture, or to boast of, marital links with the Mongol conqueror’s descendants.40 Muḥammad Mūnis, whose *Firdaws al-iqābāl* (‘The Paradise of Good Fortune’) was commissioned by the first Qongrat khan of Khiva, Eltüzèr, turned the khan’s ancestor Tinim into Chinggis Khan’s trusted commander and son-in-law (küregen), Jochi’s deputy and thus an analogue of Yazdī’s Qarachar in the Chaghadayid ulus. Tinim’s descendants in turn (among them the celebrated Noghai, shamelessly purloined from the Chinggisid tree) are said to have governed Bulghār and to have held later the office of chief amir (*amīr al-umūrā*) under Özbeg and his successors.41

Conversely, rulers who lacked the necessary Chinggisid qualifications, or felt unable to counterfeit them, were forced back upon alternative sources of legitimacy. The strong attachment to genealogy among the Arabs went right back to the pre-Islamic (Jāhiliyya) era; and following the rise and spread of Islam the illustrious ancestor had generally been a Caliph (not necessarily one of the Prophet’s own family), a sayyid, a prominent early Muslim leader, or a king. The novel phenomenon that surfaces in the later Chinggisid era is the appeal to descent (real or purported) from a figure who was closely associated with the conversion process. Thus the Golden Horde amir Edigü, frequently under attack from one or the other of Toqtamish’s sons, devised an ancestry that led back to the sufi shaykh Bābā Tükles, whom popular belief credited with a decisive role in the conversion of Khan Özbeg a century before.42

Alongside a strong sense of the charisma of the Chinggisids and their unique fitness to rule, which survived in much of Muslim Western Asia until a relatively modern date, Chinggisid princes naturally retained certain administrative practices from the era of infidel rule. In particular they, and the Turco-Mongol military aristocracy who followed them, also tended to profess a commitment to what they saw as Chinggisid law and custom, the ‘Yasa’, or ‘Tura’ (*töre*), as it was often known. To these matters we now turn.
Allegiance to Mongol norms and institutions

Attachment to steppe custom as introduced by the conquerors remained strong, even after the demise of Mongol regimes (properly speaking). Chinggisid tradition was maintained for a few centuries under dynasties such as the Timurids, the Indian Mughals, the Ottomans and the Safawids – the three latter the ‘Gunpowder Empires’, as they have been labelled. All four states could be viewed, each in its own way, as heirs to those that emerged after 1260 from the empire forged by Chinggis Khan and his immediate successors.

In some measure, the Mongols simply perpetuated Turkic traditions that had taken root under the Saljuqs, such as the tughra or stylized ‘signature’ of the monarch on administrative documents. But certain administrative norms dating from the era of infidel Mongol rule persisted for a number of centuries in the post-Mongol world, especially in the former Ilkhanid dominions. The most obvious was the suyūrghāl (Mo. soyurghal, ‘favour’, ‘reward’), a land-grant that carried administrative and revenue rights and was often hereditary, as distinct from the traditional iqṭā’ of the pre-Mongol era (in theory a grant only of revenue and non-hereditary), and utilized, in varying forms, under the Jalayirids, Timurids, Qarā Qūyūnlū, Āq Qūyūnlū and Safawids; Professor Bert Fragner views its adoption as signalling a failure to return to Islamic practice. Lesser examples are the inclusion on official documents of the Turkic formula sözümiz (‘his word’) following the ruler’s signature, which is found not only on Temür’s edicts but on those of the fifteenth-century Türkmen Āq Qūyūnlū sovereign Uzun Hasan; and the attestation of such documents by four senior noyans of the keshig, a practice, Christopher Atwood has shown, that did not originate in Chinggis Khan’s reign or form part of his Yasa, as later believed, but dated from the era of Qubilai and his contemporary, the Ilkhan Gaikhatu.

A fourth example was the exaction of a binding oath (mochelge) from office-holders through the Timurid and until the Safawid era. And yet a fifth was the official use of the twelve-year animal calendar long employed by the Turks of the steppe, and introduced by the Mongols, which persisted in Iran right down to the end of the Qājār dynasty (1925).

Such institutional hangovers from the Mongol epoch were not confined to the Iranian lands. The Ottoman empire too retained a number of administrative terms and institutions that dated back to Anatolia’s time as an Ilkhanid province. This phenomenon received an additional boost from the influx of Turkish Muslims from Central Asia during the Mongol era. In this fashion the Uighur script, which itself was closely associated with the
Chinggisids and their empire, had come into use in Anatolia by the late fifteenth century; though Ottoman political culture was increasingly arabized following the sultans' acquisition of the Arabic-speaking heartlands in the sixteenth century. Another possible link between the Chinggisids and the Ottoman state will be considered later (pp. 404–5).

The prominence of elite women in political decision-making, which had been a notable characteristic of Mongol rule, persisted under the Timurids, although it should be noted that there was a hierarchy among the wives of both Temür and his sons and grandsons: princesses of the Mongol imperial dynasty (valuable, as we noticed earlier, for the blood link they transmitted from Chinggis Khan) ranked higher than others and were treated with greater deference. With Bābur’s conquest of northern India in the early sixteenth century, the Timurid baggage train carried with it the political importance of royal women into the subcontinent, where the relatively high status of Mughal princesses has been noticed in a recent article.

We have seen how steppe law and custom sometimes conflicted with the Shari‘a, and how steppe practices were not necessarily jettisoned in the immediate wake of the Mongols’ acceptance of Islam. It is conceivable that for Mongol khans and the Turco-Mongol aristocracy of the first few generations following the conversion there was no clash between their new faith and their ancestors’ way of doing things. With time, however, observance of Islam and respect for the Yasa came to be seen as incompatible.

Temür (Tamerlane) combined Islamic zeal with a strong attachment to Mongol traditions, including the Yasa. His court historian Niẓām-i Shāmī even deemed it worthwhile, when inflating the part played by Temür’s ancestor Qarachar in the early Chaghādayid state, to depict him as the guardian of the Yasa, a role that Rashīd al-Dīn had attributed to Chaghadai himself. By contrast, Temür’s son Shāh Rukh, ascending the throne in Samarqand in 811/1409, allegedly did perceive the incompatibility of the two systems and proclaimed his intention to govern only in accordance with the Shari‘a. He appears to have taken as his model the Ilkhan Ghazan rather than Chinggis Khan. Perhaps for this reason his undertaking remained a dead letter; at best, Shāh Rukh promoted Islamic norms while preserving an allegiance to the Mongol heritage. The partiality of his son Ulugh Beg to Mongol traditions, on the other hand, has been exaggerated.

On occasion, the clash between Islam and the Yasa – albeit glaringly obvious – was merely ignored, as happened in the case of marriage policy. Timurid princes continued to marry the wives of their deceased brothers, particularly when the princess involved was of Chinggisid stock. As late as the mid-fifteenth century, when the Chaghādayids of Mughalistān had
been Muslim for five generations, we find the khan Dūst Muḥammad aspiring to marry one of his father's widows, just as Ghazan and Özbeg had done, and seeking the sanction of a number of Muslim scholars in turn; although he went further than his precursors by executing all the eight 'ulama whose judgements were unfavourable.\(^{57}\)

Dūst Muḥammad may well be an isolated case, and perhaps the significance of the tale, in part, is that our source, Ḥaydar Dughlāt, was clearly aware of the irreconcilability of Islam and at least one steppe custom. By the time he wrote, in fact, the evidence indicates that although attachment to 'the Yasa of Chinggis Khan' was still strong among the Turco-Mongol nomads of Central Asia, and although the Muslim literati were exercised about its non-Muslim origins,\(^ {58}\) it was more often invoked apropos of court ceremonial and protocol: the enthronement of khans, for example, by raising them up on a carpet of white felt;\(^ {59}\) the order of precedence among amirs, based upon the status (real or perceived) of their tribal ancestors in Chinggis Khan's military organization; the proper mode of receiving ambassadors. This is the impression we gain both from the memoirs of Ẓahir al-Dīn Muḥammad Bābur (d. 937/1530) and from the seventeenth-century author Maḥmūd b. Amīr Wāli.

Bābur was a descendant of Temūr in the sixth generation and also, through his mother, a princess from Chaghāda’yīd Mughalīstān, a descendant of Chinggis Khan. Having lost his appanage in Farghānā to the Shibanid Uzbeks in 906/1501, he had gone on to make a more distinguished career for himself as the founder of the ‘Mughal’ empire in northern India, thereby trumping the achievement of Temūr, who had contented himself with the sack of Delhi. To Bābur it was almost axiomatic that those provisions of the Yasa which had outlived their usefulness should be discarded;\(^ {60}\) but it seems significant that the criterion he advocated was not whether they conflicted with Islam. Maḥmūd b. Amīr Wāli displays less equanimity on the subject of the Yasa, furnishing a detailed list of the practices he deplores.\(^ {61}\) In the primarily ceremonial contexts that these witnesses specify it was easier, in any case, to invest un-Islamic practice with an Islamic complexion. When the Uzbek khan ʿAbd-Allāh II (d. 1006/1598) was enthroned in Bukhārā in 990/1582 and raised up on a carpet of white felt as tradition required, Muslim dignitaries were not merely present but sprinkled over the felt water from the well of Zamzam, near Mecca.\(^ {62}\) By such means could infidel custom be rendered innocuous and even acceptable.

As we saw, the Mongol era gave rise to a world that was more closely interconnected. It may well be a measure of the tighter economic links between Central Asia, India, Iran and the Near East that these regions
underwent virtually simultaneous crises in the 1330s and 1340s. It was also a more cosmopolitan world, and not merely at the level of transcontinental trade or geographical knowledge. As noticed earlier (pp. 110, 225), the very scale of the conquests created a need for linguistic specialists. It was by no means confined to the Mongols themselves or to their territories, since the exponential growth of contact between societies far distant from one another also engendered a more widespread necessity for translation into several languages. This is the world of the Codex Cumanicus, which embodies successive attempts by Western Europeans respectively to construct a Latin-Persian-Turkish glossary for the use of merchants (probably in the mid-1290s) and a collection of Christian religious texts in Qipchaq Turkic (in the 1330s) for the purpose of evangelism. To take a still more striking manifestation of the importance attached to linguistic skills, and from a less likely quarter, it is also the world of the ‘Rasulid Hexaglot’ (c. 1360), a dictionary of Arabic, Greek, Armenian, Persian, Mongolian and Turkish which al-AfdalʾAbbās b. ’Ali, King of the Yemen – geographically far removed from the Mongol dominions – commissioned in response to the broadening and quickening of cultural contacts that had their roots ultimately in the Mongol conquests.

The prestige attaching to the Chinggisid war-machine ensured that aspects of Mongol culture were adopted even in states which staunchly resisted Mongol expansion and successfully checked it. Thus Mamlūk amirs in Egypt and Syria wore Mongol dress, and al-ʿUmarī was told that the Delhi Sultan and his military officers, too, were attired in ‘Tatar’ robes. Mamlūk authors exhibit a striking familiarity with, and interest in, Chinggisid history and Mongol custom, only partly nurtured by the existence of mamluks of Mongol provenance. It is important, however, not to be misled by some of the information purveyed in Mamlūk sources. From an early stage the Yasa served as a convenient object of polemic in the Mamlūk dominions, as we saw in the writings of Ibn Taymiyya at the time of Ghazan’s first invasion of Syria (pp. 378–9). Controversy over the opposition between Yasa and Shari’a surfaced in Egypt some decades after Ibn Taymiyya, but in a totally different context. The targets of polemic were now the sultan’s mamluk officers. The claim by al-Šafadī (d. 764/1363) – that the amir Aytamish, a mamluk of Mongol birth, administered the affairs of the sultan’s personal mamluks according to the Yasa – was groundless. So too was the broader charge levelled by the early fifteenth-century historian Taqīʾal-Dīn al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442) against the sultan’s military chamberlains (ḥujjāb), of extending the Yasa to cases that involved ordinary Muslims and that properly pertained to the Shari’a and to the jurisdiction
of the qadi.\textsuperscript{69} Al-Maqriz\={i} was referring purely to the application of \textit{siy\={a}sa}, namely the secular justice administered by the sultan and his officers, and clearly anticipated that the similarity between the two words would aid his purpose.\textsuperscript{70}

**Turkicization**

The preponderance of Turkic nomads within the Mongol armies of conquest explains the fact that well before 1400 Turkish had largely supplanted Mongolian in Western and Central Asia.\textsuperscript{71} We observed al-\textquotesingle Umari\textquotesc{'} comment, as early as 1338, that the Mongols of the Jochid ulus had become assimilated culturally to the Qipchaq majority among their subjects (above, p. 339). It is also worth noting that, insofar as we can tell from the exiguous material that has come down to us, Turkish (in a document of 1398 still written in the Uighur alphabet, but with an interlinear text in Arabic script) had, at least by Özbeg\textquotesc{'} reign, become the language of administration within the Golden Horde territories, as of course was Turkish in the successor-states of Kazan, Astrakhan and the Crimea; Mongolian was restricted to a few special terms.\textsuperscript{72} This pattern is possibly less true, however, of the Chaghadayid realm. Here, admittedly, the khans Köpek and Tarmashirin spoke Turkish,\textsuperscript{73} and Mongolian tribes in Transoxiana like Temür\textquotesc{'} own, the Barlās, were Turkicized by the mid-fourteenth century. It is significant that Chaghadai (unconsciously) lent his name to the eastern Turkic literary language, Chaghatay, which developed out of Khwarazmian Turkic in the Timurid era\textsuperscript{74} and spawned in turn other tongues such as Uzbek and Kazakh. But Mongolian, to judge from the Turfan documents, was still in administrative use in the easternmost tracts of the ulus – ‘Mughalistān’, the Mongol zone par excellence – as late as 1369.\textsuperscript{75} In the Ilkhanate, a few official documents were still drafted in Mongolian as late as Abū Sa\textquotesc{'} id\textquotesc{'} reign,\textsuperscript{76} surprisingly, but the majority were now produced in Persian.

There is general agreement that, in Michal Biran\textquotesc{'} words, ‘the Mongol period completed the process of Turco-Mongol dominance of the ruling elite in the Middle East’.\textsuperscript{77} There was large-scale immigration into Iran by fresh nomadic elements – whether brought in the conquerors\textquotesc{'} baggage train from the Far East or dislodged from a domicile closer at hand and borne along by the Mongol tide, such as the Türkmen groups deposited in the region.\textsuperscript{78} We lack the solid evidence that would enable us to trace the emergence of the Qarā Qūyūnlū (\textquoteleft Black Sheep\textquotesc{)}) and Āq Qūyūnlū (\textquoteleft White Sheep\textquotesc{}), which appear already as fully fledged confederations in the
mid-fourteenth century; or tribes like the Takkalû and the Rûmlû, which played such a prominent role in the sixteenth-century Safawid polity; or the Afshârs and Qâjârs, each of which in turn would furnish Iran with a ruling dynasty in succession to the Safawids. The arrival of some of the constituent groups may postdate the Mongol conquest; but equally they may have accompanied the invading Saljuqs.\textsuperscript{79}

The process of Turkicization is clearly visible not least in the sphere of diet, which has been so extensively researched by Paul Buell. Although the lifestyles of the nomadic Mongols and Turks were traditionally very similar, Turkic cuisine was somewhat more varied and more sophisticated, and during the imperial epoch the Mongols readily adopted Turkic dishes. What resulted was not just a newly diverse elite cuisine, since the Mongol rulers seem to have fostered the consumption of such dishes beyond steppe nomadic society.\textsuperscript{80} To take just one example: tutmach, a kind of stuffed noodle, figures among the supplies brought to Iran in large quantities to feed Hûlegû’s army.\textsuperscript{81} Within a few decades we find a Türkmen sufi, who had been given a post in the department of charitable foundations (\textit{awqâf}) in Baghdad by Naṣîr al-Dîn Ṭûsî’s son Fakhr al-Dîn, assiduously preparing \textit{tutmach} for the supervisors and scribes employed there;\textsuperscript{82} few, if any, of them are likely to have been Mongols or even Turks. We do not know how widespread the consumption of this dish had been in pre-Mongol Iraq and particularly under the Saljuqs; but the paucity of references (that is, for regions outside the Central Asian steppes) prior to the Ilkhanid period might indicate that it became more popular from the Mongol era onwards.\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{The exodus of Muslims from the Mongol world}

Al-Maqrîzî was able to pen his tendentious jeremiad about the Yasa precisely because of the extent of immigration from Mongol-occupied territories. At the time of Hûlegû’s invasion of Iraq and Syria, large numbers of refugees made for Mamlûk Egypt. We have already noticed (p. 174) the claim by the early fourteenth-century geographer Shams al-Dîn al-Dimashqî that immigration from Iraq, the Jazîra and Syria down to 1260 had swollen the population of Cairo to over a million. Such refugees continued to arrive over the next few decades. Among them were groups of Mongols: survivors from Jochid contingents in Iran, for instance, who headed westward following Hûlegû’s attack on the Jochid princes in his army in c. 1261; or the few hundred Oyirat horsemen, supporters of Baidu who had fled the Ilkhanate in 696/1296 in the wake of Ghazan’s triumph. Although these \textit{wâfidiyya} (‘asylum-seekers’) were made welcome, it was not until the early
fourteenth century, during the reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, that any such immigrants attained high rank in the military establishment of the Mamlūk Sultanate.84

If the contribution of Mongol immigrants to the Mamlūk war effort is difficult to quantify, we can be more confident that the Delhi Sultan's spectacular advances against independent Hindu states derived considerable impetus from the incorporation of Muslim refugees into his military forces.85 That large numbers of fugitives from Khurāsān, Ghūr and Ghazna were already entering India at the time of Chinggis Khan's operations we learn from Jūzjānī, who was one of their number.86 He also tells us that the Delhi Sultan Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (r. 607–33/1211–36) took care to welcome and reward them.87 Among those who entered the Sultanate during this first phase was the father of the Sultanate's most famous poet, Amīr Khusraw Dihlawī (d. 725/1325).88 Immigration continued later in the century, swollen by groups of Mongols who sought shelter in India. We can identify several distinct stages in this process. The most obvious are the early 1260s, coinciding with the assault by Ilkhanid forces on the Jochid contingents in eastern Iran; the year 691/1292; the few years following the overthrow of Tarmashirin in Transoxiana (735/1334); and the mid-1340s, when the influx may be linked with the deposition of the shadowy Khalil Sultan (c. 745/1344–5). As we saw, the earliest of these newcomers may have arrived as infidels but accepted Islam subsequently, as was the case with the second group; whereas those who entered the Sultanate in the 1330s and 1340s were unquestionably Muslims.89

Mongol activities even provided the Sultanate, unintentionally, with its two greatest ruling dynasties. By piecing together details supplied by Jūzjānī and by Waṣṣāf, we learn that the Khalaj chief Jalāl al-Dīn Fīrūz b. Yughrush, destined to be the first Sultan (689–95/1290–6) of the Khaljī dynasty, had arrived (probably in the 1260s) from the Binbān region, where he may have been the Mongols' shiḥna.90 And if Ibn Baṭṭūta's informant is to be relied upon, Ghāzī Malik – the later Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq and eponymous founder of the Tughluqids (720–815/1320–1412) in Delhi – was himself a 'Turk' from among the Qara'unas (Negüderis).91

It must be admitted that these 'neo-Muslims' (as contemporary Indian authors regularly label them), mingling with the Sultanate's already heterogeneous nobility and military establishment, may have played a more significant role in its fractious politics than in its expansion.92 But overall, by swelling the formidable Delhi forces they may, at the very least, have enhanced the sultan's ability to overawe his Hindu rivals. Not all the immigrants from Chaghadayid territories, moreover, were Mongols or even
military men. Sultan Muḥammad b. Tughluq (r. 724–52/1324–52), whose proverbial munificence was already widely known, took advantage of the upheavals from 1334 onwards to issue a public invitation to Muslim officials, jurists and scholars in Transoxiana to come south and enter his service; one party reached Sind just a little ahead of the Moroccan traveller Ibn Baṭṭūṭa. Civilian elements of this kind almost certainly made an important contribution to the progressive Islamization of the Sultan’s vast empire and of the successor-states into which it fragmented after the 1330s.

In chapter 8 we noticed how both the Mamlūk state and the Delhi Sultanate profited from the willingness of the Jochid khans to look benignly on a highly strategic commerce in vital war materiel, namely the conveyance of Turkic military slaves to both states and the despatch of choice warhorses to Muslim India. Taken together with the displacement of significant numbers of refugees, this traffic contributed to the resilience of Islam’s two principal bulwarks against Mongol expansion, in the Near East and the Indian subcontinent. It is possibly the most strikingly ironic of the Mongols’ indirect effects upon Islamic history.

The spread of Islam across Eurasia

The Mongols’ own policies, too, fostered the spread of Islam. We noticed above (p. 325) Juwaynī’s observation that their conquests had benefited the Dar al-Islam by causing the faith to reach parts of the world where hitherto it had been unrepresented. If the statement appears a trifle hollow in the context, it was because of the nature of the expansion: much of it was due to the forcible relocation of Muslims from Iran and Central Asia. The three principal areas in which the faith now established a solid presence were China, eastern Central Asia (comprising the modern Chinese province of Xinjiang) and the Pontic-Caspian steppe.

China

In some measure Islam, by the end of the Yuan, had not merely succeeded in penetrating into the western fringes of the qaghan’s territories but had even established itself within the metropolitan areas of China. Although the Muslim presence in the country dated back as far as the era of the Tang dynasty (618–907), it involved relatively limited numbers of traders (and sometimes their families) and was confined to the great ports of the southeast like Guangzhou, Yangzhou and Hangzhou. Moreover, in contrast with
the Muslims who reached China during the Mongol Yuan era, these early Muslim immigrants – perhaps in many cases domiciled only temporarily in China – do not appear to have considered themselves in any sense Chinese. The Mongol epoch witnessed a marked increase in the number of Muslim traders resident in China, particularly in Yuan China’s largest and most important port, Quanzhou (Zaitun), and in Hangzhou. But these fresh Muslim immigrants were by no means confined to the port cities, and a number played an important, if not always popular, role in the Mongol administration of the country. Among them was Aḥmad Fanākatī from Transoxiana, Qubilai’s notorious finance minister, who was assassinated by his Han Chinese enemies in 1282.

A still more significant proportion of Muslims residing in the Yuan territories was made up of prisoners and slaves removed from Western Asia. Already in 1260 Jūzjānī had heard that the cities of China (Tamghāch), Tibet and the former Tangut kingdom had been repopulated with large numbers of Muslims from Turkestan and Iran and that a great many mosques had been built for them. If he was possibly misinformed regarding Tibet, as far as Tangut is concerned he was indeed correct. Marco Polo reports the presence of Muslims in the cities of Shazhou and Ganzhou, though he gives the impression that they were in the minority. Rashīd al-Dīn, on the other hand, was told that Muslims were in the majority in the twenty-four large towns of the Tangut region, in contrast with the agricultural population, who were ‘idolators’; but the imprecise usage of the term ‘Tangut’ renders it difficult to ascertain just where the Muslims were concentrated. The fortunes of Islam in the territories of the Muslim convert Ananda (p. 349) after his execution – following the failure of Temūr’s widow Bulughan Khatun to enthrone him at Khanbaligh in succession to her husband in 1307 and the transfer of his principality to another branch of the imperial dynasty – are unknown. But it seems very likely that the genesis of the Hui nationality of Gansu and Ningxia dates from his time, since as early as 1272 the Tangut region appears to have contained enough adult male Muslims for the formation of a ‘Xi Xia Muslim (huihui) army’.

Many of the Muslim elements introduced into China during the Mongol era belonged to the military establishment. In the passage referred to above, Jūzjānī speaks also of the appointment of Muslim amirs to command fortresses in China and Tangut. Although the Muslim official Sayyid Ajall Bukhārī (d. 1279) – whom Qubilai sent in 1273 to head the administration of the newly conquered province of Yunnan (the kingdom of Dali) – has received much of the credit for the establishment of Islam within the region,
it is likely that this pre-dated his arrival and that the conquest, from 1253 onwards, had involved significant bodies of Muslim troops, who had then settled.\textsuperscript{103} It should also be noted that Sayyid Ajall’s policy in the province was not to promote Islamic culture so much as to foster Chinese practices and Confucian scholarship.\textsuperscript{104} Nonetheless, his activities in no way hampered the growth of the Muslim community in Yunnan, which survives to this day.

\textit{Eastern Central Asia}

If the two branches of the Chaghadaiyid dynasty that ruled in Transoxiana and in Mughalistān had alike embraced Islam by the middle decades of the eighth/fourteenth century, this was not the case with their Chaghadaiyid kinsmen and neighbours immediately to the east. These princes were descended from Alughu’s son Chūbei, who along with his brother Qaban had entered the service of the Yuan during the upheavals of the 1270s (above, p. 187).\textsuperscript{105} A number of Chūbei’s progeny bore Yuan administrative titles, notably ‘Prince of Bin’, ‘Prince of Weiwu and Xining’ and ‘Prince of Xining’, of which the first two had been bestowed upon Chūbei himself. He, or possibly his sons after his death, played a prominent role in the bitter struggle between Esen Buqa and the forces of the Qaghan Buyantu that ensued in the period 1313–20 and which advanced the frontiers of the Yuan empire to a line extending from the Altai range down to Lop Nor. The Yuan dominions thereby came to include the towns that fringed the Taklamakan desert.\textsuperscript{106}

Mirzā Ḥaydar transmits a report that the Chaghadaiyid khan of Mughalistān, Tughluq Temür’s son Khıdır Qocha, waged holy war (\textit{ghazāt}) against Qaraqocho and Turfan and brought them into the Muslim fold, presumably towards the end of the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{107} If these operations are authentic, the results are nevertheless difficult to discern. In 823/1420, when an embassy from the Timurid Shâh Rukh passed through the region on its way to China, one of its members, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Naqqāsh, kept a diary of the mission, which Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū incorporated in his \textit{Zubdat al-tawārīkh}. Ghiyāth al-Dīn reports that the majority of the inhabitants of Turfan were still ‘idolators’, and was clearly struck by the beauty of their temples; he does not, incidentally, allude to a mosque in the town.\textsuperscript{108} The preponderance of Islam appears to have occurred later, after Turfan had finally been brought under Muslim rule;\textsuperscript{109} but even in 1494 an embassy is said to have found that the majority of the inhabitants were Christian.\textsuperscript{110}

Qāshānī expressly mentions Qāmul (Ch. Hami) among the regions occupied by Chūbei’s sons, acting on the qaghan’s behalf, in c. 713/1313–14.\textsuperscript{111} In
the late thirteenth century Marco Polo had described the population as exclusively ‘idolators’, and the papal envoy Marignolli, who passed through Qāmul in c. 1340, makes no mention of Muslims there. But in contrast with Turfan, Qāmul at the time of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Naqqāsh’s visit did contain a mosque, built by the ḥākim of the town’s Muslims – though how recently he does not tell us. At any rate, Ghiyāth al-Dīn gives the impression that the mosque had been deliberately constructed opposite a Buddhist temple. Yet the princes of Qāmul, who from the 1390s, at least, were descendants of Chübei, were seemingly in no haste to embrace Islam. In the mid-fourteenth century (and hence before the emergence of the principality at Qāmul) three of Chübei’s descendants – Sulaymān (a grandson) and his sons Yaghān Shāh and Sulṭān Shāh – had borne Muslim names. Of these, Sulaymān was certainly influenced by Muslim practice, at least, since a contemporary Buddhist poem says that he condemned the consumption of alcohol and drank little himself. But we find no Muslim names among the Chaghadyid princes of Qāmul, beginning in c. 1390 with Gunashiri(n), whose name is unmistakably Sanskrit – and therefore Buddhist – in origin. Hodong Kim has argued persuasively that a faction in Mughalistān had sought to put forward Gunashiri(n) as a candidate for the throne of the Chaghadyid khanate in 1388, and conceivably this represented a reaction against the relatively fresh adoption of Islam. Yet again, of course, personal names – even Buddhist ones – are by no means a sure indication of a ruler’s faith (as the example of Tarmashirin demonstrates). But by this token, if we discount brief intervals in the 1470s and 1480s when Qāmul was occupied by the Muslims of Turfan, none of its rulers appears to have been a Muslim before the prince called in Ming sources Baiyatsi (conceivably Bāyazīd, though this is far from certain), who was overpowered by Maṇṣūr b. Aḥmad, the Chaghadyid khan of Turfan, in 1513.

The ulus of Jochi

The advance of Islam in the Golden Horde territories is perhaps the most obscure of these processes. It appears that many of the Mongols’ Qipchaq subjects, and of the peoples imported into the western steppes as a result of the Mongol conquests, were adopting Islam during the thirteenth century; though the khan Özbeg would later be credited with the major role in the Islamization of the Jochid ulus. In his Nuzhat al-qulūb (c. 1340), Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī remarked that the inhabitants of the Qipchaq steppe had for the most part accepted the faith, while according to Abū l-Fidā, writing a few years earlier, even the majority of the population of Sāqchī, on the lower Danube, was Muslim.
Yet the pace at which Islam spread within the Jochid lands could easily be exaggerated. The Siberian ‘Tatars’ may have been converted at a comparatively late date.\textsuperscript{122} In this context oral tradition can sometimes mislead us. Muḥammad Mūnis’ \textit{Firdaws al-\textit{iqbal}}, for instance, would claim that Tinim Kürege of the Qongqurat (above, p. 389) had become a Muslim late in life – that is, at some point before the early 1230s.\textsuperscript{123} Given the importance of establishing precedence (\textit{sābiqa}) in the faith, we may justifiably suspect the author of offering an improbably early date. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, moreover, Greek Orthodox Christianity was still well established among the Turkic inhabitants of the Crimean town of Südâq (Soldaia), many of whom bore identifiably Qipchaq names.\textsuperscript{124} As late as the 1330s Ibn Baṭṭūṭa encountered Christian Qipchaq names in the Kaffa region and spoke of the Qipchaq inhabitants of Sarai as Christians.\textsuperscript{125} It is not inconceivable that these tribesmen had been evangelized by Western European Franciscans, established at Kaffa since at least 1287.\textsuperscript{126} Even at the dawn of the fifteenth century a Latin prelate some years resident in the east could still report that many (though a minority) of the ‘Tartars’ of the Pontic steppes were Christian.\textsuperscript{127}

\textit{Anatolia}

The incorporation of Rūm into the Mongol dominions had a more indirect effect on the advance of Islam in the region, inasmuch as it gave a boost to the Ḥanafī school in particular. The reason was the strong presence of Ḥanafism in Central Asia, whence so many Muslims – scholars, jurists and administrators – travelled to other regions of the Mongol world. There is clear evidence for an influx of Ḥanafīs into Anatolia, imparting a distinctively Ḥanafī flavour to the Islam of the petty states that shared out the territories of the former Saljuq Sultanate, not least the nascent Ottoman polity. The significance of this for the ongoing Islamization of Anatolia is that Ḥanafīs displayed a greater latitude in their approach to conversion than did the other schools of Islamic law, including the Shāfi‘īs, and that this development accordingly facilitated the acceptance of Islam by the residual Greek Orthodox population as it came under Muslim rule in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{128}

\textit{The movement of peoples and the emergence of new ethnicities}

Among those who came to adopt an Islamic identity were many of the new ethnic groups that were forming within Mongol Eurasia. The great majority emerge into the light only in the fifteenth century, and their genesis is a
process largely hidden from us. It doubtless owed less to the flight of peoples in the path of the Mongol advance than to the way in which the Mongols themselves transferred Turkic (and, to a lesser extent, Mongolian) elements from one part of Asia to another, either to assist in the subjugation and garrisoning of their territories or to promote economic recovery when the previous populations had fled or been annihilated. The Moghols of Afghanistan are descended from Mongol-speaking elements transplanted in the thirteenth century. The Hazaras of Afghanistan, whose language is a dialect of Persian, are also believed to include a Mongol admixture, possibly, it has been proposed, from contact with the Negüderis.

In some measure also the southward shift of the Chaghadayid ulus, the ‘Time of Troubles’ in the Jochid territories, and the disintegration of the Ilkhanate and the Yuan empire in the middle decades of the fourteenth century may have contributed to the process of ethnogenesis.

We have already seen how Mongol military formations gave rise to quasi-ethnic groups such as the Ja‘ûn-i Qûrbân in Khurâsân (p. 104) and the Jurma‘îs and Ùghânîs in Kirmân (pp. 205–6). Chinggis Khan’s policy of dispersing members of the same tribe among new military units was extended to the western steppes, and Rashîd al-Dîn’s reference to a force comprising Uighurs, Qarluq, Türkmen and men from Kâshghar and Kûcha (Kûsân), assembled to accompany Chormaghun to Iran, clearly illustrates the heterogeneous character of some of the ‘Mongol’ troop divisions from an early date. As a long-term consequence of the policy in the post-Mongol era, many of the new ethnicities contained clans of the same name: Kereyit, Merkit, Naiman, Tangut and Qipchaq, to name the most prominent. In the early sixteenth century the clans of the Crimean Khanate included the Barin (Ba‘arin), the Kitan, the Manghit and the Qipchaq.

It is noteworthy how many of the new ethnicities derived their name, as did the Jurma‘îs and Ùghânîs, from an individual ruler or commander rather than from some pre-existing tribe. Behind this, in Peter Golden’s view, lies the attenuation of long-standing kinship bonds and the prominence of group identities that originated in the institution of the nökör (‘companion’). The Yasa‘ûrîs who appear in the Timurid accounts of Temûr’s early career in Transoxiana are commonly taken to have been the one-time troops of the Chaghadayid prince Yasa‘ûr (d. 1320), who must have accompanied him on his migration into Khurâsân (above, pp. 201, 207) but are said to have joined Köpek after their master’s overthrow. If this identification is correct, they may have formed the power-base of the joint khans Khalîl and Qazan, Yasa‘ûr’s sons, in the 1340s (see p. 357). An alternative possibility is that the Yasa‘ûrîs originated, rather, at an earlier
juncture, as the force commanded by the important noyan of that name, who was prominent under Baraq and Du’a and from c. 1290 was stationed south of the Oxus. This Yasa‘ur, known as ‘the Greater’, was in fact the prince’s maternal grandfather.

Better known, but more problematic, are the full-blown confederacies that emerged at a later date. The Uzbeks are traditionally connected with Özbeg, the first in the unbroken series of Muslim khans in the Golden Horde, on the authority of the semi-legendary seventeenth-century historical work of Abū l-Ghāzī, Khan of Khiva, himself an ’Arabshahid and hence a descendant of Johi’s son Shiban. Yet Abū l-Ghāzī says nothing more than that the Jochid ulus (he calls it an īl) had been known as the īl of Özbeg (Uzbek) since that khan’s reign. There is nothing intrinsically improbable about this: in much the same way it had often been called the ‘ulus of Berke’ from the 1260s, and the appellation ‘Chaghatays’ that was attached to the forces of Temür and his successors provides a fourteenth-century parallel. But the ethnicon Uzbek first appears in the sources in the mid-fifteenth century, over 150 years after the khan’s death, and attached, oddly enough, to a grouping led by descendants not of Batu but of his brother Shiban. Similarly, it is far from obvious why the Noghays, who surface in the eastern reaches of the Jochid ulus earlier in that century, should have taken their name from the Chinggisid kingmaker who had perished in 1299/1300 and whose sphere of influence had lain west of the Dnieper.

In this same category of new ‘tribes’ named after an individual belongs the most mystifying of them, located on the western edge of the Mongol world, in Anatolia. The ruling dynasty of the Ottomans (Osmanli), like that of the Noghays, was of non-Chinggisid origin but, unlike that of the Noghays, has generally not been deemed to be of Mongol extraction. In contrast, too, with the Noghays and Uzbeks alike, the Ottomans’ existence is attested during the Mongol era itself. Their eponymous leader ’Osmān (’Uthmān; d. c. 1324), whose son Orkhan was the real founder of the Ottoman state, first appears on the stage during the last years of the Ilkhan Ghazan. The scope of this chapter does not require us to trace or account for the rise of Ottoman power. Rather, we are concerned more narrowly with the possible impact of Mongol rule in north-western Anatolia. The early Ottoman sources, which contain a good deal of fanciful material and of which none dates from earlier than c. 1400, are surprisingly reticent about Anatolia’s Mongol past. But Professor Rudi Lindner has advanced evidence that ’Osmān was still subject to the Ilkhanid regime early in Öljeitü’s time and suggested that he was among those who had benefited when Ghazan, in the wake of Sülemish’s unsuccessful revolt in Rūm, sought
to bind the local powers more closely to the Ilkhanid interest by granting them the profitable right of coinage, thus occasioning the marked (if fleeting) proliferation of Anatolian mint-towns in 699/1299–1300.\(^{143}\)

It is also possible that the Mongols were more directly linked with the very formation of the Ottoman polity. There is, if anything, less scholarly agreement regarding Ottoman origins than at any time in the past. Various dates have been proposed for their first arrival in Anatolia, and we face here the same problem that surrounds the antecedents of the Qarā Qūyūnlū and the Āq Qūyūnlū (pp. 394–5). Claims that the Ottomans’ ancestors were among the new Turkic populations introduced with the advent of the Saljuqs in the eleventh century depend less on hard evidence than on a pronounced reluctance in past Turkish historiography to acknowledge that the Mongol scourge could have played any role in the genesis of Turkey.\(^{144}\) The balance of modern opinion is that the Ottomans probably arrived during the Mongol campaigns of conquest between c. 1220 and c. 1258. One possibility is that they were among the Turks who moved westwards into Anatolia following the defeat of the Khwārazmshāh Jalāl al-Dīn by a Saljuq-Ayyubid coalition in 627/1230 and his death in the next year.\(^{145}\)

‘Osmān’s name has come down to us in various guises. Those of Orkhan’s coins that include his father’s name (the earliest is dated 727 [1326–7]) spell it as ‘Osmān.’\(^{146}\) But Dr Colin Heywood has pointed out that ‘Osmān is called ‘Atmān’ by the Byzantine author Pachymeres, suggesting a Mongol background.\(^{147}\) In this connection, it is worth noting that the name *Otman was borne both by a great-grandson of Jochi’s son Shiban and by a Qongqurat noyan, who appears as the father of Bulughan Khatun, wife successively to the Ilkhans Arghun and Ghazan.\(^{148}\) More importantly, Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-‘Umarī gives two separate, if brief, accounts of Orkhan’s amirate in his section on Anatolia, evidently derived from two different informants. In the first of these, Orkhan’s father is named ‘Uthmān, as we should expect; in the second he is called ṬMAN, beneath which lurks probably the same form as that given by Pachymeres.\(^{149}\)

Taking up a statement made by the early sixteenth-century historian Khwānd-Amīr and developed by Clément Huart four centuries later, Heywood has further elaborated a case for the Ottomans as much more recent immigrants, who crossed the Straits into Anatolia from the Jochid territories following the overthrow of Noghai by the khan Toqto’a in 699/1299–1300.\(^{150}\) This is by no means implausible, since the early fifteenth-century Ottoman historian Yazıcıoğlu ṬAli, in his Turkish translation and continuation of Ibn Bibi’s work, says that other refugees were arriving from the Jochid sphere of influence around the same date. The founders of the Karası amirate, who
had allegedly accompanied Kaykāwūs II into exile (659/1261) and had been settled by the Byzantine emperor in the Dobrudja, had returned to Anatolia in or after the reign of 'Alā’ al-Dīn Kayqubād III b. Farāmurz. In support of Heywood’s proposal, one might further cite the arresting characterization, by an Anatolian author writing just before 1400, of the Ottoman Sultan (‘the son of ‘Osmān’) as ‘a simple Mongol (mughūlī- yi sāda)’. Used at that late juncture, and of a prince on the very north-western edge of Anatolia, the label could hardly allude to some (far from recent) political connection with the Ilkhanate. The current state of the evidence makes it improbable that any of these arguments can be taken further. But we are left with the fascinating possibility that the Mongols may have sponsored, in some limited sense, the creation of the most durable and successful land-based Islamic empire of the early modern era.

**The integration of Eurasia within a single disease zone: the Black Death**

It remains to consider another possible (if inadvertent) consequence of Mongol expansion for the history of the Islamic world (and indeed of Eurasia as a whole), less positive than the transfer of peoples, the spread of Islam itself or the dissemination of culinary tastes or languages: the movement of a virus. In the mid-fourteenth century the pandemic known to historians as the Black Death held sway from China to the Atlantic coasts of Europe, and its effects were thus felt over an area even vaster than the Mongol conquests. There is a broad consensus that the disease originated in the steppes and that it marked the emergence of what Samuel Adshead called ‘a single uniform disease structure’. There is less agreement that the political and economic conditions created by the spread of Mongol rule, and the growth of transcontinental contacts which it fostered, were indirectly responsible. Evidence indicates that bubonic plague was not spread by closer contacts between humans but essentially resulted from a growth in the wild rodent population, while recent biological research has revealed that relatively small shifts in temperature or precipitation can trigger dramatic increases in the reproductive cycle of fleas. There is much to be said for Thomas Allsen’s suggestion that the Mongols’ practice of dispersing or transferring large numbers of their subject peoples, sometimes across ecological frontiers, and often in harsh conditions, lowered their resistance to disease. But this may well be the extent of the conquerors’ responsibility for the Black Death. The tale peddled by the contemporary writer Gabriele de’ Mussis in his *Historia de morbo* – that it
was transmitted to Western Europe because the forces of the Golden Horde khan Janibeg, investing Genoese Kaffa in 1346, resorted to an early form of biological warfare by catapulting the corpses of their own dead into the city – is now widely discredited. But there is no reason to doubt that the disease was conveyed westwards from the Crimea by rodents stowing away on Italian ships.

Precisely where, and when, this pandemic originated is by no means clear. It does not appear to have reached China before 1331 or possibly even the 1340s. Gravestones in a Nestorian Christian cemetery unearthed near the village of Karadzhigach, ten kilometres south-east of Pishpek in present-day Kirgizstan, attest to an unusually high mortality rate in 1338 and 1339, and link ten (that is, 10 per cent of the total) of the deaths in those two years with some pestilence. Not long before, in c. 735/1334–5, Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and the Indo-Muslim sources report the outbreak in Tilang (Telingana) of a virulent epidemic (wabā’) among the troops of the Delhi Sultan Muḥammad b. Tughluq, then en route to suppress a revolt in Ma’bar in the far south. According to one author, writing in the Deccan only fifteen years later, half of the officers and a third of the soldiers perished, proportions that readily call to mind the mortality in Europe during the following decade. The Sultan was compelled to abandon his expedition and retreat into the Deccan, where he himself succumbed, though he had recovered by the time he was back in Delhi. In 744–5/1343–5 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, arriving in Madura, the capital of Ma’bar, witnessed another epidemic, which carried off the wife and son of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dāmghānī. Both visitations have been identified as cholera. So much for the outbreaks of disease that have been linked with the Black Death. The language of our sources, however, serves to obfuscate the matter. The term given for the disease on the Nestorian gravestones is a fairly general one, so that we cannot be certain it was plague. Similarly, the Arabic-Persian word wabā’ can embrace in addition typhus, smallpox or cholera, and our Muslim sources tend to use the more specific term ṭāʾūn (‘plague’) for the visitation of 1346–9. Yet it should be noted that this is not true of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who employs wabā’ alike for the pestilence in Tilang, for the later epidemic in Ma’bar and for the Black Death itself, which he witnessed in Syria and Palestine in 1349 as he made his way back to Morocco.

A handful of contemporary Muslim writers devoted treatises specifically to the pandemic, notably Zayn al-Dīn ‘Umar Ibn al-Wardī, who derived his information from Muslim merchants and who was himself among its victims in Aleppo in 749/1349. In his continuation of Abū l-Fidā’s
history, he says merely that the disease broke out in Özbeg’s dominions and then spread to the Crimea, Anatolia and Cyprus. But his treatise lists a broader range of territories. Here we read that the pestilence originated in the legendary ‘Land of Darkness’ (namely the fur-bearing regions of northern Eurasia, which for Ibn Baṭṭūṭa lay beyond Bulghār), where it had been raging for fifteen years, and then spread to China, India, Özbeg’s territories, Transoxiana, Iran and the Near East. Two authors writing in Andalusia, Ibn Khātima and Ibn al-Khaṭīb, were told that it had originated in Khiṭā, that is, northern China (although we should note that the former, whose ultimate sources were Christian merchants visiting Almeria, also specifies Ethiopia). Ibn al-Khaṭīb cites the testimony of trustworthy travellers to distant parts, of whom he names Ibn Baṭṭūṭa in particular, that the plague had begun in ‘al-Khiṭā and al-Ṣīn’ (northern and southern China) around the year 734/1333–4. The date is more or less in harmony with Ibn al-Wardī’s testimony, even if the geographical indications are not; but this information, oddly, is nowhere found in the extant version of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s travels. There is, in any case, no evidence to suggest that either China or India was a focus of plague prior to, respectively, the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.

In his recent studies of the Black Death, Professor Ole Benedictow argues that it originated in the lands of the Golden Horde, in an area known for the plague – namely, the territory extending from the north-west shores of the Caspian into southern Russia. Rightly sceptical concerning Ibn al-Wardī’s testimony and that of others who locate the origins of the plague in China, he cites what he terms the most informative of the Rus´ sources:

In that year [6854 = 1346] a punishment from God befell the peoples of the eastern regions, at the orda, and in Ornach, in Sarai, in Bezhdezh and in the neighbouring cities and districts, and there was a heavy mortality among the peoples, [namely] the Bessermens, the Tatars, the Armenians, the Abkhaz . . .

Benedictow takes this statement to indicate the Pontic-Caspian steppe and the territories south of the Caucasus, apart from the ‘Bessermens’, whom he describes as ‘a small population living in north-eastern Russia’ (and who therefore ‘do not fit into the pattern’). But his analysis is undermined by some errors of identification: ‘Ornach’ did not lie in the estuary of the Don (clearly he has taken the name to signify Tana, the modern Azov), but is in fact Ürğenç in Khwārazm; while in the Middle Ages the term ‘Bessermens’ – quite simply ‘Muslims’ – denoted specifically those living well to the east
of the Caspian and Aral Seas, in what is now southern Kazakhstan.\textsuperscript{175} The bigger flaw in Benedictow’s argument, however, is that the chronicler’s informants were speaking, in all likelihood, only of the direction from which they knew the pestilence had arrived most recently; they may have simply had no knowledge of its earlier presence and progress in more remote tracts. ‘Scythia’, where Byzantine authors locate its origins,\textsuperscript{176} denotes more than merely the Pontic-Caspian region; it is a blanket term for the entire steppe belt that stretched across the continent. We are still left with the possibility that the plague first reared its head elsewhere; and indeed the mention of Ürgenç perhaps points to its origins further east, in Chaghadayid Central Asia.

Given the poverty of source material for the Jochid and the Chaghadayid territories alike, further progress on this question is unlikely. One wonders, in any case, how far the idea that the Mongols were responsible for the genesis and spread of the Black Death drew its appeal from a readiness to credit the conquerors with yet another category of deaths on an industrial scale.
Despite the fact that the reduction of much of Muslim Central Asia by the infidel Qara-Khitai can be – and at one time was – viewed as a prelude to the Mongol conquests in the following century, the similarities are limited. The Qara-Khitai came from northern China, a region familiar in Muslim literature and possessed of a civilization that commanded admiration; they reduced only a small proportion of Muslim territory; and their yoke, at least for much of the period of their domination, was a comparatively light one. The Mongols, by contrast, emerged from tracts that were barely known; their exposure to what might be seen as civilizing influences was of very recent date; they conquered the majority of the eastern Islamic world; and their rule was undeniably both more intrusive and oppressive.

Extravagant hyperbole is the keynote of many contemporary accounts of Chinggis Khan’s campaigns, and the damaging effects of the Mongol invasions may indeed have been exaggerated both by medieval authors and by modern historians. In some measure, this sprang from the fact that the Mongols had access to a siege technology far superior to that of their predecessors on the steppe, enabling them to reduce a greater number of strongpoints within just a few years. Although Chinggis Khan’s advancing armies included sizeable contingents furnished by Muslim princes, and although many high-status Muslims joined him in the course of his great westward expedition of 1218–24, this does not seem to have mitigated the violence of the attack. The tactics the Mongols employed, moreover, were frequently ruthless. The countryside was sometimes ravaged extensively in order to encourage the submission of towns and cities. As has long been known, cities that resisted to the end, or held out for some time before surrender, met with a markedly worse fate than those that capitulated relatively
promptly. The Mongols seem, on the whole, to have observed the same laws of war as other powers had done, and we can discern a gradation of penalties exacted by the victors according to the nature and extent of the resistance. But even those urban centres that were spared a general massacre underwent the removal of any skilled elements, as well as the destruction of their fortifications, which would have left them vulnerable to brigands and the attentions of the dreaded Ismāʿīlī Assassins or of unruly elements displaced by the conquerors.

The second large-scale expedition sent out from Mongolia, by the Qaghan Möngke, doubtless owed little to an appeal from the people of Qazwīn; but such encouragement was forthcoming simply because an intensification of Mongol control promised the restoration of some semblance of order. It was not, like Chinggis Khan’s campaigns, an act of vengeance. Even so it was designed to bring to heel those powers in Iran, and the territories beyond, that still lay outside effective Mongol control. Hülegü’s operations had, on the whole, a far less destructive effect on the Iranian lands than those of his grandfather; but they nevertheless merit being ranked alongside the earlier invasion apropos of their impact on Iraq and Syria, where a number of cities were sacked and the populations subjected to massacre and selective deportation just as in Chinggis Khan’s time. If this occurred less frequently under Hülegü, the main reason was that so many cities chose to yield without a struggle.

For all that the Mongol empire had access to more impressive military resources than those available to any previous steppe power, it shared with its predecessors certain weaknesses. There were, firstly, no fixed rules for the succession, which led to a lengthy interregnum following the Qaghan Ögödei’s death (1241) and again after the death of his son and successor Güyük (1248). In 1251 the imperial dignity passed to the branch of Tolui, the youngest of Chinggis Khan’s sons, by virtue of an armed struggle that resulted in the execution of several members of the lines of Ögödei and his brother Chaghadai. Secondly, much of the conquered territory was granted out by way of appanages to members of the imperial dynasty. In addition, Chinggisid princes had their own representatives within the secretariats created under Ögödei to administer China, Central Asia and Iran respectively, and tried to extend their control over lands and revenues that were under the direct authority of the qaghan. There were frequent conflicts of interest between the qaghan and his kinsfolk, between the Mongol governors and local client princes, and between the military and an embryonic civil administration.

During the decades preceding Hülegü’s expedition, the Jochids based in the Pontic and Caspian steppes and headed first by Batu and then by his
brother Berke, had enjoyed a preponderant influence in the administration of Iran and Anatolia and the apportionment of the revenues of these regions, particularly following the discomfiture of the Ögödeyid and Chaghadayid lines in 1251–2. Despite the lack of clarity in our sources regarding Möngke’s precise purpose for the future of the conquests in south-west Asia, the balance of the evidence is that he intended Hülegü to act merely as his lieutenant and to return, in due course, to Mongolia; there are no substantial grounds for believing that the Jochids’ rights had been abolished or even curtailed. In the wake of Möngke’s death and the outbreak in 1260 of a succession dispute between his brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke in the Far East, Hülegü launched an assault on the Jochid contingents in his army and on Jochid interests in Iran, and thereby turned the territories south of the Oxus into a new ulus, on a more or less equal footing with the others. His actions dealt the coup de grâce to the unitary empire.

The coup d’état that brought Möngke to the imperial throne in 1251 and Hülegü’s creation of the Ilkhanate each alike administered a disruptive twist to the development of the united empire; and it is important to recognize that these events are handled in a highly tendentious manner by our chief sources. Juwaynî, writing in the wake of Möngke’s accession and for the new sovereign’s brother Hülegü, saw it as his task to justify the ascent to power of the Toluid branch of the dynasty. Rashīd al-Dīn, for his part, was firmly committed to the cause of Hülegü’s line, the Ilkhans, and to their Toluid cousins in the Far East, from whom his Ilkhanid patrons ultimately derived their authority. Other sources – notably those composed in the Mamlûk realm, which was allied with the Jochids – display a bias of their own; but they also furnish a healthy corrective.

As had been the pattern in the Qara-Khitai empire, many sedentary regions both in the Ilkhanid territories and in Central Asia remained under client princes who had accepted Mongol overlordship. The comparative freedom of high-status women in steppe society was reflected in one notable aspect of Mongol overlordship in Iran (the only region where we have adequate data): namely, the conferment of power on princesses of the Qutlughkhanid dynasty in Kirmān (a dynasty that was itself of Qara-Khitai origin) and their enjoyment of the prerogatives of sovereignty such as mention of their name in the khutba and on the coinage. In the Ilkhanate vassal rulers were to be found in Mesopotamia, in southern and eastern Iran, and possibly in the north as well. They were required, inter alia, to pay tribute, strike coins in the qaghan’s name (or later that of the regional khan), provide royal hostages, cooperate with a Mongol resident (basqaq; shihna) and place their military forces at the conquerors’ disposal. On the other
hand, Mongol overlordship conferred undoubted benefits in the form of patents of authority and in some cases territorial aggrandizement and additional funds; newly emergent dynasties, like the Kurtids of Herat, owed their position largely to Mongol favour. This perhaps explains why rebellions were few. Of those that did occur, moreover, fewer still appear to have been inspired by a spirit of holy war against the infidel. Mongol intervention in the client states was spasmodic, although it grew more frequent towards the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the Salghurid dynasty in Fārs and the Saljuqs of Rūm yielded place to more or less direct rule. On balance, however, the Ilkhans were more prone to resort to tax-farming, as they did in Fārs.

As to the administrative structure of the newly emergent Mongol realms, we know virtually nothing of the Jochid regime and not much more about that of the Chaghadayids; though the Turfan documents from the eastern reaches of Chaghadai's ulus indicate a reliance on local officials whose names might suggest Buddhist Uighurs. In contrast with the Yuan regime in China, where the indigenous Han population were excluded from the highest echelons of the administration, the Ilkhans governed their dominions through a Central Asian-Persian ('Tājīk') bureaucracy in conjunction with Turco-Mongol military officers. But the Tājiks were by no means all Muslims or exclusively made up of representatives of the traditional official cadres that had served the Saljuqs and Khwārazmshāhs, like the Juwaynīs. From 1288 to 1291 the wazir was a Jew, Sa’d al-Dawla; and the historian Rashīd al-Dīn, who served as joint wazir in the early fourteenth century, was a Jewish convert to Islam. Whereas Persian was dealt a fresh impetus as the language of administration in the Ilkhanate, the use of Mongolian persisted longer in the Chaghadayid state and Turkish had ousted Mongolian in the Jochid territories by the beginning of the fifteenth century.

If the Mongol military and Tājik bureaucrats in the Ilkhanate were able, on occasion, to cooperate to good effect, it would be a mistake to see this as symptomatic of their growing consolidation into a single ruling class. Mongol grandees appear to have reacted sharply to signs of presumption on the part of Tājik officials, and in any case relations were frequently vitiated by calumny and jealousy and by the existence of factions. Many a Tājik wazir was brought low by (probably) false accusations or by the downfall of a Mongol commander with whom he was too closely connected. Yet higher military officers were equally likely to suffer demotion and execution as the result of association with a vulnerable bureaucrat. The fact that civilian and military affairs were not clearly differentiated added to the instability. It is a characteristic of the late thirteenth-century Ilkhanid regime that a powerful...
CONCLUSION

military figure, holding the rank of viceroy (nā‘īb) to the Ilkhan, might be entrusted also with the dignity of wazir; and conversely, at intervals from the early 1290s we find Tājīk wazirs in turn wielding unprecedented authority. Amid all this, despite recent efforts to rehabilitate the Ilkhans, there are grounds for adhering to the long-held view that the majority were more intent on pleasure and left government to others, whether Mongol or Tājīk.

By obeying Chinggis Khan’s injunction to treat all faiths even-handedly, the conquerors have gained the reputation for a religious toleration equated, at times, with indifference. Just how anachronistic (not to say simplistic) this is, in fact, emerges from their attempts to impose certain of their own ancestral norms as law and to outlaw Islamic practices that were contrary to steppe custom. The evidence is admittedly patchy and comes from the first half-century or so of Mongol rule. Yet whereas the Mongols briefly required the population of China to practise levirate marriage, for instance, nothing indicates that they made the same demand on the Muslims of south-west Asia en masse. But some among the client Muslim princes were apparently required to observe the custom. An effective prohibition of the Muslim slaughter-ritual or of Muslim ablutions is virtually inconceivable on logistical grounds; it may have been confined to the vicinity of the qaghan’s headquarters or of princely encampments. Insofar as ordinary Muslims were impeded in the practice of their faith, this occurred primarily in the territories held by Chinggis Khan’s second son Chaghadai or, more briefly, in Qubilai’s China.

In general, the vivid anecdotes in our sources that illustrate the perils of infringing such laws are perhaps best seen in the broader context of Muslim insecurity under infidel rule. Chinggis Khan’s enactment regarding the equality of the various faiths sanctioned the practice of Buddhism in the conquered Muslim territories, put an end to the inferior status of the ‘People of the Book’ (Christians and Jews), who were now relieved of the obligation to pay the poll-tax (jizya), and gave rise to competition and increased tension between Sunni Muslims and other confessional groups. In the Ilkhanate Islamic pious foundations (awqāf) were for a time placed under the authority of the Shi‘i Naṣîr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, and their revenues were partly siphoned off to help fund his observatory at Marāgha and in part made available, for charitable purposes, to Christians and Jews.

The fragmentation of the empire hastened the development of its constituent parts along divergent lines. In the Iranian lands, which from c. 1260 were governed by their own branch of the Chinggisid dynasty, Hülegü and his immediate successors (with the exception of Tegüder Aḥmad) showed no inclination to succumb to Islamic cultural influences; but they were nevertheless dependent on a largely Muslim official class. Certain members
of that class espoused the project of assimilating their new monarchs – the first to rule over the entire country as a distinct geopolitical entity since the fall of the Sasanians and the Arab conquest in 651 – to the ancient Iranian kings, a project to which some Ilkhans may have been willing to subscribe. Ilkhanid Iran thereby entered upon a trajectory that marked it out as separate not merely from the unitary empire but from the longer-established political units over which the Jochids and Chaghadayids presided.

Identifying the Ilkhans with the pre-Muslim Iranian kings was just one means of rendering infidel rule more acceptable by pointing to a continuity with the distant past. Another means was to attempt, as Juwaynī did, to see the conquerors as monotheists not far removed from the true faith and thus ripe for conversion. It is indeed possible that this was among the tactics employed in winning the Mongols over to Islam. We have little insight into proselytism among the rank and file; we know only that it was already under way as early as the 1240s. Here the wide dispersal of Mongol (and infidel Turkish) troops was undoubtedly instrumental, displacing large numbers, settling them in an unfamiliar milieu and bringing them into close proximity with Muslim populations and Muslim scholars and sufis; there are slight indications that Mongols living in or near urban centres were particularly susceptible.

Historians long accepted the image purveyed by our principal sources, whereby the initiative in the Islamizing process came from Mongol rulers and the rank and file followed in their wake. But it is now clear that those khans who accepted Islam were more often responding to the presence of a significant Muslim convert element within the ranks of the military. They may have been influenced also by motives other than securing the support of their military commanders: the desire, for instance, to reach out to a Muslim constituency within a territory on which they had designs, or to cement their acceptability in the eyes of the existing Muslim elites, or even to enhance the commercial attractiveness of their dominions. It should be borne in mind once again, moreover, that the sundering of the empire after 1260, and the emergence of successor-states in three regions of Western Asia that were culturally distinct, gave rise to different imperatives. The Ilkhans, presiding over a predominantly Muslim society and separated by a vast distance from the lands of their Toluid allies in the Far East, must have experienced a more pressing need to bolster their legitimacy by recourse to the dominant religious idiom. The Jochids and the Chaghadayids, who took longer to adopt Islam, ruled over territories that were more heterogeneous, containing a smaller proportion of Muslims. In the Jochid realm, that Muslim element, notably in Khwārazm, was culturally and
CONCLUSION

415
economically the most advanced and considerably more so than the
Christian Rus’. The Chaghadayid lands for the most part overlapped with
the territory of the former Qara-Khitai empire, and here, as in the era of the
Qara-Khitai, a strongly Muslim society in Transoxiana and neighbouring
regions was more or less counterbalanced by the rival Buddhist culture of
Uighūristān, which might help to explain the comparatively late date at
which Islam took root, especially in the eastern half of the ulus.

None of this is to imply that the acceptance of Islam by Chinggisid khans
was in some way hollow or specious, as the Mongols’ Mamlūk antagonists
believed – or affected to believe. We lack the information, in any event, that
would enable us to ascertain the royal convert’s state of mind. Muslim
authors writing under Mongol rule are less interested in some internal
transformation than in external, observable signals, notably the jettisoning
of the distinctive Mongol hairstyle or a change in apparel. Islamization was
a protracted process: over the first few generations, at least, it did not neces-
sarily entail the discarding of traditional steppe norms, as is clear from the
khans’ continued attachment, for instance, to the practice of levirate
marriage. It seems also that an excessively precipitate departure from
Chinggis Khan’s even-handed religious policy could result in rebellion and
the overthrow of the convert Muslim ruler. In the Ilkhanate, matters moved
at a gentler pace than they did in Chaghdaï’s ulus in c. 1309 or the early
1330s. Although Christians and Jews initially suffered persecution following
the conversion of Ghazan, and some discrimination subsequently at the
hands of Öljeitü, it was not until the reign of Abū Sa’īd that the ‘People of
the Book’ were once again subjected to the jizya. As far as we can tell, the
khans of the Golden Horde too were prepared to progress slowly in the
work of Islamization.

The Mongols’ efforts to rehabilitate the conquered territories had begun
within a relatively short interval – in regions such as Transoxiana after 1221
and the Transcaucausus after c. 1239 – and such measures may well have
been implemented even more speedily in the wake of Hülegü’s expedition,
particularly in Baghdad. What underlay this is no more likely to have been
some humanitarian impulse than a dawning recognition that economic
recovery would benefit the conquerors. The decades after 1260, however,
witnessed fresh damage to the Muslim lands, whether from the repeated
conflicts between rival khanates or in the course of military struggles within
an individual polity or as the result of fresh migrations of nomads from one
region to another. Eastern and southern Iran, Khwārazm, Transoxiana and
the cities of the Tarim basin appear to have suffered in particular. Moreover,
although the rulers of the successor-states – even those whose territories
comprised mainly steppelands and whom historiography has tended to see as champions of nomadic interests – attempted to foster economic recovery, their efforts, as we might have expected, given the nomads’ traditional concern for commerce, appear to have focused more on the promotion of towns and trade than on the needs of agriculture.

This brings us to the broader effects of incorporation within the Mongol world-empire. In view of the incidence of warfare between the successor-states after 1260, which can be seen at times to have affected trade and travel for other purposes, the time-honoured notion of a Pax Mongolica has to be abandoned. Yet the conclusion is inescapable that contemporaneously with the Mongol hegemony a vast part of Eurasia became increasingly interconnected. The period witnessed a marked growth in trade between the Islamic world, on the one hand, and China and other regions of the Far East, on the other, both by land and more especially by sea. The Mongols’ own contribution to this process (which may have already been under way a century or two earlier, in the era of the Saljuqs and the Kitan-Liao) was primarily the simplification of commercial taxes, the advance of capital to favoured merchants by members of the dynasty and others among the elite, a rise in demand for certain commodities, particularly luxury goods such as gold brocade, furs and slaves, and – in all likelihood – the dehersaurization of considerable quantities of silver following the overthrow of the Song empire in the late 1270s.

The era of Mongol domination also stimulated intellectual and cultural activity in the Islamic world. The transplantation of groups of newly conquered subjects (usually enslaved craftsmen in the Muslim case) across Asia in both directions, followed in time by regular diplomatic ties between the Ilkhans and their Yuan cousins, brought the eastern Islamic lands into closer contact than ever before with China, and facilitated the transmission of scientific and medical ideas and the reproduction of instruments and other artefacts. Through the medium of servitors such as Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and the wazir, historian and polymath Rashīd al-Dīn, Ilkhanid rule brought together Chinese and Muslim scholars, who collaborated in activities such as the composition of a multi-epoch calendar and the translation of Chinese scientific writings into Persian. If closer scrutiny reveals that Chinese knowledge and techniques were not invariably taken on board by Ilkhanid Muslim scholars, and that the impact of Mongol rule in the cultural sphere may therefore, in some respects, have been less far-reaching than is commonly supposed, there is no doubt that the Chinggisid era witnessed a remarkable expansion in Muslim intellectual horizons, which accelerated in the wake of the conversion. Even were Chinese influence to be left out of the equation, the collaborative work carried out by Muslim scholars at the
Marāgha observatory, both under Ṭūsī’s aegis and after his death, was rich in consequences for later Muslim astronomers and for their sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European counterparts from Copernicus onwards. Not the least conspicuous result of contact between Western Asia and the Far East, moreover, was the importation into the Ilkhanate of new techniques and themes in the visual and plastic arts, the impact of which was certainly long-lasting. The part played in all this by the Ilkhans themselves, some of whom sought to surround themselves with intellectual luminaries, is debatable but not, it appears, negligible.

Taking a still longer-range view, the impress of Mongol governance was still visible centuries after the deaths of Chinggis Khan’s grandsons. Muslim political culture, on which the Mongols drew, returned the compliment by absorbing the idea that Chinggisid descent was an important qualification for sovereignty, with the result that major dynasties of Chinggisid origin were still ruling in the western steppe and in Central Asia as late as the eighteenth century. Mongol imperial policy towards the subject peoples also left its mark on the ethnographic map of Eurasia. One major consequence was the introduction of fresh Turkic groups into Western Asia and the growing Turkicization of the region. Another was the removal of communities of enslaved artisans and their families from Iran and Central Asia to the Far East, where they established a Muslim presence, as in Yunnan and Gansu, that endures to the present day. Older tribes such as the Kitan, the Kereyit and the Naiman disappeared as identifiable political actors, and were replaced in time by new ethnicities which frequently took their name from an individual leader and which often emerged from military groupings reconfigured under Mongol rule or, to a lesser extent, from the westward migrations of Turkic elements, with or without the direct instrumentality of the Mongol regimes. The pandemic of the 1340s known as the Black Death has been attributed to Mongol expansion, and certainly the long-distance transfer of population groups, with all its potentially debilitating effects, may have increased vulnerability to disease. But in the absence of hard evidence, it seems safest to conclude that the result of their military operations least intended by the conquerors was the migration of large numbers of Muslims into independent Muslim territories such as the Mamlūk empire and the Delhi Sultanate, which served to toughen their resistance to Mongol attacks and decisively checked the extension of Mongol rule.

* * *

The undeniably positive results of Mongol rule in the eastern Islamic lands remained too long unsung. They are in scarcely less doubt than the damage
visited on hitherto flourishing urban centres by Mongol campaigns or the forced removal of thousands of Muslims from their homes to serve the conquerors in some far-distant region of the empire. To attempt to weigh the transformation of the Islamic world wrought by the Mongols against the destruction, upheaval and misery for which they were responsible, however, is to court the charge of sophistry. Unless we are to adopt some kind of utilitarian tariff, by which a process of conquest involving extensive violence is justified by the enhanced prosperity of those who survive it (and we cannot take such prosperity invariably for granted), or the lives of ordinary cultivators and townsfolk are worth less than those of artists and scholars (not a judgement to which even a professional academic might care to rush), no amount of commercial or cultural efflorescence could be deemed to offset the cost of the Mongol invasions in terms of thousands of lives lost.

And yet overall our image of the Mongol campaigns and Mongol rule has broadened irreversibly, with the effect not so much of prompting a revised view of the destructive nature of the conquests (though that has indeed been overestimated) as of bringing into sharper focus the protean humanity of the conquerors. Confronting us, alongside leaders single-mindedly bent on securing submission to Tenggeri's decree, are Mongol khans and generals who stop short of slaughtering a Muslim populace; Mongol officers who extend their protection to Muslim pious foundations; and Mongol grandees who befriend and work harmoniously with Persian officials and sometimes, like them, fall victim to their royal master's anger and suspicion. The founder of the Ilkhanate spares the garrison of a recalcitrant citadel (p. 168) and an aged Muslim prince (p. 130), and exhibits compassion on a youthful one (p. 244). This does not mean that Mongol rulers made a habit of treading softly, respecting the sensitivities of their subjects, or governing energetically and equitably – any more than did many of their contemporaries elsewhere in Eurasia. The first Ilkhan, frequently judged to have been an able and estimable ruler, is also ready at times to break his word to those who have been granted quarter (p. 169), and inflicts appalling punishment on a rebel prince who had been especially favoured and – worse – on his infant son as well (p. 265). The next one, extolled for his justice in the sources, can sadistically bait a vulnerable Muslim chief minister (p. 277); and a number of Hülegü's successors too seldom betray a taste for the responsibilities of rulership (p. 286). But we have come a long way from 'hated alien conquerors', 'cold and deliberate genocide' and 'blind unreasoning fear and hatred of urban civilisation'.
ALTAN ORUGH (Mo.-Tu.) the ‘golden family’, i.e. the imperial dynasty
AMIR AL-UMARĀ (Ar.-Pers.) chief amir [see also below, BEGLERBEGI]
‘AWĀRĪDĀT (Ar.-Pers.) irregular taxes
BAKHSHI (Tu.-Mo.) Buddhist monk
BASQAQ (Tu.) intendant, governor [see also below, DARUGHACHI]
BA'URCHI (Mo.) cook, steward
BEGLERBEGI (Tu.) chief amir
BICHECHI (Mo.) scribe, secretary [see also below, BITIKCHI]
BILIG (Mo.) utterance, pronouncement
BITIKCHI (Tu.) scribe, secretary
DARUGHACHI (Mo.) governor
DHIMMI (Ar.-Pers.) one among the ‘People of the Book’ (i.e. a Jew or a Christian) living in Muslim territories
ELCHI (Tu.) envoy; courier
FAQIR (Ar.-Pers.) ascetic
IL / ILLI / EL (Tu.) peace; submission
INCHĪ (Tu.) personal property
IQĀṬ (Ar.-Pers.) revenue assignment; land-grant
JASAGH (Mo.) order, regulation, (normative) law [see also below, YASA]
JIZYA (Ar.-Pers.) the head-tax paid to the Islamic state by its dhimmi subjects
KESHĪ (Mo.), guard corps
KHARAJ (Ar.-Pers.) the Islamic land-tax
KHATUN (Tu.) queen, princess
KHUṬBA (Ar.-Pers.) sermon, preached in the Friday prayer, in which the sovereign is named
KÜKELTASH (Tu.-Mo.) foster-brother
KÜREGEN (Tu.-Mo.) [royal] son-in-law
MÖCHELGE (Mo.) written pledge
NAʿĪB (Ar.-Pers.) viceroy; deputy, lieutenant; representative
NÖKÖR (Mo.) comrade; associate, partner
NOYAN (Mo.) military commander
OGHUL (Mo.) prince of the blood
ORDO (Mo.; Tu. ORDA) encampment, headquarters
ORTAQ (Tu.) partner (used of a merchant in partnership with a Mongol khan, prince or princess)
PAIZA (Mo.; Ch. PAIZE) tablet of authority
QAGHAN (Tu.) emperor; khan of khans; ‘Great Khan’
qol / qul (Mo.) centre (of an army; in the context of property or rights, those of the qaghan)
qubchur (Mo.) a head-tax originally paid by the nomads; subsequently imposed on the
Mongols’ sedentary subjects
quriltai (Mo.) assembly
sāhib-diwân (Ar.-Pers.) finance minister
shihna (Ar.-Pers.) representative; governor
tamgha (Tu.-Mo.) a tax on commercial transactions; seal
tamma (Mo.) troops detached to garrison newly conquered territory
tenggeri (Tu.-Mo.) sky; ‘Heaven’
tūmen (Mo.) ten thousand (used both of a military unit and of a monetary sum, Pers. tūmān)
tūyin (Tu.-Mo.) Buddhist priest
‘ulamā (sing. ‘ālim) (Ar.-Pers.) scholars, the learned class
ulus (Mo.) the complex of peoples and grazing-grounds held by a Mongol khan or prince
waqf (pl. awqāf) (Ar.-Pers.) religious foundation for charitable purposes
wazir (Ar.-Pers.) chief minister/adviser
yaghi (Tu.) rebel, rebellion
yam (Tu.; Mo. dzam) courier relay network
yarghu (Mo.) court of inquiry
yarligh (Tu.) command, edict
yasa / yasaq (Tu.) regulation, (normative) law; order [in the sense of ‘system’]
yosun (Mo.) custom
yurt (Mo.) encampment; pasturelands
zakāt (Ar.-Pers.) obligatory payment required of Muslims for the benefit of the poor
APPENDIX 2
Genealogical Tables and Lists of Rulers
Table 1: The Qaghans

Temüjin
CHINGGIS KHAN  
(d. 1227)

Lochay  
(d. c. 1225)

Chaghadai  
(d. 1244/5)

ÖGÖDEI  
(1229–41)

m. Töregene

Tobui  
(d. 1232/3)

m. Sorqulani

Orda  
Batu  
Berke

GÜÜG  
(1236–48)  
m. Oghul Qaimish

Kodın  
Köchü  
Qashi  
Qarachar  
Qadan  
Melik

Sartaq

Qochi  
Naqu  
Hoqu

Shiremtin  
Qaidu  
(d. 1303)  
Totoq

CHAPAR  
Orus  
Sarban

MÖNGKE  
(1251–59)

QUBILAI  
(1260–94)

Hülegü  
(d. 1265)

ARIGH BÖKE  
(1266–64)

Jimgim  
Nomohan  
Manggala

(IIkhan:  
Table 4)

Kammala  
Dharmabala  
Temür  
(1294–1307)

Ananda  
(d. 1307)

Yesün Temür  
(1323–28)

Qaishan  
(1307–11)

Buyantu  
(1311–20)
Table 2: The Jochids

JOCHI
(d. c. 1225)

Orda

Batu
(c. 1225–55/6)

Sartaqtai
Qongquran
Quli

Sartaq
(1255/6–57/8)

Toqoqan

Balagha
Tutar

Qon'ichi

Tartu

Mengütemür
(1267–80)

Tode Mengü
(1285–87)

Tama Toqa

NOGHAF
(d. 1299)

Buyan

Tölé Buqa
(1287–90)

TOQTO' A
(1291–1312)

Toghrilcha

CHEKEP
(d. 1300/1)

Teke Buri (Turfi)

Özbeg
(1312–41)

JANIBEG
(1342–57)

Berdibeği
(1357–59)

TOQTAMISH
(d. 1407)

Sasi Buqa
(d. 1320/1)

Irazan
(d. 1344/5)

6 generations to
Table 3a: The khans of Chaghadai’s ulus
(dates are often approximate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAGHADAI</th>
<th>CHINGGIS KHAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(d. 1244/5)</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mochi Yebe</td>
<td>Mō'etügen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yesü Möngke</td>
<td>Sarban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qara Hülegü</td>
<td>Baidar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negübei</td>
<td>Qadaqai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alughu</td>
<td>Baiju</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ögödei</td>
<td>Qidan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melik</td>
<td>Turchan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eser Temüü</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abd-Allah**

**ABISHQA**

**MUBĀRAK SHĀH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHUĐÉI</th>
<th>QABAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**BUQA TEMÜR**

**NALIQÖ'A**

**Buqu**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Örüz Temüü</th>
<th>'Ali</th>
<th>Dhu l-Qarnayn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yasa'ur</td>
<td>Biliqchi</td>
<td>Buyan Quli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sulayman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KHĀLIL**

**QAŻÁN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gunashirin</th>
<th>Engke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QANUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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5 These princes may have been descended from Baiju, Chaghadai’s seventh son.
6 Buqa Temüü and his brothers may have been sons of Chaghadai’s son Qadaqai.
7 Only in the western half of the ulus.
Table 3b: The khans of Chaghadai’s ulus (continued)

Yestin To’a
  ||
  || BARAQ
  || (1266–71)
  ||
  || DU’A
  || (1282/3–1307)

Qutlug Qocha (d. 1299)
  ||
  || KÖNCHÉK (1307–08)
  ||
  || ESEN BUQA (1309–20)
  ||
  || KöPEK (1320–26)
  ||
  || It-qiL
  ||
  || ELIGIDEI (1326–30)
  ||
  || DÖRE TEMÜR (1330–31)
  ||
  || Sorghatı
  ||
  || Ebitgen
  ||
  || Emil Qoqa
  ||
  || TARMASHIRIN (1331–34)

Da’ud Qoqa
  ||
  || Bolod

Dörji
  ||
  || BUZUN (1334–35)
  ||
  || BUYAN QULU (1348–58)

CHANGSHI (1335–37)
  ||
  || YESUN TEMÜR (1337–39/40)
  ||
  || TUGHLUQ TEMÜR (1347–63)

MUHAMMAD (1340–41)
  ||
  || KĀBUL SHÀH (1365/6–67/8)
  ||
  || ‘ADIL SULTAN (1364–65)

TEMÜR SHÀH (1358–60)
  ||
  || ILYAS QOCHA (1363–69)
  ||
  || KHIĐR QOCHA (–1399)

(khans of Mughalıstân down to the late 17th century)

\(^{7}\) Only in the western half of the ulus.

\(^{8}\) Only in Mughalıstân for most of his reign, but occupied the western half of the ulus briefly in 1360 and 1361.

\(^{9}\) Only in Mughalıstân, having earlier ruled in Transoxiana on his father’s behalf.

\(^{10}\) Of dubious ancestry, and only in Mughalıstân.
Table 4: The Ilkhanids

HULEGÜ
(d. 1265)

Jumughur
ABAGHA
(1265–82)
Yoshmut
Tubshin
TEGÜDER
(SULTAN AHMAD)
(1282–84)
Mengü Temür
Taraghai
Ejei
Hulechtu
Yesuder
Qongquatai

Jushkeb
Kingshtu

ARGHUN
(1284–91)
GAIKHATU
(1291–95)
Soge
Qara Noghai

GHAZAN
(1295–1304)
OLJEITU
(MUHAMMAD KHUDÂBANDA)
(1304–16)

ABU SA'ID
(1316–35)
SATI BEG
(1338–39)
The Salghurid Atabegs of Fārs

Abū Bakr (Qutlugh Khan) b. Sa’d I 623/1226
Sa’d II b. Abī Bakr 659/1261
Muḥammad b. Sa’d II 659/1261
(under regency of his mother Terken Khatun)
Muḥammad Shāh b. Salghūr Shāh b. Sa’d I 661/1263
Saljuq Shāh b. Salghūr Shāh 661/1263
Ābīsh bint Sa’d II 662/1264
(jointly with her husband Mengü Temür from
672/1273–74 until his death in 680/1281; deposed
in 684/1285)

The Saljuqid Sultans of Rūm

Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw II 634/1237
‘Īzz al-Dīn Kaykāwūs II b. Kaykhusraw 643/1245
Rukn al-Dīn Qālīch Arslan IV b. Kaykhusraw 644/1246
‘Īzz al-Dīn Kaykāwūs II b. Kaykhusraw
(in exile from 659/1261)
Rukn al-Dīn Qālīch Arslan IV b. Kaykhusraw
(sole ruler from 659/1261)
‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kayqubād II b. Kaykhusraw
(d. 655/1257)
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw III b. Qālīch Arslan 663/1265
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Mas‘ūd II b. Kaykāwūs 682/1283
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Mas‘ūd II (restored) 702/1302–03

The Qutlughkhanid Sultans of Kirmān

Baraq Ḥājib (Qutlugh Khan) 619/1222
Rukn al-Dīn Khwājahuq b. Baraq 632/1235
Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Tayangu 649/1251
Mużaffar al-Dīn Ḥaḍjāq b. Muḥammad
(in exile from 674/1275)
Qutlugh Terken (previously regent for Ḥaḍjāq) 674/1275
Jalāl al-Dīn Soyurghatmish b. Muḥammad 681/1282
Pādis̱hāh Khatun bint Muḥammad 690/1291
Kūrtūdūchīn 694/1295
Mużaffar al-Dīn Muḥammad Shāh b. Ḥaḍjāq 695/1296
Quṭb al-Dīn Shāh Jahān b. Soyurghatmish
(deposed in 704/1305)

The Artuqid princes of Mārdīn

al-Sa’id Najm al-Dīn Ilghāzī 637/1239
al-Mużaffar Qara Arslan b. Ilghāzī 659/1261
al-Sa’id Shams al-Dīn Dā’ūd b. Qara Arslan 691/1292
al-Manṣūr Najm al-Dīn Ghāzī II b. Qara Arslan
(raised to the rank of sultan by
the Ilkhan Ghazan)

Table 5: The Client States

[Dates are those of accession. Only the states mentioned frequently in chapter 9 are represented here:
for the others, the reader is referred to Clifford Edmund Bosworth,
NOTES

Introduction


2. See, e.g., the eloquent plea of Christopher I. Beckwith, Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present (Princeton, NJ, 2009), introduction, xxiv–xxix, for a revision of these traditional views; and in far greater depth, his epilogue, 'The Barbarians', ibid., 320–55.


5. See Peter K. Marsh and Myagmar Saruul-Erdene, 'I conquer like a barbarian! Genghis Khan in the Western popular imagination', in William W. Fitzhugh, Morris Rossabi and William Honeychurch (eds), Genghis Khan and the Mongol Empire (Santa Barbara, CA, 2009), 278–81.


8. Bernard Lewis, 'The Mongols, the Turks and the Muslim polity', in his Islam in History: Ideas, Men and Events in the Middle East (London, 1973), 179–98 (here 179); in the new
edn, *Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East* (Chicago and La Salle, IL, 1993), 189–207 (here 189); see also the references quoted in ibid. (1973), 324, n. 1/(1993), 443, n. 1.


15. See the survey of two volumes of conference proceedings by Anja Pistor-Hatam, 'History and its meaning in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The case of the Mongol invasion(s) and rule,' in Ali M. Ansari (ed.), *Perceptions of Iran: History, Myths and Nationalism from Medieval Persia to the Islamic Republic* (London and New York, 2014), 147–62.

16. This is very much the view (specifically in the Russian context) of Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Bloomington, IN, 1985), 85.


30. Linda Komaroff and Stefan Carboni (eds), *The Legacy of Genghis Khan: Courtly Art and Culture in Western Asia, 1256–1353* (New Haven, CT, and London, 2002); also Komaroff’s introduction to *Beyond the Legacy*, 1–2, for the coincidence of date.

31. The title of ch. 3 in his *Central Asia in World History: ‘The Mongolian Explosion and the Basic Information Circuit, 1200–1300’*, for an exegesis of the phrase, see ibid., 70–7.

32. Timothy May, *The Mongol Conquests in World History* (London, 2012), part 2; for the term, see May’s introduction, 22.

33. Morgan, ‘Mongol empire in world history’, 426; also his ‘Mongol historiography since 1985: The rise of cultural history,’ in Amitai and Biran (eds), *Nomads as Agents*, 271–82 (here 275–9).


40. My definition thus differs from that of Beatrice Forbes Manz (ed.), Central Asia in Historical Perspective (Boulder, CO, and Oxford, 1994), for whom the term equates to just the five former Soviet republics; of Robert McChesney, Central Asia: Foundations of Change (Princeton, NJ, 1996), who uses it to embrace those five republics and northern Afghanistan, but excludes Xinjiang; and of Peter B. Golden, Central Asia in World History (Oxford, 2011), 1–2, who includes not only Xinjiang but Mongolia and Manchuria.

41. Thus approximating to the boundaries specified by Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge, 2000), ix–x, and by the editors in CHIA, 1. Denis Sinor’s definition in his introduction to CHEIA, 3, is more fluid, varying with the extent of territories (even some with a predominantly agrarian economic base) ruled by representatives of an Inner Asian cultural zone, and thereby including, for instance, most of Anatolia from the late eleventh century. My ‘Inner Asia’ is equivalent (confusingly) to ‘Central Asia’ as defined by Christoph Baumer, The History of Central Asia, I. The Age of the Steppe Warriors (London and New York, 2012), 10.

Chapter 1 Medieval Authors on the Mongols


3. JT, I, 227 (trans. in CC, 83, slightly modified). For the Altan Debter, cf. also ibid., I, 186 (CC, 70); other references at I, 235 (CC, 85). These must be the scattered records referred to at I, 35 (CC, 13).


11. IA, XII, 318 (tr. Richards, III, 172–3).
12. Ibid., 359–60 (tr. Richards, III, 202–3); and cf. also 375 (tr. Richards, III, 215), where it is pointed out that Mongol forces have traversed the territory from the borders of China as far as Armenia in less than a year. Cf. Yaqūt al-Ḥamawi, Mu‘jam al-buldān, ed. Ferdinand Wüstenfeld, Jacut's Geographisches Wörterbuch (Leipzig, 1866–73), I, 254–5.
15. Ibid., 360–1, 376 (tr. Richards, III, 204, 215).
16. Ibid., 440 (tr. Richards, III, 261); at 362 (tr. Richards, III, 205), there is merely an obscure hint to this effect.
17. IA, XII, 372–3 (tr. Richards, III, 213).
18. Ibid., 361 (tr. Richards, III, 204).
21. IA, XII, 331 (tr. Richards, III, 182).
25. Ibid., text, 177 (tr. Houdas, 253; omitted in the Persian redaction), where this view is put into the mouth of Sharaf al-Mulk. See further Itani, ‘Jalāl al-Dīn Khwārazmshāh’ , 159.
29. Ibid., II, 90–1 (tr. Raverty, 879–87).
30. Ibid., II, 90 (tr. Raverty, 874–9); cf. also I, 441, and II, 48 (tr. Raverty, 599, 800).
31. Ibid., I, 404 (tr. Raverty, 487); and II, 92–4, 98 (omitted in Raverty’s trans.); Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 113.
34. See S. M. Stern, ‘Ab al-Latīf al-Baghdādī’, EF, I, 74; Josef von Somogyi, ‘Ein arabischer Bericht über die Tataren im „Tārīḥ al-Islām“ von aṭ-Ḍahabi\textsuperscript{1}', Der Islam 24 (1937), 105–30, although the claim there that Ibn al-Labbād journeyed as far as Mongolia is based on Von Somogyi’s misreadings of what are in fact Anatolian place names (e.g. Divrīgī).
35. See, e.g., Hasan Maḥmūd Kātīb, Dīwān-i qā’imiyyāt, ed. Sayyid Jalāl Ḥusaynī Badakhshānī (Tehran, 1390 sh./2011), 212 (qaṣīda no. 78, v. 2286–7), 329 (qaṣīda no. 125, v. 3759). In tackling this source, I have been greatly helped by an unpublished paper
(containing translated extracts) given by Dr Miklós Sárközy in Jerusalem in June 2014. On the author and his other works, see Badakhshānī's English introduction, 10–12; and for the Qiyāma, M. G. S. Hodgson, 'The Ismāʿīlī state', in CHI, V, 422–82 (here 458–66).


39. Ibn Abīl-Damm, al-Shamārīkh fī l-tawārīkh, Bodleian ms. Marsh 60, fos 171bff. On the 'eirenic' approach of this author, see the comments of Donald S. Richards, 'The crusade of Frederick II and the Ḥamāh succession', BEO 45 (1993), 183–200 (esp. 184, 185–6).

40. See Konrad Hirschler, Medieval Arabic Historiography: Authors as Actors (London and New York, 2006), 2009–11.

41. I have used the recent edition of this work together with that of Sibt's continuator al-Yūnīnī (see p. 37) but have inserted references also to the Hyderabad edn: for some criticisms of the latter, see Claude Cahen, 'Editing Arabic chronicles: A few suggestions', in his Les peuples musulmans dans l'histoire médiévale (Damascus, 1977), 11–36 (here 12–14). On the author, see Cahen, Ibn al-Dżawzī, Shams al-Dīn Abu'l-Muẓaffar Yūsuf b. Kızoghlu, EF, III, 752–3.

42. See Gamal el-Dīn el-Shayyal, 'Ibn Wāṣil', EI, III, 967; Hirschler, Medieval Arabic Historiography, 12–13; and Mohammed Rahim's introduction to his edition of IW, VI, xii–xvi. It should be noted that Rahim's edition ends in 659/1261, at a point corresponding to 315 of Tadmurī's text; the latter edition goes down to 661/1263. For the Ayyubids, see A. M. Eddé, 'Ayyubids', EI 4 (2007), no. 2, 191–204.

43. IW, IV, 296, 323–4; the section on the invasion of Syria in 1260 is in VI, 265–97/193–217 passim. MZ, VIII, part 2, 670–1 (= MZDMZ, XV, 59).

44. On the author, see HWC, introduction; also Charles Melville, 'Jahângošā-ye Jovayni, Tārik-e', EIr, XIV, 379–82, and George Lane, 'Jovayni, 'Alā'-al-Dīn 'Aṭā-Malek', EIr, XV, 63–8. His birth date (10 Rabī'I 623) is given in HJ, 423/460; but IF, II, 316 (no. 1537), has 622.

45. TJG, I, 134 (HVC, 170).

46. Ibid., I, 2–3 (HVC, 4–5).

47. Ibid., I, 5 (HVC, 8).

48. Ibid., II, 228 (HVC, 492).


50. TJG, II, 261 (HVC, 525), and I, 75 (HVC, 96), respectively.

51. JT, II, 1099 (with Muḥarram in error; but see CC, 350 and n. 3).

52. TJG, III, 95–6 (HVC, 610–11). Cf. the corresponding point in JT, II, 976–7 (CC, 340), where Hülegü's commission from the Qaghan is explicit: along with instructions to suppress the Kurds and Lurs, the Caliph is to be made to submit or be destroyed. George Lane, 'A Tale of Two Cities: The liberation of Baghdad and Hangzhou and the rise of the Toluids', CAJ 56 (2012–13), 103–32 (here 113), believes that Juwaynī was 'simply too busy with his duties as governor of Baghdad' and that his silence was due to 'the political sensitivities of his new job rather than any squeamishness'; see also Lane, 'Whose secret intent?', in Morris Rossabi (ed.), Eurasian Influences on Yuan China (Singapore, 2013), 1–40 (here 10–11).

53. TJG, I, 50 (where this sentiment is put into the mouths of the people of Kāshghar), 55 (HVC, 67, 73).
NOTES to pp. 23–6

54. Ibid., I, 9–10 (HWC, 13–14); and see I, 159 (HWC, 201), for the link with Ögödei’s reign.
56. TJG, I, 157–9 (HWC, 199–201).
57. Ibid., I, 190 (HWC, 178), and see I, 141–2, for the link with Ögödei’s reign.
58. TJG, I, 2 (HWC, 4, slightly modified).
59. Ibid., III, 61 (HWC, 589).
60. Ibid., III, 102, jihād (HWC, 615), and 106, ghazā (HWC, 619), for the link with Ögödei’s reign.
61. Ibid., III, 102, jihād (HWC, 615), and 106, ghazā (HWC, 619), renders this merely as ‘war’). For Juwaynî’s view of the Assassins’ overthrow, see generally Morgan, ‘Persian historians’, 117–18, and Lane, ‘Whose secret intent?’, 2–3.
62. TJG, III, 140 (my translation; cf. HWC, 639–40); on the Saljuqs’ efforts, see 137 (HWC, 637).
64. TJG, III, 138–9 (HWC, 638).
65. Ibid., III, 105 (HWC, 617).
66. Aubin, Émirs mongols, 23.
67. For a useful summary of the contents of both pieces, see the English introduction to TJG, I, xxxvii–xlvi.
70. Melville, ‘From Adam to Abaqa: Qâḍî Bâidâwî’s rearrangement of history (Part II)’, StIr 36 (2007), 7–64; the text of the second recension is given ibid., 52–7 (trans., 58–64). The printed editions, including the most recent, by Mir Hâshim Muḥammad (1382 sh./2003), are all based on the standard version.
73. On the ms., see Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, ‘The Qūṭ al-Dīn al-Shirāzī (d. 710/1311) Codex (Ms Mar‘ashī 12868) [Studies on Qūṭ al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, II]’, StIr 36 (2007), 279–301 (here 283–99; 287 for the Akhbâr). The date heading each section is not found in the manuscript and is inserted by Afshâr, the editor.
75. BL ms. IO Islamic 316 (Ethé, Catalogue, no. 115), fo. 90b, has been checked against IO Islamic 3292 (Ethé, no. 112), fos 305b–306a. The passage is in AM, 22–3 (fo. 24a in the facsimile): see below, p. 138.
76. Others (active under the Jalayirid or Muzaffarid dynasties, for example), who furnish information that only indirectly throws light on the earlier period, will be introduced within the chapter where they are first cited.
77. Amnon Netzer, ‘Rashid al-Dīn and his Jewish background’, in Shaul Shaked and Amnon Netzer (eds), Irano-Judaica, III: Studies Relating to Jewish Contacts with Persian Culture


90. Waṣṣāf, 6, ll. 8–9, for the date in the preface, and 25, l. 16, for 698 (GW, I, text, 9, 50, trans., 9, 49, respectively); ibid., 405, ll. 10–12 (GW, IV, 30), for 702; 425, l. 7 (GW, IV, 82), for the date 706.

92. See especially Vaṣṣāf, 147–8 (GW, II, 3–5), and the lengthy section that then follows on the history of Fārs.

93. Ibid., 26, l. 13 (GW, I, text, 52, trans., 50); cf. also 41, ll. 8–9 (GW, I, text, 78, trans., 80).


96. Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1165, 1473; tr. Leonard J. Ward, ‘The Zafar-Nāmah of Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī and the Il-Khān Dynasty of Iran’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Manchester, 1983, II, 4, and III, 672. On this work, see Ward’s introduction, I, 30–37a. For the background of ‘Yula Temūr (whom Ward calls ‘Bolad Timur’), see TG, 814; he is briefly mentioned ibid., 595, as stationed at Qazwīn when he was killed by the Ilkhan Tegūder Ahmad, and figures several times in the pages of Waṣṣāf.


99. See the distinction drawn by Julie Scott Meisami, Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century (Edinburgh, 1999), 9–10.


101. IF, I, 387, ḡawādīth al-ṭārīkh; II, 315 (where the commission by Juwaynī is mentioned), kitab al-ṭārīkh wa l-ḥawādīth; IV, 263, qad dhakartuhu fi l-ṭārīkh; and V, 489, dhakarnāhū fi siyāq al-ṭārīkh. Reuven Amitai, ‘The conversion of Tegūder Ilkhan to Islam’, JSAI 25 (2001), 15–43 (here 21, n. 27), draws attention to a passage in al-Dhahabi’s TI suggesting that the two works were by IF. It is possible, however, that al-Dhahabi is citing IF’s biographical dictionary, Majma’ al-ṭādāb, rather than HF.


106. These two Kirmān histories are examined most fully in Karin Quade-Reutter, „…denn sie haben einen unvollkommenen Verstand” – Herrschaffliche Damen im Grossraum Iran in der Mongolen- und Timuridenzeit (ca. 1250–1507) (Aachen, 2003), 60–74.

108. IF, III, 395, and IV, 177–8, 179–80 (nos 2832, 3614, 3616). For another instance of such duplication, see I, 310–11, 316–17 (nos 438, 449).


111. On this, see Philip Remler, 'New light on economic history from Ilkhanid accounting manuals', *StIr* 14 (1985), 157–77 (here 161–2).


113. A. H. Morton, 'The letters of Rashīd al-Dīn: Īlkhānid fact or Timurid fiction?', in Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David Morgan (eds), *The Mongol Empire and its Legacy* (Leiden, Boston, MA, and Cologne, 1999), 155–99. See also Birgitt Hoffmann, 'In pursuit of memoria and salvation: Rashīd al-Dīn and his Rab’s-i Rashīdī', in Pfeiffer (ed.), *Politics*, 171–85 (here 174–5). For a spirited, but for me unconvincing, attempt to rehabilitate these documents, see Abolala Soudavar, 'In defense of Rašid-od-din and his letters', *StIr* 32 (2003), 77–120.


117. See the trans. in S. K. Ibragimov et al. (eds), *Materialy po istorii kazakhskikh khanstv XV–XVIII vekov (izvlecheniya iz persidskikh i tiurkskikh sochinenii)* (Alma-Ata, 1969), 33–43.

118. Essays on a number of these works are to be found in M. Kh. Abuseitova and Iu.G. Baranova (eds), *Pis’mennye istochniki po istorii i kul’ture Kazakhstana i Tsentral’noi Azii v XIII–XVIII vv. (biobibliograficheskie obzory)* (Almaty, 2001).


121. See the introduction to the edition and translation in *IKPI*, I, esp. 7–8, 14–24; more briefly, P. Jackson, 'Djamāl al-Ḳarshī', *EF*, XII (Supplement), 240; and T. I. Sultanov, 'Medieval historiography in manuscripts from East Turkestan', *Manuscripta Orientalia* 2, part 1 (March 1996), 25–30 (here 26).

122. For these authors, see John E. Woods, 'The rise of Timurid historiography', *JNES* 46 (1987), no. 2, 81–108; and on Yazdi’s various historical works, Ilker Evrim Binbaş, 'The
histories of Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī: A formal analysis, AOASH 65 (2012), 391–417. The muqaddima is found only in the facsimile edition of Yazdī’s ZN by Urunbaev and in the more recent edition (unfortunately inaccessible to me) by Sa’īd Mīr Muḥammad Ṣādiq and ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Nawā’ī (Tehran, 1387 sh./2008).


128. TR, I (text), 106, 109–10, II (trans.), 85–6, 89. I have used Thackston’s two-volume edition of 1996 throughout, since his translation reissued in 2012 (as Classical Writings of the Medieval Islamic World: Persian Histories of the Mongol Dynasties, I) is not accompanied by an edition of the Persian text.


132. An abridged version, Durar al-tījān, ed. in Gunhild Graf, Die Epitome der Universalchronik Ibn ad- Dawādārīs im Verhältnis zur Langfassung (Heidelberg, 1990), contains nothing of interest for our purposes.

133. Two major lacunae in the text affect the years 666–668/1268–1270 and 682–687/1283–early 1289.

134. An abridged version, Iznāq al-mu’ādhdhīn, ed. in Gunhild Graf, Die Epitome der Universalchronik Ibn ad- Dawādārīs im Verhältnis zur Langfassung, I U 129 (Berlin, 1990), contains nothing of interest for our purposes.

135. Two major lacunae in the text affect the years 666–668/1268–1270 and 682–687/1283–early 1289.


138. al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-ʿarab, XXVII, ed. Saʿīd al-Fathūʾ Āshūr et al. (Cairo, 1405/1985), 300–419. For his contacts with the Mongols, see Reuven Amitai, ’Did Chinggis Khan have a Jewish teacher? An examination of an early fourteenth-century Arabic text,’ JAOS 124 (2004), 691–705 (here 691–2); more generally, his ‘Al-Nuwayrī as a historian of the Mongols,’ in Kennedy (ed.), Historiography, 23–36.
140. WW, XI, 197–9 (Chinggis Khan), XIII, 348 (Khuṭṭū Shāh), XVI, 469 (Ṭuqṭā’ī < Tqto’ā), XXIV, 185 (Qubilai), and XXVII, 399–401 (Hūlegū). AA, II, 666–7 (Khuṭṭū Shāh), 854 (Ṭuqṭā’ī). According to JT, II, 1278 (Dzhīṭ, III, 320; CC, 446), Qutlugh Shāh was a Muslim; though since al-Ṣafādī evidently thought he was an infidel (as did his source, al-Dḥahabī: TJ, LIII, 61), the point about this author’s wide-ranging coverage still stands. See generally Donald P. Little, ‘Al-Ṣafādī as a biographer of his contemporaries’, in Little (ed.), Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to Niyyazi Berkes (Leiden, 1976), 190–210.
141. There are surveys of the two works in Peter Hardy, Historians of Medieval India: Studies in Indo-Muslim Historical Writing (London, 1960), chs 2 and 6. The scattered comments in Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, chs 3 and 8, tend to stress their problematic nature. On Barani, see now also Blain H. Auer, Symbols of Authority in Medieval Islam: History, Religion and Muslim Legitimacy in the Delhi Sultanate (London and New York, 2012), 20–1, and index s.v. ‘Ẓiyā’ al-Dīn Barānī’.
149. JT, II, 1007 (CC, 350). There is a summary of this counsel (in which Ṭūsī figures merely as an anonymous ‘alim’) in Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqa, 190 (tr. Whitting, 135–6).
151. Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqa, 21, ll. 1–6 (tr. Whitting, 14).
153. BH, 431, 444, respectively.
154. E.g. ibid., 433, 449, 458.
155. Ibid., 354. Cf. TJG, I, 60 (HWC, 78).


Chapter 2 The Islamic World and Inner Asian Peoples down to the Mongol Invasion


7. WR, 92/in *SF*, 212 (tr. MFW, 131).


9. See Johan Elverskog, *Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road* (Philadelphia, PA, 2010), ch. 2, for Muslim views of Buddhism during these early centuries.


13. al-Marwazi, Ar. text, 18, trans., 29.

14. BH, 205; and see Golden, *Introduction*, 274.


30. JQ, Ar. text, clxxxi–ccx (Russian tr., 133–56), passim.

31. TR, I (text), 300, II (tr.), 225–6.

32. TJG, I, 44 (HWC, 59–60); and see Josef Markwart, ‘Guwaini’s Bericht über die Bekehrung der Uiguren’, Sitzungsberichte der preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1912), 486–502. For the material in al-Tha’ālibi’s Ta’rikh ghurar al-siyar, see C. Edmund Bosworth, ‘Tha’ālibi’s information on the Turks’, in Rudolf Veselý and Eduard Gombár (eds), Zafar Nāme: Memorial Volume of Felix Tauer (Prague, 1996), 61–6 (text, 63, tr., 64).


34. WR, 180, 182, 204/in SF, 261–2, 272 (MFW, 193, 205).

35. al-Marwazī, Ar. text, 18–19, trans., 30.


History of the Seljuq State (London and New York, 2011), 65; and TN, cited at p. 57 and n. 68. This generic usage of the term ‘Turk’ was not confined to Muslim observers: Golden, Introduction, 115–16.


41. For the comments of these three authors, see C. T. Harley Walker, ‘Jāḥiẓ of Basra to al-Fath ibn Khāqān on the “Exploits of the Turks and the army of the Khalifate in general”’, JRAS (1915), 631–97; Bosworth, ‘Tha’alibi’s information’, text, 63 (trans., 64); and Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Shajarat (or Bahṛ) al-ansāb, partial ed. and tr. E. Denison Ross, Ta’rīkh [sic]-i Fakhru’d-dīn Mubārakshāh (London, 1927), 37.


45. See Emeri Van Donzel and Andrea Schmidt, Gog and Magog in Early Eastern Christian and Islamic Sources: Sallam’s Quest for Alexander’s Wall (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2010), Part 2.

46. TQ, II, 93 (omitted from Raverty’s translation on the grounds that the world had not yet ended).


48. TQ, II, 98 (tr. Raverty, 935).


50. TJG, I, 11 (HWC, 16).


52. Barthold, Zwölf Vorlesungen, 121 (= Sochinenia, V, 103–4). Golden, Introduction, 274, n. 245. On their ethnicity, see S. Murayama, ‘Sind die Naiman Türken oder Mongolen?’, CAJ 4 (1959), 188–98. They had at one time been called by the Turkic name Sekiz Oghuz (‘the Eight Oghuz’). The reference by JQ, Ar. text, cxlvii, clxii (Russian trans., 105, 118) interestingly, to the Naiman khan Gūchūlūg as ‘al-Saghīzī’ (presumably using a velar plosive in error for a post-palatal plosive) suggests that Muslim writers still knew them under some such designation.


56. JT, I, 441–2 (CC, 151). For other evidence, see Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, 143–5.

57. Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, 'The Liao', in CHC, VI, ch. 1. See also Herbert Franke, 'The forest peoples of Manchuria: Kitans and Jurchens', in CHEIA, 400–10; Denis Sinor, 'The Kitan and the Kara Khitai', in HCCA, IV, part 1, 227–42.


61. Michal Biran, 'The Mongols and nomadic identity: The case of the Kitans in China', in Amitai and Biran (eds), Nomads as Agents, 152–81 (here n. 6 at 173, citing a paper by D. Kane).

62. Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, ch. 1. For a sketch of the history of this state, see Baumer, History of Central Asia, III, 144–9.


64. On these events, see Turkestan, 326–37 (= Sochineniia, I, 389–400); C. E. Bosworth, 'The political and dynastic history of the Iranian world (A.D. 1000–1217)', in CHI, V, 144–57 passim, 173–5, 185–7.

65. For the duel between the two dynasties, see ibid., 159–66; C. E. Bosworth, 'The Ghurids in Khurasan', in A. C. S. Peacock and D. G. Tor (eds), Medieval Central Asia and the Persianate World: Iranian Tradition and Islamic Civilisation (London and New York, 2015), 210–21.


67. TN, II, 102 (tr. Raverty, 963).

68. Ibid., II, 94 (tr. Raverty, 900).

69. Michal Biran, 'True to their ways: Why the Qara Khitai did not convert to Islam', in Amitai and Biran (eds), Mongols, Turks, and Others, 175–99; Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, 196–201.

70. IA, XI, 84, 310 (tr. Richards, I, 361, and II, 153). This testimony, from the son of the ra’is ‘Umar killed by the Qara-Khitai (below), perplexed Bartol’ d: see Turkestan, 334, n. 3 (= Sochineniia, I, 398, n. 1).

71. Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, 117–23; and see also Biran, 'Between China and Islam: The administration of the Qara Khitai (Western Liao), 1124–1218', in David Sneath (ed.), Imperial Statecraft: Political Forms and Techniques of Governance in Inner Asia, Sixth–Twentieth Centuries (Bellingham, WA, 2006), 63–83.


74. IA, XI, 86 (tr. Richards, I, 363); see also al-Ḥusaynī, Akhbār al-dawla al-saljūqiyya, tr. Bosworth, 66. On this dynasty, see Omeljan Pritsak, ‘Al-i Burhān’, Der Islam 30 (1952),
75. IA, XII, 257 (tr. Richards, III, 125). Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, 124.
76. TN, II, 96 (tr. Raverty, 911–12).
77. IA, XI, 83–4 (tr. Richards, I, 361); on this, see Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, 175.
78. Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, 171–91.
79. Ibid., 56; and for the Gūr-khan’s difficulties in the east, see 57.
80. IA, XII, 231 (tr. Richards, III, 105–6).
81. See Turkestan’, 363 (= Sochineniia, I, 428), for references.
83. TJG, I, 52 (HWC, 70).
84. Ibid., II, 89 (HWC, 357). TN, I, 302 (tr. Raverty, 244), omitting the simile of the Wall.
85. TJG, II, 79–80, 183 (HWC, 347, 452); MZ, VIII, part 2, 671 (= MZDMZ, XV, 59); and cf. IW, IV, 296. On all this, see Michal Biran, “Like a mighty wall”: The armies of the Qara Khitai, JSIA 25 (2001), 44–91; and for Dhu l-Qarnayn’s Wall in the Qur’ān, Van Donzel and Schmidt, Gog and Magog, 50–4. Pace Elverskog, Buddhism and Islam, 128–9, the evidence that Muslims saw the Qara-Khitai as a protective wall postdates the collapse of their empire.
86. IA, IX, 520, cited in Golden, Introduction, 213; see also Golden’s comment in ‘Karakhanids and early Islam’, 354.
100. Ibid., II, 109 (HWC, 378).


118. For *ulus*, see TMEN, I, 175–8 (no. 54).


132. SH, §§ 196–8 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 122–6); the chronology is a few years awry. TJG, I, 46–7 (HWC, 63).

133. TN, I, 309; cf. Raverty trans., 267, which adopts the reading YTWR (‘Yughūr’), to be corrected to qahr from BL ms. Add. 26189, fo. 129b. Jūzjānī here places Muḥammad’s victory over the Merkit immediately before the ‘calamity of the infidels of Chiṅ (ḥāditha-yi kuṣfarr-i Chiṅ’); i.e. the Mongol invasion.

134. TJG, I, 51–2 (HWC, 69). For the dating, see Buell, ‘Early Mongol expansion’, 12–16.

135. TN, I, 309 (tr. Raverty, 267–8).


140. JT, I, 107 (DzhT, I, part 1, 242–3; CC, 42).


145. IA, XII, 361 (tr. Richards, III, 204); and see also p. 52 above.


Chapter 3 The Mongol Westward Advance (1219–53)


2. JT, I, 296, 587 (CC, 103, 204).


NOTES to pp. 71–4

6. The principal sources are: SH, § 254 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 181); IA, XII, 361–4 (tr. Richards, III, 204–6); Nasawi, 41–3 (tr. Houdas, 57–61; Pers. redaction, 50–2); TJG, I, 58–63 (HWC, 77–82), and cf. also II, 99–100 (HWC, 367–8); TN, II, 103–4 (tr. Raverty, 966–8); Ibn Nazif al-Hamawi, fo. 137a–b. It is worth noting that Yelü Chucai also makes the Utrakr incident the sole reason for the Western campaign: Xi you lu, tr. De Rachewiltz, 21. See the treatment of this episode in Turkestan, 397–9 (= Sochineniia, I, 464–6); in Boyle, 'Dynastic and political history of the Il-khans', in CHI, V (1968), 303–421 (here 304–5); in Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, 122–3; and in Biran, Chinggis Khan, 54–5.


8. For what follows, see Petrushevskii, 'Pokhod', 110–14, 118. Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, 121, disagrees.

9. For an example of the former, see WR, 168/in SF, 255 (MFW, 186).

10. TJG, I, 59–60 (HWC, 77–9); on the numbers, see above, p. 68 and n. 143 at p. 448.


14. SH, § 254 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 181; but cf. n. 4 ibid., and commentary at 924). Allsen, ‘Mongolian princes’, 92, points out that Chinggis Khan and his kinsfolk had also suffered the loss of their own investment.


16. JQ, Ar. text, cxii (Russian trans., 118); also in Turkestan, I, 135–6.


18. IA, XII, 440 (tr. Richards, III, 361). For rumours about Frederick II, see Gustav Strakosch-Grassmann, Der Einfall der Mongolen in Mitteleuropa in den Jahren 1241 und 1242 (Innsbruck, 1893), 115–16; Jackson, Mongols and the West, 68.


20. Ibid., XII, 362 (tr. Richards, III, 205); though he is much more outspoken at XII, 440 (tr. Richards, III, 261). Richards, ‘Ibn al-Athīr and the later parts of the Kāmil’, 97. See also IW, IV, 170–1, and MZ, VIII, part 2, 634 (= MZDMZ, XV, 27).


23. al-Nāṣir’s correspondence, see TJG, II, 120 (HWC, 390–1). Jalâl al-Dîn’s claim, MZ, VIII, part 2, 634 (= MZDMZ, XV, 27). See generally Turkestan, 374, 399–400 (= Sochineniia, I, 439, 467), where rumours about contact with Chinggis Khan are dismissed. Those who do not rule out the possibility are Petrushevskii, ‘Pokhod’, 117–18; Mason, Two Statesmen, 111; and Angelika Hartmann, An-Nâṣir li-Dīn Allâh (1180–1225). Politik,
Religion, Kultur in der späten 'Abbāsidenzeit (Berlin and New York, 1975), 83–4, and 'al-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh, EF, VII, 996–1003 (here 997–8). Spuler, Mongolen⁴, 18, believes that the reports were true.


25. Turkestan³, 400 (= Sochineniia, I, 467). Cf. also Spuler, Mongolen⁴, 20; Morgan, Mongols⁵, 60, and Medieval Persia, 58; Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, 121; and Baumer, History of Central Asia, III, 134.


28. TIG, I, 114 (trans. in HWC, 145, modified); a less specific reference to a document in the Uighur script at I, 136 (HWC, 173).

29. SH, § 263 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 194); the mention in this passage of Mas'ūd and of Maḥmūd's own appointment to North China is anachronistic (see De Rachewiltz's comments at 964).


37. SH, § 237, tr. De Rachewiltz, 163. TJG, I, 33, 50 (HWC, 46, 67–8), making it clear that this was a separate campaign from the attack on the Khwārazmshāh’s dominions; for the location, see the long notes in HWC, 67–8, n. 18, and in SH, tr. De Rachewiltz, 844–5.

38. TJG, I, 113 (I have amended the trans. in HWC, 143, which unaccountably renders this phrase as ‘villages and countryside’); see also II, 126 (HWC, 396–7), and for the astrologers, II, 105 (HWC, 375).


40. TJG, II, 109 (HWC, 378). Cf. also Ibn Naẓīf, fo. 139b.

41. IA, XII, 368 (tr. Richards, III, 209–10); see also ibid., XII, 375 (tr. Richards, III, 214), regarding the mamlik Aqush.


44. The weakness of the Khwārazmshāh’s situation is well outlined in Turkestan, 404–6 (= Sochineniiia, I, 472–4), and in Morgan, Medieval Persia, 51–2; see also Petrushevskii, ‘Pokhod’, 109. For opposition to the proclamation of the anti-caliph, see IF, II, 355 (no. 1621).

45. TJG, I, 64, 70–1 (HWC, 83, 91–2).

46. Only in Nasawi, 45 (tr. Houdas, 63; Pers. redaction, 54). Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, 130, is sceptical.

47. TJG, I, 91–2 (HWC, 117). For the date, see the discussion in Turkestan, 409 (= Sochineniiia, I, 476), where 1 Dhū l-Ḥijja 616 [7 Feb. 1220], supplied by TN, II, 106 (tr. Raverty, 976–7), is preferred to Muḥarram 617 [March] in TJG, I, 79 (HWC, 102).


50. Nasawi, 46 (tr. Houdas, 64; Pers. redaction, 55).

51. TJG, II, 199 (HWC, 466), and cf. II, 106 (HWC, 375). But Nasawi, 46–8 (tr. Houdas, 65–8; Pers. redaction, 56–9), provides a much more detailed account.

52. For this and what follows, see TJG, I, 97 (HWC, 123–4); IA, XII, 394–5 (tr. Richards, III, 227–8).

53. TN, II, 108 (tr. Raverty, 981–9): he sets the Mongol force at 60,000.

54. TJG, I, 113, 117 (HWC, 143, 151).

55. What follows is taken from TJG, I, 113–16 (HWC, 144–9), unless otherwise specified. For Sarakhs (not mentioned in their itinerary), see ibid., I, 121, 123–4 (HWC, 155, 158).

56. Ibid., II, 199–200 (HWC, 465–8).

57. IA, XII, 374 (tr. Richards, III, 214). The brief history of the Khwārazmshāhs in Tabrizi, Safina-yi Tabriz, 439, dates Muḥammad’s death on the eve of Friday 1 Sha’bān 617/1 October: the author’s source is unknown.


59. TJG, I, 118 (HWC, 151–2).


61. For his activities in India, see Peter Jackson, ‘Jalāl al-Dīn, the Mongols and the Khwarazmian conquest of the Panjāb and Sind’, Iran 28 (1990), 45–54.


63. In the commentary to his trans. of SH: III, 131.

65. *SH*, § 274 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 205; and see his note at 1002–3). For *tamma*, see *TMEN*, I, 255–7 (no. 130); Paul D. Buell, 'Kalmyk Tanggaci people: Thoughts on the mechanics and impact of Mongol expansion,' *MS* 6 (1979), 41–59 (here 45–7); and Qu Dafeng, 'A new study concerning an explanation of the word “Tamaci” and the Tamaci army,' *CAJ* 47 (2003), 242–9. Donald Ostrowski, 'The tamma and the dual-administrative structure of the Mongol empire,' *BSOAS* 61 (1998), 262–77 (here 262–8), argues that tamma originally designated the commander of such a force; but see now Timothy May, Mongol conquest strategy in the Middle East', in De Nicola and Melville (eds), *Mongols' Middle East*, 13–37 (here 17).


68. Ta'rīkh-i Sistān, 395; TJG, II, 219, 268 (HWC, 483, 532).


70. IA, XII, 496 (tr. Richards, III, 303).


74. *TN*, II, 158–9 (tr. Raverty, 1118–19); for Fārs, see also Waṣṣāf, 156, ll. 17–19 (GW, II, 22). These client princes are further discussed in chapter 9.

75. TJG, I, 205, 212, and III, 74 (HWC, 250, 257, 597).


78. Waṣṣāf, 30, ll. 17–19 (GW, I, text, 60, trans., 57–8). For a report of a victory by al-Mustanṣir's forces, see *JT*, I, 814 (CC, 281).


81. Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, ed. Djebli, Ar. text, 59 (trans., 64), says that the Sultan of Aleppo bought them off. For other references, see Peter Jackson, 'The crusades of 1239–41 and their aftermath,' *BSOAS* 50 (1987), 32–60 (here 57); repr. in G. R. Hawting (ed.), *Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders* (London and New York, 2005), 217–47 (here 244).
82. SSQ, 112 (text excerpted from VB, xxxii, 50). Simon’s ‘Angutha’ has usually been identified with Eljigidei (above); but Arghun Aqa appears a far more likely candidate. For Aleppo, see also PC, 274, but adopting the variant Alepie in preference to the Damasci of the text (MM, 32).
97. *SH*, § 202 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 133–4), where Chinggis Khan appoints 95 commanders of ‘thousands’; figure repeated at § 231 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 160). See the remarks of May, *Mongol Art of War*, 28 and n. 4 at 161. But it should be noted that the figures given in the 1241 census for registered conscripts (105,471) and for the number genuinely resident and available for service (97,575) clearly relate to Chinese troops in the Mongol armies: *YS*, ch. 98, in Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, 75.


102. IA, XII, 367 (tr. Richards, III, 209).


104. The disadvantages are discussed by Smith, 'From pasture to manger', 64–6.


111. See, e.g., *TJG*, I, 21–4 (HWC, 29–32); PC, 245, 267–8, 269 (MM, 15, 27, 28).

112. Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan*, 84, 94.


116. On the classic description in *TJG*, I, 19–21 (HWC, 27–9), where Juwaynī draws the close analogy with warfare. See also WR, 34, 36/in *SF*, 181 (MFW, 85). On the *nerge* (or *jerge*), see *TJG*, I, 291–3 (no. 161).


120. PC, 378 (MM, 49); see also 367 (MM, 37), for siege tactics. Admittedly, the conquerors did encounter difficulties with mountain fortresses in the Far East: Huang Kuanchung, 'Mountain fortress defence: The experience of the Southern Song and Korea in resisting the Mongol invasions', in Hans Van de Ven (ed.), *Warfare in Chinese History* (Leiden, Boston, MA, and Cologne, 2000), 222–51.


125. HJ, 99/128. MZ, VIII, part 2, 699 (= MZDMZ, XV, 86), describes the Mongol army as ‘horse and foot’.
126. Zhao Hong, Meng Da beilu, tr. in Olbricht and Pinks, 53; Hsiao, Military Establishment, 133, n. 79; Allsen, ‘Circulation of military technology’, 268.
127. HJ, 99/128. MZ, VIII, part 2, 699 (MZ, XV, 86) describes the Mongol army as ‘horse and foot’.
129. This is dealt with extensively in SCC, V, part 7. See also Wang Ling, ‘On the invention and use of gunpowder and firearms in China’, Isis 37 (1947), 160–78 (here 165–73); L. Carrington Goodrich and Fêng Chia-shêng, ‘The early development of firearms in China’, Isis 36 (1946), 114–23 (here 114–18). Most recently, Stephen G. Haw, ‘The Mongol Empire – the first “gunpowder empire”?’, JRAS, 3rd series, 23 (2013), 441–69 (here 443–4, 446–8, 453), has shown that the development of these weapons in China, whether of an incendiary or an explosive type, had begun considerably earlier than was previously believed.
130. For the Chinese officer, see YS, ch. 151, and for incendiary devices, ibid., ch. 149, and TJG: all cited in Allsen, ‘Circulation of military technology’, 277–8, 279; Haw, ‘Mongol Empire’, 458–60 (Haw seems to have been unaware of Allsen’s article). But for a sceptical view, cf. May, Mongol Conquests, 145–9. For the application of the term naf to weaponry based on gunpowder, see David Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Medieval Society (London, 1956), ch. 2.
131. The implication in May, Mongol Art of War, 117. The western Qipchaq groups in contact with Rus’, on the other hand, had begun to use siege weaponry: Golden, ‘War and warfare’, 152 (repr. in Golden, Studies, 112–13).
135. Much the same point has been made apropos of the deeply fragmented Rus’: see Janet Martin, Medieval Russia 980–1584, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 2007), 155.
136. JQ, Ar. text, cxlii-cxliv (Russian trans., 118)/in Turkestan, I, 135–6. TJG, I, 48, 57, 63 (HWC, 65, 76, 82). For the variant accounts, see Turkestan, 401 (= Sochineniia, I, 468).
137. TN, II, 112, 119 (tr. Raverty, 1004, 1023); TJG, I, 63 (HWC, 82).
138. Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, 103. Sighnaq-tegin would marry a Chinggisid princess in Ögödei’s reign.
139. Nasawi, 53 (tr. Houdas, 75; Pers. redaction, 64).
140. TJG, II, 197–8 (HWC, 464–5).
141. Ibid., I, 95 (HWC, 121–2).
142. Nasawī, 57 (tr. Houdas, 79; Pers. redaction, 68).
144. IA, XII, 454 (tr. Richards, III, 272); hence Nasawī, 146 (tr. Houdas, 204; abridged in the Pers. redaction, 152).
145. IA, XII, 495, 496 (tr. Richards, III, 283).
146. IA, XII, 470 (tr. Richards, III, 283).
147. IA, XII, 470 (tr. Richards, III, 283).
150. MN, VIII, part 2, 733 (= MZDMZ, XV, 116).
153. On their careers, see Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, 137–8; Th. T. Allsen, ‘Mahmūd Yalavāch (?–1254), Mas’ud Beg (?–1289), ‘Alī Beg (?–1280), Safaliq Bujir (fl. 1206–1260)’, in Igor de Rachewiltz et al. (eds), In the Service of the Khan: Eminent Personalities of the Early Mongol-Yüan Period (1200–1300) (Wiesbaden, 1993), 122–5 (here 122–9).
156. IA, XII, 375 (tr. Richards, III, 213).
158. IA, XII, 375 (tr. Richards, III, 213–15).
162. On this term, see generally Golden, ‘I will give the people unto thee’, 24–5.
164. Described by PC, 232–3 (MM, 7); by WR, 38/in SF, 182 (MFW, 88); and by Zhao Hong, Meng Da beilu, tr. in Olbricht and Pinks, 69.
165. TJG, I, 95 (HWC, 121). The version given in JT, I, 503 (CC, 175), differs slightly, saying that only the Qangli were killed. The significance of the episode is highlighted by Ayalon, ‘Great Yāsā…. (C2)’, 151–2.
Chapter 4 Apportioning and Governing an Empire (c. 1221–c. 1260)


2. Uighurs: see Brose, 'Uighurs and technologies of literacy,' and 'Uyghur technologists,' 410–23; also his *Subjects and Masters: Uyghurs in the Mongol Empire* (Bellingham, WA, 2007), 89–112. Kitan: De Rachewiltz, 'Personnel and personalities,' 96–8, list at 105, and passim.


4. In this sense – of drawing on both steppe and sedentary traditions of government and of employing personnel from within each sphere – the system was a 'dual' one, as outlined by Denise Aigle, 'Iran under Mongol domination: The effectiveness and failings of a dual administrative system,' in Bethany Walker and Jean-François Salles (eds), *Le pouvoir à l’âge des sultanats dans le Bilād al-Shām* (Damascus, 2008), 65–78 (here 67–8, 72–4). See also Ostrowski, 'The tamma'.

5. Allsen, 'Yüan dynasty and the Uighurs,' 263 and n. 141 at 278; Morgan, *Mongols* 2, 88.


7. On the various stages, see Hosung Shim, 'The postal roads of the Great Khans in Central Asia under the Mongol-Yuan empire,' *JSYS* 44 (2014), 405–69 (esp. 408–27). See also David Morgan, 'Reflections on Mongol communications in the Ilkhanate,' in Hillenbrand (ed.), *Sultan’s Turret*, 375–85 (here 379); Morgan, *Mongols* 2, 94; Adam J. Silverstein, *Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World* (Cambridge, 2007), 141–51; and Thomas T. Allsen, 'Imperial posts, west, east and north: A review article,' *AEMA* 17 (2010), 237–75 (here 240–3). Such details as we have on its establishment are in *SH*, § 279 (tr. De


15. For a similar uncertainty vis-à-vis the Qarakhanid ‘system’, see Boris D. Kotchnev, ‘La chronologie et la généalogie des Karakhanides du point de vue de la numismatique’, in Fourniau (ed.), *Études Karakhanides*, 49–75 (here 51). On what we know of the Saljuqid system, see Peacock, *Great Seljuk Empire*, 131–2.

16. PC, 264 (MM, 25). Cf. above, p. 100 regarding the attempted coup in 1246 of Chinggis Khan’s brother; also Waṣṣāf, 501, ll. 15–17 (*GW*, IV, 275), on Ananda’s bid for the imperial throne in China (1307).

17. 1227, as given by Paul Pelliot, *Notes sur l’histoire de la Horde d’Or* (Paris, 1949), 28, by Michal Biran, *Joči*, *EIr*, XV, 1, and by István Vásáry, ‘The Jochid realm: The western steppe and eastern Europe’, in *CHIA*, 67, is supported by the statement in *TN*, II, 176 (tr. Raverty, 1172), that Jochi’s son Batu (known to have died in c. 654/1256) reigned for ‘28 years more or less’. I have adopted 1225, which is given by *JQ*, Ar. text, clxiv (reading TWBNY in error for TWŠY; Russian trans., 119: for the Turkish form Tushi, see above, n. 36 at p. 450), and supported at one point by *JT*, I, 536–7 (*CC*, 186). Qu Dafeng and Liu Jianyi, ‘On some problems concerning Jochi’s lifetime’, *CAJ* 42 (1998), 283–90 (here 289–90), arrive at the same date by different means.


22. *SH*, § 255 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 187–8; and see his note at 934–5).

25. TJG, III, 22 (trans. in HWC, 562, modified).


27. JT, I, 69 (DzhT, I, part 1, 140–1; CC, 28). Ratchnevsky, 'Šigi-Qutuqu', 117. Allsen, 'Guard and government,' 498, is therefore wrong to state that Möngke's second election was 'without a word of dissent'. Hodong Kim, 'A re-appraisal of Güyük Khan', in Amitai and Biran (eds), Mongols, Turks, and Others, 309–38 (here 324).

28. JT, II, 806 (SGK, 182; CC, 278). Both claims are found in TJG, III, 21–2 (HWC, 562); hence JT, II, 826 (SGK, 203; CC, 285).

29. JT, I, 69 (DzhT, I, part 1, 141; CC, 28–9). There is a vague echo in YS, ch. 2, tr. Abramowski, 'Die chinesischen Annalen von Ögödei und Güyük', 17, where this speech is attributed to Möngke's half-brother Möge. See Kim, 'Reappraisal', 321.

30. TJG, III, 3 (HWC, 549); also I, 146 (HWC, 186), where the equation is put into Ögödei's own mouth. Hence JT, I, 635 (DzhT, II, part 1, 50; SGK, 30–1; CC, 222); and see also I, 618 (DzhT, II, part 1, 4–5; SGK, 17; CC, 215). See the comments of David Ayalon, 'Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān . . . (B)', SJ 34 (1971), 151–80 (here 153–5). Krawulsky, 'Testament of Čingiz Khān', 21–2, and Fletcher, 'Turco-Mongolian monarchic tradition', 239–40; for the 'hearth-prince', V. Vladimirtsov, Le régime social des Mongols. Le féodalisme nomade, tr. Michel Carsow (Paris, 1948), 60, 67.

31. JT, I, 537 (CC, 186).

32. Ibid., II, 825 (SGK, 202; CC, 285).

33. SH, §§ 242–3 (tr. De Rachewitz, 166–8); whether this is identical with the allocation referred to at § 203 (tr. De Rachewitz, 135), is unclear. The Mōngke of the SH is called Möge by Rashid al-Dīn (see below, n. 139 at p. 551). TJG, I, 30 (HWC, 41), makes only a brief reference to the distribution of troops.

34. JT, I, 592, 604 (CC, 207, 211); cf. also I, 785 (SGK, 164; CC, 272). The numbers allotted to the other members of the dynasty are listed at I, 605–11 (CC, 211–13). Hodong Kim argues that Tolui may have felt he retained a right to the troops of the centre after he relinquished the regency: see his 'A re-examination of the "Register of Thousands (hazāra)" in the Jāmi` al-tawārīkh', in Akasoy, Burnett and Yoeli-Tlalim (eds), Rashid al-Dīn, 89–114 (here 104–9).

35. Peter Jackson, 'From ulus to khanate: The making of the Mongol states c. 1220–c.1290', in Amitai-Preiss and Morgan (eds), Mongol Empire and its Legacy, 12–38 (here 36–7). Krawulsky, 'Das Testament', 76, 77, and 'Testament of Čingiz Khān', 26–7, while pointing out the clash between JT and SH regarding the number of Tolui's troops, appears to accept Rashid al-Dīn's figure as authentic. So too does L. Venegoni, 'The reorganization of the Mongol army under the heirs of the house of Tolui and the role of the non-Mongol tümen in the new portions of the Mongol empire: A comparison between Il-Khānid and Yuan military manpower', in Nikonorov (ed.), Tsentral`naia Aziia, 326–8 (here 326), although he concedes that Tolui would initially have enjoyed control of the 'troops of the centre' as regent from 1227 to 1229.

36. JT, I, 608 (CC, 212).

37. Ibid., II, 785 (SGK, 164; CC, 272); see also I, 618 (DzhT, II, part 1, 4; SGK, 17; CC, 215).

38. PC, 264 (MM, 25), calling him, misleadingly, a nephew (nepos) of Chinggis Khan and giving no name. JT, II, 801–2, 806 (SGK, 178, 182; CC, 277, 279); more obscurely in TJG, I, 199–200, 210 (HWC, 244, 255).


40. The date given by JQ, Ar. text, clxvi (Russian trans., 125) in Turkestan, I, 138.

41. For what follows, see Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 26–7, 30–4.

42. For a fuller discussion of what follows, see Jackson, 'From ulus to khanate', 17–28, and Thomas T. Allsen, 'Sharing out the empire: Apportioned lands under the Mongols', in...
Anatoly M. Khazanov and André Wink (eds), *Nomads in the Sedentary World* (Richmond, Surrey, 2001), 172–90 (here 176ff).


44. Only a brief reference to one brother, ‘Otegin’ (i.e. Temüge Otchigin, the youngest), ibid., I, 31 (HWC, 42). For fuller details on the appanages of all the brothers, see *JT*, I, 276, 279, 281 (CC, 97, 98, 99); Jackson, ‘From *ulus* to khanate’, 17.

45. *SH*, §§ 269–70 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 200, ‘the domain of the centre’; and note at 988); Kim, ‘A re-examination’, 108. For the guard as yeke *qol*, see *SH*, § 226 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 155, and commentary at 825). See generally Buell, ‘Kalmyk *Tanggaci* people’, 43–4, who renders *qol*-un *ulus* as ‘the pivot *ulus*’.

46. For the distribution of territory, see *TJG*, I, 31–2 (HWC, 42–3).


48. Chaghadai’s *ulus* is also defined at *TJG*, I, 226 (HWC, 271). Here, and in the earlier reference, as Allsen, ‘Yüan dynasty and the Uighurs’, nn. 38 and 39 at 272, points out, Boyle’s translation is misleading because he omitted to translate ‘border’; see ibid., 248–50, for the hypothesis that the Uighur territory lay outside the appanage. *JT*, I, 762 (SGK, 145; CC, 265), says that Chaghadai’s lands extended to the Altai.

49. *TJG*, I, 31–2, reads *Tūlī nīz muttasīl-u mujāwir-i û biyd*, rendered in *HWC*, 43, as ‘Toli’s territory, likewise, lay adjacent thereto’. Yet the Persian makes no mention of territory, and it seems likely, therefore, that û refers not to Ögödei but to their father. Ibid., I, 146 (HWC, 186), Juwayni makes Ögödei say that Tului had been in constant attendance on Chinggis Khan; hence *JT*, I, 635 (*DzhT*, II, part 1, 50–1; SGK, 31; CC, 222).


52. Wašşāf, 50, l. 4, *yurt-i Tūlū* [sic] (GW, I, text, 96, trans., 93); he thus understands Juwayni’s statement much as did the modern translators Boyle and Lech.

53. As stated in, e.g., *JT*, II, 787–8 (SGK, 166; CC, 273).

54. Ibid., I, 207 (*DzhT*, I, part 1, 550; CC, 77).

55. *TJG*, I, 229 (HWC, 273).


60. *TJG*, I, 117 (HWC, 151); cf. also I, 66–7, 113 (HWC, 86, 143).

61. Ibid., I, 211–12 (HWC, 256).

62. Ibid., III, 90 (HWC, 607).

63. Some of these are listed ibid., I, 224 (HWC, 269). *JT*, I, 665–6, 668 (*DzhT*, II, part 1, 123–4, and SGK, 56, omitting Kölgen, Büri and Baidar; *DzhT*, II, part 1, 133; SGK, 59; CC, 230–1, 232).

64. *TJG*, III, 91–2 (HWC, 607–8).


67. Aubin, ‘*Lethnogénèse*’, 75.

68. See *TMEN*, II, 220–5 (no. 670: ‘Domäne, korneigene Länderei: Territorium, das einem Angehörigen des Herrscherhauses . . . persönlich gehört’).

69. Nasawī, 114 (tr. Houdas, 154; Pers. redaction, 124).

70. WR, 296/inf *SF*, 318 (MFW, 260).

71. For this, see Jackson, ‘From *ulus* to khanate’, 21–3; Allsen, ‘Sharing out the empire’, 176–9, and *Culture and Conquest*, 45–9.
74. SH, § 239 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 164–5).
75. JT, I, 731 (SGK, 117; CC, 254).
76. For a good succinct survey of the Golden Horde territories, see Vásáry, ‘Jochid realm’, 73–4; for the origin of the term, ibid., 68.
77. JT, I, 714 (SGK, 103; CC, 248).
78. TN, II, 179 (tr. Raverty, 1177–81).
80. That he dwelt close to Jochi’s encampment is clear from PC, 315 (MM, 60).
81. WR, 112/in SF, 224 (MFW, 144–5). JT, I, 753 (SGK, 138; CC, 261), says only that Büri had abused Batu while drunk.
83. JT, II, 939 (SGK, 310). CC, 326, follows a corrupted text: for the authentic readings, see Paul Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo (Paris, 1959–73), I, 341–2 (though he doubted that ‘Qirghiz’ was correct).
86. Biran, Empire of the Qara Khitai, 48–50, 54–8, and esp. 160–2 for the fact that both ruled in their own right, despite the claim in the Liao shi that the first was merely regent. For the Liao, see David C. Wright, ‘The political and military power of Kitan empress dowagers’, in Veit (ed.), Role of Women, 325–35.
89. JT, II, 977 (DzhT, III, 24; CC, 340).
90. Bruno De Nicola, 'Women's role and participation in warfare in the Mongol empire', in Klaus Latzel, Franka Maubach and Silke Satjukow (eds), Soldatinnen: Gewalt und Geschlecht im Krieg vom Mittelalter bis heute (Paderborn etc., 2011), 95–112 (here 96–104). For the example of Chinggis Khan's daughter Alaqa Beki, see Buell and Kolbas, 'Ethos of state and society', 52.
91. Lambton, Continuity and Change, 289. Ilkhanid royal women are surveyed in Quade-Reutter, ch. 4.
93. De Nicola, 'Women's role', 105–11.
97. Morgan, Mongols', 95–6.
98. TJG, II, 76, 81 (HWC, 343, 349); at 83 (HWC, 351) he is expressly called the basqaq.
100. For both terms, see TMEN, I, 319–23 (no. 193), and II, 241–3 (no. 691); and for darughā, Francis Woodman Cleaves, 'Daruyu and gerge', HJAS 16 (1953), 237–59 (here 237–55). On the etymology, see now De Rachewiltz's note in his trans. of SH, 961; also István Vásáry, 'The origin of the institution of basqaqs', AOASH 32 (1978), 201–6, who discusses the pre-Mongol background. Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, 138, suggested that the darughāchi was a Mongol officer, whereas the basqaq was a local official; ibid., 178–80, he believed that the functions of the two were sometimes identical but also on occasions varied. I am not convinced by the arguments of Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589 (Cambridge, 1998), 37–41, that the darughāchi (that is a military one and synonymous with the tammachi.
102. Li Zhichang, Xi you ji, tr. Waley, Travels of an Alchemist, 85.
104. On these figures, see Paul D. Buell, 'Sino-Khitan administration in Mongol Bukhara', JAH 13 (1979), 121–51 (here 122–6, 135–41); also his 'Yeh-li A-hai (ca. 1151–ca. 1223), Yeh-lü 'U-hua (d. 1231)'; in De Rachewiltz et al. (eds), In the Service of the Khan, 112–21 (here 113–19). For his appointment, see TJG, I, 83–4 (HWC, 107).
105. TJG, II, 218 (HWC, 482); called 'basqaq of Ürgeńch' at II, 227 (HWC, 491). For an outline of his career, see P. Jackson, 'Čin Timūr', Elr, V, 567.
106. TJG, II, 218–23 (HWC, 482–7).
107. Ibid., II, 224–5, 229 (HWC, 488–9, 492–3).
108. For Arghun, see P. Jackson, Arğūn Aqa, Elr, II, 401–2; and for a fuller study, George Lane, Arghun Aqa: Mongol bureaucrat, IS 32 (1999), 459–82.
109. Li Zhichang, Xi you ji, tr. Waley, Travels of an Alchemist, 92, 109. For a general overview of the darughāchis's functions, see Buell, 'Sino-Khitan administration', 133; Elizabeth Endicott-West, 'Imperial governance in Yuan times', HJAS 43 (1986), 523–49 (here 541–2).
NOTES to pp. 109–12

110. TJG, II, 229–30 (HWC, 493).
112. Ibid., II, 243 (HWC, 507).
114. On these two figures, see Allsen, ‘Maḥmūd Yalavac’, 124–8; and for the tracts allotted to Mas‘ūd, TJG, III, 73 (HWC, 597).
116. See the discussion in May, ‘Conquest and rule of Transcaucasia’, 146–7.
119. Li Zhichang, Xi you ji, tr. Waley, Travels of an Alchemist, 93; see 97, 105, 116–17 for the Li who is described as ‘the Intendant of the Governor’ and who was also ‘in charge of the observatory’; also Buell, ‘Sino-Khitan administration’, 137, nn. 76, 78.
121. WR, 126/in SF, 233 (MFW, 157).
123. IF, III, 198 (no. 2472).
124. TJG, I, 4–5 (HWC, 7–8, slightly modified); and for another sardonic comment on the Uighur script, II, 260 (HWC, 523). See the remarks of A. P. Martinez, ‘Changes in chancellery languages and language changes in general in the Middle East, with particular reference to Iran in the Arab and Mongol periods’, AEMA 7 (1987–91), 103–52 (here 142–3).
125. TJG, II, 239 (HWC, 502).
126. See Lane, ‘Arghun Aqa’, 462; also p. 274 on Arghun Aqa and the historian’s brother.
127. TJG, II, 218–19 (HWC, 483).
128. For what follows, Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 144–71, 186–7, is fundamental. There is also a succinct outline in Morgan, Medieval Persia, 68.
133. Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan, 183. For Tu. tamgha, see TMEN, II, 554–65 (no. 933, tamghā: ‘... Zoll’), passim; the word also means ‘seal’ (ibid.).
As noticed by Lambton, ‘Mongol fiscal administration’ [Part I], 84. Yet there is evidence As

For examples, see Lambton, ‘Mongol fiscal administration’ [Part I], 87, and Continuity and Change, 200–1; and for the mechanics and purposes of the census, Thomas T. Allsen, ‘Mongol census taking in Rus’, 1245–1275, HUS 5 (1981), 32–53 (here 47–52).


TJG, II, 256, 261 (HWC, 519, 524).

As noticed by Lambton, ‘Mongol fiscal administration’ [Part I], 84. Yet there is evidence that in Armenia in 1254 it was also levied on women and children: A. G. Galstian (trans.), Armianskie istochniki o mongolakh, izvlechenia iz rukopisei XIII–XIV vv. (Moscow, 1962), 26; cited in Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 166. Possibly, therefore, the local unit of assessment here was the household, as was in fact consistently the case in Mongol China: Allsen, ‘Rise of the Mongolian empire’, 401–2, and Mongol Imperialism, 149.

As TJG, I, 25 (HWC, 34), makes clear. Petrushevsky, ‘Socio-economic condition’, 530, adds some evidence of territory in Iran that was subject either to the kharaj or the quбереж but not both. For the land-tax as 50 per cent, see Grigor Aknerts’i, Patmut’iwn vasn azgin netoghats’, tr. Robert P. Blake and Richard N. Frie, ‘History of the Nation of the Archers (the Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc’ [sic], HJAS 12 (1949), 269–399 (here 301); Judith Kolbas, The Mongols in Iran: Chingiz Khan to Uljaytu 1220–1309 (London and New York, 2006), 97.


PC, 244 (MM, 14). WR, 264/in SF, 301 (MFW, 241). For further references, see John Andrew Boyle, ‘Turkish and Mongol shamanism in the Middle Ages’, Folklore 83 (1972), 177–93 (here 183–4).


‘Imperial’: De Rachewitz, ‘Some reflections on Činggis Qan’s Jasay’, 94–5. ‘Rule’: ibid., 97, citing SH, § 189 (tr. De Rachewitz, 111, and commentary at 683); cf. also TMEN, IV, 80. For the phrase yāsā-u yūsūn, see JT, I, 685 (DzhT, II, part 1, 183; SGK, 77; CC, 237, here renders it misleadingly as ‘the custom’); other examples at I, 582, 762 (CC, 200, 265), and II, 976, yūsān-u yāsā-yī Chingīz Khān (DzhT, III, 23; CC, 340). Hope, ‘Transmission of authority’, 104, sees the term jasagh as ‘a prescription for the ideal society’.


SH, § 203 (tr. De Rachewitz, 135–6, and see commentary at 772–4); also Morgan, ‘The “Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khan” and Mongol law’, 164–5 (repr. in Hawting (ed.), Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders, 199–200); Allsen, ‘Mongol census taking’, 34.


158. Ibid., I, 288 (cf. trans. in CC, 101, where ‘codified’ seems to stretch the meaning of *mudawwan* unduly).

159. *TJG*, I, 149 (HWC, 189). *YS*, ch. 2, tr. Abramowski, ‘Die chinesischen Annalen von Ögödei und Güyük’, 124 (‘die grosse Yasa’ here is misleading, as evident from the parenthetical comment that follows).


161. Ibid., I, 288 (cf. trans. in CC, 101, where ‘codified’ seems to stretch the meaning of *mudawwan* unduly).

162. *Waṣṣāf*, 504, ll. 15–16 (cf. GW, IV, 282).

163. *JT*, I, 207 (trans. in CC, 77, modified). For these two terms, see *TMEN*, IV, 82–92 (no. 1791: ‘staatliche Ordnung’), 92–6 (no. 1794: [+ kardan] ‘organisieren, in Ordnung bringen’), respectively; *yasal* had also a more narrowly military significance (‘Schlachtordnung’), but such does not seem to be the sense at this point in *JT*.


165. For a list (in tabular form) of the principal yasas attested in sources from the imperial epoch, see Aigle, ‘Le Grand Jasaq’, 71–4.


170. PC, 264 (MM, 25), mentioning the attempt by Temüge to usurp the throne; *TJG*, I, 210 (HWC, 255), says that Temüge was executed ‘in accordance with the yasa’.

171. *TJG*, I, 18 (HWC, 25); see also I, 28 (HWC, 39).


173. Ibid., 128. Allsen, ‘Yüan dynasty and the Uighurs’, 248–50, is surely right that the Uighur principality lay outside any princely ulus. But in my view he gives insufficient weight to the grant of Beshbaligh to Qadan.

174. *JT*, I, 775 (SGK, 156; CC, 269). For the probable context, see Buell, ‘Sino-Khitan administration’, 143–6.

175. *TJG*, II, 246 (HWC, 508–9).

176. Ibid., II, 241–2 (HWC, 504–5); also II, 243 (HWC, 507).

177. Sayfī, 127–8: the year given, 639 [1241–2], is by no means reliable. Körgüz’s arrest and execution on the orders of Chaghadai’s widow may have been due to his obstruction of Chaghadaiid encroachments.


179. Ibid., II, 244 (HWC, 507–8); see also the less specific allusion at II, 238 (HWC, 501–2).
180. Ibid., II, 237 (HWC, 501).
181. Ibid., II, 238 (HWC, 502); also II, 229–30 (HWC, 493).
182. Ibid., II, 236 (HWC, 500).
183. Ibid., II, 245–6 (HWC, 509).
184. Kim, 'Reappraisal', 326–8; and see 309–13 for his review of previous historiography.
186. For what follows, see Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 79–82.
187. On this term, see TMEN, II, 25–7 (no. 446, 'Kaufmann, der in Kommission und mit Kredit des Chans seine Geschäfte abwickelt').
188. Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 58, citing YS: for the relevant passage, see YS, ch. 3, tr. Abramowski, 'Die chinesischen Annalen des Möngke', 22.
191. TG, 799. François de Blois, 'The Iftikhāriyān of Qazvīn', in Eslami (ed.), Iran and Iranian Studies, 13–23 (here 14–15). Iftikhār al-Dīn is said to have been their tutor during Ögödei's reign.
192. Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 221, 222–3.
194. Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 47.
195. See the remarks of Aubin, Émirs mongols et vizirs persans, 11–14 passim.
196. TJG, II, 218–19 (HWC, 483).
197. Ibid., II, 223, dar ḥukhmā sharīk kard (HWC, 487).
198. Nowhere expressly stated, but implicit ibid., II, 224, 228, 229 (HWC, 489, 492, 493), where their names are frequently linked.
199. Ibid., II, 243 (HWC, 506).
200. Ibid., II, 227–8 (HWC, 491); see also II, 219 (HWC, 483).
201. Sayfī, 128, l. 6: the context is the preferential treatment accorded to the envoys of Batu and Kōrgūz over those of Ögödei and Arghun (below).
202. TN, II, 176, to be amended from BL ms. Add. 26189, fo. 255b, which reads naṣīb mīburdand for naṣb būdand (cf. Raverty trans., 1172). For a similar statement about Batu's status, see TJG, I, 222–3 (HWC, 267).
204. Ibid., 124–7.
205. Ibid., 128.
206. Ibid., 136–9; for Majd al-Dīn's death, 132–4. Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 153–5, surveys these events.
207. Sayfī, 228–9. The date given, 656/1258, is probably too late: as Aubin, 'L'ethnogénèse', 71, points out, his chronology is to be treated with caution.
211. MA, III, 78 (Lech, Ar. text, 15, l. 17–16, l. 2, German trans., 100–1).
213. AK, ed. 'Ābbāra, III, part 2, 477.
214. TJG, II, 223 (HWC, 487).
215. Ibid., II, 268 (HWC, 532).
216. Ibid., II, 243 (HWC, 507).
217. Ibid., II, 250 (HWC, 513).
218. Ibid., II, 250–1, 260 (HWC, 514, 523), suggesting a relatively late date for the confirmation; but cf. YS, ch. 3, tr. Abramowski, 'Die chinesischen Annalen des Möngke', 19.
219. TFG, II, 250, 256 (HWC, 513, 519).
220. From the lost portion of 'Izz al-Din Ibn Shaddâd, Târîkh al-malik al-Zâhir, as cited by DMZ, I, 497–8, and II, 161–2 (and see MZDMZ, XVII, 34); by ID, VIII, 92–3; and by IAF, part 1, 445. The later author Qaratây al-‘Izzî al-Khâzânàdârî says that the Golden Horde received one-third: Târîkh majmû’ al-nawâdir (c. 1330), ed. Horst Hein and Mêhammad al-Ḫâġârî (Beirut and Berlin, 2005), 126 (= SMIZO, I, Ar. text, 70–1, but there wrongly identified as IW). The evidence is conveniently summarized in Ayalon, 'Great Yasa . . . (B)', 174 (though he follows Tizenguazen's error regarding Qaratây's work).
221. TN, II, 176, 218 (tr. Raverty, 1172, 1292–3).
222. Waṣṣâf, 51, ll. 2–3 (GW, I, text, 98, trans., 94). See the analysis of this passage in Turkestân', n. 225 at 516–17 (= Sochinenia, I, n. 1 at 577–8).
223. WR, 112/in SF, 225 (MFW, 146). Cf. also B. Ahmmedov (revised by D. Sinor), 'Central Asia under the rule of Chinggis Khan's successors', in HCCA, IV, part 1, 264; though his source for the restitution of property in Khujand to the son of its erstwhile commander, TFG, I, 73 (HWC, 94), says only that this was done through the good will (sayyûrghâmîshî) of Batu's court, and the context, moreover, is Ögödei's reign.
224. YS, ch. 3, cited by Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 103–4; for the passage, see the translation in Abramowski, 'Die chinesischen Annalen des Möngke', 26.
229. JT, I, 736 (SGK, 122; CC, 255).
230. As is clear, for example, from the diverse allegiances of prominent members of the Jalayir and Qongqurat tribes: JT, I, 67–72, 159–60 (DzhT, I, part 1, 134–49, 395; CC, 28–30, 60). See also the comment on the Ilkhanid military aristocracy, ibid., II, 975 (DzhT, III, 22; CC, 340); and Wing, Jalayirids, 39–42.
231. SH, § 279 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 215).
233. JT, II, 976 (DzhT, III, 23; CC, 340).
234. TJG, I, 30, and III, 67–8 (HWC, 41–2, 593–4), with the anecdote regarding the arrows in both places. JT, I, 582 (CC, 200–1), lists it among Chinggis Khan's sayings (biligs); see also ibid., I, 539, and II, 840–1 (SGK, 216; CC, 187, 290), and Riccoldo, Liber peregrinationum, ed. Kappler, Latin text, 100, 102, 104 (tr. George-Tvtrovkii, 195). In SH, § 22 (tr. De Rachewiltz, 5), the anecdote is attached to Chinggis Khan's remote ancestress, Alan Qo'a: Gießauf, 'Der Traum von der Weltherrschaft', 47–8.
235. TJG, I, 143, madâr-i kâr-u yâsâ-yi ışhân (HWC, 181–2, modified).
236. In addition to the references in n. 152 at p. 464, see, e.g., Chinggis Khan's own bilig at JT, I, 582 (CC, 200–1); the edict of the Ilkhan Ghazan, ibid., II, 1479 (DzhT, III, 511; CC, 512); Du'a's petition to Chapar, claiming that Chinggis Khan's progeny had flouted his yasa: Waṣṣâf, 452, ll. 14–15; Chapar's letter to the Qaghan Temûr (1303–4): ibid., 452, l. 20–453, l. 1, and (citing the anecdote of the arrows) 453, ll. 1–6 (all at GW, IV, 147–8); also Liu Yingsheng, 'War and peace between the Yuan dynasty and the Chaghadài khanate (1312–1323); in Amitai and Biran (eds), Mongols, Turks, and Others, 339–58 (here 354); and Michal Biran, 'Diplomacy and chancellery practices in the Chagataid khanate: Some preliminary remarks, OM 88 (2008), 369–93 (here 391–2).
Chapter 5 Hülegü's Campaigns and Imperial Fragmentation (1253–62)


5. *JT*, II, 981 (*DzhT*, III, 27; *CC*, 342), for the date.


10. For these events, see Cahen, *Formation of Turkey*, 184–9; also May, 'Mongol conquest strategy', 28.


12. The respective dates given in *TJG*, III, 96 (*HWC*, 611), and *JT*, II, 978, 979 (*DzhT*, III, 24, 26; *CC*, 341). For his departure from his ordo, *JT* has first the Year of the Ox/1253, at II, 848 (*SGK*, 223; *CC*, 293), and then the autumn of the Year of the Leopard/1254 at II, 978 (*DzhT*, III, 24; *CC*, 341). Conversely, Juwayni supplies no date for the crossing of the Oxus.


16. *TJG*, III, 93–4 (*HWC*, 608–10). *AM*, 24, gives a fuller list of provisions, the stacks of which resembled 'mighty hills'.


19. For the next two paragraphs I rely on the closely similar accounts given in Naṣīr al-Din ʿUṣūl Kayfijiyat and *MTD* in preference to Rashid al-Din. For the demand for reinforcements, see also *JT*, II, 997 (*DzhT*, III, 41; *CC*, 347).


23. JT, II, 993 (DzhT, III, 39; CC, 346).


25. JT, II, 1003–4, 1010 (DzhT, III, 47–8, 53–4; CC, 349, 351); cf. also Ṭūsī, Kayfiyyat, 284 (tr. in Boyle, ‘Death of the last ’Abbasid Caliph’, 155), and MTD, 472 (tr. in Wickens, ‘Nasir ad-din Ṭūsī’, 33). There is a vague echo in Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, 316/tr. Khanlarian, 229.

26. JT, II, 1006–7 (DzhT, III, 50–1; CC, 350).

27. Waṣṣāf, 30, l. 23–31, l. 1 (GW, I, text, 60, trans., 58).


30. BH, 431.

31. Ṭūsī, Kayfiyyat, 290 (tr. in Boyle, ‘Death of the last ’Abbasid Caliph’, 159). Waṣṣāf, 39, l. 20–40, l. 4 (GW, I, text, 78, trans., 75); this section of his work was completed in 699/1300. See also Guy Le Strange, ‘The story of the death of the last Abbasid Caliph, from the Vatican MS. of Ibn al-Furat’, JRAS (1900), 293–300.


34. JT, II, 1039–40 (DzhT, III, 82; CC, 361), alleging that al-Muzaffar killed his father. AK, ed. ‘Abbāra, III, part 2, 566, supplies two dates (Dhū l-Ḥijja 658 and 16 Ṣafar 659) for al-Sa‘id’s death, but makes it clear that the investment of the citadel lasted into 659/1261. Of the varying accounts of its surrender, I have adopted that given in HJ, 342–3/372–3, which is seemingly the most coherent. Waṣṣāf, 49 (GW, I, text, 95–6, trans., 91–2), alleges that al-Sa‘id eventually surrendered on terms but that Hülegū put him to death and replaced him with al-Muzaffar, whom the Mongols had released from his prison. IF, III, 108 (no. 2290), says merely that al-Muzaffar was appointed when he brought a letter purportedly written by his father, in which the latter excused himself for his non-appearance on the grounds of illness.


36. Ibn al-‘Amid, 163 (tr. Eddé and Micheau, 95).


41. WR, 164/in SF, 253 (MFW, 184).


47. What follows is largely based on Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 35–9.

48. Waṣṣāf, 47, l. 25 (*GW*, I, text, 92, trans., 89).

49. For his dealings with Acre, see Jackson, ‘Crisis’, 503.

50. IW, VI, 293 (with Ḥamāh in error for Ḥims)/214. His version of events is to be preferred to that of al-Ashraf’s mamluk, Ṣārim al-Dīn Özbeg, which seeks to play down his master’s support for the Mongols: see Amitai, ‘Mongol raids’, 239–40.

51. For the campaign, see Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 39–45; for the aftermath, ibid., 45–7.

52. Abū Shāma, 208, ll. 7–10. For the common view of the nomads of East Asia as Turks, see above, p. 52.


55. As early as 1254 Rubruck, then in Qaraqorum, learned that this was the qaghan’s order: WR, 232/in SF, 287 (MFW, 222).


NOTES to pp. 134–8

59. *JT*, II, 985 (*DzhT*, III, 31; *CC*, 343); see II, 988–9 (*DzhT*, III, 34; *CC*, 344), for the advice.
60. Ibid., II, 995–6 (*DzhT*, III, 40–1; *CC*, 346).
65. *AM*, 23–4. For the atabeg of Fārs, see also *TN*, II, 190 (tr. Raverty, 1228–9).
70. See the list in Eddé, *Principauté ayyoubdie*, 190–1.
72. For a thorough survey, see Amitai, ‘Mongol provincial administration’, 130–4.
75. *AM*, 22–3. The equivalence of a gaz is by no means certain, but it measured approx. 95 cm. in seventeenth- and nineteenth-century Iran: Walther Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte* (Leiden, 1955), 62. For this weapon in China, see Franke, ‘Siege and defense’, 166; and *SCC*, V, part 6, 188, 192–9 and fig. 63 (depicting a ‘triple-bow mounted crossbow’). Raverty’s notes to his translation of *TN*, 1191, incorporate an unattributed passage strongly reminiscent of that in *AM*, but including an additional line about siege engines that could be dismantled and reassembled (below, n. 86); it is in turn cited in *SCC*, V, part 6, 219. The work Raverty used was in fact Āḥmad b. Naṣr-Allāh Daybūlī Tattawi, *Ṭarīkh-ī alfī* (late sixteenth century), which must here be based on *AM* or a common source: see BL, IO Islamic ms. 316, fo. 90b.
76. IAF, part 2, 496–7: forty-eight of them fell into Mamlūk hands.
82. Smith, ‘Hülegü moves west’, 125–6. *SCC*, V, part 6, 187, note a, may be wrong in suggesting that Ar. manjanīq always denotes a trebuchet.
83. See *SCC*, V, part 6, 220–1; Rossabī, *Khubilai Khan*, 86.
84. Smith, 'Mongol warfare', 320, and 'Hülegü moves west', 126, n. 75. Depiction: EUL ms. Or. 20, fo. 124b; David Talbot Rice and Basil Gray, The Illustrations to the 'World History' of Rashid al-Din (Edinburgh, 1976), 146 (no. 54), portraying (anachronistically) the attack on Zaranj by Mahmūd of Ghazna in 1003.

85. AM, 32. For the manān, which in thirteenth-century Iran was equivalent to 260 dirhams (five-sixths of a kg.), see Hinz, 18. Cf. the stone weighing 89.4 kg. that was fired from the trebuchet deployed at the siege of Xiangyang in 1272 and manufactured by a Muslim artificer: YS, ch. 203, cited in Allsen, 'Circulation of military technology', 271. For weights and ranges, see SCC, V, part 6, 187, 204. Modern experiments have shown that a trebuchet with a 10–ton counterweight could hurl a projectile of 100–150 kg. a distance of c. 150 metres: Christopher Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, 1192–1291 (Cambridge, 1992), 213.

86. Tattawī, Taʾrikh-i alfī, BL ms. IO Islamic 316, fo. 90b; Needham, in SCC, V, part 6, 168, note e, sees this testimony as 'very interesting confirmation, from an independent source, of the composite nature of the arms of the Chinese trebuchets'. Cf. AM, 23, ll. 7–8, where a line may possibly be omitted.

87. Catapult from Mosul: JT, II, 1036 (DzhT, III, 79; CC, 360). 100: AK, ed. 'Abbāra, III, part 2, 565 (reading sittata for the miāt of the Bodleian ms. Marsh 333, fo. 136b). The two illustrations of siege artillery in the EUL ms. of JT (Plates 2 and 3) depict the operators as Muslims while Mongols look on.


89. Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 47–8, and 'Sharing out the empire', 173, 175. Cf. also his 'Rise of the Mongolian empire', 407–8.


91. TMEN, II, 207–9 (no. 657).


94. Antoine Mostaert and Francis Woodman Cleaves, 'Trois documents mongols des archives secrètes vaticanes', HJAS 15 (1952), 419–506 (here 484–5). I owe this reference, and the precise rendering given above, to Professor Hodong Kim. It should be noted, however, that Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 37, rejects this interpretation on the grounds that the seal contains the character bao (Wade-Giles: pao), meaning that it can only have been produced in China.


97. TJG, III, 90 (HWC, 607).

98. HJ, 267/311.

NOTES to pp. 140–4

100. *NT*, 2nd recension, ed. and tr. Melville, ‘From Adam to Abaqa . . . (Part II)’, text, 52 (trans., 58). The text reads *mamālik-i Ghaznayn-u Jayhūn ki Īrān-zamin khwānand bādī tafwīd kard*, where I suspect the mention of Ghazna is a corruption; possibly the original read *gharbī* at this point.

101. Shabānkāra’ī, 259; more briefly at 260.

102. Banākatī, 413–14. *TG*, 587–8 (at 589 he says more specifically that Hūlegū was sent to suppress the Ismā’īlīs); Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1170–1 (tr. Ward, II, 14–17).


104. JT, II, 974 (*DzhT*, III, 20–1); cf. trans. in *CC*, 340, which, like Allsen, ‘Sharing out the empire’, 174 (‘to Hūlegū he assigned the countries of the West . . . ’), stretches the meaning somewhat. But *JT*, II, 901 (*SGK*, 274; *CC*, 311), says expressly that Möngke had given Qubilai ‘that kingdom’ (i.e. China).


106. Ibid., I, 87–8, 615–16, and II, 975 (*DzhT*, I, part 1, 188–9, and III, 21–2, for the first and third of these references; *CC*, 35, 214, 340).


108. MA, III, 69 (Lech, Ar. text, 1, ll. 16–17, German trans., 91); for Tolui, see above, p. 102.

109. MA, III, 81 (Lech, Ar. text, 20, ll. 2–3, German trans., 103–4).

110. Ibid., III, 69 (Lech, Ar. text, 2, ll. 1 and 5, German trans., 91).

111. See Lech’s introduction, 32–4 (al-Īṣfahānī), 36–7 (al-Ṭayyārī).


113. TN, II, 198 (tr. Raverty, 1257). *DMZ*, II, 365 (= *MZDMZ*, XVIII, 7); *TI*, XLIX, 191; and *WW*, X, 118.

114. For a similar conclusion, see Ayalon, ‘Great Yāṣa . . . (B)’, 176; Jackson, ‘Dissolution’, 225–6; Ciocîltan, *Mongols and the Black Sea Trade*, 66, n. 27.

115. JT, II, 1034 (*DzhT*, III, 77; *CC*, 360).


117. Ibid., I, 738 (*SGK*, 122–3; *CC*, 256). On Rashid al-Din’s own admission Balagha was present at the siege of Baghdad in 1258.

118. Waṣṣāf, 50, l. 22–51, l. 2 (*GW*, I, text, 98, trans., 94).


120. Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, 331/tr. Khanlarian, 236. The account of their execution in K’art’lis Tskhovreba, 359, is similarly brief.

121. The point was made by W. Barthold, *A Historical Geography of Iran*, tr. Svat Soucek and ed. C. E. Bosworth (Princeton, NJ, 1984), 218–19.

122. MA, III, 78 (Lech, Ar. text, 15, ll. 9–10, German trans., 100).

123. Ibid., III, 126 (Lech, Ar. text, 78, ll. 3–10, German trans., 143–4).

124. Ibid., III, 80 (Lech, Ar. text, 17, ll. 19–21, German trans., 102).


126. Waṣṣāf, 50, ll. 5–6 (*GW*, I, text, 96, trans., 93).


130. Ibid., II, 260 (*HWC*, 523): the context suggests that his confirmation in office and his second visit to Sarai coincided with Möngke’s march into the Song empire, which took place in the summer and autumn of 1258 (Allsen, ‘Rise of the Mongolian empire’, 410).
131. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 87–8, and ‘Sharing out the empire’, 174. The source is Sayfī, 87–8, and ‘Sharing out the empire’, 174. The source is Sayfī, 228–33: the date, given as 656/1258, cannot in reality be later than 653/1255, since Hūlegū was still in Transoxiana when he received Shams al-Dīn and the latter’s conflict with the Jochid princes preceded his killing of ‘Ali b. Masʿūd, the malik of Sīstān, which occurred in Saḥar 653/April 1255 (*Tarīkh-i Sīstān*, 398–9).


134. *TU*, 146.


136. *AM*, 21: the author has just used this same verb to describe Möngke’s measures in relation to Turkestan, ‘Khiṭā’, Transoxiana, Tibet and Tangut – all territories that were already under Mongol rule.

137. Ibid., 39; the date is specified at 41.

138. Ibid., 39, 40. My translation of this passage differs somewhat from that of Lane, ‘Mongol news’, 553. For *inchi*, see above, p. 104.

139. For the chronological evidence, see Jackson, ‘Dissolution’, 233–4.

140. *JT*, II, 880, 1047 (*SGK*, 255–6; *DzhT*, III, 90; *CC*, 304, 364): unless it relates to a subsequent occasion, the chronological context of the second of these references is confused, since by that time, allegedly, Arīgh Bōke had been defeated and Alughu had died (no earlier than 1264 in either case).

141. Mustawfī, *ZN*, II, 1294, l. 1, *Hūlākū chū gasht az jahān nāpadīd z Qublāī badīn mulk farmān rasīd ki farrukh Abagha bar in būm-u bar ba-shāhi-yi Irān bandad kamar* (tr. Ward, II, 272–3); for the immediately preceding lines, see above, n. 103 at p. 473. Qubilai’s diploma for Abagha arrived in Rabi’ I 669/Nov. 1270, according to *JT*, II, 1097 (*DzhT*, III, 139; *CC*, 380).

142. Shabānkāra’ī, 263.

143. ‘Menkonis chronicon’ [written c. 1273], ed. Ludwig Weiland, in G. H. Pertz et al. (eds), *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*, XXIII (Hanover, 1874), 549, *sperans se dominium suscepturum ulterius non processit*. In ‘Dissolution’, 230 and n. 197, and in *Mongols and the West*, 116, I mistakenly interpreted this as referring to Hūlegū’s candidature for election as qaghan (see next note); had this been so, he would surely instead have continued to move east.


149. Shabānkāra’ī, 247, 259, 260. What might have rendered this statement vaguely plausible was the fact that during Chinggis Khan’s invasion Tului, in contrast with his brothers, had spent so much time campaigning in Khurasān.

151. Smith, ‘Mongol society and military’, 250, assumes, as I do, that the conquests in the Near East were not assigned to Hulegu, but would later have been apportioned among the various branches of the imperial family.


153. JT, I, 738–9 (SGK, 123; CC, 256). For clarification of the fragmentary data, see Aubin, ‘Lethnogénèse’, 80–2; and for further detail, Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 165–6.


155. JT, I, 754, 767–8, and II, 877–8 (SGK, 138–9, 150, 253; CC, 261, 266, 303). TG, 586, inserts Abishqa before Alughu in the list of khans of Chaghadaï’s ulus.

156. Waṣṣāf, 12, ll. 6–8 (GW, I, text, 23, trans., 24).

157. The details in JT, II, 882 (SGK, 257–8; CC, 304–5), and Waṣṣāf, 12, ll. 15–20, and 51, ll. 2–5 (GW, I, text, 23–4, 98, trans., 25, 94), clearly refer to the same episode, though the link made by Waṣṣāf with a census of Bukhārā by Qubilai’s agents obscures its significance: see Gafurov’s correction of Barthold’s interpretation in Turkestani, n. 225 at 516–17 (= Sochinenia, I, n. 1 at 577–8).

158. JT, II, 885 (SGK, 261; CC, 306).


161. Patent:

162. al-Dhahabī alone gives the month of his death, Rabī’ ‘āf with a census of Bukhārā by Qubilai’s agents obscures its significance: see Gafurov’s correction of Barthold’s interpretation in Turkestani, n. 225 at 516–17 (= Sochinenia, I, n. 1 at 577–8).

163. al-Dhahabi alone gives the month of his death, Rabi’ II (corresponding to Jan. 1267): TT, XLIIX, 191.

164. For a brief sketch of his career, see Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, I, 124–8, and Biran, ‘Mongols in Central Asia’, 49–54; but the comprehensive study is Biran, Qaidu.

165. JQ, Ar. text, lii (Russian trans., 124)/Turkestani, I, 138. TU, 214. Tash ‘üt, tr. Budge, 139/ tr. Borbone, 58. Biran, ‘Rulers and city life’, 266–7; in Qaidu, 96–7, she proposes that he also may have had another principal residence further east, between the Chu and the Ili.


167. JT, I, 625–6 (DzhT, II, part I, 19–20; SGK, 22–3; CC, 217); see also I, 608–9 (CC, 212).

168. Du’a: JQ, Ar. text, liii (Russian trans., 126); and see the discussion in P. N. Petrov, ‘Khronologija pravleniia khanov v Chagataiskom gosudarstve v 1271–1368 gg. (po materialam numizmaticheskikh pamiatiñnikov)’, in S. G. Kliahshtorny, T. I. Sultanov and V. V. Trepavlov (eds), Istoriia i kul’ tura turkskich narodovRossii i sopredel’nykh stran (Moscow, 2009 = Turkologicheskiy Sbornik 2007–8), 294–319 (here 298–9). Mas’ūd Beg and his sons: JQ, Ar. text, clxxv–clxxvii (trans., 129–30); both JQ passages also in Turkestani, I, 139–40.

169. TU, 235, da wā-yi qānī mīkārd bā qā’ān. JQ, Ar. text, clxx, l. 2, khwa‘aqīn-nā, using a broken plural form (Russian trans., 123); also in Turkestani, I, 138, l. 6. According to Biran, Qaidu, 28–9, 32, 108–9, Qaidu did not claim the title; but cf. her more recent view, in ‘Mongols in Central Asia’, 50.

170. Rather than 701 (1301–2), as in JQ, I have adopted the date given in TU, 32, which harmonizes better with the date 6 Sha’bān 702 for the arrival of the news at Ghazan’s headquarters in Syria as supplied by JT, II, 1312 (DzhT, III, 356; CC, 458).

171. For the beginnings of this correspondence, see Zakirov, Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia, 39–50; more briefly, Spuler, Goldene Horde, 40–1, 44–6.

172. The uncertainties surrounding these embassies are discussed in Jackson, Mongols and the West, 166.
Chapter 6 Devastation, Depopulation and Revival in the Age of Conquest


2. Fletcher, ‘Mongols: Ecological and social perspectives’, 42–3: judging from the context, he had in mind the sedentary world more generally.


4. Allsen, ‘Rise of the Mongolian empire’, 348; though, as he notes, the earliest firm evidence for belief in such a mandate dates from no earlier than Ögödei’s reign (see above, pp. 74–5).


7. IA, XII, 358–9 (tr. Richards, III, 202).


13. Ibid., 67 (tr. Houdas, 92–3). This led Petrushevskii, ‘Pokhod’, 127, to abandon a more detailed survey of the capture of the various cities, apart from Khujand.


16. Ibid., II, 158 (tr. Raverty, 1117). See also the statement by Juwaynī quoted below (p. 169).


24. IA, XII, 373, 374, 382–3 (tr. Richards, III, 213, 214, 220). For the location of Baylaqān, see Barthold, *Historical Geography*, 228.

25. Smith, ‘Demographic considerations’, 332–4. These tactics would also have formed part of the ‘Tsunami Strategy’: see May, ‘Mongol conquest strategy’, passim.


28. Ibid., I, 75, 92 (HWC, 96, 117).

30. TN, II, 105 (tr. Raverty, 970–1). Cf. also Nasawi, 45 (tr. Houdas, 63; Pers. redaction, 54). TJG, I, 66 (HWC, 85), speaks of common people and artisans who had escaped the slaughter being carried off.

31. JT, I, 489 (CC, 170–1).

32. IA, XII, 366–7 (tr. Richards, III, 208–9); for the distribution of the merchandise, see ibid., XII, 362 (tr. 205).

33. TJG, I, 75 (HWC, 96).

34. IA, XII, 367–8 (tr. Richards, III, 209–10); cf. also TJG, I, 81–3 (HWC, 105–7).


37. TJG, I, 108 (HWC, 135). Turkestan, 444–5 (= Sochinenia, I, 512), points out that there is no evidence that the inhabitants had rebelled.

38. TJG, I, 106, and II, 196 (HWC, 133–4, 463), respectively.

39. Ibid., I, 108 (HWC, 135). Turkestan, 444–5 (= Sochinenia, I, 512), points out that there is no evidence that the inhabitants had rebelled.


42. IA, XII, 390 (tr. Richards, III, 225); cf. also TJG, I, 113 (HWC, 144), and for men from Balkh in the operations at Merv, IA, XII, 391 (tr. Richards, III, 226).


44. IA, XII, 390 (tr. Richards, III, 225); cf. also TJG, I, 113 (HWC, 144), and for men from Balkh in the operations at Merv, IA, XII, 391 (tr. Richards, III, 226).

45. IA, XII, 390 (tr. Richards, III, 225); cf. also TJG, I, 113 (HWC, 144), and for men from Balkh in the operations at Merv, IA, XII, 391 (tr. Richards, III, 226).

46. IA, XII, 390 (tr. Richards, III, 225); cf. also TJG, I, 113 (HWC, 144), and for men from Balkh in the operations at Merv, IA, XII, 391 (tr. Richards, III, 226).

47. IA, XII, 390 (tr. Richards, III, 225); cf. also TJG, I, 113 (HWC, 144), and for men from Balkh in the operations at Merv, IA, XII, 391 (tr. Richards, III, 226).
NOTES to pp. 159–62


56. IA, XII, 376–7 (tr. Richards, III, 216).
57. Ibid., XII, 370 (tr. Richards, III, 211).
59. TJG, I, 115 (HWC, 146).
60. IA, XII, 377–8 (tr. Richards, III, 216), saying that they killed everyone; see 404 (tr. Richards, III, 235), however, for the women and the slaughter of ‘most of its people’. TJG, I, 116 (HWC, 148), is very brief.
61. Yāqūt, I, 198. IA, XII, 382 (tr. Richards, III, 219), mentions only one attempt on the city, as does TJG, I, 116 (HWC, 147). For the massacre, see also Petrushevsky, ‘Socio-economic condition’, 484.
62. IA, XII, 374 (tr. Richards, III, 214). Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1024–5; part of the relevant section is reproduced and tr. in Browne, History of Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion, 96–8.
64. TJG, I, 115, and II, 114 (HWC, 147, 384); for the date of the sack, see II, 112 (HWC, 381).
65. IA, XII, 373 (tr. Richards, III, 213); later, 399 (tr. Richards, III, 231), he alleges that the Mongols killed everyone there.
66. Ibid., XII, 419 (tr. Richards, III, 246).
67. Ibid., XII, 383 (tr. Richards, III, 220).
71. IA, XII, 374, 377 (tr. Richards, III, 214, 216).
72. TJG, II, 147 (HWC, 415).
73. IA, XII, 382 (tr. Richards, III, 220).
75. IA, XII, 374 (tr. Richards, III, 214); for the shihna, see TJG, I, 115 (HWC, 147).
76. IA, XII, 380–1 (tr. Richards, III, 218–19); more briefly in TJG, I, 116 (HWC, 148).
77. Ibid., II, 269 (HWC, 533). The statement in the anonymous Dhayl-i Tārikh-i Ṭabaristan (a mid-fourteenth-century continuation of Ibn Isfandiyār’s history), abridged trans. by Edward G. Browne (Leiden and London, 1905), 257, that Ṭabaristan was without a ruler for thirty years while the Mongols passed to and fro, suggests that devastation continued during the era of Chin Temür and his successors.
78. TN, I, 466 (tr. Raverty, 655); see also II, 165 (tr. 1135).
79. Ibid., II, 158–9 (tr. Raverty, 1118–19).
80. MZ, VIII, part 2, 699 (= MZDMZ, XV, 86). See also HI, 99/128.
84. Ibn Bībī, al-Awāmir, 527–8; Mukhtaṣar, 241 (tr. Duda, 229–30). SSQ, 75 (= VB, xxxi, 147), confirms that the inhabitants in general were spared.
85. IA, XII, 269 (tr. Richards, III, 133). For this episode, see Turkestan¹, 365–6 (= Sochineniia, I, 430–1), though the city is there said to have surrendered.
86. PC, 283 (MM, 37–8).
87. IA, XII, 368 (tr. Richards, III, 209–10); cf. also TJG, I, 95 (HWC, 121).
88. Ibid., I, 70 (HWC, 91).
89. IA, XII, 499 (tr. Richards, III, 306). MZ, VIII, part 2, 666 (= MZDMZ, XV, 55), who mentions the female captives, dates the attack at the beginning of winter.
90. Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ Nahj al-bilāgha, ed. and tr. Djebli, Les invasions mongoles en Orient, Ar. text, 58–9, trans., 63. Cf. also BH, 402, for the governor’s offer, on which MZ and HJ (n. 80 above) are silent.
93. Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, 198/tr. Khanlarian, 177–8, mentions the female captives, dates the attack at the beginning of winter.
94. Balāsāghūn: TJG, II, 92 (HWC, 360), where the number of slain notables alone is set at 47,000. Kāshghar: JQ, Ar. text, cxlvii (Russian trans., 105)/in Turkestan 1, I, 133.
95. IA, XII, 269 (tr. Richards, III, 133). TJG, II, 125 (HWC, 395).
98. TJG, I, 131 (HWC, 167), who does not name him, says that he took over Merv for six months.
99. The text in Nasawī, 121–2 (tr. Houdas, 164–5), is faulty here, and I have used the Persian text, 131–2.
100. For the details, see Turkestan¹, 439–41 (= Sochineniia, I, 506–8).
101. TJG, II, 219–21 (HWC, 483–5).
103. TJG, II, 278 (HWC, 542).
104. Ibid., II, 276, l. 10 (cf. HWC, 540).
105. IW, V, 285. See also MZ, VIII, part 2, 670 (= MZDMZ, XV, 59).
107. Morgan, Mongols¹, 150: the context is Persian historians’ recollections of Ilkhanid rule in the light of the chaos that followed it.
108. TJG, III, 102–3 (HWC, 615–16), fails to mention its earlier capture. JT, II, 981, 984 (DzhT, III, 27, 29–30; CC, 342, 343), clarifies the sequence of events.
109. This is also the view of Amitai, ‘Im Westen nichts Neues?’, arguing against Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 27.
110. JT, II, 1009 (DzhT, III, 53; CC, 350).
111. Ibid., II, 999, 1014–15 (DzhT, III, 44, 58; CC, 347, 353).
112. Ibid., II, 1015–17 (DzhT, III, 59–60; CC, 353–4); see II, 1011 (DzhT, III, 54–5; CC, 352), for the onset of fighting. AM, 33, similarly mentions the massacre of all who emerged from the city. Ṭūsī, Kayfiyyat, 290 (tr. in Boyle, ‘Death of the last Abbasid Caliph’, 160), MTD, 475 (tr. in Wickens, ‘Nasir ad-dīn Ṭūsī’, 35), and al-Nuwayrī, XXVII, 383, assert that the sack lasted seven days; forty days according to IW, VI, 216/156, HJ, 329/359 (tr. in Gilli-Elewy, ‘Al-Hawādīṯ al-ḡāmiʿ a’, 367), Waṣṣāf, 42, ll. 23–24 (GW, I, text, 83, trans., 80), and Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, 318/tr. Khanlarian, 230.
114. Michal Biran, ‘Music in the Mongol conquest of Baghdad: Saḥī al-Dīn Urmawi and the Ilkhanid circle of musicians’, in De Nicola and Melville (eds), Mongols’ Middle East, 133–54; also her ‘Violence and non-violent means in the Mongol conquest of Baghdad
(1258)', in Robert Gleave and István Kristó-Nagy (eds), Violence in Islamic Thought from the Mongols to European Imperialism (Edinburgh, [forthcoming]).


118. **BH**, 435; **MTD**, 486 (Ḥarrān, al-Ruhā and Manbij).


120. **JT**, II, 1026 (DzhT, III, 68; CC, 357).


124. A letter of Thomas Agni di Lentino, papal legate, 1 March 1260, in Barber and Bate (eds), Letters from the East, 154, claims that ‘all’ the inhabitants were killed. For the expectation that the city could hold out for a long time, see **IW**, VI, 265/194.

125. **IW**, VI, 343–7 (not in Rahim’s edn).


133. **BH**, 435. But in **MTD**, 486, the same author (Ibn al-‘Ibri) says merely that it defied him and that the entire populace was slaughtered, as does **HJ**, 340/370.
135. Abū Shāma, 203, l. 25.
136. For the figures, see Morgan, Mongols, 65–72; Lambton, Continuity and Change, 19–20.
137. TJG, I, 17 (trans. in HWC, 25, modified).
138. Ibid., I, 101 (HWC, 128); for the artisans, I, 100 (HWC, 127).
139. BH, 382.
140. Rāzī, Mirād, 9 (tr. Algar, 40); cited (with the figure 700,000) in Lambton, Continuity and Change, 19.
141. Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1025, l. 9 (also in Browne, History of Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion, text at 97, trans. at 98).
142. TN, II, 121 (tr. Raverty, 1038).
143. Sayfī, 80 and 63 respectively.
144. TJ, XLIV, 50 (Cahen, ‘Abdallatif al-Baghdadi, portraitiste’, 127). In the Ghurid era, according to NQ, ed. Dabir-Siyaqi, 187/ed. Le Strange, I (text), 152, II (trans.), 151, Herat had contained 444,000 houses.
145. IA, XII, 393 (tr. Richards, III, 227); the figure also in al-Dimashqi, Nukhbat al-dahr, 225 (tr. Mehren, 312).
147. SSQ, 76 (= VB, xxxi, 147).
148. Li Zhichang, Xi you ji, tr. Waley, Travels of an Alchemist, 93.
149. Ibid., 111. For the inhabitants’ fate, see above, p. 159.
152. Yaqut, IV, 858, wa-ijtama’a akhthar ahl khurasan wa l-ghurabā’. For Nishāpūr, see also p. 175.
155. TJG, I, 128, 130–2 (HWC, 163–4, 166–8). Petrushevsky, ‘Socio-economic condition’, 485, n. 4, charges Juwayni himself with reaching the first total by the arbitrary method of assuming that 100,000 corpses could be counted in each of the thirteen days the sayyid and his colleagues spent on the task. See also Kolbas, ‘Historical epic’, 162–3.
156. IA, XII, 410–11 (tr. Richards, III, 240). Yaqut, I, 798, mentions only the return of those who had fled, accompanied by others.
157. See JT, I, 537 (CC, 186).
159. Jin: TJG, I, 153 (HWC, 195). Rus’ (or possibly, from the context, Magas): ibid., I, 225 (HWC, 270); BH, 398. That the Mongols cut off an ear from each of the slain Poles and Germans after the engagement near Liegnitz (Wahlstatt) in 1241 and filled nine sacks, as stated by the early sixteenth-century Polish author Mathias of Miechow, is therefore highly likely: Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 55.
160. AM, 31.
161. TJG, I, 140 (HWC, 178). IA, XII, 393 (tr. Richards, III, 227), suggests merely that the conquerors were keen to ensure nobody survived.
163. IA, XII, 374 (tr. Richards, III, 214).
164. TJG, I, 138 (HWC, 175).
165. Nasawī, 64 (tr. Houdas, 88; Pers. redaction, 77).
167. Respectively IA, XII, 499 (tr. Richards, III, 306), and MZ, VIII, part 2, 666 (= MZDMZ, XV, 55).
168. MZ, VIII, part 2, 787 (= MZDMZ, XV, 167).
169. BH, 426.
170. JT, II, 1020 (DzhT, III, 63; CC, 355).
171. IW, VI, 269/197. Eddé, ‘Prise d’Alep’, 231; and cf. her Principauté ayyoubide, 178–9. AM, 35, says that ‘most’ (aktīhar) of the population were killed.
173. Xi shiji, tr. in Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, I, 138–9.
174. NT, 83.
175. Krämer, ‘Fall of Baghdad’, 100, for the latter two sources. al-Dhahabī, Duwal al-Islām, tr. Nègre, 267.
176. TG, 589. For the epidemic, see HF, 331/360 (in Gilli-Eleywy, Al-Hawādish al-gāmi’a, 368), which sets the dead at ‘more than 800,000’. Gilli-Eleywy, Bagdad, 31 and n. 105, judges these and still higher figures in later sources as excessive.
177. For popular belief, see Ibn al-‘Īqṭaqā, 190 (tr. Whitting, 136); a faint echo in Waṣṣāf, 25, ll. 20–22 (GW, I, text, 51, trans., 49). AM, 32, and HF, 322/351, 329/359 (tr. in Gilli-Eleywy, Al-Hawādish al-gāmi’a, 362, 367), confirm that the city was vastly overcrowded with refugees from the Sawād: few of them, according to HF, survived, while AM speaks of a high mortality rate due to famine and pestilence. Refugees in the 1230s and 1240s: HF, 109/138, 200/240, 241/285.
179. TJG, I, 95, 101, 140 (HWC, 122, 128, 177). His figure for Gurgānj artisans (p. 169 above) is too high.
180. Sayfī, 106.
184. BH, 439. IW, VI, 216/194, mentions merely the arrival of people ‘from outlying parts and from cities’.
186. WW, II, 4 (no. 249), and IV, 189–90 (no. 1733).
187. Sayfī, 258.
188. al-Dimashqī, Nukhbat al-dahr, 230 (tr. Mehren, 322).
189. TJG, II, 221 (HWC, 485).
192. PC, 314 (MM, 59).
193. Ibid., 270 (MM, 28–9, reading ‘Sakint’).
194. WR, 114/in SF, 226 (MFW, 147).
195. JT, II, 975 (DzHT, III, 22; CC, 340).
198. IA, XII, 389 (tr. Richards, III, 224); for the capture of Südāq, see 386 (tr. Richards, III, 223).
203. IA, XII, 392, 393 (tr. Richards, III, 226, 227).
204. AK, ed. Dominique Sourdel, La description d’Aleppo d’Ibn Sādād (Damascus, 1953), 36; also in ‘Abbārās edn, I, part 1, 116. Eddé, Principauté d’Alep, 179–80. For the looting of the Shi’ī shrines at Aleppo, the Mashhad al-Muḥassin and the Mashhad al-Husayn, see Mulder, Shrines of the ‘Alids, 80, 89.
206. TJG, I, 3–4 (HWC, 5–6).
207. In a letter of 617/1221 to the wazir of Aleppo, which is incorporated in Yāqūt’s biography in Ibn Khallikān’s Wafayāt al-‘ayān: see De Slane’s trans., IV, 17–19.
211. TJG, I, 3 (HWC, 5–6).
212. Ibid., I, 95–6 (HWC, 122).
213. Ibid., I, 5–7 (HWC, 8–10).
214. Ibid., I, 9 (HWC, 13–14).
215. Yāqūt, II, 54. See also TJG, I, 100–1 (HWC, 127).
217. TJG, I, 75 (HWC, 96–7).
218. Yelü Chucai, Xi you lu, tr. De Rachewiltz, 21, 22, respectively. For his impressions of Samarqand, see also Wayne Schlepp, ‘Ye-lü Ch’u-t’s’ai in Samarkand’, Canada Mongolia Review 1, part 2 (1975), 5–14.
221. PC, 270 (MM, 29).
223. Allsen, Commodity and Exchange, 39–40. The figure is from Sayfī, 127.
225. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 121–2, and ‘Population movements’, 131, citing Rashid al-Dīn, Aḥār wa-ahāy, ed. Minūchīhr Sutūda and Irāj Afsār (Tehran, 1368 sh./1989), 144–5. NQ, ed. Dabir-Siyāqi, 97/ed. Le Strange, I (text), 85, II (trans.), 86–7: since Khūy had therefore become known as ‘the Turkistān of Iran’, the settlers here are more likely to have been Kitans than Chinese.
227. Ganja and Erzurum: Kirakos, tr. Bedrosian, 199, 255/tr. Khanlarian, 155, 182. Rayy and Ișfahān: ibid., tr. Bedrosian, 196/tr. Khanlarian, 153–4; but against this must be set the testimony of NQ that Rayy was in a ruined state (p. 179 and n. 243). Grigor Aknerts’i, tr. Blake and Frye, 303, says that Ganja was restored under Chormaghun, who made it his headquarters. See Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog, ‘The Mongol conquerors in Armenia’, in Tubač et al. (eds), Caucasus during the Mongol Period, 53–82 (here 60).
228. Drechsler, Geschichte der Stadt Qom, 238–9.
231. Ibid., II, 238 (HWC, 501).
233. TJG, II, 246–7 (HWC, 510).
235. IF, III, 111 (no. 2297).
236. JTJ, II, 1019, naming the noyan as Qaraqai (DzhT, III, 62; CC, 354–5); see 1017 (DzhT, III, 59; CC, 354) for the burning. Cf. also Ṭūsī, Kayfiyyat, 292 (tr. in Boyle, ‘Death of the last ‘Abbasid Caliph’, 160).
237. Mustanṣiriyya: IF, II, 139. ‘Imād al-Dīn: ibid., II, 125–7 (no. 1169); and see also p. 317 below.
240. E.g., WW, III, 149, 238–9, and IV, 229 (nos 1103, 1249, 1758). Michal Biran, ‘Libraries, books and the transmission of knowledge in Ilkhanid Baghdad’, JESHO [forthcoming].
244. NQ, ed. Dabīr-Siyyāqi, 70/ed. Le Strange, I (text), 64, II (trans.), 69. On Sarjahān, see Krawulsky, Īrān, 308–9.
247. Ibid., ed. Dabīr-Siyyāqi, 170/ed. Le Strange, I (text), 139, II (trans.), 138: from 880,000 dinars in Saljuq times to 676,500.
251. Cf. the comments of Manz, ‘Rule of the infidels’, 133.
Chapter 7 The Era of Inter-Mongol Warfare

2. JT, I, 711 (SGK, 100; CC, 247).
5. For clarification of the fragmentary data, see Aubin, ‘L’ethnogénèse’, 80–2.
9. MA, III, 69 (Lech, Ar. text, 1, German trans., 91); and cf. also 89 (Ar. text, 26, trans., 109).
11. TR, I (text), 107, II (trans.), 85. Cf. Barfield, Perilous Frontier, 212; Jackson, ‘From ulus to khanate’, 14–15; and Biran, Chinggis Khan, 81.
13. Darress, ‘From Mongol empire to Yuan dynasty’, 122, 125–6, 132, estimates the distances. For the two capitals, see Rossabi, Khubilai Khan, 31–4, 131–5, respectively.
16. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 31–3: the exception is coinage struck in Georgia, where, as Allsen points out, the shift to a more distinctively Islamic legitimacy was neither necessary nor desirable. See also his comments ibid., 75, regarding the status of the qaghan’s representative, Bolod Chingsang.
19. MA, III, 126 (Lech, Ar. text, 78, German trans., 144): the account here reads in a slightly confused manner.
27. *JT*, I, 741, and II, 779–80 (SGK, 124, but making Toqto’a’s mother Kelmish Aqa’s grandmother in error, and 160; CC, 256, 270). Here and at I, 722 (SGK, 109; CC, 249), the relationship to Toqto’a varies.
29. Waßâf, 475, ll. 12–16 (GW, IV, 208–9), with a fuller list.
32. See the thorough survey, based on Chinese as well as Muslim sources, in Liu, ‘War and peace’. I have adopted ‘Köpek’, rather than the usual ‘Kebek’, since Köpek’s mother in error, and 160; CC, 256, 270).
34. MA, III, 89 (Lech, Ar. text, 26, ll. 8–12, German trans., 109); passage noticed in Biran, *Qaidu*, n. 49 at 173.
37. *JT*, II, 1067, 1068–9 (*DzhT*, III, 110; CC, 370); at I, 770 (SGK, 152; CC, 267), Baraq says that his troops have grown too numerous and that his ulus cannot support them.
40. Waßâf, 509, ll. 18–21 (GW, IV, 295), furnishes a list of princes from most of these branches in the context of the upheavals of 1305. See Biran, *Qaidu*, 41, 50, 82, for princes who joined or deserted Qaidu at different times; also O. Karaev, *Chagataiskii ulus. Gosudarstvo Khaidu. Mogulistan. Obrazovanie Kyrgyzskogo naroda* (Bishkek, 1995), 30.
41. *JT*, I, 772, and II, 891, 913, 927 (SGK, 144, 153, 265, 286, 299–300; CC, 268, 308, 317, 322); and see also *TU*, 202, 208 (reading ÇWPAN for ÇWBAY in error). For references in YS, see ch. 107, ed. and trans. Louis Hambis (with supplementary notes by Paul Pelliot), *Le chapitre CVII du Yuan che. Les généalogies impériales mongoles dans l’histoire chinoise officielle de la dynastie mongole* (Leiden, 1945 = Supplement to TP 38), n. 8 at 92–3.
42. Mubârak Shâh: *JT*, I, 759, 772 (SGK, 142–3, 153–4; CC, 263, 268). Böjei was a grandson of Baiju, son of Chaghadaï’s son Möetügen (though some mss. of *JT* make Baiju a son of Chaghadaï himself: see CC, 384, n. 1): *SP*, fo. 118b; *Mu‘izz al-ansâb*, fo. 30b, in *IKPI*, III,
For these events, see Barthold, Four Studies, I, 130–1, and Zwölf Vorlesungen, 201–2 (= Sochineniia, II, part 1, 73, and V, 160, respectively).

See Barthold, Four Studies, I, 131 and n. 3 (= Sochineniia, II, part 1, 74 and n. 60). Nalıqo’a appears as a grandson of Būri in JT, I, 753 (CC, 261) and in SP, fo. 118b.

For Talas, see JT, II, 72–4. More fully in Biran, Qaidu, 69–78.

TU, 150.

Nalıqo’a, Ṭabas, 519 (GW, IV, 316); under Nalıqo’a. He had his own governor in Samarqand: TU, 215.


TU, 144. For what we know of its course, see Allsen, ‘Princes of the Left Hand’, 22–5; also M. G. Safargaliev, Raspad Zolotoi Ordy (Saransk, 1960), 62–3.

A word is evidently omitted in JT, I, 48 (DzhT, I, part 1, 91; CC, 20), which appears to state that these two cities belonged to both princes; the text needs to be corrected in view of the phrasing in JT, ed. Jahn, Geschichte der Oğuzen, facs. text, 1 (German trans., 17). Although the Mamlük sources regularly make Qonichi and Bayan rulers also of Ghazna and Bāmiyān, in present-day Afghanistan, this is a misapprehension: Allsen, ‘Princes of the Left Hand’, 25 and n. 85.

Allsen, ‘Princes of the Left Hand’, 26, 32, citing Mu‘in al-Dīn Naṭanżi, Muntakhāb al-tawārīkh, extrait, Jean Aubin, Extraits du Muntakhāb al-tavarih-i Mu‘ini (Tehran, 1336 sh./1957), 88. Naṭanżi wrongly attributes Uṯrār, a Chaghādayd mint-town, to the Blue Horde, but cf. V. P. Schekin, ‘Klad serebrianykh dinarov i dirikhemov chagataidov XIV v., Epigrafika Vostoka 23 (1985), 60–2 (here 62, nos 22–3); Michael Fedorov, A hoard of fourteenth-century Chaghādayd silver coins from North Kirghizstan, Numismatic Chronicle 162 (2002), 404–19 (here 414, nos 22–3, and 415, nos 26–8); and Petrov, ‘Khronologija’, 305–6, 308–10, 314–15. MA, III, 124 (read SWRAN for SWDAQ; cf. Lech, Ar. text, 75, German trans., 142), lists the other four towns among the Jochid possessions. The statement ibid., 99 (text corrupt; see Lech, Ar. text, 38, l. 2, German trans., 116), that Jand and Barchinlighkent were Chaghādayd possessions may be anachronistic, though it is possible that they were forfeited to Orda’s line soon afterwards, during a Jochid campaign in 742/1342, which is mentioned by Shams al-Dīn al-Shujā’ī, Taʿrīkh al-malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn al-Ṣāliḥi wa awlādihi, ed. and tr. Barbara Schäfer, Die Chronik aṣ-Ṣuḡā’īs (Wiesbaden, 1977–85), I (text), 214, 234, II (trans.), 249, 268. Janibeg (1342–58) too is said to have annexed some unspecified Chaghādayd territory: Abū Bakr al-Quṭbī Ahari, Taʿrīkh-i Shaykh Uways (written in or after 760/1359), ed. and tr. J. B. Van Loon (The Hague, 1954), text, 177, trans., 76.

István Vásáry, ‘The beginnings of coinage in the Blue Horde’, AOASH 62 (2009), 371–85 (here 378–80). For the khans’ burials, see Naṭanżi, 88, 89; Ṣeṣūr’s name is possibly a metathetic form of that of the Rus’ town of Riazan. It should be noted that the Mu’izz al-ansāb does not supply any descendants for Sasi Buqa.

Barthold, Four Studies, I, 129–30 (= Sochineniia, II, part 1, 72), suggested that the shift began with the wars of Qaidu and Du’ā against Bayan. But words imputed to the noyan Nawrūz (the context is 1284) might suggest that Qonichi’s territory already lay not far beyond the Oxus: JT, II, 1140 (DzhT, III, 185; CC, 394).

As noted by MA, III, 99 (Lech, Ar. text, 39, ll. 14–15; German trans., 117), renders man yastahāqqu mīrāth al-ṭakht misleadingly as ‘ein Thronprätendent’, ascribing the practice to fear of Chaghādayd attacks, and Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1440, ll. 24–6 (tr. Ward, II, 599); see also Ḥāfiz-i Abrū, Dhayl-i Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh, ed. Khān-bābā Bayānī, 2nd edn (Tehran, 1350 sh./1971), 111.


63. The situation so eloquently outlined for the sixteenth-century Uzbek khanate by McChesney, 'Chinggisid restoration in Central Asia', 281–2, applies in equal measure to the Mongol khanates of the thirteenth century, albeit across a larger canvas. See also Kradin, 'Chinggis Khan', 186–7.


65. Qaraṭāy al-'Izzī al-Khaznadārī, 128, ll. 16–18; cited by Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 80 (but the reference to 1W is an error derived from *SMIZO*, I, 72). See also the comments of Elverskog, *Buddhism and Islam*, 186.


70. Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, *Tāshrif al-ayyām wa l- ʿuṣūr fi sirat al-malik al-Mansūr*, ed. Murād Kāmil and Muḥammad 'Ali al-Najjār (Cairo, 1961), 70; passage trans. in Judith Pfeiffer, 'Aḥmad Tegüder's second letter to Qalāʿūn (682/1283)'; in Pfeiffer and Quinn (eds), *History and Historiography*, 167–202 (here 189). Pfeiffer sees the aim of this second embassy differently and accepts (ibid., 184) that the reconciliation with the Jochids was genuine.

71. ZF, 336; cited by Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 78.


75. *JT*, I, 740 (*SGK*, 124; *CC*, 256); for the envoys, ibid., II, 1097 (*DzhT*, III, 139; *CC*, 380). But *DMZ*, II, 443 (= *MZDMZ*, XVIII, 72), reports news of Abagha's defeat by 'Berke's nephew' (Mengü Temür himself or Noghai?) early in 669/in the winter of 1270–1; Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks*, 88, is sceptical.
76. See TG, 592 (calling the Jochid force lashgari-ya’āzim), and the Mamlûk authors cited by Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 88–9.

77. JT, I, 740 (SGK, 124; CC, 256).

78. Ibid., II, 1176–7 (DzhT, III, 221; CC, 406). This is presumably the Jochid attack, headed by an unidentified commander who was killed, that is described by Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1321–3 (tr. Ward, II, 334–7).

79. JT, II, 1196 (DzhT, III, 238–9; CC, 413).

80. Waṣṣāf, 51, l. 11 (GW, I, text, 99, trans., 95).


82. JT, I, 747–8 (SGK, 129–30; CC, 258–9); and see II, 1265 (DzhT, III, 306; CC, 441), for a visit to the Ilkhan’s court by Noghai’s widow and son Türi (or Büri) in 695/1296, an impossible date.

83. JT, II, 1176–7 (DzhT, III, 221; CC, 413). This is presumably the Jochid attack, headed by an unidentifiable commander who was killed, that is described by Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1321–3 (tr. Ward, II, 334–7).


86. Biran, ‘Mongols in Central Asia’, 57: her source is possibly the fifteenth-century Mamlûk chronicler al-ʿAynī.


88. JT, II, 1527 (DzhT, III, 557; CC, 529).

89. Ibid., II, 1044–6, 1062, 1164 (DzhT, III, 87–8, 103–4, 207–8; CC, 363, 368, 402); for Tama Toqta’s parentage, see I, 724–5 (SGK, 111; CC, 250).


96. Sayfi, 629–30. Petrov, ‘Khronologiiia’, 302–3, dates its subjection to Köpek’s reign (1320–6); see also 305. MA, III, 99 (Lech, Ar. text, 38, l. 5, German trans., 116), includes Badakhshân in the Chaghadayid dominions; though ibid., 105 (Lech, text, 46, trans., 123), it is said to be independent of the neighbouring rulers.

97. JT, II, 1527 (DzhT, III, 557; CC, 529).

98. JT, II, 1527 (DzhT, III, 557; CC, 529).


102. MA, III, 99–100 (Lech, Ar. text, 39–40, German trans., 117–18); see also 118 (Lech, text, 67, trans., 136), for another comment about the inadequacy of the inhabitants of the Golden Horde for war.


104. JT, II, 1222 (DzhT, III, 264; CC, 422), Sayfī, 432.

105. JT, I, 772 (SGK, 153–4; CC, 268).


107. Nāṣir al-Dīn Munshī Kirmānī, Simt al-’ulā lī l-hadrat al-’ulāyā, ed. ’Abbās Iqbāl (Tehran, 1328 sh./1949), 49. TG, 531, describes this as an appeal to Ögödei’s line (i.e. Qaidu). The earlier status of ‘Abd-Allāh may have misled an author writing in Delhi, and describing his invasion of India in 691/1292, into calling him a descendant of ‘Hulū’, i.e. Hülegü: Diya’ al-Dīn Baranī, Tārīkh-i Firūzshāhī (c. 1358), ed. Saiyid Ahmad Khán (Calcutta, 1862), 218.

108. Described at length by Waṣṣāf, 199–202 (GW, II, 119–29); briefer accounts include (with the year 676) in Tārīkh-i shāhī, 281, and (with 677) in Mu’in al-Dīn Ahmad Ibn Zarḵūb, Shīrāz-nāma (Tehran, 1310 sh./1932), 66/ed. Ismā’īl Wā’iz Jawādī (Tehran, 1350 sh./1971), 91–2.

109. JT, II, 772, 1109–10, 1210–11 (SGK, 154, n. 40; DzhT, III, 152–3, 252–3; CC, 268, 384, 417). For the date, see Aubin, ‘L’ethnogénèse’, 85, n. 4. Shimo, ‘Qarāūnās’ presents a good deal of evidence for the subsequent history of these troops, though some of his assumptions should be treated with caution. The details in Grupper, ‘A Barulas family narrative’, 53–9, it should be noted, refer to noyans appointed to command these Ilkhanid Qara’unas.


112. Sarban: Waṣṣāf, 509, l. 25–510, l. 2 (GW, IV, 295); JT, BN ms., ed. in Jahn, Geschichte Gāzān Hānī’s, 26, and in DzhT, III, 577 (CC, 424; not in Rawshan and Mūsawī edn.). Yasa’ur: JT, I, 606–7 (CC, 212), and II, 1226 (more fully in DzhT, III, 578; CC, 423–4). The base on the upper Oxus must have been Sarban’s summer quarters: ibid., I, 628–9 (DzhT, II, part 1, 27–8; SGK, 25–6; CC, 218–19). For this southward expansion, see Kempiners, ‘Vaṣṣāf’s Tajziyat al-amšār’, 180–4.

113. Waṣṣāf, 314, ll. 8–10, 20 (GW, III, 134, 135). On Nawrūz’s defection to Qaidu, see Biran, Qaidu, 57–9.

114. JT, I, 300 (CC, 104–5). For ‘Abd-Allāh’s recall, see ibid., II, 1109 (DzhT, III, 152; CC, 384), dating it in 698 [1298–9], which is too late; also SGK, 144 (omitted in JT, I, 761, and in CC, 263), and cf. the reconstruction of this corrupt passage by Aubin, ‘L’ethnogénèse’, 84, n. 2, and Kempiners, ‘Vaṣṣāf’s Tajziyat al-amšār’, 182–3. Pace Aubin (84, n. 1), he is clearly the ‘Abd-Allāh, son of Bōjei, briefly mentioned at JT, I, 753 (SGK, 138; CC, 260): although Rashid al-Dīn mentions two different genealogies here, he gives only one in SP, fo. 118b. Aubin, ‘L’ethnogénèse’, 82–4, dates ‘Abd-Allāh’s recall soon after 1270; but cf. Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 119, 121–2.


116. Ibid., 368, l. 3 (not in Ménard’s edn.).

117. JT, II, 1229 (DzhT, III, 271–2; CC, 425); at I, 757 (SGK, 141; CC, 262), they are said merely to have done much damage in Khurāsān and killed many Muslims. Waṣṣāf, 314, ll. 11–13 (GW, III, 135), specifies that Nawrūz himself plundered Tūs.

118. Sayfī, 401–18, gives a detailed account. There is a brief mention of their invasion in JT, II, 1261 (DzhT, III, 302; CC, 440); cf. also I, 757 (SGK, 141; CC, 262).

119. Waṣṣāf, 344, ll. 15–17 (GW, III, 208).

120. JT, II, 1109 (DzhT, III, 152; CC, 384), and Waṣṣāf, 368–71 (GW, III, 263–70): the invading army is here said to have been sent by Qutluğ Qocha himself, who was, however, dead by this date (see above). The year 699 that Waṣṣāf gives throughout for these operations is a year too early, since he makes them coincide with the revolt of Maḥmūd Shāh in Kirmān, which lasted well into 700/1300. Kirmānī, Simt al-’ulā, 89, confirms the year 700 for the Ghaghadaiyid invasion.
121. For these attacks on the Ilkhanate, see generally JT, I, 628–9, 758 (DzhT, II, part 1, 28–30; SGK, 25, 142; CC, 218–19, 262), and TU, 18–20 (date missing, but clearly the invasion of 1302–3).

122. NQ, ed. Dabir-Siyāqi, 197/ed. Le Strange, I (text), 159, II (trans.), 156.

123. MP, II, 2 (tr. Ricci, 54; tr. Latham, 74).


125. Qutlug Qocha's death: TU, 193, 201, and Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 222. His brothers: Waṣṣāf, 510, 517 (GW, IV, 295–6, 312), and TU, 149–50.


127. TG, 617. Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1464, ll. 3–9 (tr. Ward, III, 652). Hence Hafız-i Abrū, Dhayl-i Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh, 167–8; but in his Jughrāfīyya, fos 294b–295a, he supplies a slightly more detailed account, the source of which is unknown.

128. IB, III, 41–2, 87–8 (tr. Gibb, 561, 589–90). Hafız-i Abrū, Jughrāfīyya, fo. 308a, indicates that N. E. Khurāsān ('Balkh, Taliqān, Andkhūd and Shabūrghān', as far as the borders of Badakhshān and Bāmiyān) was under Chaghadayi id rule at the death of the Ilkhan Abū Sa‘īd (1335).

129. MA, III, 40; also ed. and tr. Otto Spies, Ibn Fadlallāh al-‘Omarīs Bericht über Indien in seinen Werke Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amsār (Leipzig, 1943), Ar. text, 8 (German trans., 30)/tr. Iqṭidar Husain Siddiqi and Qazi Muhammad Ahmad, A Fourteenth-Century Arab Account of India under Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq (Aligarh, [1972]), 32.

130. TJK, I, 75 (HWC, 96–7); see also I, 84–5 (HWC, 107–9), specifically on Bukhārā. See above, pp. 176–7.

131. JT, II, 927 (SGK, 300; CC, 322).

132. The son who was allegedly slain, the shaykh al-islām Burhān al-Dīn, has possibly been confused with his elder brother, Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad, who is said to have been killed in Bukhārā on Wed. 16 Jumādā I 661/28 March 1263: Iraj Afshar, 'Saif- al- Din Ḥusayn, known occurrence of the term 'Population movements', 135–6. Waṣṣāf, 77 (GW, I, text, 154–5, trans., 147–8). Kish and Nakhshab are mentioned only in the version in JT, II, 1098–1100 (DzhT, III, 140–2; CC, 380–1).

133. Waṣṣāf, 78, ll. 10–13 (GW, I, text, 156, trans., 148): the erroneous year given, 694, is due to the common confusion between sab ‘in (70) and tis ‘in (90) in Arabic-Persian script. JT; II, 1100 (DzhT, III, 142; CC, 381), says that Chūbei and Qaban devastated the region for three years and confirms that it lay desolate for (a further) seven.

134. TR, I (text), 106, II (trans.), 85. For the putative sense of Jata, see TMEN, III, 55–6 (no. 1071); and for the equation with Qazaq, Barthold, Zwölf Vorlesungen, 215 (= Sochinenia, V, 170), and Peter B. Golden, 'Migrations, ethnogenesis', in CHIA, 109–19 (here 117). Martinez, 'Some notes on the Il-xānid army', 232, however, links it with Mo. root yada- (dzada-), 'poor', 'indigent'. On Tu. qazaq (possibly from qaz-, 'to wander') and the related abstract noun qazaqliq, see now especially Maria E. Subtelny, Timurids in Transition: Turko-Persian Politics and Acculturation in Medieval Iran (Leiden and Boston, MA, 2007), 29–30 and n. 73; and Yuri Bregel, 'Uzbeks, Qazaqs and Turkmens', in CHIA, 221–36 (here 225, nn. 15 and 16).

135. JQ, Ar. text, excii, but reading JAYH for JTA’YH and misinterpreting it as ‘collectors of taxes’ (Russian trans., 143); cf. the text in Turkestan’, I, 146. This is the earliest known occurrence of the term Jata. Michele Bernardini, Mémoire et propagande à l’époque timouride (Paris, 2008), 61, however, regards its application to the troops of Mughalistan as a later phenomenon.

136. NQ, ed. Le Strange, I (text), 262, II (trans.), 255.

137. Waṣṣāf, 517, ll. 1–2 (GW, IV, 312). TU, 37, with LYCH in error for KNJK (ms. Ayasofya 3109, fo. 18a, reads LJH).

138. Waṣṣāf, 519, ll. 18–24 (GW, IV, 318).

yūt (Mo. dzud), i.e. starvation of livestock when vegetation is rendered inaccessible to the horses by dense frozen snow: see TMEN, IV, 209–11 (no. 1911, 'Epizootie, Viehsterben im Winter durch Unzugänglichkeit des Futters').


142. JT, II, 882 (SGK, 258; CC, 305).

143. Waṣṣaḥāf, 77 (GW, I, text, 154, trans., 147). JT makes no mention of operations in Khwārazm.

144. JT, I, 625–6 (DzhT, II, part 1, 19; SGK, 23; CC, 217).

145. Ibid., I, 745–6 (SGK, 127–8; CC, 257–8).

146. MA, III, 139 (Lech, Ar. text, 94, German trans., 154).

147. One is reminded of the flourishing Frisian emporium of Dorestad, of which a Carolingian annalist says that the Vikings 'destroyed everything' there in 834, 'laid it waste and looted it savagely' in 835 and 'devastated' it in 836, and then assures us, in all seriousness, that they 'fell on it with . . . fury and exacted tribute' in 837: The Annals of St-Bertin, tr. Janet L. Nelson (Manchester and New York, 1991), 30, 33, 35, 37. See Else Roesdahl, Viking Age Denmark, tr. Susan Margeson and Kirsten Williams (London, 1982), 210. But the Mongol armies were surely more numerous than those of the ninth-century Vikings and the cities they sacked incomparably more populous than Dorestad.

148. Marco Polo, tr. Ricci, 394/tr. Latham, 310 (not in Ménard's edn); though Berke is said below to have 350,000 (tr. Ricci, 395, 396/tr. Latham, 311). JT, II, 1032 (DzhT, III, 75; CC, 359).

149. MA, III, 99 (Lech, Ar. text, 39, German trans., 117). Hayton, French text, 214, 215, Latin trans., 335. For these and other figures, see Biran, Qaidu, 85–6. Spuler, Goldene Horde, 376, sets the maximum size of the Golden Horde army at 60,000, which in my opinion is too low.


152. JT, I, 747 (SGK, 129; CC, 258); see also I, 606 (CC, 211), and SP, fo. 107b (both of which add 'Mājār', i.e. Hungarians), and Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 207–9, for the ethnic composition of Jochid armies.

153. JT, I, 747 (SGK, 129; CC, 258); see also I, 606 (CC, 211), and SP, fo. 107b (both of which add 'Mājār', i.e. Hungarians), and Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 207–9, for the ethnic composition of Jochid armies.


155. See Morgan, 'Mongol armies in Persia'; 88–91; also the comments of Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 193–4, 198, 206–7, discussing the numbers for Möngke's reign.

156. Goriatcheva, 'À propos de deux capitales', 97 (citing Maḥmūd Walī).

157. NQ, ed. Le Strange, I (text), 256, II (trans.), 249. Shabānḵārā'ī, 231, already confused it with Almālīgh.

158. JT, I, 630 (omitted in SGK; CC, 219).

never visited) was in ruins, ibid., III, 63 (tr. Gibb, 574), is confirmed by NQ, ed. Dabir-
Siyāqī, 195/ed. Le Strange, I (text), 157, II (trans.), 154. Ḥāfīz-i Abrū says that it lay in
ruins until the Timurid Shāh Rukh ordered its repopulation in 812/1410: Jughhrāfiyya,
160. Yazdi, ZN, ed. Urunbaev, fo.80a, ll. 12–13: Yazdi too dated its ruined state from Chinggis
Khan’s time.
161. On which see A. Mahdī Ḥusain, The Rehla of Ibn Battūta (Baroda, 1953), n. 5 at 1–2.
162. MA, III, 115 (Lech, Ar. text, 62; cf. German trans., 133). Barthold, Four Studies, I, 132, n. 2, and Zwölf Vorlesungen, 202 (= Schocheniniia, II, part 1, 74–5, n. 63, and V, 161,
respectively), suggested that this description reflected the events of the early four-
teenth century.
164. See the remarks of Petrushevsky, ‘Socio-economic condition’, 491–2, and Lambton,
Continuity and Change, 173–84 passim.
165. JT, II, 884 (SGK, 260; CC, 305).
166. Ibid., I, 769 (SGK, 151; CC, 267).
167. Ibid., II, 1066, 1069–70 (DzhT, III, 108–9, 111; CC, 370, 371).
168. Waṣṣāf, 71, l. 6 (GW, I, text, 141, trans., 134). Biran, Qādī, 30.
385–94 (here 391–2). For other examples (a number of which are from the post-
Ilkhanid period), see Gronke, Derwische, 62–3, 66–7.
170. JT, II, 1078, 1097 (DzhT, III, 120, 138; CC, 374, 380). Cf. DMZ, II, 434, 435 (= MZDMZ,
XVIII, 64); ID, VIII, 148; and IAF, part 1, 521. Biran, ‘Battle of Herat’, 191.
172. JT, II, 1224 (DzhT, III, 266; trans. in CC, 422, modified).
173. Ibid., II, 1477 (DzhT, III, 509; CC, 511).
174. Jurma: either the Šōnit commander who arrived with Chormaghun and on whom see
JT, I, 74 (DzhT, I, part 1, 155; CC, 31, ‘Chorma’), or his namesake of the Tatar tribe, as
ibid., I, 88 (DzhT, I, part 1, 191; CC, 35, ‘Joma’); at the latter point, the editors of the
Persian text adopt the reading IWRMH. Ughan: ibid., I, 71 (DzhT, I, part 1, 145; CC, 29).
175. 1278–9: Waṣṣāf, 202, ll. 11–12 (GW, II, 127, omits the name); cited by Lambton, Mongol
fiscal administration’ [Part I], 83. 1301: Waṣṣāf, 368, l. 13–369, l. 8; the erroneous reading of
Ūghāniyān as Afghāniyān, found, for example, in GW, III, 263–5 (‘Afghānīn und
Dschurmanen’), misled Martinez, ‘Some notes on the Īl- xānid army’ , 220–1.
176. Kirmānī, Simīţ al-lūlā, 58. Mu‘in al-Dīn Yazdi, Mawāhib-i lāhī dar ta’rīkh-i āl-i Muzaffar,
ed. Sa‘dī Nafīsī (Tehran, 1326 sh./1947), 171 ff., cited by Lambton, Continuity and
Change, 18. Ḵᵛājā Khutbū, Tārīkh-i āl-i Muzaffar, ed. ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Nawā’ī (Tehran,
GW, I, 239, trans., 223); see also 136, l. 3, shayāţīn (GW, I, text, 277, trans., 259). For their depredations, see JT, II, 1137, 1147 (DzhT, III, 181–2, 193; CC, 393, 396). Shimo, ‘Qarāūnās’ , 144–8, establishes that the ravaging of Dāmghān,
on which see Waṣṣāf, 129, ll. 6–8 (GW, I, text, 264, trans., 245), was the work of a
Qaraun group stationed in the Bādghīs area under the noyan Hindu.
177. JT, II, 1225 (DzhT, III, 267; CC, 423).
178. Waṣṣāf, 118, ll. 16–17, nasnās-ṣifat and na-nās wa-dar miyān-i mughūl az ishān
bibāktar nabāshad (GW, I, text, 239; cf. trans., 223); see also 136, l. 3, shayāţīn (GW, I,
text, 277, trans., 259). For their depredations, see JT, II, 1137, 1147 (DzhT, III, 181–2,
193; CC, 393, 396). Shimo, ‘Qarāūnās’, 144–8, establishes that the ravaging of Dāmghān,
on which see Waṣṣāf, 129, ll. 6–8 (GW, I, text, 264, trans., 245), was the work of a
Qaraun group stationed in the Bādghīs area under the noyan Hindu.
179. JT, II, 1225 (DzhT, III, 267; CC, 423).
180. Ibid., II, 1288 (DzhT, III, 330; CC, 449).
587–8, with 6,000 in error). TU, 54, 82, mentions only Sarban and Temūr. For these and
other immigrant princes, see Kempiners, ‘Vaṣṣār’s Taţziyat al-amšār’, 184–6.
Ūghāniyān allies, see Biran, ‘Diplomacy and chancellery practices’, 378, n. 44.
184. Yasa‘ūr’s overthrew is narrated by Sayfī, 765–9. See further Bosworth, History of the
Saffarids, 437–8.
Chapter 8 Pax Mongolica and a Transcontinental Traffic


3. Although Susan Whitfield, ‘Was there a Silk Road?’, AMTM 3 (2007), 201–13, queries the usefulness of the term, I employ it here for the sake of convenience.


13. I have adapted slightly the useful taxonomy in A. P. Martinez, ‘Institutional developments, revenues and trade’, in *CHIA*, 89–108 (here 100–1), since (as he points out) bullion, his second category, was normally classed with the first.


17. As did Ögödei in 1229: SH, § 274, tr. De Rachewiltz, 205 (and see commentary at 1007–8); see also IA, XII, 502 (tr. Richards, III, 308–9), for the ‘fine textiles’ demanded from Azerbaijan in 628/1231. For the Uighur tribute, see SH, § 238, tr. De Rachewiltz, 163.

18. JT, II, 1135 (*DzhT*, III, 179; CC, 392); and see Allsen, *Commodity and Exchange*, 57.


23. 1288: al-Nuwayrī, XXVII, 354–5, and ZF, 262; the details of this engagement are muddled, since it is here linked with the mutiny against Qubilai’s son Nomoghan, which is known to have occurred in 1275 (see p. 185 above). 1297–9: Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *al-Tawfīq al-mulākīyya fi l-dawlat al-turkīyya*, ed. ’Abd al-Ḥamīd Şāliḥ Ḥamdān (Cairo, 1407/1987), 152, 159; ZF, 347.


NOTES to pp. 213–16


27. JT, I, 88, and II, 975 (DzHT, I, part 1, 189, and III, 22; CC, 35, 340); JT, ed. Jahn, Indiengeschichte, Ar. text, Tafel 61, II. 18–19 (German trans., 56)/Khalili Coll. ms., fo. 268b, facsimile in Blair, Compendium.

28. See Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 116–18, 237.

29. O. D. Chekhovich (ed.), Bukharskie dokumenty XIV veka (Tashkent, 1965), text, 109 (Russian trans., 184); and see the editor’s introduction, 22.


31. Barani, Ta’rikh- i Firuzshāhī, 53.

32. On which see Yasuhiro Yokkaichi, ‘Horses in the east-west trade between China and Iran under Mongol rule’, in Fragner et al. (eds), Pferde in Asien, 87–97.


35. This can be inferred from scattered information in MA, III, 124, 125 (Lech, Ar. text, 75, 77, German trans., 142, 143). Egorov, Istoricheskaiia geografiiia, 30, 45, 55, identifies Chūlmān as a river and district in Siberia.


38. TN, II, 163 (tr. Raverty, 1133).


40. WR, 98/in SF, 216 (MFW, 135).


43. MP, I, 149 (tr. Latham, 26/tr. Ricci, 32–3).
44. Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum fidelium crucis, 23 (tr. Lock, 51).
47. Martin, Treasure of the Land of Darkness, 29–32.
56. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 72.
57. Waṣṣāf, 505–7 (GW, IV, 285–7); such is the reason proposed by Jean Aubin, ‘Les princes d’Ormuz du XIIIe au XVe siècle’, JA 241 (1953), 77–138 (here 96), and Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 34.
58. JT, II, 946 (SGK, 319; CC, 328).
60. Waṣṣāf, 454, ll. 11–12, and 476, ll. 17–23 (GW, IV, 150, 211–12). See Biran, Qaidu, 72, 103. The effects of inter-Mongol warfare on the land routes are discussed by Martinez, ‘Eurasian overland and Pontic trades’, 138–9, 153–4.
61. Waṣṣāf, 519, l. 21 (GW, IV, 318).
65. Pegolotti, Pratica, 22 (tr. in Yule, Cathay, III, 152). Such a statement is absent from the anonymous treatise of c. 1315, edited in Bautier, ‘Les relations économiques’, and referred to earlier (p. 215).
66. JT, I, 755, muta’alliqān-i īshān bigrift-u muṣādara kard (SGK, 140; CC, 261); cf. also I, 1072 (DzhT, III, 114; CC, 372), where livestock belonging to both sovereigns are involved.
67. Sūdāq alone is mentioned by DMZ, ed. Guo, II (text), 70–1 (= MZDMZ, XXI, 68; cf. Guo’s trans., I, 127); al-Jazārī, Hawādith al-zamān, ed. ’Umar ’Abd al-Salām Tadmurī (Ṣaydā, 1419/1998), I, 441; and IAF, part 2, 629–31. ZF, 327 (= SMIZO, I, Ar. text, 88–9, Russian trans., 111–12), lists the other towns, on which see Alexander I. Aibabin, ‘Cities and steppes of the Crimea in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries according to the archaeological data’, in Schmieder and Schreiner (eds), Il codice Cumanico, 297–334. The
Sivas chronicle, dating Noghai’s advance on Solghat on the feast of St James (25 July), mentions only the capture of traders, blaming over 15,000 deaths on blizzards: Galstian, Armianskie istochniki, 32. JT, I, 746 (SGK, 127; CC, 258), is brief. See also Ciocîltan, Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, 161–2.

68. Waşşaf, 505, ll. 23–4 (GW, IV, 285).
69. TU, 204–5, 208.
70. Waşşaf, 476, l. 23–477, l. 2 (GW, IV, 212).
71. Ibid., 51, ll. 11–13, where NQAY is surely an error for TQTAY (cf. GW, I, text, 99, trans., 95).
72. JT, II, 1063, 1164 (DzhT, III, 104, 207–8; CC, 368, 402).
73. Ibid., II, 1302 (DzhT, III, 344–5; CC, 454).
74. TU, 146; cited by Ciocîltan, Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, 174.
75. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 144: Berke and Hülegü are mentioned in the very next line. She sees the situation deteriorating only gradually, as the ‘subgroups’ became ‘assimilated in their conquered territories’ and ‘increasingly diverse and ... progressively at odds with one another’ (ibid., 144–5).
76. Ciocîltan, Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, 32.
77. Morris Rossabi, ‘The “decline” of the Central Asian caravan trade’, in Gary Seaman (ed.), Ecology and Empire: Nomads in the Cultural Evolution of the Old World (Los Angeles, CA, 1990), 81–102 (here 86; though admitting also that there was ‘much strife and even actual warfare among the various Mongol khanates’). Kradin, ‘Chinggis Khan’, 176–7, sees the upheavals after Möngke’s death as having only a temporary effect.
79. May, Mongol Conquests, 123.
80. Amitai-Preiss, ‘Northern Syria between the Mongols and Mamluks’, 143.
83. The growing importance of seaborne commerce has been pointed out by Bentley, Old World Encounters, 115, and Endicott-West, ‘Merchant associations’, 147.


98. An excellent introduction is Allsen, ‘Mongols as vectors’.


100. See the examples in Biran, ‘Encounters among enemies’, 33–7.

101. IA, XII, 503 (tr. Richards, III, 309).


103. Li Zhichang, Xi you ji, tr. Waley, 93, 94, 97; see also above, p. 110.

104. TJG, I, 101 (HWC, 128). On the basis of Chinese evidence, Allsen, Commodity and Exchange, 35–6, is able to date their arrival in the East to 1223.


108. YS, ch. 120; cited by Allsen, Commodity and Exchange, 43–4.

109. Allsen, ‘Population movements’, 134 [the italics are his].

110. JT, II, 1027 (DzhT, III, 69; CC, 357).
111. MTD, 489–90. BH, 438, gives a less detailed account. JT, II, 1034 (DzhT, III, 76; CC, 359), is still briefer. But the biographical notice in IF, V, 117 (no. 4753), has him leaving al-Nāṣir’s service at an earlier juncture.


113. JT, I, 8–9 (DzhT, I, part 1, 16–17; CC, 3). See also Lane, ‘Intellectual jousting’, 242–3.


117. Kadoi, Islamic Chinoiserie, 86.

118. For an admirably succinct overview, see Biran, ‘Mongol empire and civilizational exchange’, 541–5.

119. IA, XII, 503 (tr. Richards, III, 309); cited by Allan, ‘Chinese silks and Mosul metalwork’, 55. See also Kadoi, Islamic Chinoiserie, 18.

120. Kadoi, Islamic Chinoiserie, 44–5, 82–3.


122. BS, ch. 203, cited in Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, I, 4, and in Rossabi, ‘Muslims in the early Yüan’, 287; see further SCC, V, part 6, 222–3. The city fell two years or so before the Venetians reached China; but see Haw, Marco Polo’s China, 116. For a possible difference between Muslim and Chinese trebuchets, see above, p. 138.

123. SCC, III, 372–5. Rossabi, ‘Muslims in the early Yüan’, 286. For his career, see Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 166–70, correcting certain misapprehensions.


129. IF, V, 489.

130. JT, ed. Jahn, Chinageschichte, Pers. text, Tafel 2, ll. 21–25 (German trans., 22)/ed. Wang, 84. For the Chinese scholar, see Yoichi Isahaya, ‘History and provenance of the

131. The misnomer is pointed out by Isahaya, ibid., 20–2.


135. Ibid., III, 317.

136. Ibid., III, 440 (no. 2927). AA, IV, 2060–1, however, says merely that he studied astronomy and the rest of mathematics (al-hay’a wa-baqiyat al-riyāḍī) under Ṭūsī.

137. Ibid., III, 504, 533 (nos 3070, 3137).


140. That the SP too contains sections on the popes and emperors (fos 149a–170a) and on the Chinese dynasties (fo. 170b–end) has tended to attract less notice.


142. JT, ed. Jahn, Indiengeschichte, Pers. text, Tafeln 34–42 (incomplete)/Ar. text, Tafeln 68–80 (German trans., 70–104)/Khalili Coll. ms., fos 272a–278a, in Blair, Compendium.


144. Rashīd al-Dīn, Tanksūq-nāma- yi ilkhānī dar funūn-i ulūm-i khitā’i, ed. Mujtabā Minuwi as Tanksūq-nāma yā ʿīb-b-ī ahl-i khitā (Tehran, 1350 sh./1972), 7. On this work, see Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 144–5. For Tu. tansuq, see TMEN, II, 570–3 (no. 939, tansuq, ‘ein Geschenk . . .; kostbar’).


149. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 134–8.

150. For Part I: see above, p. 27; for Part II, see Shiraiwa, ‘Rashīd al-Dīn’s primary sources’, 52–6.

151. JT, I, 35, and II, 1338 (DzhīT, I, part 1, 66–7, and III, 379; CC, 13, 465), for his unparalleled knowledge of Mongol and Turkish history; also II, 1308 (DzhīT, III, 351; CC, 456). Ibid., II, 899 (CC, 311), for his familiarity with Yuan China.
152. JT, ed. Jahn, Chinageschichte, Pers. text, Tafel 4, ll. 7–8 (German trans., 23–4)/ed. Wang, 86. I follow the reconstructions suggested tentatively by Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 92. In this passage, the word taʾrīkh is clearly used in two distinct senses: in the context of the two men's skills, it is less likely to mean 'history' than 'calendar', for which sense see Isahaya, ‘Tārīkh-i Qitā’, 149.


156. John Andrew Boyle, 'Bīrūnī and Rashīd al-Dīn', CAJ 21 (1977), 4–12; repr. in Boyle, Mongol World Empire.

157. E.g. JT, ed. Jahn, Indiengeschichte, Pers. text, Tafeln 1, ll. 6–7, and 34, ll. 1–2/Ar. text, Tafeln 43, ll. 8–9, and 68, l. 35 (German trans., 19, 70)/Khalili Coll. ms., fos 259b, 272a, in Blair, Compendium. For bakhshī, see p. 299 and n. 12 at p. 520.


160. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 67–9, 115–16. For Bolod as a ba'urchi, see ibid., 73; JT, I, 197 (DzhT, I, part 1, 518; CC, 73).


162. JT, I, 9 (CC, 3). Muginov, 'Persidskaia unikal’naia rukopis’', 374. For evidence that the Ṣuwar was completed, see Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 103–4.

163. See especially Allsen, Biography of a cultural broker, and Culture and Conquest, 63–80.


166. MZDMZ, XXI, 356–7. Lech, introduction, 29, 32, 34, 35–6, 37. For another such visitor to China who returned much earlier (prior to 682/1283, since he is said to have joined Muhuyi al-Din al-Maghribi at Marāgha), see IF, I, 146–7 (no. 121).


169. IF, IV, 65 (no. 3345).


171. Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic Worlds, 140–1.

172. Cited by George Lane, 'The Phoenix Mosque', in De Nicola and Melville (eds), Mongols' Middle East, 237–76 (here 244–6).


180. Nasser D. Khalili Collection, ms. 727, fo. 11a. See Blair, ‘Tabriz: International entrepôt’, 327: as she points out, the artists do not exactly betray an over-familiarity with the conventions of Chinese iconography.

181. For these characteristic Chinese motifs, see Kadoi, *Islamic Chinoiserie*, 23–32.


184. For another example (if from a somewhat different context), see Persis Berlekamp, *Painting as persuasion: A visual defense of alchemy in an Islamic manuscript of the Mongol period*, *Muqarnas* 20 (2003), 35–59.

185. See generally Eva Baer, *The Human Figure in Islamic Art: Inheritances and Transformations* (Costa Mesa, CA, 2004), 26–31.


188. See Blair, ‘Tabriz: International entrepôt’, 323–5, for this and another borrowing from Christian (possibly English) art.


191. JTG, III, 270 (HWC, 719).


199. Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, 23 (cf. Whitting trans., 16, with that of Martinez, 'Changes in chancel-

lery languages', 113).
200. JT, II, 1048–9 (DzhT, III, 90–1; CC, 364): hikmat could mean, more narrowly, medicine. For Hūlegū's interest in alchemy, see also p. 300; for his reputation as a patron of scholars, see Biran, 'Libraries, books, and the transmission of knowledge', JESHO [forthcoming].
201. George Saliba, 'Horoscopes and planetary theory: Ilkhanid patronage of astronomers', in Komaroff (ed.), Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan, 357–68; though he believes that the Ilkhan's interest in astrology has been overstated.
202. The point is well made by Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 175; see also 211.
204. Komaroff, for instance, in her introduction to Beyond the Legacy, 7, doubts whether the Mongol rulers' personal tastes played much part in these designs.
205. Rossabi, 'Mongol empire and its impact', 221; Yuan patronage of painting is discussed in ibid., 219–22.
208. Hillenbrand, 'Propaganda', 32–8. For another set of miniatures that express these themes, see Teresa Fitzherbert, 'Religious diversity under Ilkhanid rule c. 1300 as reflected in the Freer Bal'ami', in Komaroff (ed.), Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan, 390–406 (esp. 392–7); though the patron in this case was probably the Christian governor of Mosul.
211. See the remarks of Allsen, 'Mongols as vectors', 149–50, regarding 'intellectual properties'.
214. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 207.
215. Ibid., 152–3.
222. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 174–5. For a list, see Isahaya, ’Tārīkh-i Qitā’, 150.
Chapter 9 Mediated Sovereignty: The Client Muslim Kingdoms


2. The history of all those in Iran is sketched by Spuler, Mongolen⁴, 117–38. Fuller narratives for Fārs, Kirmān and Herat are provided in Lane, Early Mongol Rule, ch. 5, 'The provinces', and for Shabānkāra in Aubin, Ėmīrs mongols, 69–80. The standard work on Fārs is now, of course, Aigle, Le Fārs sous la domination mongole. For the Saljuqids of Rūm, see Charles Melville, 'Anatolia under the Mongols', in Kate Fleet (ed.), The Cambridge History of Turkey, I. Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453 (Cambridge, 2009), 51–101.

3. TJG, II, 267, 268 (HWC, 531, 532).

4. Ibid., II, 232 (HWC, 495).

5. Ibid., I, 58 (HWC, 77).

6. JQ, Ar. text, clxxix (Russian trans., 132)/in Turkestan⁴, I, 140. Shabānkāra'i, 232, who confuses the princes of Almaligh with Arslan Khan's descendants (above, p. 90), makes the latter rule there until recent times.

7. On these local princes, see Barthold, Zwölf Vorlesungen, 188–90 (= Sochineniia, V, 151–2); examples (from JQ) in Biran, Qaidu, 174, n. 213. A grandson of the malik of Khotan is mentioned in TJ, II, 88 (the context is Ghazan's first invasion of Syria in 1299).


11. Shifā' al-qulūb fī manāqib banī Ayyūb, BL ms. Add. 7311: see fos 124b ff for this branch. The last date mentioned (fo. 127a) is the 'Īd al-fiṭr (1 Shawwāl) 812/7 Feb. 1410. See S. Ory, Ḥiṣn Kayfā', EF, III, 506–8.


13. IF, V, 579 (no. 5736). AK, ed. 'Abbāra, III, part 2, 510, 541: this was Sharaf al-Dīn 'Abd-Allāh al-Lāwī, at one time master of the horse (āmir ākhūr) to Shihāb al-Dīn Ghāzī.


31. The principal source is TJG, II, 149–50, 165, 205–6, 211–14 (HWC, 417–18, 433, 472–3, 476–9). The date of Baraq Ḥājīb’s embassy to the qaghan can be inferred from the fact that Juwashāi makes it coincide with the Mongol investment of Shahr-i Sīstān; but the head, for which see JT, I, 658 (DzhT, II, part I, 102; SGK, 50; CC, 228), may have been sent with an earlier mission.

32. TJG, II, 255 (HWC, 518–19). For this narrower sense of ‘Sīstān’, see Waṣṣāf, 81, l. 3 (GW, I, text, 163, trans., 154); Aubin, ‘L’ethnogénèse’, 91.


34. Sayfī, 71–2, 74; see p. 159 above.

35. Waṣṣāf, 80, l. 25–81, l. 4 (GW, I, text, 163, trans., 154).


38. TJG, I, 95 (HWC, 121–2); cf. also JT, II, 503 (CC, 175). Sayfī, 151, 156, specifies that Shams al-Dīn’s uncle Rukn al-Dīn had received such a yarligh.

39. Sayfī, 139, heard that he took over in the year that Shams al-Dīn Kālyūnī died (see p. 121 above).


43. See the discussion in Charles Melville, ‘The Mongols in Iran’, in Komaroff and Carboni (eds), Legacy of Genghis Khan, 37–61 (here 43–6); also Barthold, Historical Geography, 219. Öljeitū’s seasonal migrations were confined to the north and north-west quadrant of Iran, except when he was engaged in military campaigns: Melville, ‘Itineraries’, 58.


47. I follow the reconstruction of events in Kolbas, *Mongols in Iran*, 132, 151.
51. *MA*, III, 133 (Lech, Ar. text, 86, German trans., 148).
52. Ibn Bazzāz, 384.
55. Ibid., II, 233, 278 (*HWC*, 497, 542–3).
56. Thus Spuler, *Mongolen* 4, 290, lists Ṣadr al-Dīn among the ‘governors’ of Tabrīz.
57. For comparison, see the analysis of the ‘new political relationship’ imposed on the Rus’ princes after 1240, in Martin, *Medieval Russia*, 163–7; and for the princes of Greater Armenia, Dashdondog, ‘Mongol conquerors in Armenia’, 68–73.
62. *AK*, ed. ‘Abbāra, III, part 2, 505. That Hūlegū was set on the destruction of strongpoints is confirmed by Waṣṣāf, 423, ll. 22–3 (GW, IV, 78).
64. Waṣṣāf, 163, l. 24–164, l. 1 (GW, II, 39).
69. Waṣṣāf, 49, l. 23 (GW, I, text, 96, trans., 92).
70. Cahen, ‘Contribution’, 68.
73. Fennell, *Crisis of Medieval Russia*, 78.
74. Waṣṣāf, 157, ll. 8–9 (GW, II, 25); the figure appears incorrectly as 1,000 in Aigle, *Fārs*, 103, and ‘Iran under Mongol domination’, 75.
77. *AK*, ed. ‘Abbāra, III, part 1, 237–8, 241–2; the passages are translated (from the Berlin ms.) in Patton, *Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’*, appendix, 85–6, 88–90.
NOTES to pp. 253–7


83. Waṣṣâf, 374 (GW, III, 276–7).

84. TG, 543, 544.

85. JT, II, 1015 (*DzhT*, III, 58; CC, 353). Mustawfî, ZN, II, 1215, ll. 23–7 (tr. Ward, II, 115), has Hûlegû send Lu'lu' the heads of seven executed caliphal commanders.

86. Waṣṣâf, 157, ll. 10–11, and 181, ll. 6–12 (GW, II, 25, 78–9), respectively.

87. PC, 319 (MM, 62).

88. AK, ed. 'Abbâra, III, part 2, 479, 481: al-Kâmil gave the date of his return in a letter to al-Nâṣîr Yûsûf.


91. Sayfî, 170–1, for the act of investiture, though the year given, 645 [1248], ibid., 169, is incorrect, as Potter, 'Kart dynasty', 41, n. 3, points out. See Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 71.


93. AK, ed. 'Abbâra, III, part 2, 480.


95. Melville, *Anatolia under the Mongols*, 55–6, with full citation of the relevant sources.


97. So according to the anonymous *Tân-risk-i āl-i Saljûq dar Ānâtûlî*, 107. BH, 462, says that Mas'ûd (mistakenly called 'Izz al-Dîn) had earlier been granted a share of the annual revenues by Agabha.


100. AK, ed. 'Abbâra, III, part 2, 527, 570, respectively.

101. JT, II, 1040, 1313 (*DzhT*, III, 82–3, 356; CC, 361, with the curious rendering 'made a peer', and 458).


104. Only the marriage policies of the Yuan emperors have been subject to in-depth investigation: see George Qingzhi Zhao, *Marriage as Political Strategy and Cultural Expression: Mongolian Royal Marriages from World Empire to Yuan Dynasty* (New York, 2008).


111. *JT*, II, 1152 (DehT, III, 196; CC, 398).

112. Only in IF, V, 542.


115. For her turbulent career, see Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, 127–9.

116. On whom see Lambton, ‘Mongol fiscal administration in Persia (Part II)’, SI 65 (1987), 97–123 (here 98–9), and *Continuity and Change*, 278–83; Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, 106–16, 118–22; and more fully, Quade-Reutter, 75–165.

117. Kirmānī, *Simṭ al-ʿulā*, 49, includes the date of his death. TG, 531–2, with the incorrect date 669 [1270–1] for his flight from Kirmān. *Taʾrīkh-i Sīstān*, 405, says that he stayed in Sīstān one year and dates his departure for Delhi in 675 [1276–7], which fits better with the statement in *JT*, II, 934 (SGK, 305; CC, 324), that he was in India for fifteen years. The date 666 in Spuler, *Mongolen*, 128, is groundless; and the discussion of the chronology in Jackson, *Delhi Sultanate*, 80, n. 112, stands in need of revision. Shabānkāraʾi, 199, supplies no dates.


119. These events are sketched by *JT*, II, 934–5 (SGK, 305–6; CC, 324), and by TG, 532–4. For this period, see Lambton, ‘Mongol fiscal administration (Part II)’, 99–101, and *Continuity and Change*, 281–7; Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, 116–18; more briefly, A. K. S. Lambton, Kirmānī, *EF*, V, 162.

120. Jackson, *Delhi Sultanate*, 65, and *Ṣulṭān Raḍiyya*, 189–90.


122. The statement quoted from *Taʾrīkh-i shāhī*, 139, by Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, 280, and by Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, 109, that Pādishāh Khatun would become part of ‘the haram of his [Abagha’s] chief wives’, is bizarre, since the Ilkhan was an infidel; the term haram can only be highly figurative.

123. Quade-Reutter, 199, believes they were not (and cf. also Gilli-Elewy, ‘On women’, 714, regarding a Mongol princess). Pfeiffer, ‘Not every head’, 26–7, is unconvinced.


126. For these and other examples, see Üçok, Femmes turques, 18–23; on Đayfa Khatun’s regency, see especially Eddé, Principauté ayyoubide, 107–30 passim; on Ghâziyya Khatun, IW, V, 345.
127. TG, 534.
128. For her khutba and coinage, see Quade-Reutter, 290–3; Lambton, Continuity and Change, 272.
129. As pointed out by Üçok, Femmes turques, 18–23; on Ḍayfa Khatun’s regency, see especially Eddé, Principauté ayyoubide, 107–30 passim; on Ghâziyya Khatun, IW, V, 345.
130. For her khuṭba and coinage, see Quade-Reutter, 290–3; Lambton, Continuity and Change, 272.
133. Waṣṣāf, 183, ll. 9–10, and 184, ll. 4–7 (GW, II, 83, 85).
135. I should stress that the concern here is with rebellions specifically by Muslim princes. For the rising by the Qadi Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn in Fārs (663/1265), for instance, which was directed against the regime of the Atabeg Ābish and was suppressed at the instigation of her wazir, see below, p. 322.
136. These events can be pieced together with difficulty from a range of Muslim and Greek sources. ZF, 71–3, 93–4, 126, 168, supplies by far the greatest detail. See also al-Nuwayrī, XXVII, 110–11; Vásáry, Cumans and Tatars, 72–7; and Melville, ’Anatolia under the Mongols’, 59, 63, 72.
137. IW, VI, 359 (not in Rahim’s edn). Ibn ’Abd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ, 149 (tr. Sadeque, 165). Baybars also wrote to Kaykāwūs II in 660/1262: IW, VI, 330 (not in Rahim’s edn).
138. ZF, 88.
139. Ta’rīkh-i Sīstān, 406.
141. JT, II, 1271 (DzhT, III, 312; CC, 443); TG, 547–8, 600. See the account in Spuler, Mongolen, 134–5.
142. Mentioned only by Waṣṣāf, 267 (GW, III, 24–5).
143. Shabānkāra’i, 212–14, gives the fullest account. Ja’fari, Ta’rīkh-i Yazd, 26–8, omits the atabeg’s capture and death. Naṭanzī, 34, says that he was executed because (owing to illness) he had delayed in preparing to accompany Ghazan on his Syrian campaign.
144. Examples listed in Bosworth, History of the Saffarids, 437.
147. Ibn Shaddād, Ta’rīkh, 331–3, 335–8, passim.
148. al-Birzālī, I, 539.
149. Waṣṣāf, 251, ll. 7–10 (GW, II, 238–9).
150. Shabānkāra’i, 213.
151. JT, II, 1042 (DzhT, III, 86; CC, 362).
152. AK, ed. ’Abbāra, III, part 2, 505, l. 6, saqītuka fi Hamadān fa-mā sharibta.
153. JT, II, 1038, gunāhān-ī ʿū bar way shumurd (DzhT, III, 80; CC, 361).
154. See Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 169–75.
155. TG, 558. See also the unexplained execution of Jalāl al-Dīn Tayyib Shāh of Shabānkāra by Tegüder Ḥamd (681/1282): Waṣṣāf, 425, ll. 2–4 (GW, IV, 81).
156. Thus according to HJ, 353/384–5, under the incorrect year 663/1265. See ZF, 116, for a different account, ad annum 666/1267–8.
157. ZF, 239, dating this after Arghun’s accession; and see 238 for his suspicions. But cf. Melville, ’Anatolia under the Mongols’, 74.
NOTES to pp. 265–70

159. See the comments of Aigle, ‘Iran under Mongol domination’, 78.
160. Waṣṣāf, 190, ll. 10–14 (GW, II, 100). Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 131.
162. Waṣṣāf, 224, ll. 20–1 (GW, II, 176).
164. ZF, 239, l. 7.
166. TG, 480, has Mas’ūd die in 697/1297–8 and makes Kayqubād (‘Alā’ al-Dīn) the last. But see Melville, ‘Anatolia under the Mongols’, 84–6; Cahen, Formation of Turkey, 225; Patricia Blessing, Rebuilding Anatolia after the Mongol Conquest: Islamic Architecture in the Lands of Rūm (Farnham and Burlington, VT, 2014), 129, mentions a Qilich Arslan V, who died in 1318. For ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, see Āqsarā’ī, 291; IF, II, 345 (no. 1601).
167. Waṣṣāf, 224, ll. 20–1 (GW, II, 176).
170. ID, IX, 149, and IAef part 3, 135. TU, 55. For the Gilān campaign, see the thorough study by Charles Melville, ‘The Ilkhān Öljeitū’s conquest of Gilān (1307): Rumour and reality’, in Amitai-Preiss and Morgan (eds), Mongol Empire and its Legacy, 73–125.
173. JT, II, 882 (SGK, 257; CC, 304).
174. For a narrative of the period, see Boyle, ‘Dynastic and political history’, 355–97.
175. Aubin, Émirs mongols, 22, 82.

8. Bruno De Nicola, 'Ruling from tents: The existence and structure of women's ordos in Ilkhanid Iran,' in Hillenbrand et al. (eds), Ferdowsi, 116–36; and his 'The economic role of Mongol women: Continuity and transformation from Mongolia to Iran,' in De Nicola and Melville (eds), Mongols' Middle East, 79–105. See also IB, II, 122 (tr. Gibb, 340); Morgan, 'Ibn Battūta and the Mongols,' 9; Pfeiffer, 'Not every head,' 23.


10. Ibid., II, 1060, 1099 (DzhT, III, 102, 141; CC, 368, 380).


15. Ibid., II, 1162–3 (DzhT, III, 206; CC, 401). Ibn al-Šuqā’ī, text, 113, trans., 139–40, suggests that he was executed because Aruq (whose name he spells AZQ), accused by Gaikhatu, blamed Hārūn for the deaths of Majd al-Šīn and others. Waṣṣāf, 142, ll. 18–21 (GW, I, text, 292, trans., 272–3), says that Aruq put to death both Hārūn and Majd al-Šīn. See p. 293.


17. JT, II, 1145 (DzhT, III, 191; CC, 396).

18. Ibid., II, 1125 (DzhT, III, 169; CC, 389).


20. Most of these are named in JT, II, 1131 (DzhT, III, 175; CC, 391); for Buqa and his background, see ibid., II, 1110, 1125, 1142 (DzhT, III, 153, 169, 186; CC, 384, 389, 394).


22. JT, II, 1131, 1134 (DzhT, III, 175, 178; CC, 391, 392).


25. Ibid., II, 1154, 1155 (DzhT, III, 198–9; CC, 399). Waṣṣāf, 139, ll. 8–9 and 17–23 (GW, I, text, 285–6, trans., 266–7), is roughly in agreement. Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1312, ll. 5–6 (tr. Ward, II, 312), makes Hulechū one of the two princes who seated Arghun on the throne; but see Boyle, 'DYNastic and political history,' 368.

26. JT, II, 1168–72 (DzhT, III, 212–16; CC, 403–5); ibid., II, 1219–20 (DzhT, III, 260–1; CC, 421), where we are told that Hulechū was apprehended in Khurāsān by Ghazan, who sent him to Arghun. For the children, see ibid., II, 1181 (DzhT, III, 225; CC, 407). Waṣṣāf, 232 (GW, II, 193–4), describes more briefly the plot and Jūshkeb’s actions.

27. Waṣṣāf, 244, ll. 6–8 (GW, II, 221–2).


29. Waṣṣāf, 267, ll. 2–5 (GW, III, 23–4, following a doubtful and faulty ms. reading, has 'fragte er die Prinzenv'). For qam, see TMEN, III, 402–6 (no. 1409).

30. BH, 498, 500.

31. Its revenues were accounted separately during the Mongol era: NQ, ed. Dabir-Siyāqī, 27, 181/ed. Le Strange, I (text), 26–7, 147, II (trans.), 32, 146: Hamd-Allāh attributes this to the fact that so many wazirs and treasury officials hailed from Khurāsān.

32. TJG, III, 105 (HWC, 617); and cf. III, 113 (HWC, 622). JT, II, 985, 1009, 1020 (DzhT, III, 30, 52, 63; CC, 343, 350, 355); in the first of these passages, corresponding to the earlier of Juwayni’s, Rashid al-Dīn calls him ‘wazir and administrator (mudabbīr)’.

33. TJG, I, 35 (HWC, 49–50).

34. JT, II, 1045 (DzhT, III, 88; CC, 363); see also Aubin, Émirs mongols, 21, and II, IV, 457 (who dates the executions in Rajab 660 [May–June 1262]).

35. For a convenient survey of their antecedents, see Lambton, Continuity and Change, 52, 305–6; for their ancestry, II, II, 315 (no. 1537).


For these two wazirs, see *TG*, 595, 597–8; and for Sa’d al-Dawlā’s appointment, *JT*, II, 1173 (DzhT, III, 317; CC, 405). For Jalāl al-Dīn, see Mustawfī, *ZN*, II, 1319–20 (tr. Ward, II, 329–30); Kirmānī, *Nasā‘īm al-āshār*, 106, says that he was Juwaynī’s immediate successor and that he was wazir for five years, a figure accepted by Aubin, *Émirs mongols*, 38.


Wasṣāf, 245, ll. 1–3 (GW, II, 224).

*JT*, II, 1195 (DzhT, III, 237; CC, 412), with the date; *HJ*, 474/513, has 692/1293, which is less probable. There is a valuable resumé of his first term of office in Aubin, *Émirs mongols*, 46–51.


*JT*, II, 1252 (DzhT, III, 294; CC, 436).

Ibid., II, 1256–7 (DzhT, III, 298; CC, 438–9); Banākati, 455; *TG*, 601. Aubin, *Émirs mongols*, 58, 61.

*JT*, II, 1274 (DzhT, III, 315–16; CC, 444). Mustawfī, *ZN*, II, 1357, ll. 1–3 (tr. Ward, III, 404), ascribes Ṣadr al-Dīn’s disappointment to the fact that Dastjir čānī had bribed the noyan Nurin to recommend him to Ghazan; he does not mention the brief wazirate of Simnānī.


Appointment to Baghdad: *HJ*, 484/523–4. Dismissal as wazir in 695/1296: ibid., 490/529, and *JT*, II, 1271 (DzhT, III, 312; CC, 443); though Wasṣāf, 330, l. 25–331, l. 1 (GW, III, 174), dates this a mere three days prior to Dastjir čānī’s execution.

*JT*, II, 1271 (DzhT, III, 312–13; CC, 443), with the date; and see Aigle, *Fārs*, 149, n. 567. *HJ*, 492/531, has Muḥarram 696, and Banākati, 457, 9 Muḥarram [7 Nov. 1296].

Wasṣāf, 331, ll. 1–2 (GW, III, 174, omits the phrase ‘Ṣadr-i Jahān’).

*JT*, II, 1284 (DzhT, III, 327; CC, 448).

Wasṣāf, 55, l. 19, mushta ‘il-i ātiṣh-i istīlā-yi muḥūl wa-muṣṭabīḥ-i tabāshīr-i ghalaba-yi biğānān (GW, I, text, 109; cf. trans., 104).
NOTES TO PP. 277–9


62. BH, 445.


68. Ibid., 106, l. 11 (GW, I, text, 217, trans., 202).


72. *HJ*, 466/7/503.


74. On the Ka’ba project, see *Waṣṣāf*, 242, ll. 10–14 (GW, II, 217–18); Mustawfī,ZN, II, 1323, ll. 21–6 (tr. Ward, II, 338–9; on his links with Ṣadr al-Dīn, see pp. 280–1). For a later phase of Ilkhanid–Mamlūk contention over the Holy Places, see Charles Melville, “‘The Year of the Elephant’: Mamlūk-Mongol rivalry in the Hejaz in the reign of Abū Sa’īd (1317–1335),” *StTr* 21 (1992), 197–214.


77. See, on this head, Lane, ‘Persian notables’, 196–7; and cf. also his ‘Whose secret intent?’, 16.


79. BH, 491–2. See also *JT*, II, 1192, 1194 (*DzhT*, III, 234, 236; *CC*, 411, 412).


81. Ibid., 268, ll. 1–7 (GW, III, 25–6); for the quotation, see 279, l. 21, tā saltanat-ū pādīshāhī niz maḥbūb-i ʿūnī pūshī binumād (GW, III, 55, glosses over this phrase), Boyle, ‘Dinastic and political history’, 376, cites the translation in D’Ohsson’s *Histoire des Mongols*. See also BH, 494; Mustawfī,ZN, II, 1328–9 and 1331, ll. 10–11 (tr. Ward, II, 348–9, 354).

82. BH, 505.

83. Morgan, *Medieval Persia*, 71. See *JT*, II, 967 (*DzhT*, III, 11; *CC*, 336), where he is merely said to have contested the throne in succession to Gaḥkatu.


102. Waṣṣāf, 245, l. 16 (GW, II, 225).
105. Waṣṣāf, 320, ll. 11–17 (GW, III, 149).
109. For his background, see ṣṣ (GW, III, 8).
112. Lambton, Continuity and Change, 50; and for military activity by Saljuqid wazirs, 30–1. Aigle, ‘Iran under Mongol domination’, 72, sees the office as undergoing a ‘fundamental transformation’ in this era. See also Gilly-Elewły, Bagdad, 46.
114. A point made by Morgan, ‘Mongol or Persian’, 68.
116. For Tu. cherīg, see TMEN, III, 65–70 (no. 1079).
117. Lambton, Continuity and Change, 53–4; and cf. ibid., 224.
118. Spuler, Mongolen, 235–6, reaches the opposite conclusion, that the nā‘īb was deputy to the wazir.
120. NT, 132; 2nd recension in Melville, ‘From Adam to Abaqa . . . (Part II)’, text, 53 (trans., 59). Waṣṣāf, 55, ll. 10–11 (GW, I, text, 108, trans., 103–4). JT, II, 1061 (DzhT, III, 103; CC, 368), mentions his responsibility for the two provinces but does not call him nā‘īb. Spuler, Mongolen, 238, and Gilly-Elewły, Bagdad, 47, n. 33 (following Mir Khwānd), mistakenly see Sughunchaq as nā‘īb to the wazir Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī.
121. Waṣṣāf, 110, l. 1 (GW, I, text, 225, trans., 209).
122. JT, II, 1130 (DzhT, III, 173; CC, 390). SP, fo. 140b.
123. JT, II, 1178 (DzhT, III, 222; CC, 406). For his role in 1284, see ibid., II, 1138 (DzhT, III, 182; CC, 393); Waṣṣāf, 135, l. 6 (GW, I, text, 276, trans., 258).
125. Aubin, Émirs mongols, 85.
126. JT, II, 1155–6 (DzhT, III, 200; CC, 399).
127. Waṣṣāf, 229, ll. 6–10, and 230, ll. 1–4 (GW, II, 187–8, 189). For the seal, see also BH, 478; JT, II, 1167 (DzhT, III, 210; CC, 403). This suggests that he had custody of the al-tamgha.
124. Only in the BN ms. of JT, ed. in Jahn, Geschichte Gżān Ḥānīs, 95–6 (in DzhT, III, appendix at 618). Waṣṣāf, 325, ll. 14–15, says that he was given 'the lieutenancy and unlimited authority (niyābat-u hukūmat-i mušlaq) in the empire... and the affairs of the great army (kār-i charīk-i buzūrg)' (cf. GW, III, 162); in this case, as in Buqā'ī's, great' here must have the sense of 'imperial.' It was presumably for this reason that Sharaf al-Dīn Simnānī did not bear the title of wazir: Kirmānī, Nāṣa'īn al-āshār, 111.


126. JT, II, 1167 (DzhT, III, 211; CC, 403).


128. TG, 595.

129. Aubin, Ėmīrs mongols, 38.

130. JT, II, 1350 (DzhT, III, 391; cf. CC, 469).

131. Ibid., II, 1274 (DzhT, III, 316; CC, 444). Waṣṣāf, 327, ll. 7–9 (GW, III, 166), says that Dastjīrdānī received manṣāb-i wizārat-u niyābat dar diwān-i hafarat. Mustawfī,ZN, II, 1358, l. 17 (tr. Ward, III, 408), says that whoever was wazir was Nawrūz's deputy. Aubin, Ėmīrs mongols, 62. Aigle, Fārs, 148.


133. Spuler, Mongolen ti, 236, and Lambton, Continuity and Change, 54, are especially pertinent here.

134. Illige: JT, I, 67 (DzhT, I, part 1, 136; CC, 28); Wing, Jalayirids, 49. Shīktür: JT, II, 1192 (DzhT, III, 234; CC, 411). Aḏbuqā: Waṣṣāf, 264, l. 25–265, l. 1, and 278, ll. 6–7 (GW, III, 18, 50); and cf. JT, I, 68 (DzhT, I, part 1, 138; CC, 28); Wing, Jalayirids, 56. CC twice obscures the sense by translating as 'a great commander.' See Aubin, Ėmīrs mongols, 46; and for a list of 'chief amirs,' Atwood, 'Ulūs emīrs,' 156–7.

135. Waṣṣāf, 284, ll. 7–8 (GW, III, 66).

136. SP, fo. 146b. HJ, 436/472.


139. Waṣṣāf, 238, l. 21, and 239, ll. 5–6 (GW, II, 209, 210). Cf. also BH, 490.


141. Waṣṣāf, 265, ll. 15–16, and 269, l. 22–270, l. 25 (GW, III, 19, 30–3).

142. JT, II, 1282 (DzhT, III, 324; CC, 447).

143. On this, see the nuanced comments of Aubin, Ėmīrs mongols, 47.

144. Pace Spuler, Mongolen ti, 235 and n. 2, who says that the wazir was often designated as the Ilkhān's nā'īb and gives Dastjīrdānī as an example; but his source, Waṣṣāf (see n. 131), says merely that Nawrūz (then Ghazān's nā'īb) appointed him as wazir and as (his own) deputy in the diwān. This is surely also the sense of JT, II, 1273 (DzhT, III, 314; but CC, 444, inserts 'the emperor's' in parentheses).

145. Waṣṣāf, 347 (GW, III, 214–15, rendering nīyābat-i jahānbānī as 'Stellvertretung des Ilchans').

146. For these two events, see JT, II, 1285, 1299–1300 (DzhT, III, 328, 342; CC, 448, 453).

147. Morgan, 'Mongol or Persian,' 68–73, and 'Mongols in Iran,' 133–4; and cf., e.g., Gilly-Elewey, Bagdad, 70, who assumes that the ephemeral Mongol shiḥnas in Baghdad
contemporary with 'Alā’ al-Dīn Juwaynī were uninterested in continuity of government.

148. JT, II, 1342 (DzhT, III, 383; CC, 467).
149. Ibid., II, 1492 (DzhT, III, 522; cf. CC, 516).
150. Melville, ‘Keshig in Iran’, 159.
151. MA, III, 141 (Lech, Ar. text, 96, German trans., 155); ibid., XI, 187, for a still more extreme statement.

152. Waṣṣāf, 268, ll. 8–10 (GW, III, 26).
153. Ibid., 230, ll. 3–4, bīrūn ism- i khāniyyat ânchi az lawāzim- i kār- i pādishāhī- u nafādh- i awāmir- u nawāhī būd ba- way tafwīḍ farmūd (cf. GW, II, 189). See also NT, 2nd recension, in Melville, ‘From Adam to Abaqa . . . (Part II)’, text, 54 (trans., 60–1); and SP, fo. 146b, hāl- u ‘aṣd bar dasť- i ū bāz gudhāst; and TG, 595, dasť- i ū dar mulk muṭlaq gardānīd chunānki bar pādishāh nāmī bīsh nabūd.

154. Herbert Franke, ‘Could the Mongol emperors read and write Chinese?’ , Asia Major, n.s., 3 (1953), 28–41; repr. in Franke, China under Mongol Rule.
155. JT, II, 1135 (DzhT, III, 179; CC, 392).
162. Kirmānī, Nasā’īm al- asḥār, 110. For the ability of Ṣadr al-Dīn and other wazirs to speak Mongolian, see Martinez, ‘Changes in chancellery languages’, 109 and n. 7.
165. Waṣṣāf, 236, l. 1 (GW, II, 203).
166. TU, 75; cited by Blair, ‘Architecture as a source’, 223.
168. IF, I, 392–3, and III, 178 (nos 600, 2431): to Qutlugh Shāh and to Sevinch respectively.
169. For Lane, ‘Persian notables’, 201, Buqa’s appointment as wazir ‘reinforces the sense of integration between Persian and Mongol’; I take the opposite view.
171. JT, II, 1114 (DzhT, III, 160; CC, 386).
172. Ibid., II, 1259 (DzhT, III, 300; CC, 439). We are told simply that this was among the reasons why Ṣadr al-Din’s affairs declined; see p. 276 and n.55 above.
173. Waṣṣāf, 124, ll. 20–22 (GW, I, text, 254; cf. trans., 236).
176. TI, I, 81; hence MA, XI, 189, l. 5.
177. JT, II, 1061, calling him Sughunchaq’s nā’ib (DzhT, III, 103; CC, 368).
178. HJ, 350/381, 352/383.
180. HJ, 352/383.
181. Ibid., 412/449.
183. Abagha: BH, 472; JT, II, 1127, 1131 (DzhT, III, 171, 175; CC, 390, 391). Both: Waṣṣāf, 119, ll. 8–10 (GW, I, text, 240, trans., 224); ZF, 238. His brother ‘Alā’ al-Dīn was also rumoured to have arranged for the assassination of both men: ibid., 213.
185. ZF, 284. BH, 490–1, implies remissness.
186. Waṣṣāf, 47, ll. 5–6 (GW, I, text, 90–1, trans., 88).
188.JT, II, 1107, nagudhāsht ki ba-muwājahān ānjāmad (DzhT, III, 150; CC, 383, has ‘to prevent an audit’).
189. Ibid., II, 1158 (DzhT, III, 202; CC, 400). Waṣṣāf, 142, l. 15 (GW, I, text, 291, trans., 272).
192. See, for instance, the list in Ibn Shaddād, Ta’rīkh, 335–7.
193. Lambton, Continuity and Change, 63, suggests that the wazir’s post was more hazardous than it had been under the Saljuqs.
194. TG, 616. This verdict is accepted in the secondary literature, e.g. in Spuler, Mongolen, 103–4, and in Morgan, Medieval Persia, 76.
195. Jalāl al-Dīn: TG, 598; Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1320 (tr. Ward, II, 330); there is a longer account of his arrest and execution (with the date in full) in JT, II, 1173–4 (DzhT, III, 217–18; CC, 405); Kirmānī, Nasā‘īm al-ashār, 107, says that he survived one year out of office. Fakhr al-Dīn: TG, 597, 598–9.
196. Waṣṣāf, 350, ll. 8–9 (GW, III, 222). See Aigle, Fārs, 151; and for his appointment as wazīr, n. 56 above.
197. Waṣṣāf, 61, ll. 8–9 (GW, I, text, 121, trans., 115). JT, II, 1061 (DzhT, III, 103; CC, 368).
198. Waṣṣāf, 66, ll. 6–8, and 91, ll. 4–5 (GW, I, text, 130–1, 184, trans., 125, 173).
202. HJ, 490/529. IF, II, 45 (no. 1003).
204. HJ, 446/481. For Tāj al-Dīn’s father’s name I have followed Ibn al-Šuqā‘ī, text, 113, trans., 139.
205. HJ, 448/484. For Majd al-Dīn, see also JT, II, 1162 (DzhT, III, 206; CC, 401); Waṣṣāf, 142, ll. 18–21 (GW, I, text, 292, trans., 272–3); IF, IV, 520 (no. 4359). On the background of this Qutlugh Shāh (not to be confused with the noyan prominent under Ghazan and Öljeitū), see JT, II, 1130, 1165 (DzhT, III, 174, 208; CC, 391, 402); at the latter point, he is said to have had the governorship (ḥukūmat) of the city, but HJ’s account is more circumstantial. Gilli-Elewy, Bagdad, 80. His father is named as Ṭāhir al-Malik in one of Pūr-i Bahā’s poems: BL ms. Or. 9213, fos 39b–40b.
206. With which JT, II, 1167 (DzhT, III, 210; CC, 403), connects it.
208. Ibid., II, 1165–6 (DzhT, III, 209; CC, 402). Malik here seems to equate to ṣāhib-diwān (below).

209. HJ, 459/496. JT, II, 1173 (DzhT, III, 217; CC, 405).

210. HJ, 457/494.

211. Waṣṣāf, 142, ll. 16–21 (GW, I, text, 292, trans., 272–3); HJ, 449–50/485–6. Of the younger sons, JT, II, 1160, 1162–3 (DzhT, III, 204, 206; CC, 401), mentions only the slaying of Yahyā (dated by IF, I, 368, on 14 Rabī’ I 684 [20 May 1285]), and has Hārūn killed by Gaikhatu, who linked him with Aruq’s excesses (see p. 271 above).


217. JT, II, 1115 (DzhT, III, 161; CC, 386).

218. Ibid., II, 1157 (DzhT, III, 202; CC, 400).

219. Ibid., II, 1271 (DzhT, III, 312–13; CC, 443).


221. A point stressed by Lane, ‘Persian notables’, 192; see also ibid., 204.


223. JT, II, 1157 (DzhT, III, 201; CC, 400).

224. Ibid., II, 1165 (DzhT, III, 208–9; CC, 402).


228. JT, II, 1131 (DzhT, III, 175; CC, 391).

229. Ibid., II, 1114, 1117, 1131 (DzhT, III, 159, 163, 175; CC, 386, 387, 391).

230. Ibid., II, 1166, 1168 (DzhT, III, 209–10, 212; CC, 403).

231. Ibid., II, 1175 (DzhT, III, 219; CC, 406).

232. Ibid., II, 1181 (DzhT, III, 226; CC, 408). Waṣṣāf, 244, ll. 24–5, and 245, ll. 5–6 (GW, II, 224).

233. JT, I, 68, and II, 1202, 1248–9 (DzhT, I, part 1, 138, and III, 244, 291; CC, 28, 415, 434); for Ḳubqa, see also SP, fo. 144b. Banākatī, 452. Waṣṣāf, 282, l. 20 (GW, III, 62). TG, 602, for both men.

234. BH, 479, 480, and TG, 604, respectively.

235. This takes into account only adult males: the figure of sixteen excludes Arghun’s wife Toghachaq Khatun and the children of Hūlechū and Qara Noghai. The remaining twenty-two include Sa’d al-Dawla along with Muslim servitors, but not three whom Aruq put to death without the Ilkhan’s leave. The point is made by Aubin, Ėmirīs mongols, 82, who suggests, however, that more princes and noyans were executed than ‘divaniens’.

236. These figures exclude alike unnamed Mongol officers, such as three commanders under the rebel Sūlemish in Anatolia, and various sayyids and shaykhs; nor are Nawrūz’s anonymous shīhānas (who could have been either Mongols or Tājīks) in various towns taken into account.
Chapter 11 The Rule of the Infidel

1. The phrase is David Durand-Guédy’s (‘Ruling from the outside’, 330). See also pp. 96–7 above.


8. TJG, III, 89 (trans. in HWC, 606, slightly modified).


10. Waṣṣāf, 262–3 (GW, III, 13, mistranslating jāthlīqān as ‘Diacone’).

11. Atwood, ‘Validation by holiness’, 255; for examples of privileged ‘religious’, ibid., 238–43, 245–7. TJG, III, 78 (HWC, 599), says that Mōngke excluded the Jews, to their great chagrin. Aptin Khanbaghi, The Fire, the Star and the Cross: Minority Religions in Medieval and Early Modern Iran (London and New York, 2006), 57, 64, assumes that the Zoroastrians were also excluded, but cites no specific evidence. For Zoroastrian writing in the early Ilkhanid era, see Ž. Amūzgār, ‘Bahrām(-e) Paždū’, EIr, III, 524–5, and Sheila S. Blair, ‘The religious art of the Ilkhans’, in Komaroff and Carboni (eds), Legacy of Genghis Khan, 104–33 (here 111 and n. 20).

12. For these two terms, see TMEN, II, 648–51 (no. 993) and 271–7 (no. 724), respectively. The etymology of bakhshī is discussed by Leonard W. J. Van der Kuijp, ‘“Baγši” and baγši- s in Tibetan historical, biographical and lexicographical texts’, CAJ 39 (1995), 275–302.


14. Only one of the documents edited in Heribert Horst, Die Staatsverwaltung der Grosselğūken und Ḫorezmšāhs (Wiesbaden, 1964), even refers to the jizya and then in unspecific terms.
15. TJG, I, 11, 18 (HWC, 15, 26).
16. WR, 116/in SF, 228 (MFW, 151).
19. JT, II, 1331–2 (DzhT, III, 373; CC, 463); for his upbringing, see II, 1210, 1211, 1253–4 (DzhT, III, 252, 253, 295; CC, 417, 418, 437, reading, at this last juncture, ‘Arghun’ in error for Abagha).
23. T.JG, II, 89, l. 15 (HWC, 357, has ‘capitation-tax’). Ibn Nazīf, fo. 141a, l. 7. At an earlier date, the word had admittedly denoted the land-tax: see Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (repr. Cambridge, 1984), s.v. JZY (8.). But there were other words that Ibn Nazīf could have chosen had he wished.
25. HJ, 375/411.
27. TJG, II, 89, l. 15 (HWC, 357, has ‘capitation-tax’). Ibn Nazīf, fo. 141a, l. 7. At an earlier date, the word had admittedly denoted the land-tax: see Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (repr. Cambridge, 1984), s.v. JZY (8.). But there were other words that Ibn Nazīf could have chosen had he wished.
30. TJG, I, 22 (HWC, 30).
31. Ibid., II, 274–9, and III, 76–7 (HWC, 538–43, 599).
32. Petrushevsky, ‘Socio-economic condition’, 535–6: he acknowledges the pre-Mongol precedents (apropos of the billeting of troops and the provision of animals for the relay network), though he assumes that under the Mongols these obligations were more oppressive.
33. TJG, I, 75 (HWC, 97).
34. HJ, 398–9/436.
35. Ibid., 424/461.
36. Ibid., 454/491–2.
37. Ibid., 495/535.
43. On the operation of the yarghu, see Lambton, Continuity and Change, 83–90.
44. Lane, *Early Mongol Rule*, 111–13, 120.
50. Thus, for instance, Roux, ‘La tolérance religieuse’, confines his discussion to the broader issue of whether the Mongols’ subjects were allowed to retain their faith. But for an incisive comment on Mongol ‘tolerance’ (in a Far Eastern context), see Benjamin Z. Kedar, ‘The multilateral disputation at the court of the Grand Qan Möngke, 1254’, in Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Mark R. Cohen, Sasson Somekh and Sidney H. Griffith (eds), *The Majlis: Interreligious Encounters in Medieval Islam* (Wiesbaden, 1999), 162–83 (here 182–3).
52. Waṣṣāf, 222, ll. 5–6 (GW, II, 170).
54. For examples, see Hambis, ‘Une coutume’, 385–9. It had been enforced by the Uighur *iduq-qut* of Beshbaligh, for instance: *TJG*, II, 226 (HWC, 490). It had also been practised by the Oghuz: Christian, *History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia*, I, 355.
55. *JT*, II, 963 (*DzhT*, III, 6; CC, 334, unaccountably renders the phrase as ‘by custom’). For another example, see ibid., II, 966, *ba-rāḥ-i yāsā* (*DzhT*, III, 9; CC, 335). See also WW, XXV, 229, which speaks expressly of a *yasa* regarding marriage to the father’s wives.
58. According to PC, 239 (MM, 11).
60. Of the Chinggisids in Iran, Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, 292, gives several examples, including Pādishāh Khatun (below); see also JT, I, 102, and II, 966, 1055 (DzhT, I, part 1, 229, and III, 9, 96; CC, 40, 335, 366), for Anbarchi (married to one of the widows of his father Mengü Temür), Jūshkēb (to one of his father Jumughur's widows) and Abagha (to Hūlegū's widow Ölıjēi Khatun), respectively. Commanders: Tödökēh, Hūlegū's daughter, married first to Tenggiz Küregen of the Oyirat tribe, was later the wife successively of his son Sülemish and the latter's son Chechek Küregen: ibid., I, 102, and II, 971 (DzhT, I, part 1, 228, and III, 16; CC, 40, 338), and SP, fo. 139b; Qutluqan, another daughter, married Yesü Buqa of the Dörben and later his son Tūkēl: SP, fo. 139b. Taghāi of the Barghut married Kūrdūchin, widow of his grandfather Satilmish: JT, I, 104 (DzhT, I, part 1, 234; CC, 41), though at II, 969 (DzhT, III, 14; CC, 337, omitting Taghāi's name), her second husband is called the cousin of her first. Toghan, son of Shadai, married his father's widow Keltūrmish, daughter of Tegūder Ahmad by a concubine: ibid., II, 1123 (DzhT, III, 167; CC, 388).


62. TG, 533.


64. See ZF, 126, for her parentage.

65. The Saljuq Sultan Ālp Arslan (in 1063): Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, 259. An atabeg of Lesser Luristan (between 621/1224 and 640/1242): TG, 555. In 690/1291 Muẓaffar al-Dīn ‘Alī, a son of the historian Juwaynī, married a Mongol lady, the daughter of Arghun Aqa, who was the widow of his uncle, the Ṣāḥīb-dīwān Shams al-Dīn: HJ, 469/505; the marriage is not mentioned in his biography in IF, V, 283–4 (no. 5094).

66. Waṣṣāf, 424, l. 23–425, l. 1 (GW, IV, 81). Shabānkāra’ī, 169, for Nuṣrāt al-Dīn; at 170 he mentions her remarriage to only one further brother, Nuṣrāt al-Dīn's immediate successor Jalāl al-Dīn Ṣayyib Shāh. Spuler, *Mongolen*, 122, raises the possibility that Nuṣrāt al-Dīn may have had a hereditary claim on the widow.

67. TJG, I, 161–3 (HWC, 204–6); reproduced in JT, I, 685 (DzhT, II, part 1, 183–5; SGK, 77; CC, 237–8). TN, II, 152–3 (tr. Raverty, 1107–9), is briefer and lacks some of the details.

68. For what follows, see Francis Woodman Cleaves, 'The rescript of Qubilai prohibiting the slaughtering of animals by slitting the throat', in *Essays Presented to Richard Nelson Frye on His Seventieth Birthday by His Colleagues and Students* (Cambridge, MA, 1992 = JTS 16), 67–89 (here 72–3). For the Muslims' inability to circumcise their sons, see also JT, II, 921 (SGK, 293–4; CC, 319); though it is not here made part of the Qaghan's edict. I regret that the important discussion by İsenbike Togan, 'Variations in the perception of Jasagh', in D. A. Alimova (ed.), *Markazii Osiyo tarixi zamonavii medievistikta ta'kimida / History of Central Asia in Modern Medieval Studies* (Tashkent, 2013), 67–101, came to my notice too late to be taken into account here.

69. For a discussion of the background, see Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan*, 199–201 (though the link made there, 199, between Qubilai's anti-Muslim legislation and the threat from the 'Muslim' Qaidu is questionable). See also Elverskog, *Buddhism and Islam*, 238–9; Rossabi, *Muslims in the early Yuan*, 259–5; and Rossabi, 'Notes on Khubilai Khan: Religious toleration or political expediency?', in Binbaş and Kılıç- Schubel (eds), *Horizons of the World*, 119–29 (here 124–6).


71. TJG, I, 163, 227 (HWC, 206, 272).
73. TN, II, 167 (tr. Raverty, 1146).
74. TJG, I, 163 (HWC, 206–7); reproduced in JT, I, 686 (DzhT, II, part 1, 186–7; SGK, 77–8; CC, 238), where Rashid al-Din adds, seemingly by way of exegesis, that the Turk had flouted the yasa by climbing onto the roof.
75. JT, II, 921 (SGK, 294; CC, 319).
76. This is also the view of Ayalon, ‘Great Yāsā . . . (A),’ SI 33 (1971), 99–140 (here 120).
77. Lambton, Continuity and Change, 90.
81. Henry Serruys, ‘Remains of Mongol customs in Ming China,’ Monumenta Serica 16 (1957), 137–90 (here 151–3), and repr. in Serruys, The Mongols and Ming China: History and Customs (London, 1987); at 158, 177–8, however, he appears confident that the Mongols did not impose their own customs on the Chinese.
84. Aubin, Émirs mongols, 26, however, believes that this shaft was aimed only at the conquerors.
85. BH, 490.
86. JT, II, 1060 (DzhT, III, 102; CC, 368).
87. TBG, 805.
89. JT, II, 1490–1, 1495 (DzhT, III, 521–2, 526; CC, 515–16, 517); see II, 1493 (DzhT, III, 523–4; CC, 516), for a Jew who tried to extract money in this fashion from Shams al-Din Juwayni.
90. Kirmānī, Nasāʾīm al-asḥār, 106.
92. Aubin, Émirs mongols, 26, however, believes that this shaft was aimed only at the conquerors.
93. BH, 490.
94. JT, II, 1490–1, 1495 (DzhT, III, 521–2, 526; CC, 515–16, 517); see II, 1493 (DzhT, III, 523–4; CC, 516), for a Jew who tried to extract money in this fashion from Shams al-Din Juwayni.
95. Kirmānī, Nasāʾīm al-asḥār, 106.
97. Aubin, Émirs mongols, 26, however, believes that this shaft was aimed only at the conquerors.
99. See the survey of primary and secondary literature in Netzer, 'Rashīd al-Dīn and his Jewish background.'

100. E.g. PC, 237–8 (MM, 9–10). See the discussion in Timothy May (T. Mei), 'Mongoly i mirovye religii,' in B. V. Bazarov, N. N. Kradin and T. D. Skrynnikova (eds), Mongol’skaia imperiia i kochevoi mir (Ulan Ude, 2004), 424–43 (here 438–9).


102. TJG, III, 8–9 (HWC, 552–3). Rossabi, Khubilai Khan, 13.


105. WR, 172/in SF, 256 (MFW, 187).


107. BH, 490; cited in Morgan, 'Who ran the Mongol empire?', 124.

108. WR, 62/in SF, 195 (MFW, 107). They were generally Khwarazmian Turks: Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 109–10. A 'Saracen' conducted the census in Rus’ in 1247: Allsen, 'Mongol census taking in Rus', 37.

109. For these and other episodes, see Jackson, 'Hülegü Khan and the Christians', 201–4.

110. AK, ed. Sourdel, Description d’Alep, 36; also in 'Abbāra’s edn, I, part 1, 116.


112. On which see J.-B. Chabot, 'Notes sur les relations du roi Argoun avec l’Occident,' Revue de l'Orient Latin 2 (1894), 566–629; more briefly, Jackson, Mongols and the West, 169–70.


114. BH, 466; MTD, 505, giving the month in error as Dhū l-Qa`da [February].


116. Ibid., II, 1080, 1137, 1375–6 (DzhT, III, 121, 182, 416; CC, 374, 393, 477).


118. Aqsaʾrāʾi, Muṣāmarat al-akhbār, 153.


121. JT, II, 963 (DzhT, III, 7; CC, 334).

122. Letter of Ladislaus, warden of the Franciscan province of ‘Gazaria,’ 7 April 1287, in Girolamo Golubovich (ed.), Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell’Oriente Francescano (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1906–27), II, 444. Jean Richard, La papauté et les missions d’Oriente au Moyen Age (XIIe–XVe siècles) (Rome, 1977), 90–1; and his ‘Les missions au nord de la mer noire (XIIIe–XVe siècles),’ in Schmieder and Schreiner (eds), Il codice Cumanico, 231–46 (here 237), and tr. as ‘The missions to the north of the


124. The verses are preserved in TII, XLVIII, 37–9, and excerpted in Joseph de Somogyi, 'A qasīda on the destruction of Baghdād by the Mongols, BSOS 7 (1933–5), 41–8 (text at 44, trans. at 45), repr. in Hawting (ed.), Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders, 1–10.

125. TII, I, 11 (HWC, 16).


127. MA, III, 138 (Lech, Ar. text, 92, German trans., 153).


129. Lambton, Continuity and Change, 152–4; also her 'Wa`f, III. In Persia, EF, XI, 84, and 'Awqāf in Persia, 305. Petrushevsky, 'Socio-economic conditions', 517, states that expropriation occurred, though without citing any source.

130. Waṣṣāf, 624, I, 24–625, I, 5 (reading awqāf for the awqāt of the text); cited in Lambton, Continuity and Change, 275–6, and 'Wa`f, III', 84. Waṣṣāf claims that Fārs, under the nominal government of the princess Kūrduchīn during the Ilkhan Abū Sa`īd’s reign, was an exception. Nakhchīwānī, Dastūr al-kātib, I, part 1, 176.

131. E.g., S. J. Badakhchani (ed. and tr.), Shi‘i Interpretations of Islam: Three Treatises on Theology and Eschatology (London and New York, 2010).


133. HJ, 443/478; IF, II, 552–3 (no. 1976). For the vicissitudes of Ṭūsī’s sons in their supervision of the awqāf, see HJ, 456/493; Gilli-Elewy, Bagdad, n. 406 at 123–4.


135. TI, II, 90; tr. in Joseph [de] Somogyi, 'Adh-Dhahabi’s record of the destruction of Damascus by the Mongols in 699–700/1299–1301', in Samuel Löwinger and Joseph Somogyi (eds), Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume (Budapest, 1948), I, 353–86 (here 378, reading ‘Uṣayf!). See also DMZ, ed. Guo, I (trans.), 158, II (text), 119 (= MZDMZ, XXI, 120), ID, IX, 32, and IAF, part 2, 661, all citing al-Birzālī; this detail, which does not figure in the Muqṭafā, may well be based on al-Birzālī’s oral testimony, on which see Little, Introduction to Mamlūk Historiography, 54–5. WW, I, 183.

136. Waṣṣāf, 472, ll. 1–2 (GW, IV, 198).

137. Conflict with Sāwāji: TU, 83, 88, 130; Gilli-Elewy, Bagdad, 123–5. Aṣīl al-Dīn’s death: TU, 198; TI, LIII, 139 (no. 437), gives the date as 715, and AA, I, 327, as Ṣafar of that year; Banākātī, 476, as 714. Removal of his representatives: IF, II, 530.

138. Spuler, Mongolen', 179, 273–4; and pace Petrushevsky, 'Socio-economic condition', 517. For a fuller discussion, see Pfeiffer, 'Aḥmad Tegüder’s second letter', 173–5.

139. Abū Shāma, 204; hence DMZ, I, 350 (= MZDMZ, XVI, 382), and see also II, 13 (= MZDMZ, XVII, 65–6). Pouzet, Damas au VIIF/XIIIIF siècle, 293; Amitai, 'Mongol provincial administration', 136–7.


142. IF, II, 126.
143. TJG, I, 18–19 (HWC, 26).
146. Abū Shāma, 208. DMZ, I, 362–3 (= MZDMZ, XVI, 391–2), cites Abū Shāma’s version; but at I, 363–5 (= MZDMZ, XVI, 392–3), al-Yūnīnī reproduces a fuller account by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Jazarī (d. 739/1338), whose source in turn was his father Ibrāhīm b. Abī Bakr al-Jazarī (d. 693/1294). For this section of al-Jazarī’s Hawādith al-zamān, extant only in the Rabat ms. and inaccessible to me, see Haarmann, Quellenstudien, 48, and his survey of mss. at 40, 44. Muslim–Christian relations in 1260 are outlined, mainly on the basis of data from Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373), by Pouzet, Damas au VIIe/XIIIe siècle, 329–31.
147. IW, VI, 290/213: his wording (‘alā mā qīla) may indicate mild scepticism.
148. TJG, I, 34–9, and III, 60–1 (HWC, 48–53, 589); cf. also III, 28 (HWC, 566), where the princes of Ögödei’s line are blamed. Allsen, ‘Yüan dynasty and the Uighurs’, 250–1, deals briefly with this episode.
149. See the comment in Elverskog, Buddhism and Islam, 136.
150. TJG, I, 163–4 (HWC, 207); reproduced by Rashid al-Dīn in JT, I, 686–7 (DzhT, II, part 1, 187–9; SGK, 78; CC, 238).
151. TJG, I, 179 (HWC, 223–4); reproduced in JT, I, 697 (DzhT, II, part 1, 220–1; SGK, 87; CC, 242).
152. TJG, I, 181 (HWC, 225); reproduced in JT, I, 687 (DzhT, II, part 1, 190–1; SGK, 79; CC, 238, translates as ‘a Persian speaker’).
159. MP, II, 10–11 (tr. Ricci, 63–4; tr. Latham, 50–1). The chronological context is apparently Qaidu’s era.
161. BH, 451.
163. BH, 447–8.
164. Gilli-Elewy, Bagdad, 191, linking this with the later attempt on ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s life (see also ibid., 63).
166. TN, II, 215–17 (Raverty’s trans., 1288–90, differs slightly regarding the force sent by Berke).
167. See the comments of Melville, ‘Mongol and Timurid periods, 158–61, 186–7; also his ‘Historian at work, passim.’
170. Patricia Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 2004), 250.
171. IW, VI, 213/153. For Sunnī responses, see Heidemann, Das Aleppoiner Kalifat, 67–9.
172. Several times in II; I, alone: see 99, 220, 239, 248, 269, 305, 467, 497, 505; for the latter phrase, see V, 376. HJ, 446/481, also employs the term wāqi’a in relation to 1258.


177. Thus in *MZ*, VIII, part 2, 787 (with 20 in error for 10) = *MZDMZ*, XV, 168. *HJ*, 98/128, 114/142, 121/150, 139/168, 146/175, 150/179, 173/202, 208/249, 215/256, 283 [sentence omitted from the 1932 edition], 245/289, and 253/297, says that it lapsed from 634 [1237] to 639 [1242] and again in 643 [1246], 644 [1247] and 646–7 [1249–50], and that in 648/1251 only a group from Baghdad left. See Gilli-Elewy, ‘Al-Ḥawādiṯ al-ḡāmi‘a’, 359. This would surely have outweighed by far al-Musta‘sim’s failure to rid the Islamic world of either the Ismā‘īlis or the Khwarazmian freebooters, to which Lane, ‘Persian notables’, 184, draws attention.


184. The view, for example, of Rypka, ‘Poets and prose writers’, 55.

185. E.g. IF, I, 467; III, 281–2, 480; and V, 512 (nos 744, 2638, 3007, 5597).


NOTES to pp. 324–7


196. For much of what follows, see Michael Weiers, ‘Die Mongolen und der Koran’, in Rybatzki et al. (eds), Early Mongols, 209–17.

197. TJG, I, 1 (HWC, 3).

198. Ibid., I, 9, 18 (HWC, 13–14, 25); for the implantation of Muslims across the breadth of Asia in Ögödei’s reign also, see ibid., I, 159 (HWC, 201).


200. TJG, I, 1 (HWC, 3, renders rahish as ‘this way’ in error for ‘his way’). For further thoughts on Juwaynī’s writing, see Kolbas, ‘Historical epic’.

201. TJG, I, 10 (HWC, 15).


204. NT, 132; ibid., 3, he defines Iran as extending from the Oxus to the Euphrates.

205. The phrase is Melville’s: ‘Mongol and Timurid periods’, 159.


Chapter 12 The Onset of Islamization: (a) Common Themes

3. See DeWeese, 'Islamization in the Mongol empire', 120–1. My debt to DeWeese's chapter in CHIA will be evident in much of what follows.
4. I shall be using this term, throughout, to signify not merely conversion but also the implementation of Islamic law and the diffusion of Islamic culture and institutions.
5. DeWeese, 'Islamization in the Mongol empire', 133.
6. See also DeWeese, 'Problems of Islamization.'
10. David Parkin, 'Inside and outside the mosque: A master trope,' in Parkin and Headley (eds), Islamic Prayer, 1–22 (here 3).
12. See the comments of Bulliet, 'Conversion stories in early Islam', in Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi (eds), Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands, Eighth to Eighteenth Centuries (Toronto, 1990), 123–33; also C. F. Beckingham, in the preface to his Between Islam and Christendom (London, 1983), ii–iii, speaking of the two faiths as – in the eyes of the mass of the people – ‘two sets of well-defined practices' rather than ‘two mutually exclusive systems of belief'.
13. Alessandro Bausani, 'Can monotheism be taught?', Numen 10 (1963), 167–201 (here 174: 'The Truth (ḥaqq) of Islam is not, or not chiefly, a theoretical truth, but also, and prevalently, law and customs felt as given by God, and obviously cannot be spread through personal persuasion, but only through the physical conquest of the region to be converted . . . [T]he Truth is not, for Islam, a theology, is not a knowledge that brings salvation to the single, but a true attitude or behaviour of an entire society . . .').
21. BH, 505. TR, I (text), 13, II (trans.), 11.
23. BH, 505.
25. JT, II, 1282 (DzhT, III, 324; CC, 447). Wasşaf, 344, ll. 20–2 (GW, III, 209). Melville, 'Pādshāh-i Islām', 171. The sarāghūch seems to have differed from the Mongol caps illustrated in Arabic mss. of JT (Rice and Gray, Illustrations, 20 and figs 10A and D respectively at 21): see Stewart, 'If the cap fits', 142–6.
26. TR, I (text), 13, II (trans.), 11.
27. Ibid., I (text) 36, II (trans.), 31. For the date of his death, see Kazuo Enoki, 'Fu An's mission to Central Asia', MRTB 35 (1977), 219–31 (here 225): the name in the Chinese reports is here transcribed 'Maḥmūd'.
32. Omeljan Pritsak, 'The Khazar Kingdom's conversion to Judaism', HUS 2 (1978), 261–81 (here 280); repr. in Pritsak, Studies.
34. WR, 86/in SF, 209 (MFW, 127).
40. IB, III, 32 (tr. Gibb, 556).
41. JT, II, 922–3 (SGK, 295; cf. CC, 320): the verse in question was presumably an amalgamation of the Qur‘ān, ix, 5 and 29 (tr. Abdel Haleem, 116, 118).
42. Cited in Hatcher, 'Peddling Islam', 35.
46. See the discussion in DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, 181–93; also Bruno De Nicola, 'Patrons or murīds? Mongol women and shaykhs in Ilkhanid Iran and Anatolia,' *Iran* 52 (2014), 143–56 (here 147–8).

47. De Rachewiltz, 'Heaven, Earth and the Mongols', 127; the suggestion is made almost in passing.


49. E.g., *ZF*, 108; al- Nuwayrī, XXVII, 359 (also in *SMIZO*, I, Ar. text, 131, Russian trans., 151; whence cited by DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, 84, n. 15); Conermann, 'Mongolische Religiosität', 85–6, rightly labels this detail as ‘topoihaft’ (see also ibid., 92, n. 80). Other instances are Haydar's account of Tughluq Temür's adoption of Islam and the Persian accounts of Ghazan's conversion (below, p. 341).


57. Ibn Shaddād, *Ta’rikh*, 153–4; tr. P. M. Holt in appendix 1 to his trans. of Abū l-Fidā, *Memoirs of a Syrian Prince*, 92. The passage is reproduced by *DMZ*, III, 164 (= *MZDMZ*, XVIII, 254); by ID, VIII, 188–9; and by IAF, part 2, 403–4 (Blochet's trans. of *kāfir* as ‘bouddhiste’ somewhat forces the meaning). *ZF*, 152, mentions the flight of Sögetei and Ja'urchi but not the dispute with their brother; ibid., 229, their arrival is dated in 674/1275–6. Amitai, 'Conversion of Tegüder', 41–2, is not convinced that Sögetei and Ja'urchi were converts.


63. al-Nuwayrī, XXVII, 384; cited by Pfeiffer, 'Reflections', 373.
69. Jackson, *Delhi Sultanate*, 80–1. Pfeiffer, ‘Reflections’, 374–5, assumes that they were already converts.


71. Ögödeyids: Biran, *Qaidu*, 93. Chaghadayids: to those listed ibid., n. 159 at 171–2, should be added ‘Ali and Dhū l-Qarnayn, nephews of the khan Naliqo’a.


73. *MA*, III, 99 (Lech, Ar. text, 38–9, *fa-minhum man kānā qad sabaqa islāmahū*; trans., 117, renders this misleadingly as ‘manche von ihnen . . . ’).


75. *TR*, I (text), 12–13, II (trans.), 10.

76. *JT*, II, 1150 (CC, 398; and see *DzhT*, III, 195, n. 6); but Lambton, *Continuity and Change*, 288, n. 157, shows that he must have been born c. 657/1259. The central point is nevertheless well made by Birgitt Hoffmann, ‘Iran unter mongolischer Herrschaft: die Ilchane’, in Conermann and Kusber (eds), *Mongolen in Asien*, 103–19 (here 118).


78. BH, 486 (*ad annum* 1290), 505 (*ad annum* 1295); cf. also 354. Riccoldo, *Epistolae ad ecclesiam triumphantem*, ed. R. Röhricht, ‘Lettres de Ricoldo de Monte-Croce’, *Archives de l’Orient Latin* 2 (1884), Documents, 258–96 (here no. 3, at 285; cf. also 276); tr. in Kappler, *Ricold de Monte Croce: Pélerinage*, 237 (cf. also 226), and in George-Tvrtković, 161 (cf. also 152). This letter dates from soon after 1291.

79. *TU*, 98; and see, e.g., Morgan, *Mongols*, 142, and *Medieval Persia*, 73.


81. *TU*, 98: as Morgan, “‘Great Yasa of Chinggis Khan’ revisited’, 304, n. 38, points out, in the unique Istanbul ms. Ayasofya 3019 Qutlugh Shāh contrasts Islam with the new law and custom (*yāsāq-u yīsūn-i naw*) of Chinggis Khan, but the word *naw* is omitted from the printed text.


84. Yasa: Ibn ‘Abd al-Ẓāhir, *al-Rawd*, 171 (tr. Sadeque, 187); hence al-Nuwayri, XXX, 87. See the reconstruction of the passage in *al-Rawd* (corrupt in the unique ms.) by Ayalon, ‘The Great *Yasa* . . . . (B)’, 167–72. The failure to consult is mentioned only in *JT*, II, 1044 (*DzhT*, III, 87; CC, 363), and is less reliable here.


92. Ibn Ṭabd al-Zāhir, Tashrīf, 70. See P. M. Holt, 'The Ilkhān Ahmad's embassies to Qalāwūn: Two contemporary accounts', BSOAS 49 (1986), 128–32 (here 131–2, with the incorrect Hijrī year 683); Pfeiffer, 'Aḥmad Tegüder's second letter', 183–4 (and trans. at 189).

93. Waṣṣāf, 316, ll. 6–9 (GW, III, 139). Melville, 'Pādshāh-i Islām', 166. Rashid al-Dīn is keen to deny that Ghazan was responding to external pressure of this kind: see p. 372.

94. 'Author Z' in Zetterstéen (ed.), Beiträge, 35, ll. 6–7. al-Ḥazarī, Ḥawādith al-zamān, I, 255 (tr. in Melville, 'Pādshāh-i Islām', 164 and n. 27).

95. TII, LII, 38. al-Ḥazarī, Ḥawādith al-zamān, I, 256 (tr. in Melville, 'Pādshāh-i Islām' , 164 and n. 27).

96. Amitai, Holy War, 65, citing ZF, 11. MZ, VIII, part 2, 790 (= MZDMZ, XV, 171), speaks merely of the high opinion that the Mongols in Khurāsān formed of him and of their lavishing money on him.


98. MA, III, 79 (Lech, Ar. text, 16, German trans., 101). JQ, Ar. text, clxv (Russian trans., 120)/in Turkestan 1, I, 136.


100. IB, III, 32 (tr. Gibb, 556).

101. TU, 213; both here and in the Istanbul ms. Ayasofya 3019, fo. 95a, the spelling is MNDANY.

102. MA, III, 99 (Lech, Ar. text, 39, ll. 3–4, German trans., 117).


104. TR, I (text), 11–13, II (trans.), 9–11.

105. Ibid., I (text), 13, II (trans.), 11.


109. This story is found in HJ, 343/373. Amitai-Preiss, 'Sufis and shamans', 29–30.


111. For what follows, see Amitai-Preiss, 'Sufis and shamans'. For the older view, see, e.g., Morgan, Medieval Persia, 73; Gronke, Derwische, 129. Jürgen Paul, 'Scheiche und Herrscher im Khanat Čaġatay', Der Islam 67 (1990), 278–321 (here 318–19), sees sufī shaykhs as instrumental in royal conversions but excludes the possibility that they employed techniques reminiscent of the shaman.


118. IB, III, 54 (tr. Gibb, 568).

119. Amitai-Preiss, 'Sufis and shamans', 41.

120. ID, VIII, 262–3 (tr. in Haarmann, Quellenstudien, 210–11). HJ, 431–2/467–8. These and other sources are cited by Allouche, 'Tegüder's ultimatum', 443; cf. also Amitai-Preiss, 'Sufis and shamans', 30. To be added is al-Jazari, Hawādith al-zamān, in Haarmann, Quellenstudien, Ar. text, 32; also cited in WW, XVIII, 314.

122. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, 86. In his ‘Islamization in the Mongol empire’, 124–5, he suggests that the attribution of Ghazan’s conversion to several sufi figures may owe more to the prestige thereby to be garnered by their lineages.


124. Richard, ‘Conversion de Berke’, 176, n. 8, 180. In his ‘Islamization in the Mongol empire’, 124–5, he suggests that the attribution of Ghazan’s conversion to several sufi figures may owe more to the prestige thereby to be garnered by their lineages.

125. DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, 86. In his ‘Islamization in the Mongol empire’, 124–5, he suggests that the attribution of Ghazan’s conversion to several sufi figures may owe more to the prestige thereby to be garnered by their lineages.


128. Waṣṣāf, 518, ll. 13–14 (GW, IV, 315). For his mother, see also *TU*, 147; *SP*, fo. 118b; and *Mu’izz al-ansāb*, fo. 31a, in *IKPI*, III, Pers. text, lxvi (Russian trans., 42), do not bear Muslim names.


130. See, for instance, the mid-twelfth-century *Bahr al-fawā'id*, tr. Julie Scott Meisami, *The Sea of Precious Virtues* (*Bahr al-fava’i’d*). *A Medieval Islamic Mirror for Princes* (Salt Lake City, UT, 1991), 81, 154.


140. Ibid., II, 179 (tr. Raverty, 1181).

141. *TJG*, II, 242 (*HWC*, 505); hence *JT*, II, 813 (SGK, 190; *CC*, 281).


Chapter 13 The Onset of Islamization: (b) Royal Converts and Muslim Resurgence

1. See the caveat in DeWeese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, 95.


4. IAF, part 1, 458–62. ID, VIII, 100, mentions only the cap. For the sarâghûch/sarâqûj, see p. 93 above.
6. JT, I, 744–5, reading QYAQ for the QBAQ of the text (SGK, 126–7; CC, 257, calling her 'Qiyan'). For the religious connotations of the term 'Uighur', see al-Birzâli, as cited below and n. 14.
11. Ptolemy of Lucca, Annales, ed. Bernhard Schmeidler, Die Annalen des Tholomeus von Lucca in doppelter Fassung (Berlin, 1930), 237; for a discussion of the fuller details in this author's Historia ecclesiastica, see Spinei, Les Mongols et les Roumains, 156, 161–6 passim. See also the letter of the Franciscans of Kaffa, in which Toqto'a is said to have died a Christian: Bihl and Moule, 'De duabus epistolis', 111 (tr. Moule, 'Fourteenth-century missionary letters', 365).
17. Ibid., 93–4 and n. 55. More generally, see Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, 144–55.
19. Text in Bihl and Moule, 'Tria nova documenta', 65. Richard, 'Les missions au nord de la mer noire', 239, tr. in Ryan (ed.), Spiritual Expansion, 350; I can find no evidence for his statement (n. 17 ibid.) that the khan had a Franciscan church in Solghat demolished in 1320.
20. Naṭanzî, 83. For policy towards the Orthodox clergy, see Spuler, Goldene Horde, 228; and for a comparison between Özbeg and Janibeg, Richard, La papauté et les missions d'Orient, 160–1.
22. Vásáry, 'Beginnings of coinage', 378–80, 382–3, resolving a long-standing chronological problem. Mubârak Qocha appears in Muʿizz al-ansâb, fos 26b–27a, in IKPI, III, Pers. text, lii–liii (Russian trans., 44, 45), as two generations closer to Toqa Temûr than were Orus Khan (d. c. 1377) and Toqtamish.
24. Waṣṣâf, 75, ll. 22–3 (GW, I, text, 151, trans., 144).
26. T U, 210, 211.
29. For this date, see MA, III, 99 (Lech, Ar. text, 38; his trans., 117, reads ‘seit 750’ in error). Biran, ‘Chaghadaids and Islam’, 745–7: she advances circumstantial evidence that he may have converted as late as 729/1328–9.
33. For what follows, see Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 135–6 ( = Sochinenia, II, part 1, 76–7). According to the *Shajarat al- atrāk*, Harvard University, Houghton Library, ms. Persian 6, fo. 113b, Tarmashirīn was succeeded by a Toluid, a son of the Ilkhan Öljeitū named Arjagham (?), against whom Buzun contended unsuccessfully for the throne: K āvaev, *Chagataiskii ulus*, 57. But no other source mentions him.
37. *Chronica XXIV Generalium Ordinis Minorum* [early 1370s], in *Analecta Franciscana*, III (Quaracchi, 1897), 531, *quidam religiosus saracenus, Alisoldani nomine*. Bartolomeo da Pisa, *De conformitate vitae beati Francisci ad vitam Domini Iesu* [between 1385 and 1390], in *Analecta Franciscana*, IV (Quaracchi, 1906), 335, *quidam pessimus falcherius saracenus . . . nomine Alisolda* (tr. in Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, III, 32, rendering *falcherius* incorrectly as ‘falconer’).
38. Although the literary sources make *‘Ādīl Sulṭān* succeed him as Amīr Ḥusayn’s shadow-khan, numismatic evidence shows that *‘Ādīl Sulṭān* was his predecessor: Shāmī, ZN, I, 55; Yazdī, ZN, I, 138, 142/ed. Urunbaev, fos 133b, 134b; Petrov, ‘Khroronologiia’, 317.
39. MA, III, 99 (Lech, Ar. text, 39, ll. 5–6, German trans., 117).
40. T G, 586.
41. Yazdī, ZN, ed. Urunbaev, fo. 81a, l. 4.


45. For a good survey of the situation in the western half of the ulus, see Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Ulus Chaghatai before and after Temür’s rise to power: The transformation from tribal confederation to army of conquest, CAJ 27 (1983), 79–100 (here 79–88); also her The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane (Cambridge, 1989), ch. 2.

46. See Aubin, 'Le quriltai de Sultán-Maydân', 180–1, 191–2. The amirs of Khurásan hoped to profit from the chaos in the western half of the Ilkhanate to mount a successful campaign there. In the case of the ulus of Chaghadai, Tughluq Temür's own bid to assert his authority in Transoxiana had to wait for several years.

47. TR, I (text), 8–9, II (trans.), 6–7.

48. Mu’izz al-ansāb, fo. 33b, in IKPI, III, Pers. text, lxvi (Russian trans., 51). The first redaction of Shāmī'sZN (dedicated to Temür-i Lang) likewise makes Tughluq Temür the son of Emil Qocha, although his parentage is omitted in the later version: see Tauer's edn, I, 13; also Yazdi, ZN, I, 33. On Tughluq Temür's questionable origins, see Barthold, Zwölf Vorlesungen, 208–9 (= Sochineniia, V, 165–6); also Pishchulina, Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstän, 43, for other problems with Haydar's information.

49. DeWeese, 'Islamization in the Mongol empire', 132.

50. See Petrov, 'Khronologijaia, 309, on the coins of these khans.

51. See Tegüder A, ḥ, 54.


53. Tegüder A, ḥ, 55.

54. TR, I (text), 5, II (trans.), 3.

55. See most recently Thomas T. Allsen, 'Mongols as vectors', 143.

56. Tegüder A, ḥ, 56. Hence from the latter work that Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalānī derived the passage in his al-muzā, 13; also Yāzdi, ZN, I, 33. On Tughluq Temür’s questionable origins, see Barthold, Zwölf Vorlesungen, 208–9 (= Sochineniia, V, 165–6); also Pishchulina, Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstän, 43, for other problems with Haydar's information.

57. Tegüder Ahmad: Waṣṣāf, 125 (GW, I, text, 255–6, trans., 237–8); JT, II, 1134, 1147–8 (DzhT, III, 177, 193–4; CC, 392, 396), Tarmashirin: TI, LIII, 330; hence WW, X, 383, and AA, I, 523. IB, III, 42 (tr. Gibb, 562), names the victim incorrectly as the khan Köpek (d. 1326), but it is more likely to have been Buzun's father, and Tarmashirin's immediate predecessor, Döre Temür (d. 1331): see IB, III, 42 (tr. Gibb, 562), and the references in n. 58 below.

58. TI, LIII, 330, amara bi l-shar wa-taraka l-yāsāq; hence WW, X, 383, but reading siyāsāt for yāsāq; AA, I, 523, taraka l-bāsāt [sic] . . . wa-amara bi-akhām al-shar‘a’. It was seemingly from the latter work that Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalānī derived the passage in his al-Durar al-kāmina cited by Ayalon, 'The Great Yasa (B)', 178–9, where some corrupt phrases in the printed text are elucidated.


60. TI, LIII, 330, akrama l-umāra l-muslimāna wa qarrabahum wa jafā l-kafara minhum wa ab‘adahum. Hence WW, X, 382–3; AA, I, 523, akrama l-umāra l-muslimāna wa
qarrabahum ... wa jafā l-kafara wa ab’ adahum wa haddadahum wa tawa’ adahum (in both cases I have substituted jafā for the hafā of the printed text).

61. IB, III, 40–1 (tr. Gibb, 560–1).
62. Manz, ‘Rule of the infidels’, 163, likewise doubts that it was, but on different grounds.
63. MA, III, 83 (Lech, Ar. text, 22, German trans., 105).
70. MA, III, 83 (Lech, Ar. text, 22, German trans., 105).
74. BH, 505. Step’anos Orbelian, Histoire de la Siounie, I, 260. It is, of course, possible that Baidu’s residence in Baghdad for over a decade had bred a sympathy for Islam – or gave rise to the perception that it had done so.
75. Only in the BN ms. of JT: ed. Jahn, Geschichte Gāzān Ḥāns, 82a; also in DzhT, III, 608.
76. JT, II, 1126 (DzhT, III, 170; CC, 389). Amitai, ‘Conversion of Tegüder’, 17, interprets the phrase to mean, rather, that he performed the Muslim prayer.
77. See Melville, ‘From Adam to Abaqa . . . (Part II)’, text, 53, trans., 60.
78. Mustawfī, ZN, II, 1292, l. 12 (tr. Ward, II, 269). His source was Buqa, son of *Yula Temūr (see p. 30 above).
79. Amitai, ‘Conversion of Tegüder’, 27, n. 60.
80. Not in Rawshan and Mūsawī’s edn of JT or in CC: see DzhT, III, 616.
84. Blair, ‘Religious art of the Ilkhanids’ 106, 108. For the importance of the south, see, e.g., WR, 20, 22/in SF, 173, 174 (MFW, 74–5); as Tomoko Masuya, ‘Ilkhanid courtly life’, in Komaroff and Carboni (eds), Legacy of Genghis Khan, 74–103 (here 89–90), points out, the traditional alignment was N.N.W. – S.S.E. rather than N.- S.
NOTES to pp. 364–6


87. Waṣṣāf, 329, l. 3 (GW, III, 170). Cf. Spuler, Mongolen’, 209, and Boyle, ‘Dynastic and political history’, 381. At least two more princes shared their fate in the next few years.

88. JT, II, 1300–1 (DzhT, III, 343; CC, 454).


91. JT, II, 1260 (DzhT, III, 301; CC, 440); and see also SP, fos 146b, 148b.

92. JT, II, 1189, 1215 (DzhT, III, 231, 256; CC, 410, 419). In a moment of near-candour when chronicling the marriage, JT, II, 1269 (DzhT, III, 310; CC, 443, has ‘the anniversary of the death’ in error), Rashid al-Dīn calls her the mother of Alafirang (Gaikhatu’s son). In SP, fo. 148b, he mentions Ghazan’s marriages to Dondi and to another of Gaikhatu’s widows, Öljei. Banākatī, 451, neglects to mention the previous husband of both Bulughan and Dondi.

93. Eltüzmish: TU, 7, for her two previous marriages, see JT, II, 1055, 1189 (DzhT, III, 96, 231; CC, 366, 410); Bruno De Nicola, ‘The ladies of Rûm: A hagiographic view of women in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Anatolia’, Journal of Sufi Studies 3 (2014), 132–56 (here 151, n. 101), believes that there were two different queens of this name, but the sources name the same father in each case. Günjüshkeb: KWB, 329, l. 3 (here 151, n. 101), believes that there were two different queens of this name, but the sources name the same father in each case. Günjüshkeb: KWB, 329, l. 3 (here 151, n. 101), believes that there were two different queens of this name, but the sources name the same father in each case. Günjüshkeb: KWB, 329, l. 3 (here 151, n. 101), believes that there were two different queens of this name, but the sources name the same father in each case.

94. For the context of courtly life prior to Ghazan, see Masuya, ‘Ilkhanid courtly life’, 75–84.


96. al-Jazari, Hawādith al-zamān, I, 256, 286 (former passage tr. in Melville, ‘Pādshāh-i Islām’, 164; and see ibid., 170–1). For what follows, see further Denise Aigle, ‘The Mongol invasions of Bilād al-Shām by Ghāzān Khān and Ibn Taymīyah’s three “anti-Mongol” fatwas’, MSR 11, part 2 (2007), 89–120 (here 106–7); revised as A religious response to Ghazan Khan’s invasions of Syria. The three “anti-Mongol” fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya, in her Mongol Empire, 283–305 (here 296); also Aigle, ‘Légimité islamique’, 10–11, and Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology, 65–6. The device has been adopted, of course, in much more recent times – and in very different circumstances – by the adherents of ‘Islamic State’.


98. JT, II, 1461 (DzhT, III, 494; CC, 505).

99. Waṣṣāf, 347, l. 21, kharāj-u qubchūr-i mu’ayyan; cf. 161, l. 17 (referring to an earlier period), qubchūr-i mawashī mu’ayyan nashuda (GW, II, 34, and III, 216, fails to translate either phrase fully). Lambton, ‘Mongol fiscal administration’ [Part I], 89–90.


the tax is to be paid in cash (al-ʿayn) confirms that the traditional levy of livestock is not involved: ibid., text, 73, 131, 142–3 (trans., 39, 122, 138). See also Lampton, Mongol fiscal administration' [Part I], 91. For another example of Mongol administrative practice surviving the adoption of Islam, see p. 390 on the suyyughāl.


104. For a good discussion, see Amitai, 'Conversion of Tegüder', 26–30.


108. Ibid., 110, ll. 11–12 (GW, I, text, 226, trans., 210); hence Michael Weiers, 'Die Mongolen in Iran', in Weiers (ed.), Mongolen, 313; Amitai, 'Conversion of Tegüder', 27–8, doubts whether the measure could have been fully executed.

109. BH, 467; MTD, 506, mentions his generosity to Christian priests but not the decrees. For new church building, see Bar Hebraeus, Chronicon ecclesiasticum, III, cols 454, 456.


111. DMZ, IV, 141 (= MZDMZ, XIX, 187); hence TI, I, 6.

112. Allouche, 'Tegüder's ultimatum', 444.


114. Letter to Qalāwūn: MTD, 508; Waṣṣāf, 114, ll. 8–10 (GW, I, text, 233, trans., 217); Ibn Mughayzil, Dhayl Mufarrij al-kurūb, ed. 'Umar 'Abd al-Salām Tadmurī (Beirut, 1425/2004), 129; Shāfiʿ b. 'Ali al-ʿAsqalānī, al-Faḍl al-maʾthūr min sīrat al-sultān al-malik al-Manṣūr, ed. Paulina B. Lewicka, Šāfiʿ Ibn 'Ali's Biography of the Mamluk Sultan Qalāwūn (Warsaw, 2000), 313. Both documents: Ibn Ṭ Abd al-Ẓāhir, Tashrīf, 5, 8; hence ZF, 219, ll. 2–4, and 221, ll. 4–7; and cf. al-Nuwayrī, XXVII, 402, and the summary in DMZ, IV, 141 (= MZDMZ, XIX, 187). See Pfeiffer, Ahmad Tegüder's second letter', 173–5; though she seems to assume that the reform was designed primarily to end the diversion of waqf funds to the observatory.


117. See Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 27–8, for the circumstantial evidence; also his 'Changing forms of legitimation', 228–9.

118. BH, 505. 'Author Z', in Zetterstéen (ed.), Beitritte, 34, says that he had become a Christian (tanassara). al-Ŷūnīnī, in MZDMZ, XX, 279, mentions Baid's favour towards Christians and the rumour that he himself was one; TI, LI, 191, repeats this, while stressing that both he and Gaikhatu died as polytheists and infidels.

119. Specified by BH, 506.

120. JT, II, 1356 (DzhT, III, 396–7; CC, 471); ibid., I, 29 (DzhT, I, part 1, 56; CC, 12), for Ghazan's personal participation. Waṣṣāf gives a shorter account (reference in n. 123).

121. IF, V, 40 (the context suggests that this occurred in Baghdad). BH, 507, says merely that very many 'pagan priests' became Muslims.

122. JT, II, 1357 (DzhT, III, 397–8; CC, 471). Cf. the brief comments in Spuler, Mongolen', 156.

123. Waṣṣāf, 323, ll. 7–9 (GW, III, 155). Tashʿ ītā, tr. Budge, 210/tr. Borbone, 90. JT, II, 1259 (CC, 439; see also the variant reading in DzhT, III, 300), adds synagogues.

124. BH, 506. For King Khetʿum's intervention, see Tashʿ ītā, tr. Budge, 213/tr. Borbone, 92. His role is confirmed by Armenian authors: Stepʿanos Orbelian, Histoire de la Sioumie, I, 262; Sivas chronicle, in Galstian, Armianskje istochniki, 31.

125. BH, 506–7 (attributing this decree to Nawrūz). HJ, 483/523. Waṣṣāf, 324, ll. 18–20 (GW, III, 160), mentioning the imposition of jizya only on the Jews. For distinguishing
marks often imposed in the past on the ahl al-dhimma, see M. Perlmann, ‘Ghiyār’, EF, II, 1075–6.

126. HJ, 484/523. Tash’ītā, tr. Budge, 223–4/tr. Borborne, 95–6, strongly implies that Ghazan’s resumption of the palace was permanent; and see also MA, III, 138 (Lech, Ar. text, 91–2, German trans., 152). Gillī-Elewy, Bagdad, 105, misrepresents this episode, but gives a correct account at 190.

127. al-Jazari, Ḥawādith al-zamān, I, 286.


129. al-Jazari, Ḥawādith al-zamān, I, 256 (tr. in Melville, ‘Pādshāh-i Islām’, 164): although al-Jazari was indebted to al-Bīrzālī, the ultimate source was Ibn Taymiyya’s brother, an eyewitness. Calmard, ‘Le chisme imamite’, 270, n. 50.

130. Step’anos Orbelian, Histoire de la Siouwie, I, 261. For Nawrūz’s activities and the shifts in Ghazan’s religious policy, see Aubin, Ėmiris mongols, 61–6; also Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road, 121–2.

131. HJ, 483–4/523, 494/533: ‘two months (shahrayn)’ at the latter juncture, regarding the ghiyār specifically. Fiey, Chrétiens syriaques, 69, n. 18.


133. JT, II, 1285 (DzhT, III, 327; CC, 448).


136. TU, 90–1 (reading ikhtiyār for the ikhtitām of the text); cited by Broadbridge, Kingship and Ideology, 67. For the return to pluralism, see Jackson, ‘Mongol khans’, 117–18.


138. Jackson, Mongols and the West, 177.


140. TC, 602–3.

141. Wāsāf, 327, ll. 18–19, tamāmat-i masājid-i bilād-i islāmrā bāz muʿābid-u šawāmi’i asāqifa-u rahābīn sāzand (cf. GW, III, 167). Aubin, Ėmiris mongols, 63 (no source specified). See also Spuler, Mongolen’, 81–2; Amitai, Holy War, 69.


143. Sanjian, Colophonos, 52, 53, 60. MZDMZ, XXII, 328.

144. Bundy, Syriac and Armenian Christian responses, 40–1.

145. For this sequence of events, see Tash’tā, tr. Budge, 258, 259–60/tr. Borborne, 110, 111. Sanjian, Colophonos, 52. Fiey, Chrétiens syriaques, 75–6. The text in Sanjian, 60–1, from the end of Öljettī’s reign, mentions the exemption for clergy and monks, but says that the jizya was again being levied on the laity.

146. TT, LIII, 317. WW, X, 323. AA, I, 497. For an example of the verse, see Ahari, Ta’ārikh-i Shâykh Ūways, text, 155–6. Boyle, ‘Dynastic and political history’, 413.


148. Tabrizī, Saʿādat-nāma, Pers. text, 144 (German trans., 139), gives a tax yield from dhimmis, specifically Jews and Armenians, in the military district (tūmen) of Kāshān.


150. JT, II, 1256, 1333, 1335 (DzhT, III, 296, 297, 374, 376; CC, 438, 463, 464).
151. Ibid., II, 1254 (DzhT, III, 295–6; CC, 437).
152. Ibid., II, 1358–9 (DzhT, III, 398–400; CC, 472).
155. Ibid., I, 244 (cf. CC, 87); see also I, 273, 293–4 (CC, 96, 102).
156. Ibid., I, 223 (CC, 82).
157. Ibid., I, 289 (cf. CC, 101); cf. also I, 29, and II, 1335 (DzhT, I, part 1, 56, and III, 377; CC, 12, 464).
158. Ibid., I, 27 (DzhT, I, part 1, 50–1; CC, 11); cf. also I, 287–8 (CC, 101).
159. Ibid., I, 27–30 (DzhT, I, part 1, 51–8; CC, 11–12).
160. Ibid., I, 32 (DzhT, I, part 1, 60; CC, 12).
161. Ibid., I, 288 (CC, 101).
162. Ibid., I, 27 (DzhT, I, part 1, 51; CC, 11).
163. Ibid., I, 288 (CC, 101). Interestingly, WR, 124, 126/in SF, 232, 233 (MFW, 156, 157), thought that the Uighurs as well as the Mongols were monotheists.
164. JT, II, 1308 (DzhT, III, 351; CC, 456).
165. Ibid., I, 474–5 (CC, 166).
166. Ibid., I, 666 (SGK, 57; CC, 231).
167. TJG, I, 62, 226 (HWC, 80–1, 270).
168. JT, I, 643–4 (SGK, 38–9; CC, 224).
171. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 55.
172. TJG, I, 18 (HWC, 26).
176. JT, I, 29, and II, 1210 (DzhT, I, part 1, 55, and III, 251; CC, 11, 417); and see Amitai-Preiss, ‘Ghazan, Islam and Mongol tradition’, 4, and in Hawting (ed.), Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders, 256.
177. TI, XLIX, 182; WW, XXVII, 400. See Biran, ‘Islamisation of Hülegü’.
178. Mustawfî,ZN, II, 1213, ll. 3–5, 1214, ll. 3–4, and 1219, l. 2 (tr. Ward, II, 109, 111, 122), respectively.
181. IW, VI, 213/153.
183. al-Nuwayrî, XXVII, 301–2; see 300 for this author’s debt to envoys and other visitors from the Ilkhanate. For analysis, see Amitai, ‘Al-Nuwayrî’, 26–9, and ‘Did Chinggis Khan have a Jewish teacher?’, esp. 698–705.
184. ID, IX, 32, l. 15; IAF, part 2, 660; but cf. the different report in DMZ, ed. Guo, I (trans.), 158, II (text), 119 (= MZDMZ, XXXI, 120), citing al-Birzâlî. See Denise Aigle, ‘Les invasions


186. The rebuttals issued in the name of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad by his entourage are discussed by Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 82–4, 86.

187. For what follows, see Aigle, ‘Mongol invasions’ (where the probable dates of the three *fatwā* are discussed at 117–18), and ‘Religious response’, 302–5; more briefly, Amitai, *Holy War*, 78–80.


196. *MA*, V, 478. To the best of my knowledge, this detail is not met with elsewhere.

197. Ibn Taymiyya, XXVIII, 504–5, and 520, ll. 9–10 and 17; tr. in Michot, ‘Textes spirituels . . ., XI’, 31 and n. 47.


199. Ibn Taymiyya, XXVIII, 520, ll. 2–8; tr. in Michot, ‘Textes spirituels . . ., XI’, 30–1.


NOTES to pp. 379–84


Epilogue

1. TJG, I, 83 (HWC, 107).

2. JT, I, 32 (DzhT, I, part 1, 59–60; my translation; cf. CC, 12).

3. This chapter owes a great debt to Biran, Chinggis Khan, ch. 4, ‘The Chinggisid Legacy’; though she is concerned with the conqueror’s own legacy as well as that of Mongol rule in general.

4. Although, as pointed out by John E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire, revised edn (Salt Lake City, UT, 1999), 7–8, Islamic sacred law and nomadic political tradition formed ‘a curious amalgam of legitimizing principles’, at least until the late fifteenth century. See also pp. 384–5, on the diverse bases of Temür’s claim to rule.


6. See A. P. Grigor’ev, ‘Zolotoordynskie khany 60–70-x godov XIV v.: Khronologiiia pravlenii’, Istoriografiia i Istochnikovedenie Istoriii Stran Azii i Afriki 7 (1983), 9–54. Safargaliev, Raspad, 111–34, discusses this period in the history of Batu’s ulus, pointing out (115, n. 2) the unreliability of Naṭanzī in ascribing certain khans to Orda’s line, but also preferring (129, n. 2) that author’s testimony that Orus Khan (above, n. 22 at p. 536) was descended from Orda. Mu’izz al-ansâb, which makes Orus, like Toqtamish, a descendant of Toqa Temür, provides the most reliable genealogies of the Jochid rulers (to be supplemented by those in Tawârîkh-i guzîda-yi nuṣrat-nâma: see p. 34 above).

7. Although it has been proposed (in the Iranian context) that the absence of pretenders capable of advancing their claims in person, at the head of their own supporters, could be taken to signal a lessening of respect for Chinggisid legitimacy: Melville, ‘End of the Ilkhanate and after’, 319.


13. For Temür's relations with Ming China, see Ralph Kauz, *Politik und Handel zwischen Ming und Timuriden. China, Iran und Zentralasien im Spätmittelalter* (Wiesbaden, 2005), ch. 3.


16. For an overview of the various sources of Temür's legitimacy, see Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology*, 169–70; and Aigle, 'Epilogue: The Mongol empire after Genghis Khan', in her *Mongol Empire*, 306–22 (here 308–9). For the treatment in the Timurid sources, see also Bernardini, *Mémoire et propagande*.


32. *JT*, I, 606 (CC, 211–12), where Qarachar is one of four noyans allotted to Chaghadai; also *SP*, fo. 117b. *SH*, § 243 (tr. De Rachewiltz, I, 167), says he was one of three; cf. § 202 (trans., 133), where he simply appears in the list of ninety-five commanders of 1,000.


34. Woods, 'Rise of Timurid historiography', 104–5; and see n. 106 ibid., for the single reference to shared ancestry that Yazdī retained (*Yazdī*, *ZN*, II, 516).


40. Biran, *Chinggis Khan*, 104. For examples, see Bregel, ‘New Uzbek states’, 395, 399.


46. I owe this point to an unpublished paper by Dr Andrew Peacock, entitled ‘Intellectual exchange between the Islamic East and Anatolia in the Middle Ages’ and delivered at a conference convened by the British Institute of Persian Studies in London on 16 September 2016 to celebrate the life and work of Edmund Bosworth.


50. McChesney, *Central Asia*, 127–32, for the concerns of some sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors.
59. On the evidence of Western sources, Ron Sela, *Ritual and Authority in Central Asia: The Khan’s Inauguration Ceremony* (Bloomington, IN, 2003), 28–32, demonstrates that this tradition went back to the thirteenth century and the era of the unitary empire.


61. McChesney, *Chinggisid restoration*, 283–6. See also his *Central Asia*, 130.


64. For the two texts and the dating, see Vásáry, ‘Oriental languages’, 110–11; more broadly, Felicitas Schmieder, ‘The world of the *Codex Cumanicus*, the *Codex Cumanicus* in its world’, in Schmieder and Schreiner (eds), *Il codice Cumanico*, xiii–xxxi. The interpreter whom Rubruck’s party had acquired at Soldaia, and whom the friar dismisses as ‘neither intelligent nor articulate’, belonged – one hopes – to an era when standards were significantly lower: WR, 54/in *SF*, 191 (*MFW*, 101).


71. For Iran, see the comments of Martínez, ‘Changes in chancellery languages’, 144–5.


73. IB, III, 32, 33, 36 (tr. Gibb, 556, 557, 558).


79. See the discussion in Hans Robert Roemer, ‘The Türkmen dynasties’, in CHI, VI, 147–88 (here 147–54); more briefly, Morgan, Medieval Persia, 100–1, 103.


81. AM, 24.

82. IF, I, 322 (no. 460). There is no indication of date, apart from the year of his death, 704 (1304–5).

83. For references in the sources, see TMEN, II, 457–9 (no. 876: ‘tutmâč, ein Nudelgericht’): for pre-Mongol Iran Doerfer here cites a single reference from IA relating to the reign of the Saljuq Toghril Beg (d. 1063).


86. TN, I, 419, 420 (tr. Raverty, 534, 539–41). For other references, see Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 40–1.

87. TN, I, 440–1 (tr. Raverty, 598–9).


89. Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 234; and for the 1330s and 1340s, see also Jackson, ‘Mongols and the Delhi Sultanate’, 127–8, 147–52. On Khalîl Sulṭān, see above, p. 357.

90. TN, II, 88 (tr. Raverty, 862). Waṣṣāf, 311, ll. 7–8 (GW, III, 126), says that he had governed the Khalaj on behalf of Nâṣîr al-Dîn Muḥammad of Binbân (see p. 246 above); hence JT, ed. Jahn, Indiengeschichte, Ar. text, Tafel 57 (German trans., 48–9; the Pers. text is corrupt)/Khalili Coll. ms., fo. 266b, in Blair, Compendium. See Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 80, and Kumar, ‘Ignored elites’, 50–1.


92. For examples, see Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 173–4; Wink, Al-Hind, II, 210–11.


94. Michael Dillon, China’s Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement and Sects (Richmond, Surrey, 1999), 12–13, 25.


96. See H. Franke, ‘Ahmad (?–1282)’, in De Rachewiltz et al. (eds), In the Service of the Khan, 539–57.

97. TN, II, 151 (tr. Raverty, 1106–7); for Muslim captives dispersed throughout these regions, see II, 155 (tr. Raverty, 1112).

98. MP, II, 16, 22 (tr. Ricci, 68, 75; tr. Latham, 54, 60).


102. TN, II, 151 (tr. Raverty, 1107).

105. See Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, I, 262–3; Biran, Qaidu, 49–50.
106. On these events, see Liu, ‘War and peace’, 348–9.
111. TU, 208 (reading ČWPAN in error for ČWBAY); also 202.
112. MP, II, 18 (tr. Ricci, 71; tr. Latham, 57).
117. See Elverskog, Buddhism and Islam, 181, and Zieme, ‘Notes on the religions’, 182: both authors, however, erroneously identify him with the Ilkhan Sulaymān (1339–43).
118. Gunashirin and his brother Engke Temür (d. 1404) appear in Mu ‘izz al-ansāb, fo. 38b, in IKPI, III, Pers. text, lxxvi (Russian trans., 54), as the great-grandsons of Chūbei. Their grandfather Buyan Quli (not to be confused with the near-contemporary Chaghadayid khan of the same name) appears as prince of Weiwu and Xining in 1348: Franke, ‘A 14th century Mongolian letter fragment’, 120. On Gunashirin, see Kauz, Politik und Handel, 32–3.
125. IB, II, 357, 448 (tr. Gibb, 470, 516).
126. Richard, La papauté et les missions d’Orient, 89–90. See also his ‘Les missions au nord de la mer noire’, 237–8, tr. in Ryan (ed.), Spiritual Expansion, 348–9; Jackson, Mongols and the West, 257.
128. Here again I am indebted to a paper by Andrew Peacock (see n. 50 above).
129. See Allsen, ‘Ever closer encounters’, 8–9, and ‘Population movements, passim; see also the remarks in Golden, ‘Migrations, ethnogenesis’, 118–19.


139. He was the son of Möge of the Jalayir tribe, one of Chaghadai’s commanders of a thousand, and his son Changshi, a leading amir in the early fourteenth century, is described as Prince Yasavî’s maternal uncle: see *JT*, I, 72, 606–7 (with MWNGGH in error for MWGH at the latter point; rendered correctly in CC, 30, 212); *TU*, 36.


141. As noticed by Biran, *Chinggis Khan*, 101. There is a brief discussion in Bregel, *Uzbeks, Qazaqs and Turkmens*, 221 and n. 3.


144. Lindner, *How Mongol were the early Ottomans?*, 282–3, and *Explorations*, 24–6.


148. Jochid prince: *JT*, I, 725 (SGK, 112; CC, 250). Qongqutr noyan: ibid., I, 160, and II, 1152, 1215 (DzhT, I, part 1, 396, and III, 197, 256; CC, 61, 398, 419); SP, fos 146b, 148b (*WTMAN*); Banākāti, 451, has *WGAN*, but this is evidently a misreading for *WTMAN*, as given in the late sixteenth-century BL ms. Add. 7626, fo. 156a.
149. MA, III, 226; also ed. Franz Taeschner, Al-‘Umarî’s Bericht über Anatolien in seinem Werke Masâlik al-‘abyûr fi mamâlik al-‘amsâr, I [text only published] (Leipzig, 1929), 41: in a communication dated 1 December 2015, Dr Heywood suggests the reading 'Taman', a metathetic form of that given by Pachymeres. The name appears as 'Uthmân in MA, III, 208/ed. Taeschner, 22 (where the text reads 'WRXAN'). We might have suspected that al-'Umarî confused Orkhan with his namesake, the ruler of Menteshe, but he and his principality are covered at III, 230/ed. Taeschner, 47.


155. Ole J. Benedictow, 'Yersinia pestis, the bacterium of plague, arose in East Asia. Did it spread westwards via the Silk Roads, the Chinese maritime expeditions of Zheng He or over the vast Eurasian populations of sylvatic (wild) rodents?', JAH 47 (2013), 1–31 (here 29–31).


158. This testimony is discussed by Ole J. Benedictow, The Black Death 1346–1353: The Complete History (Woodbridge, 2004), 51–4.


160. See Dols, Black Death, 49–50, and McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 164–5, who both link the inscriptions with the Black Death; so too, in a fuller treatment of the gravestones, does Klein, Das nestorianische Christentum, 287–8. But see below and n. 165.


162. IB, III, 333–4 (tr. Gibb, 717), saying that the majority of the troops died. Barani, Tarîkh-i Firuzshâhî, 481. For the probable date of Muḥammad’s campaign, see Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, 268.

174. Benedictow, *Black Death*, 50–1 and n. 44, and ‘Yersinia pestis’, 19 and n. 69; he does not specify the original source, but relies on K. G. Vas’ilev and A. E. Segal, *Istoriia épidemii v Rossii (materialy i ocherki)* (Moscow, 1960), 28, who here cite the *Voskreenskaia letopis*.  
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Chaghatay Turkish


Mongolian


Chinese


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INDEX


'Abbasid dynasty, 'Abbasid Caliphate, 3–4, 17–18, 23–4, 31, 40–1, 47, 49–51, 84–5, 126, 128–9, 134, 142, 166, 217, 247, 255–6, 273–5, 321, 324, 334–5, 365, 383; reactions to its overthrow, 321–2, 324; puppet Caliphate in Cairo, 36, 264, 322, 324, 342–3, 365

'Abbasid revolution, 365, 369

'Abd-Allāh, Chaghadayid prince, 195, 197, 259, 340

'Abd-Allāh II, Uzbek khan, 392

'Abd al-Mu'min, lawyer, 296

'Abd al-Raḥmān, Shaykh Kamāl al-Dīn, 32, 312, 347, 367

'Abd al-Rashīd, Chaghadayid khan of Mughālistān, 35

Abhar, 276

Ābish, (female) Salghurid atabeg of Fārs, 258, 260–3, 266, 304, 510n

Abishqa, Chaghadayid khan, 148

Abiward, 80, 165, 206, 249

*Abka (Ambughai), Mongol noyan, 88

Abkhaz, Abkhazia, 293, 407

ablutions: see ghusl

Abū Bakr b. Sa’d, Salghurid atabeg of Fārs, 135, 245–6, 251–2, 254

Abū Bakr(-i) Kurt, 247, 477n


Abū l-Ghāzī, 'Arabshahid khan of Khiva, 403

Abū l-Khayr, Uzbek khan, 388

Abu-Lughod, Janet, 220

Abū l-Ma’āli al-Juwaynī, 322

Abū Muslim, 365

Abū Sa’id, Ilkhan, 28–30, 139, 142, 184, 189, 192, 198, 206, 229, 316, 362–3, 371–2, 383, 386, 394, 415

Abū Shāma, Shihāb al-Dīn, 21, 37, 133, 169

Abulustayn, 172

Acre, 45, 132, 214

Adam, Guillaume, Dominican friar, 45, 347–8, 354

'Ādil Sulṭān, Chaghadayid puppet khan, 537n

Adshead, Samuel, 5, 405

al-Afḍal ‘Abbās b. ‘Ali, Rasulid ruler of the Yemen, 393

Afghanistan, 12, 49, 68, 76–7, 82, 104, 141, 148, 173, 183, 195, 197, 402

Afrāsiyāb, legendary Turanian hero, 53, 326

Afrāsiyāb b. Yūsuf Shāh, atabeg of Greater Luristān, 256, 263–4

Africa, 233–4; North Africa, 215

Afshār, tribe, 395

agronomy, 5, 26, 230–1

Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-'Azīz, ra’īs of Buhkārā, 58

Aḥmad b. Ḥusayn b. ‘Ali Kātib, 32

Aḥmad b. Yūsuf Shāh, Lur prince, 256

Aḥmad Fanākatī, minister under the Qaghan Qubilai, 398

Aigle, Denise, 14, 308–9

Akhābār-i mughūlān, 9, 25, 135–6, 138, 145, 272, 290–1
Akhlāṭ, 84, 131, 163, 179
Akhlāṭ, Fakhr al-Dīn, astronomer, 228
Akhsitān, Shirwānshāh, 244
Akeray, battle of (1256), 126
Āl-i Burhān, local dynasty of šādars in Bukhāra, 58, 243
'Ālā’ al-Dawla, atabeg of Yazd, 253
'Ālā’ al-Dawla Simnānī, 33, 275, 278, 300, 323
'Ālā’ al-Dīn, Assassin Master, 125, 127
'Ālā’ al-Dīn, ruler of Qunduz, 90
'Ālā’ al-Dīn, siege engineer, 227
'Ālā’ al-Dīn Hindū Faryūmadī, Ilkhanid wazir of Khurāsān, 198, 274
'Ālā’ al-Dīn Ḥusayn ‘Jahānsūz’, Ghurid Sultan, 180
'Ālā’ al-Dīn Khaljī, Delhi Sultan, 267
Alafirang, Ilkhanid prince, 540n
Alamūt, 20, 74, 145
Alans (Ossetes, Ās), 80, 104, 213, 219, 457n
Alatagh, 300
Alburz mountains, 125–6, 145
Alchemists, alchemy, 225, 237, 300, 312, 347
Aleppo, 41, 84, 121, 130–1, 135–6, 166, 172–3, 176, 226, 253, 257, 261, 290, 314, 323, 406; Mongol capture of, 130, 168–9, 172, 176
Alexander the Great: see Dhū l-Qarnayn
Alexandria, 216
'Alī, Chaghadayid prince, 533n
'Alī, fourth Caliph, 57, 235, 321, 372, 376, 384
'Alī Bahādur, Ilkhanid governor of Baghdad, 289
'Alī Khwāja, malik of Jand, 243
'Alī al-Riḍā, Eighth Imam, 176, 315
'Alī al-Riḍā, Eighth Imam, 176, 315
'Alī Sulṭān, khan of Chaghadai’s ulus, 356–7, 359, 361–2, 386
'Alī Tamghāchī, Ilkhanid governor of Tabrīz, 284, 294
'Alīs, 167, 370
Almaligh, 34, 48, 66, 73, 102, 108, 116, 148–9, 177, 194, 204, 243, 357, 361–2
Almeria, 407
Alp Arslan, Great Saljuq Sultan, 523n
Alp Direk, Oran chieftain, 61
Alp Qara, Oran chieftain, 60–1
Alp Tonga, identified with Afrāsiyāb, 53
Altai mountains, 55, 63, 105–6, 149, 188, 399
Altan Debter, 16, 27
altan orugh (’golden kin’), the imperial family, 97, 347
Altan Tobchi, 98
Alughu, Chaghadayid khan, 148–9, 184, 187, 199, 201, 269, 399; his sons, 199, 207, see also Chūbēi, Qaban
Āmīd, 135, 251, 257, 265
Āmīn al-Dawla, brother of Sa’d al-Dawla, 292
Amir Ḥusayn, Qara‘unas amir, 357, 385
Amir Khusro Dihlawī, 39, 396
Amīr Ḥusayn ‘Jahānsūz’, Ghurid Sultan, 180
Amīr Khusraw Dihlawī, 39, 396
Andā (blood-brother), 63
Andkhūd, 156
Anān, Yuan prince, 349–50, 374, 398
Anbār, 19
Anbar, 216
Andishān, 83–4, 126, 162; Ilkhanid administration of, 273–5. See also Rūm
Anbār, 19
Anbarchi, Ilkhanid prince, 273, 523n
Antioch, 84. See also Bohemond V; Bohemond VI
appanages, distribution of, among the imperial family, 101–4
Āq Qūyūnlū, 244, 390, 394, 404
Annam (Vietnam), 151, 251
Arabic, 84. See also Bohemond V; Bohemond VI
Arable Sea, 246
Arabs, 156, 226, 414; in China, 223
Arabs, 156, 226, 414; in China, 223
Arābshahid dynasty, 329, 388–9
Arāl Sea, 95, 174, 408
Ardabil, 155, 160, 178, 313
Ardjaldār, river, 197
Arghun Aqa, Mongol governor of Iran, 22, 83–4, 106–11, 113, 118, 120–2, 144, 178, 249, 274, 302, 344, 351, 523n
Arigh Bōke, son of Tolui, 99, 106–7, 122, 132, 146, 148–50, 182, 185, 187, 204, 206, 383, 411
Arish, river, 81
Aristotle, 7, 340, 344–7, 366, 376
Armenia, Armenians, 33, 111, 135, 140, 168,
INDEX

176, 378, 407, 464n; Armenian sources, 42–4, 122–3. See also Greater Armenia, Lesser Armenia

Arrān, 17, 19, 43, 51, 81, 117, 135, 143, 145, 160, 192, 194, 244, 249, 270, 341, 347

Arslan Khan, Qarluq ruler of Qayaligh, 66, 90, 243

artisans, 104, 122, 149, 216, 224, 234, 301; spared and relocated by the Mongols, 75, 88, 157–9, 162–3, 168–9, 173, 212, 225–6, 337–8, 416–17

Artuqid dynasty, 84, 244, 254, 257. See also Mārdīn

Aruq, Ilkhanid noyan, 272, 293, 296, 366, 519n

Arzan, 244

Arzinjān (Erzincan), 83, 164, 265, 311

Ascelin, Dominican friar and papal envoy, 44

asceticism, ascetics, 169, 299, 323, 346–7, 357, 376. See also qalandars; sufis; sufism

Ashiyār, 88

al-Ashraf Mūsā, Ayyubid prince in the Ḩimṣ, 131–2, 257

Aṣīl, 111

Aṣīl al-Dīn Ḥasan, son of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, 316

Assam, 81

Assassins, 20, 24, 40, 74, 91, 125–7, 134, 165–6, 250, 253; early relations with the Mongols, 74, 91, 125, 274; their destruction, 126–7. See also Ismā‘īlīs

Astārābād, 249, 383, 385

Astrakhan (Ḥājjī Tarkhān), 215, 388; khanate of, 13, 291

astrologers, astrology, 5, 41, 225–9, 236–7, 239–41, 333

astronomers, astronomy, 225, 231, 237, 333

Āthār wa-aḥyāʾ (by Rashīd al-Dīn), 230–3

Atsiz, Khwārazmshāh, 74

Attila, 92

Atwood, Christopher, 390

Aubin, Jean, 138, 144, 277, 283, 285

Avag, Armenian prince, 307

Avars, 52

‘awāridāt: see taxation, irregular

‘Awfi, 322

Awliyā’ Allāh Āmulī, 32

awqāf: see waqf

Ayās, 214–15


al-‘Aynī, 15

‘Aynštāb, 257

Aytamish, Mamlūk amir, 393

‘āyyārān, 156, 177

Ayyubid dynasty, 91, 131–2, 134, 213, 244, 257, 260–1, 404

‘Azāz, 168

Azerbaijan, 12, 17–19, 29, 51, 79, 81–2, 92, 117, 135, 143, 145, 154, 156, 174, 192, 194, 205, 215, 217, 244, 249, 266, 270, 326, 383–4

Azhdari, 327; his Ghāzān-nāma, 327

Baba, a descendant of Jochi Qasar, 187, 201–2

Bābā Ishāq, 89

Bābā Tükles, 389

Bābī Ya‘qūb, qalandar leader, 347

Bābur, Zahir al-Dīn Muhammad, Timurid prince and first Mughal emperor in India, 349, 391–2

Bādghis, 189, 197

Badr al-Dīn al-‘Āmid, of the family of qadis of Ütrār, 90

Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, atabeg of Mosul, 79, 88, 135, 138, 175, 179, 244, 252–5; his sons, 291

Badr al-Dīn Mandānī, shaykh, 201, 335, 345, 356

Badr al-Dīn Masʿūd, atabeg of Lesser Luristan, 245


Baghlān, 81–2

Bahā’ al-Dīn, malik of Su’lūk, 249–50

Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband, shaykh, 357

Bahā’ al-Dīn Marghinānī, 269

Bahrain, 245

Bahārīs, Mamlūk regiment, 132

Baidar, son of Chaghadai, 103

Baidu, Ilkhanid shīḥna of Baghdad, 293, 302

Baidu, Mongol basqaq of Iṣfahān, 263

Baidu Sükürchi, Ilkhanid shiḥna of Baghdad, 293, 302
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baikal, Lake, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baiyatsi (Bāyazid?), prince of Qāmul, 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bākharz, 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>bakhshī</em> (Buddhist monk), 323, 299–300, 354, 361, 368–9, 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bala, Mongol noyan, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bala Bītikchi, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bālabakk, 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balāsh, 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bālish (silver ingot), 306, 319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans, 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh, 22, 76, 90, 155, 177, 197–8, 203, 207, 247, 388–9; Mongol capture of, 79, 159, 170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkhash, Lake, 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic Sea, 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāmiyān, 80, 154, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banākatī, Fakhr al-Dīn Abū Sulaymān Dā’ūd, 28, 140, 239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar Hebraeus, Gregorius Abū l-Faraj, 40–2, 48, 129, 138, 162, 167–9, 171, 173, 226, 228, 255, 272, 277, 312–13, 320, 350, 367; his continuator, 41, 273, 278–80, 331–2, 341, 362, 369. See also Ibn al-ʿIbrī; Bar Ṣawma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar Ṣawma, 41–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baranī, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, 39, 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birza, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Birzālī, ʿAlam al-Dīn al-Qāsim, 37, 284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisermini, ‘Bessermens’, 60, 407–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bīnī-yi Gāw, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Bīrūnī, Abū Rayḥān, 232–3, 236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea, 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue (or White) Horde, 182, 189, 199, 355. See also Orda, ulus of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Böchek, son of Tolui, 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boghtaq, head-dress of Mongol women, 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemond V, Prince of Antioch, 251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemond VI, Prince of Antioch, 131, 257, 304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INDEX

Böjei, Chaghadayid prince, 187, 195
Boled Chingsang, Mongol noyan, 16, 27, 217, 231–3, 256, 308, 374, 485n
Boledchi (Pūlādchī), amir of the Dughlāt tribe, 358
Bora (Muḥammad), Jochid prince, 348
Boroldai, Chaghadayid noyan, 356
Börte, Chinggis Khan’s chief wife, 101, 258
Buddhism, Buddhists, 7, 28, 48, 51, 58–9, 230, 232, 235–6, 299–300, 313–14, 367–9, 375, 400, 412–13, 415; Central Asian, 232; Chinese, 232; Tantric Buddhism of Tibet, 334; construction of Buddhist temples in Iran, 300, 372. See also bakhshī; tūyin
Buell, Paul D., 108–9, 117, 395
Bukhārā, 47, 57–8, 86, 89, 102, 108, 122, 149, 155–8, 178, 199, 201, 203, 207, 214, 227, 243, 269, 313, 322, 345, 381, 387, 389, 392; surrender of (1220), 78, 157; sack of (1273), 199
Bulgars, Danubian, 47, 105. See also Volga Bulgars
Bulghān Khatun, wife of Arghun and Ghazan, 364, 407
Bulghān Khatun, wife of the Qaghan Temür, 398
Bulughan Khurāsānī, wife of Ghazan and Öljeitü, 364
Buqa, Ilkhanid noyan and viceroy, 271–2, 275, 283–6, 293–6
Buqa, Qara’unas noyan, 206
Buqa, son of *Yula Temür, 30, 539n
Buqa Temür, Oyirat chief, 127–8, 167
Būri, Chaghadayid prince, 101, 103, 105–6, 191
Būshanj, 160
Buqantu, Qaghan, 115, 287, 399
Buuyur Nor, 63
Buqaruq Khan, Naiman ruler, 66
Buzar (or Ozar), ruler of Almaligh, 66, 73, 90, 116
Buzun, Chaghadayid khan, 356, 358, 361
Byzantine empire, Byzantines, 50, 52, 54, 131, 213, 239, 263, 334, 405, 408
Calendars, 227–8; Chinese, 229, 231, 241; Turco-Mongol twelve-year animal calendar, 28, 229, 231, 365, 390
caliph: see ’Abbasid dynasty, ’Abbasid Caliphate
Calmard, Jean, 347
Carolingian empire, 123
Carpathians, 105
Carpini, or Plano Carpini, John of, Franciscan friar and papal envoy, 44–5, 72, 84, 86, 88, 156, 163, 174, 177, 250, 254–5, 298, 308
Caspian Sea, 46, 79, 407–8; Caspian provinces, 32
’Cathay’ (Qītā, Khiṭā), 55, 151, 218
Catherine the Great, 388
Caucasus, 46, 80, 112, 132, 147–8, 150, 182, 189, 192, 219, 253, 291, 407
Census, 109, 112, 144, 177, 225
Ceramics, 175, 227, 234, 237
Chabi, wife of Qubilai, 107
Chaghadai, second son of Chinggis Khan, 77–8, 97, 100, 104, 114, 116–17, 120, 123, 147, 188, 258, 269, 306–7, 319, 386, 391, 394, 410; his appanage, 102, 104, 109; perceived hostility towards Muslims, 306–7, 310, 319; his descendants, see Chaghadayid khanate or ulus
Chaghadai ‘the Greater’, Mongol noyan, 125
Chaghadai ‘the Lesser’, Mongol noyan, 83–4
’Chaghatays’, as a term for the armies of Temür-i lang, 403
Changchun (Qiu Chuji), Daoist patriarch, 16, 108–10, 114, 170, 177, 225, 299, 323
Changde, envoy of Qaghan Möngke, 113, 172, 177
Changshi, Chaghadayid khan, 361
**INDEX**

chao (chāw): see paper currency

Chapar, over-khan in Central Asia, 34, 182, 186, 188–9, 199, 201–4, 206, 218, 357

Chechegen, daughter of Chinggis Khan, 127

Cheke, Jochid prince, 342

Cherchen, 48, 215

Chernigov, 88

Chigil, 201

Chin Temür, Mongol governor of Khurasan, 82, 108, 111, 138, 140, 155, 161


Chinese sources, 16

Chinggis Khan (Temüjin), 1–2, 6, 9–11, 13, 15–16, 22, 24, 27, 31–2, 39, 43, 46, 59, 61–2, 71, 76, 85–91, 93, 95, 97, 99–100, 102, 104, 108, 110, 112, 118, 125, 135–6, 138–44, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155–9, 164–6, 173–8, 180, 183, 198, 203, 207, 211–12, 220, 225–6, 242, 247–8, 254, 299, 303, 305, 323–4, 326, 333, 350–1, 360, 374, 378–9, 381–2, 384, 386; his origins and early career, 63–4; his assumption of the title and its significance, 64; his laws, 113–16, 307 (see also law, yasa); the aims behind his invasion of Western Asia, 72–5; his seven-year campaign, 75–81, 86; his death, 81; succession to, 97–9; viewed as a (quasi-)prophet, 376, 378; spurious links to, 386–7, 389

Chinqai, 117–18

Choban, Ilkhanid noyan and viceroy, 276, 282, 287–8

Chobanid dynasty, 29, 383

Choraghun, Mongol noyan, 16, 20–1, 82–4, 109, 111, 117, 140, 155, 161, 172, 215, 244, 250, 255, 307, 311, 402

Christian, David, 211

Christianity, 317, 320, 330–1, 337, 354, 362, 366, 379; spread of, in pre-Mongol Asia, 48

Christians, 7, 15, 32, 48–9, 150, 167–8, 229, 299–300, 303, 308, 311, 318, 320, 333, 399, 415; sources written by, 41–5; their fortunes under Mongol rule, 41–2, 313–17, 319, 360–1, 366–72, 379. See also Jacobite (Monophysite, West Syrian)

Church; Nestorian (East Syrian) Church

Chu, river, 47, 50, 66, 203

Chübei, Chaghadayid prince, 187, 199, 399

Chulmán (the Kama basin), 215

Cilicia, Cilician Armenia: see Lesser Armenia

Ciocîltan, Virgil, 220

Circassians, 213

circumcision, 307, 331

Clement V, Pope, 43


cloth of gold, 212, 216, 223. See also textiles

Codex Cumanicus, 393

Confucianism, Confucians, 306, 327, 399

consensus (ijmā’) in Islam, 331

Constantine the Great, 313

Constantinople, 40, 213

conversion to Islam, definitions of, 329–31; hallmarks of, 331–2

Copernicus, 241, 417

Covenant of ’Umar, 315

craftsmen: see artisans


Crone, Patricia, 321

crusades, crusaders, 18, 21, 43, 45, 153, 180, 304; Fifth Crusade, 17, 73; First Crusade, 329; Seventh Crusade, 121

cubeks, 240

cuisine, 5: Chinese, 231; Turkish, 395

Cumans, 54; see Qipchaq

Cyprus, 43, 121, 407; king of, 170

Dabûsiya, 156

Dadu, 45, 184. See also Khanbaligh

Dâhlâk, 373

al-Dajjâl, 154

Dali, kingdom of, 125, 398: see also Yunnan

Damascus, 21, 84, 115, 130–1, 141, 168, 228, 241, 251–2, 287, 304, 317, 338, 369, 377–9; surrender of (1260), 131, 251

Dâmghân, 165, 206

Damietta, 17

Dândaqaqân, battle of (1040), 50

Danil Romanovich, Rus’ prince, 93

Dânishmand Bahâdûr, Qara’unâs noyan, 206

Dânishmandcha, puppet khan of Chaghadai’s ulus, 546n

Danube, river, 105, 111, 183, 208, 400

Daoism, Daoists, 16, 108, 228, 299, 313, 323, 337

Darâward, 174

Darband, 104, 143, 161, 194, 215, 263, 282
Darbsāk, 257

darkhan status, exemption from forced
labour and the capitation tax, 299
darughachi, 107–8, 110, 251. See also
basqaq; shihna
Dā’ūd Qocha, Chaghadayid prince, 198
David IV, King of Georgia, 256
David V, King of Georgia, 148, 256
David of Ashby, Dominican friar, 350
Dawātdār, Lesser, 171: see Mujāhid al-Dīn
Aybak
Ḍayfa Khatun, regent of Aleppo, 261
Dayir, Mongol noyan, 82, 109, 141, 161
De Rachewiltz, Igor, 1, 15, 81, 336
Deccan, 406; Sultanate of, 39
Degei, Mongol noyan, 100
Delhi, 100, 123, 140, 215, 259–60, 319, 350,
353, 392, 406
Delhi Sultans, Delhi Sultanate, 19, 198, 214,
232, 246, 264, 340, 361, 393, 396–7, 417;
sources composed under, 19, 39–40
Deresū, 105
Despina Khatun, wife of the Ilkhan Abagha,
258
DeWeese, Devin, 32, 34, 328–30, 337, 346,
348, 357–8
al-Dhahabī, Shams al-Dīn Abū 'Abd-Allāh
Muḥammad, 20, 37, 39, 172, 285, 289,
356, 376, 378
dhimmis, 168–9, 299–301, 317, 319, 360,
366–9, 371, 379, 413. See also Christians;
Jews
Dhū l-Qarnayn (Alexander the Great),
53–4; wall built by, 53, 59–60
Dhū l-Qarnayn, Chaghadayid prince, 206,
533n
Di Cosmo, Nicola, 210
Dihistān, 148
Dimashq Khwāja, Ilkhanid noyan and
wazir, 283
divination, 52, 312
Divrigi, 162
diwān (finance office), 111, 176, 273, 278,
283–4
Diyār Bakr; 19, 172, 257, 271–2, 292
Diyār Rabi’ā, 257
Dnieper, river, 45, 105, 183, 403
Dniester, river, 105
Dobruja, 405
Doladai Idechi, Ilkhanid noyan, 295
Dölen Cherbi, Mongol noyan, 90
Dominicans, 44–5, 232
Don, river, 105, 111, 387, 407
Doni, wife of the Ilkhans Gaikhatu and
Ghazan, 364
Döqoz Khatun, chief wife of the Ilkhan
Hülegū, 41, 107, 131, 300, 305, 313, 315
Döre Temür, Chaghadayid khan, 538n
Du’a, Chaghadayid khan, 150, 182, 186–9,
191, 194–5, 197–9, 201–3, 206–7, 216,
218, 355–6, 358, 383, 403
Dughlāt, tribe and dynasty, 35, 341, 358,
383, 387
Dukhtu, Chaghadayid noyan, 358
Dumadal mongghol ulus ('Middle
Mongolian State'), as a term for the
Chaghadayid ulus, 187
Dunaysîr, 167
Dunhuang, 211
Dunnell, Ruth, 350
Dūst Muḥammad, Chaghadayid khan of
Mughalistan, 392
Duwayni, mushrif of Erzurum, 162

Eastern Europe, 154, 338
Edigū, Jochid amir, 65, 388–9
Egypt, 4, 14, 17, 21–2, 36, 68, 73, 131–3, 140,
146–7, 151, 168, 173–4, 190–1, 213–15,
218, 224, 244, 259, 263–4, 267, 284,
290–1, 332, 340, 353, 372, 377, 393, 395;
sources composed in, 36–7. See also
Mamlûks, Mamlûk Sultanate
Ejei, son of Hülegū, 271
elchī (official envoy), 113, 251, 264, 268, 281,
302–3
Elchidei (or Eligidei), Mongol noyan, 99
Eldeğüzid dynasty, 51, 79, 81, 92, 161, 244,
249
Eligidei, Mongol noyan, 83, 103, 121, 340
Eltüzer, Qongrat khan of Khiva, 389
Eltüzumish, wife of the Ilkhanhs Abagha and
Öjeittū, 364
Elverskog, Johan, 235, 321
Emil, 66, 106, 208; river, 102
Emil Qocha, Chaghadayid prince, 358
Engke Temür, Chaghadayid prince of
Qāmul, 550n
Erdal, Marcel, 139
Erzinjān: see Arzinjān
Erzurum, 83, 162, 164, 176, 178, 215; prince
of, 136
Esen Buqa, Chaghadayid khan, 186–8, 190,
198, 201, 203, 208, 219, 355, 358, 399
Ethiopia, 407
Euclid, 237
Euphrates, river, 130, 132, 167
Europe, Christian, 68, 74. See also Latin
Europe
al-Fāḍil Niẓām al-Dīn Abû l-Faḍā’il Yaḥyā
al-Ṭayyârī, informant of al-‘Umarî,
141–2
al-Fadl b. al-Rabī', 'Abbasid wazir, 274
Fakhr al-Dawla, brother of Sa'd al-Dawla, 292
Fakhr al-Din, Kurtid malik of Herat, 197, 267
Fakhr al-Din, malik of Rayy, 271, 288
Fakhr al-Din Ahmad, 218–19
Fakhr al-Din Ahmad b. Naṣir al-Din Ṭūsī, 316, 395
Fakhr al-Din Ayās al-Sāqī, commander of the citadel at Aleppo, 169
Fakhr al-Din Ibn al-Dāmghānī, Ilkhanid wazir in Baghdad, 275
Fakhr al-Din 'Īsā, Ilkhanid governor of Mosul, 41, 311
Fakhr al-Din Mustawfi Qazwīnī, Ilkhanid wazir, 275, 279, 284, 292, 294–5, 315
Fakhr-i Mudabbir, 52, 60
Fanākat (Banākat), 78, 163, 398
faqīrs, ascetics, 346, 348, 357
Fārāb, 164
Farghāna, 50, 110, 155, 164, 188, 207, 243, 392
Fārs, 14, 19, 29, 32, 83, 109, 162, 166, 190, 197–8, 205, 223–4, 245, 251, 253, 258–63, 295, 322, 384, 412; Ilkhanid administration of, 266–8, 273, 283, 289, 292;
histories of, 32. See also Salghurid dynasty
Fārāb, 164
Galician Chronicle, 93
Gabriele de' Mussis, 405; his Historia de morbo, 405
Ghāziyya Khatun, regent of Ḥamā, 261
Ghazan, 43, 111, 155, 161, 164, 178
Gansu, 194, 240, 398, 417
Ganzhou, 48, 55, 215, 398
Gardizi, 62
gems, 91, 211, 216, 223, 231, 250
Genoa, Genoese, 213–14, 406
geographical knowledge, growth of, 233–4
geographical literature, Arabic, 38, 49, 51, 54, 326
geometry, 229, 236
Georgia, kingdom of, Georgians, 17, 42, 60, 80–2, 88, 92, 109, 121, 123, 135, 144–5, 171, 180, 244, 256, 271, 314, 378
Georgian Chronicle (K'art lis ts chovreba), 42
Germans, 173
Ghaznawa, Ghaznayn, 12, 19, 77, 79–80, 148, 165, 180, 195, 197–8, 215, 267, 356, 396; Mongol capture of, 159
Ghaznavid (or Yaminid) dynasty, 49–50, 56
Ghıyāth al-Dīn, Kurtid malik of Herat, 267
Ghıyāth al-Dīn Dāmghānī, Sultan of Ma‘bar, 406
Ghıyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Rashīd al-Dīn, Ilkhanid wazir, 29, 147
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Naqqāsh, Timurid envoy, 399–400
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Pīr Shāh, son of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, 81, 83, 247
Ghiyāth al-Dīn Pīr Shāh, son of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, 81, 83, 247
Ghūr, Ghūris, 19, 76–7, 80, 90, 154, 165, 173, 247, 396
Ghurid (Shansabanid) dynasty, 56–7, 59, 61, 74, 77, 80, 180, 267
INDEX

ghusl, Islamic ablutions, 306, 336
Ghuzz: see Oghuz
Gibbon, Edward, 303–4
Gilân, 244, 253, 267
Gilli-Eleyw, Hend, 293
Girdkûh, 126–7
Golden, Peter, 402
See also Jochids; Qipchaq khanate
Goths, Crimean, 457n
grain trade, 216
grammar, 237
Grand Canal, 233
Greater Armenia, 42, 44, 82, 88, 244
Greater Luristān, 245. See also Hazaraspid dynasty
Greece, Greeks, 52, 127; science of, 230
Greek Orthodox Church (Melkites), 48, 168, 401
Grigor Aknerts’i, 43, 113, 129, 143, 146, 309
Grupper, Samuel, 314
Guangzhou, 397
Güchülüg, Naiman chief and Gür-khan of the Qara-Khitai, 21, 23, 59, 66–7, 73–4, 90, 164
Gujarat, 222, 245
Gulf, Persian, 214–15, 222–4, 245, 263
Gunashiri(n), Chaghadayid prince of Qāmul, 400
Günjüshkeb, wife of the Ilkhan Ghazan and Öljeitü, 364
Gurziwān, 158
Güstāsfī, 179
Gwāshir (Kirmān), 247
Hamadān, 82, 111, 129, 143, 155–6, 161, 175, 261, 263, 265, 314; malik of, 249
Ḥamid al-Din Sâbiq Samarqandi, qadi, 336, 374
Hanafis, Hanafism, 58, 91, 163, 170, 401
Hanbalis, 304
Hangzhou, 233–4, 238, 397–8
Hansen, Valerie, 210–11
Hantum, Mongol noyan, 195
Hārūn, 169
Harrān, 4, 84, 130, 167, 346
Hārūn, son of Shams al-Din Juwayni: see Juwayni, Shariaf al-Din Hārūn
Hārūn al-Rashīd, ‘Abbasid Caliph, 176, 230, 274
Hasan, son of the Caliph ‘Ali, 372
Hasan b. Choban, Ilkhanid noyan, 198
Hasan Hájjī, 91, 157, 333
Hasan Mahmūd Kātib, 20
Hasan Qarluq, ruler of Bīnbān, 246
Haw, Stephen, 136
al-Hawādith al-jāmi’a, 21, 30–1, 133, 139, 172, 179, 217, 275, 277–8, 280–1, 285, 293, 302, 322, 370
Hayton of Gorighos, 43, 129, 146, 202, 366, 370–1. See also Flor des Estoires de la Terre d’Orient
Hazaras, in Afghanistan, 402
Hazarasp, 201
Hazaraspid dynasty, 245
Hebei, 86
Hebron, 131
Helena, mother of Constantine the Great, 313
Herat, 12, 31, 56, 76, 117, 120–1, 155, 159–60, 173, 175, 177, 201, 225, 242, 247–8, 267, 277, 385, 412; Mongol capture of, 80, 159, 170; malik of, 195, 207, 295. See also Kurtid dynasty
Het’um I, King of Lesser Armenia, 43, 131, 253, 257
Het’um II, King of Lesser Armenia, 369
Heywood, Colin, 404–5
Hilla, 167, 321–2
al-Ḥākim bi-amr Allāh, ‘Abbasid Caliph in Cairo, 264
Halperin, Charles, 192
Ḥamā, 21, 37, 131, 129, 168, 261
Hamadān, 82, 111, 129, 143, 155–6, 161, 175, 261, 263, 265, 314; malik of, 249
Ḥamid al-Din Sâbiq Samarqandi, qadi, 336, 374
Hanafi, Hanafism, 58, 91, 163, 170, 401
Ḥanbalis, 304
Hangzhou, 233–4, 238, 397–8
Hansen, Valerie, 210–11
Hantum, Mongol noyan, 195
Hārūn, 169
Harrān, 4, 84, 130, 167, 346
Hārūn, son of Shams al-Din Juwayni: see Juwayni, Shariaf al-Din Hārūn
Hārūn al-Rashīd, ‘Abbasid Caliph, 176, 230, 274
Ḥasan, son of the Caliph ‘Ali, 372
Ḥasan b. Choban, Ilkhanid noyan, 198
Ḥasan Hájjī, 91, 157, 333
Ḥasan Mahmūd Kātib, 20
Ḥasan Qarluq, ruler of Bīnbān, 246
Haw, Stephen, 136
al-Hawādith al-jāmi’a, 21, 30–1, 133, 139, 172, 179, 217, 275, 277–8, 280–1, 285, 293, 302, 322, 370
Hayton of Gorighos, 43, 129, 146, 202, 366, 370–1. See also Flor des Estoires de la Terre d’Orient
Hazaras, in Afghanistan, 402
Hazarasp, 201
Hazaraspid dynasty, 245
Hebei, 86
Hebron, 131
Helena, mother of Constantine the Great, 313
Herat, 12, 31, 56, 76, 117, 120–1, 155, 159–60, 173, 175, 177, 201, 225, 242, 247–8, 267, 277, 385, 412; Mongol capture of, 80, 159, 170; malik of, 195, 207, 295. See also Kurtid dynasty
Het’um I, King of Lesser Armenia, 43, 131, 253, 257
Het’um II, King of Lesser Armenia, 369
Heywood, Colin, 404–5
Hilla, 167, 321–2
INDEX

Himalayas, 81

Hims, 84, 130, 168, 257; battle of (1260), 132; battle of (1281), 136

Hindu Kush, 16, 95, 105, 215

Hisn Kayfa, 167, 244; ruler of, 252

holy war, 399. See also jihād

Hongzhou, 226

Hoq, son of Guγuyγ, 106, 195, 199

horse trade, 214–15, 224, 397

Huart, Cl., 404

Hui nationality, 398

Hülechü, son of Hülegü, 271–2, 296, 519n


Ḥulwān, 128, 179

Hungarians, Hungary, 46, 52, 60, 85, 92, 173, 212–13, 338, 374

Hunhe, river, 226

Huns, 52, 92

Hurmuz, 197, 215, 223, 246

Huśām al-Din, astrologer, 129

Huśām al-Din Qazwini, 275, 295

Huśām al-Din "Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, ra'īs of Bukhārā, 58

Huṣayn, son of the Caliph 'Ali, 372, 376

Huṣayn, son of Aqbuqa, Ilkhanid noyan, 491n, 523n

Huṣayn b. 'Ali Shāh, 35

Hyperperon, Byzantine gold coin ('bezant'), 252

Hystoria Tartarorum (by C. de Bridia'), 44; see also 'Tartar Relation'

Iaroslav, Rus’ Grand Prince, 255

Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, 36, 257

Ibn Abī l-Damm, 21

Ibn Abī l-Faḍā'il, al-Muqaḍḍal, 37

Ibn Abī l-Hadid al-Madā'ini, 20–1, 59, 67, 84, 91, 163

Ibn al-'Adim, historian of Aleppo, 168

Ibn al-'Aqiqī, 'Abbasid and Ilkhanid wazir in Baghdad, 128, 134, 179, 274–5, 379

Ibn al-'Amid, al-Makin, 22, 37, 121, 130, 168

Ibn 'Arab Shāh, 115


Ibn Bazzāz, Tawakkulī, 33, 205, 323. See also Safwat al-safā

Ibn Bibi, 31, 121, 162, 250, 255, 404

Ibn al-Dawādārī, 37, 363

Ibn Duqmāq, 354


Ibn Faḍlān, 47, 49, 336

Ibn al-Furāt, 15

Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, 31–2, 39, 110, 139, 147, 178–9, 228–9, 234, 236–7, 249, 266, 280, 288, 292, 321, 323–4, 346, 369. See also Talkhīṣ

Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, 15, 39

Ibn Hawqal, 51

Ibn al-Hawwārī, 331

Ibn al-'Ibri (Bar Hebraeus), 40, 232; his Mukhtasar taʾrikh al-duwal, 232

Ibn Jamāʿa, 322

Ibn Juzayy, 40, 176

Ibn Khallikān, 39

Ibn Khāṭīb, Andalusian author, 407

Ibn Khātima, Andalusian author, 407

Ibn Khurradādbihbīh, 51, 53

Ibn al-Labbād ('Abd al-Laṭif al-Baghdādī), 16, 20, 59, 154, 165–6, 170, 175

Ibn Nazīf al-Ḥamawī, 21, 67, 73, 78, 301

Ibn al-Sā'ī, 21

Ibn al-Šayqal al-Jazari, 233


Ibn al-Šuqqa’ī, 39, 224

Ibn Taghrībirdī, 15, 39

Ibn Taymiyya, 3–4, 342, 376–9, 393

Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā (Ṣaft al-Dīn Abū Ja’far Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Ṭabāṭabā), 40–1, 134, 237, 311, 323–4
INDEX

Ibn Wāṣīl, 21–2, 37, 59, 166, 168, 172, 263, 317, 321, 376
Ibn Zarkūb, 32, 245, 262
Idolators, idolatry, 48, 300, 313, 319, 325, 369, 373–4, 379, 398–400
Iqdoguāi, Mongol noyan, 100
Iftikhār al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Naṣr Qazwīnī, 119, 287–8, 290, 350
Ikhtiyār al-Dīn, malik of Abīward, 249
Iltaqū b. Elchi Pahlawān, 165
Ilüge, Mongol noyan, 100
Ilüge, Ilkhanid noyan, 283, 285
’Imād al-Dīn Īrān Shāh Dastjirdānī, 292
’Imād al-Dīn Muḥammad, malik of Arrān and Azerbaijan, 249
’Imād al-Dīn ’Umar b. Muḥammad Qazwīnī, Ilkhanid governor of Baghdad, 179, 289–90, 317
Imaretia, 314
Inalchuq Ghayir (or Qadir) Khan, Khwarazmian governor of Uṭrār, 72, 78, 86
Inchü (private property), 104, 140, 145, 185, 214, 271, 291
Indian Ocean, 222
Indians, 213–14
Indus, river, 19, 57, 80, 92, 174, 246; battle on (1221), 80–1, 159
Ingiyanu, Mongol governor of Fārs, 262
Innaju, Mongol governor of Fārs, 262
Interpreters, 110, 225, 287
Iqaṭā’, 205, 339–40, 365, 390
’Irāq-i ’Ājam: see Persian Iraq
Īrazān, khan of Orda’s ulus, 189, 355
Irenjin, Ilkhanid noyan, 287–8
Irtiysh, river, 55, 63, 76, 105, 188; Black Irtiysh, 66
Īsā Kelemechi, 217, 308
’Iṣāmī, ’Abd al-Malik, 39
Īṣafān, 20, 82–3, 91, 155, 163, 178, 235, 261, 263, 266; Ilkhanid administration of, 292
al-Īṣafānī, Shams al-Dīn, informant of al-’Umarī, 102, 141, 143
Īṣfarāyīn, 160, 165, 249
Isfījāb, 47, 164, 189
Īshān Minglī, sufi, 347
Is’īrd, 163, 172; maliks of, 244
Islam, spread of, in the pre-Mongol era, 47–50; spread of, during the Mongol epoch, 325, 328, 331–2, 337–41, 343–64, 366–77, 397–400
Ismā’īl, Qara-Khitai basqaq of Kāsān, 66
Ismā’īl, siege engineer, 227
Ismā’īl I, Safawid shah, 388
Ismā’īlīs, Nizārī Ismā’īlīs, 20, 24, 40, 74, 91, 125–8, 135–6, 145, 165–6, 253, 275, 316, 325, 410. See also Assassins
Isolo, a Pisan, 28
Ispahbadh, 251
Israel, Children of, 154
Issyk Köl, 102
Iśṭakhrī, 51
It-qu’il, Chaghadayid prince, 198
Itīl, capital of the Khazars, 208
Ivan III, tsar of Moscow, 388
Ivan IV, tsar of Moscow, 388
Ivy, 223
‘Izz al-Dīn, malik of Herat, 120, 178
‘Izz al-Dīn Abū l-Faḍl, Ilkhanid wazir in Baghdad, 275
INDEX

'Izz al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Jalāl al-Dīn 'Ubayd-Allāh Tustarī, Ilkhanid mustawfī, 280–1, 293
'Izz al-Dīn Ṭāhir Faryūmādi, Ilkhanid wazir of Khurāsān, 274, 316
'Izz al-Dīn ’Umar, Ghurid governor of Herat, 247

Jacobite (Monophysite, West Syrian) Church, 41, 48, 168
Ja’far b. Muḥammad Ja’farī, 32
Ja’far Khwāja, 91, 333
al-Jāḥiẓ, 52
Jahn, Karl, 232
Jājarm, 80, 249
Jalāl al-Dīn, Khwārazmshāh, 17–18, 21–22, 60, 74, 76, 79–83, 88, 90–1, 158–9, 161, 165, 244, 246–7, 269, 404; daughters of, 255, 269
Jalāl al-Dīn, son of the ‘Lesser Dawātdār’ , 25, 291
Jalāl al-Dīn Fīrūz Khaljī, Delhi Sultan, 259, 396
Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan, Assassin Master, 74
Jalāl al-Dīn Mas‘ūd b. Iltutmish, Delhi prince, 246
Jalāl al-Dīn Simnānī, Ilkhanid wazir, 275, 280, 284, 291–5
Jalāl al-Dīn Ṭayyib Shāh, atabeg of Shabānkāra, 510n, 523n
Jalāl al-Dīn Soyurghatmish, Qutlughkhanid Sultan of Kirmān, 258, 260–1
Jalāl al-Dīn Ṭayyib Shāh, atabeg of Shabānkāra, 510n, 523n
Jalayir, tribe, 99, 206, 283
Jalayirid dynasty, 33, 235, 285, 358, 384, 390, 523n
Jām, 79, 165
Jamāl al-Dīn, astronomer, 227, 233
Jamāl al-Dīn ’Alī b. Muḥammad Dastjirdānī, Ilkhanid wazir, 276, 280, 284, 291–5
Jamāl al-Qarshī, 34, 50–1, 73, 98, 150, 199, 243, 269, 322, 340, 345, 350
Jāmī‘ al-tawārīkh (by Rashīd al-Dīn), 26–8, 30, 140, 145, 218, 230, 233, 281, 339, 375, 379; manuscripts of, 138, 235–6, 238; sources for, 231–3; part 1 (history of the Turks and Mongols), 26–7, 123, 239, 373; part 2 (histories of other peoples), 27–8, 230–2, 239
Jāmī‘-i tašānīf-i Rashīdī, 26, 230, 232
Jand, 60–1, 78, 88–9, 110, 157, 189, 243
Janibeg, Jochid khan, 194, 213, 332, 355, 406
Jata or Chete, 199, 358. See also Mughalistān
Ja‘ūn-i Qurbān, 104, 206, 402
Ja‘urchi, Mongol commander, 339
al-Jazīra, 19, 82, 130, 173–4, 176, 179, 251, 264, 271, 317, 395. See also Mesopotamia
Jazīrat Ibn ’Umar, 311; prince of, 252
Jebe, Mongol noyan, 20, 66, 75–6, 79–80, 83, 85, 111, 156–7, 159–61
Jedei, Mongol noyan, 100
Jerusalem, 84, 154, 180, 368, 378; kingdom of, 132
Jesus, 376
Jews, Judaism, 26–7, 32, 46, 156, 229, 276, 278–9, 281, 292–4, 299–300, 307, 312, 315, 317, 333, 337, 360–1, 375–6, 379, 412, 415; their fortunes under Mongol rule, 168–9, 278–9, 293, 307, 311, 315–17, 360–1, 367, 379. See also Sa’d al-Dawla
Jiangsu, 223
jihād, 24, 50, 135
Jingdezhen, 223
jizya, poll-tax paid by dhimmīs, 113, 299, 301, 315, 351, 360, 367, 369–72, 379, 413, 415
Jochi, eldest son of Chinggis Khan, 77–8, 81, 85, 97, 99–100, 109, 147, 157, 243, 348–9, 389, 450n; his appanage, 102, 104–5, 143
Jochi Qasar, brother of Temūjin/Chinggis Khan, 187, 206; his progeny, 187, 383
Joinville, Jean de, 130
Jordan, river, 368
Joshi, Ilkhanid noyan, 294–5
Judaism, 46, 312, 333–4, 337, 375, 379
Juki, Chaghadayid prince, 357
Julian, Hungarian Dominican friar and envoy, 74–5, 92, 553n
Jumughur, son of Hülegü, 146, 271, 523n
Jürbar, 249
Jurchen, 55, 223. See also Jin dynasty
Jurjān (Gurgān), 160, 198
Jurma, Mongol noyan, 205
INDEX

Jurma‘īs, 205–6, 339, 402
Jūshkeb, Ilkhanid prince, 270–2, 296, 523n
Juwaynī, Bahā’ al-Dīn, father of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn and Shams al-Dīn, 22, 111, 310
Juwaynī, Bahā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad, son of Shams al-Dīn, 292
Juwaynī, Mansūr, son of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, 293
Juwaynī, Sharaf al-Dīn Hārūn, son of Shams al-Dīn, 271, 275, 292–3
Juwaynī, family, 274–5, 298, 299–91, 293–4, 326–7, 412
Ka’ba, 278, 376
Kabūd-jāma, 90, 179, 249–50. See also Rukn al-Dīn
Kābul, 19, 198
Kābul Shāh, puppet Chaghadayid khan, 357
Kaffa, 213–16, 334, 401, 406
Kai ping, 184. See also Shangdu
Kakuyid dynasty, 261
Kalka, river, battle of (1223), 80
Kālyūn, maliks of, 120–1, 250
Kama, river, 216. See also Chūlmān
Kamāl al-Dīn, shaykh: see ‘Abd al-Raḥmān
Kameal al-Dīn, ‘Umar al-Tiflīsī, grand qadi of Syria, 317
Kamāla Śrī, Kashmiri Buddhist monk, 232
Kanbhāya (Cambay), 222, 245
Karasi, amirate of, 404
Karim al-Dīn Abū Bakr Salmāsī, 233
Kāsān, 66, 164
Kāshān, 161, 175
Kāshghari, Mahmūd, 52–3, 60, 67
Kashmir, 28, 213–14, 226, 300, 368
Kāt, 201
Kaykhusraw, legendary Iranian hero, 326
Kaykhusraw II, Ghiyāth al-Dīn, Saljuq Sultan of Rūm, 83, 121, 244, 250–2, 254
Kaykhusraw III, Ghiyāth al-Dīn, Saljuq Sultan of Rūm, 256, 265
Kayqubād I, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, Saljuq Sultan of Rūm, 250
Kayqubād III, ‘Ala’ al-Dīn, Saljuq Sultan of Rūm, 266, 405
Kayseri, 162, 170
Kazakhstan, 12, 65, 408
Kazan, khanate of, 13, 388, 394
Kedbuqa, Mongol noyan, 126, 131–3, 166, 202, 304, 317
Keler: see Hungarians
Kelmish Aqa, Toluid princess, 185
Kennedy, E.S., 240
Kenjek, 60, 148, 201
Kerak, 131, 168
Kerch, 219
Kereyt, tribe, 48, 63, 65–6, 258; dispersal of, and survival of tribal name, 402, 417
Kerülen, river, 102, 318
keshig, imperial guard, 65, 87, 102, 110, 118, 213, 390; its creation by Chinggis Khan, 64; Ilkhanid keshig, 213, 254, 285, 288, 295; under later sovereigns, 390
Kete, Mongol noyan, 100
Khabūr, 257
Khabūshān (Qūchān), 92, 160, 177, 300
Khalaj, tribe, 80, 90, 93, 549n
Khalil Sulṭān, Chaghanayid khan, 357, 396, 402
Khalil Sulṭān, Timurid ruler, 385
Khalji dynasty, in Delhi, 396
Khalkhāl, malik of, 249
Khamid-pūr, Khwarazmian officer, 246
Khāmūsh, Eldegüzid atabeg of Azerbaijan, 244
Khān Sulṭān or Sulțān Khâtūn, daughter of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, 348
Khānbalīg, 45, 184–5, 215, 218, 226, 233, 238, 398. See also Dadu

kharāj, Islamic land-tax, 112–13, 180, 301–2, 365

Khartuṣṭān or Sulṭān Khâtūn, daughter of the Khwārazmshāh Muḥammad, 348
Khaysār, 247

Khuzars, 46–7, 208, 333–4

Khvāf, 80


Khūrshāh, Rukn al-Dīn, Assassin Master, 127, 133, 169

Khūṣīṣ, descending from the Khawāf, 177

Khīḍr Qocha, Chaghadayid khan of Mughalīstān, 385, 387, 399
Khiva, 201; khanate of, 388–9


Khūşshāh, Rukn al-Dīn, Assassin Master, 127, 133, 169


Khūṣshān, Rukn al-Dīn, Assassin Master, 127, 133, 169

Khūṭba, sermon preached in the Friday prayer, 47, 106, 122, 245, 252, 259–61, 323

Khūy (Khoy), 177

Kirmān, 17, 19, 81, 91, 135, 162, 166, 180, 195, 197–8, 205–6, 242, 245–7, 253, 256, 258–61, 265, 267, 303, 305, 339, 384, 402, 411; histories of, 31–2; Ilkhānid administration of, 273. See also Qutluqkhānid dynasty

Kirmānshāh, 167

Kirṣehir, 312

Kisht (Shahr-i Sabz), 199, 201, 208, 384

Kitāb al-Fakhrit (by Ibn al-Ṭiqtaqaṭ), 40–1, 311

Kitai, darughachi of Rus’, 122

Kitans (Khiṭā), 16, 52–5, 60, 69, 89, 96, 108, 177–8, 223, 225, 309–10, 483n; of Mongoloid stock, 55; dispersal of, and survival of tribal name, 402, 417. See also Liao dynasty; Qara-Khitai

Kūda, son of Qūqa, 106

Köcker, Chun princess, 186, 220, 400

Köse, Khan, 118, 186, 220, 400

Köpek, Chaghadayid khan, 186, 188, 190, 194, 201, 203, 207–8, 336, 345, 355–6, 359, 394, 486n, 538n

Korea (Koryo), kingdom of, 95, 151, 248, 250

Körgüz, Mongol noyan, 386

Köten, son of Chinggis Khan, 103

Komaroff, Linda, 234

Konya, 205

Köpek, Chaghadayid khan, 186, 188, 190, 194, 201, 203, 207–8, 336, 345, 355–6, 359, 394, 486n, 538n

Krawulsky, Dorothea, 98

Kucha, 50, 66, 82, 108, 402

Küfa, 179, 321

Kūfīn, 312

Kühgülüya, 263

kücketash (foster-brother), 349

Kül Bolod, Mongol noyan, 82, 120, 165

Külün Nor, 63

Kunūz al-aṭẓam, 387

Kur, river, 194

Kurdistan, 167, 179

Kurds, 92, 126, 156, 245. See also Shabānkāra; Shahrāzūr

Kürdüchin, Ilkhānid princess, 260–1, 526n

küregen (‘son-in-law’; Gūrkān), title, 384

Kurramān, 81

Kurtid dynasty, 90, 242, 247–8, 250, 412

Küşhli Khan, Khwarazmian amir, 84, 453n

Küşhli Khan, ruler of Sind, 246, 251

Lahore, 52, 56, 91, 148, 161, 215, 246

Lambasar, 300

Lambek, Michael, 329

Labnasagut, 300

Lagziştān, 282

Lahore, 52, 56, 91, 148, 161, 215, 246

Lambasar, 282

Lambek, Michael, 329
INDEX

Lambton, Ann K.S., 282, 308, 316
Lane, George, 5–6, 25
languages, 225, 287–8: Arabic, 110, 286–7; Chinese, 110, 287–8; ‘Frankish’, 287; ‘Hindi’, 110, 287; Kashmiri, 287; Mongolian, 110, 236, 287–8, 319, 394, 412; Persian, 110, 225, 286–8, 371–2, 394, 412; Tangut, 110; Tibetan, 110, 287–8; Turkish, 288, 394, 412; Uighur, 110. See also interpreters; translation; Uighur script
Latin Europe, Latin West, Latins, 8–9, 15, 43–5, 55, 68, 93, 113, 133, 146, 150, 183, 187, 191, 212–13, 215, 218, 250, 314, 370, 401; sources from, 43–5. See also Western Europe; Franks
Lattakiya (Laodicea), 257
law, Mongol, 87, 97–9, 113–16, 303–10. See also yarghu; yasa
Lesser Armenia (Cilicia), 43, 121, 132, 172, 214, 224, 253, 314
Lesser Dawātdār: see Mujāhid al-Dīn Aybak
Lesser Luristān, 256; atabegs of, 245, 265
levirate marriage, 305–6, 310, 391–2
Levtzion, Nehemia, 329
Li Zhichang, 16, 114, 177; his Xi you ji, 16
Liao dynasty (Kitan-Liao), 55, 57, 95–6, 106, 211, 227, 232, 234, 238, 416
Liegnitz (Wahlstatt), battle of (1241), 481n
Lindner, Rudi, 403
logic, 229
Lop Nor, 399
Louis IX, King of France (St Louis), 44, 121, 130, 132, 151, 171, 340
Luqmān, Ilkhanid prince, 383, 385
Luristān, Lurs, 32, 83, 126, 135, 166, 245, 253, 263. See also Greater Luristān; Lesser Luristān
Lyons, Second Council of (1274), 190–1
Mā warā’ al-nahr: see Transoxiana
Ma’bar (Coromandel coast), 223–4, 406
Madura, 406
Maghrib, 220
magic, 298–9, 322, 347
Mahdī, 322
Maḥmūd of Ghazna, 198
Maḥmūd b. Amīr Wali, 392
Maḥmūd Tārābī, 108, 322
Maḥmūd Yalavach, 75, 91, 110, 118, 178, 225
Majd al-Dīn, malik of Kālyūn and Herat, 120–1
Majd al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥusayn Muḥammad Ibn al-Athīr, 271, 293–4
Majd al-Mulk Yazdi, Ilkhanid mushrif, 279, 288–91, 294
Makrān, 19, 81
Malabar (Kerala), 223
Mamai, Jochid amir, 387
mamluks (ghulams), 49, 51–2, 213, 259, 393, 397
Manbij, 167
Manchuria, 46, 55, 93, 101
Manchus, 382
Manghit, tribe: dispersal of, and survival of tribal name, 402; Manghit dynasty, 389
Manichaeans, Manicheism, 48, 51, 59, 333–4
Maņşür b. Ḥamad, Chaghadayid khan of Turfan, 400
al-Maņşür Muḥammad, Ayyubid prince of Ḥamā, 21, 131–2, 261
al-Maņşür Najm al-Dīn Ghāzī, Sultan of Mārdīn, 253, 257
manuscript painting, 179, 234–7
Manzikert, battle of (1071), 50
maps, 233–4
al-Maqrizī, Taqī’ al-Dīn Aḥmad, 15, 393–5
Mar Hašiyā Sargis, 311
Mar Yahballāhā: see Yahballāhā
Marāghi, Fakhr al-Dīn, astronomer, 228
Mārdīn, 84, 130, 138, 244, 251–2, 254, 257–8, 377; ruler of, 259. See also Artuqid dynasty
Margha, 165
Marignolli, Giovanni di, papal envoy, 45, 218, 400
Marino Sanudo, 216
Markós, 150: see Yahballāhā III
Martin of Troppau (Martinus Oppaviensis), 232
Martinez, A.P., 218
Marwazi, Sharaf al-Zamān Ṭāhir, 47, 52, 54–5
Masālik al-abṣār (by Ibn Fadl-Allāh al-‘Umarī), 38, 141
massacres, of urban populations, 154–65, 167–9; figures for, 169–73
Mas’ūd II, Ghiyāth al-Dīn, Saljuq Sultan of Rūm, 256, 266, 305–6
INDEX

Mas‘ūd, Ilkhanid malik of Mosul, 311
Mas‘ūd Beg b. Mahmūd Yalavach, 34, 75, 91, 110, 113, 118, 149–50, 185, 199, 205, 207, 269, 302
al-Mas‘ūdī, 51
mathematics, 229
Mawlānā Khwāja Aḥmad, informant of Mirzā Ḥaydar, 345
May, Timothy, 6, 86, 220
Mayhana, 315
Maymana, 157
Maymūndiz, 127, 136
Mayyāfāriqīn, 18, 84, 91, 121, 130, 135–6, 138, 168, 172, 244, 252, 257, 271
Māzandarān, 17, 78–9, 96, 109, 112, 120–1, 135, 154, 161, 179, 189, 197, 207, 249, 270–1; Ilkhanid administration of, 273
Mecca, 278, 363, 390
medicine, 5, 26, 230–1, 237, 239–40, 312; Chinese, 240; Galenic, 240. See also pharmacology; physicians
Mediterranean Sea, 220, 234
Medium imperium, as a term for the Chaghadayid ulus, 187
Melik, son of Ögödei, 106, 546n
Melikian-Chirvani, Assadullah, 326
Melville, Charles, 25, 204, 284, 324, 341, 380
Mendicant Orders of Friars, 44–5: see Dominicans; Franciscans
Mengü Temür, son of Hülegü, 258, 260–3, 266, 290, 304, 523n
Mengü Temür, Jochid khan, 149–50, 185, 192, 263, 305, 343, 353
Mengütei, shiḥna of Herat, 159, 247
merchants: see traders
Merkits, 62–7, 101; dispersal of, and survival of tribal name, 402
Merv, 56, 155, 159, 170–1, 175–9, 197, 388; Mongol capture of, 80, 159, 170
Mesopotamia, 60, 84, 165, 180, 244, 411. See also Jazira
messianic revolts, 322–3
metalwork, 175, 227, 234
Michael VIII, Byzantine Emperor, 258, 263
Michael the Syrian, 42
Michot, Yahya, 379
Mihrabanid dynasty, 247–8
Mihtar Hasan, aqtachi (equerry), 349
Mikhail, prince of Tver’, 354
Ming dynasty, 16, 382, 384–5
Minglī Girei, khan of the Crimea, 388
Mingqan, grandson of Arigh Böke, 206
Mingqan, Jochid prince, 143
Mir Khwānd, 15, 350
Mirzā Ḥaydar Dughlāt, 35–6, 50, 183, 199, 331, 341, 345, 349, 358–9, 385, 387, 392, 399; his Ta‘rikh-i Rashīdi, 35, 358
möchelge (pledge), 98, 390
Möetügen, son of Chaghadai, 80, 158
Möge, Chaghadayid noyan, 551n
Moghols, in Afghanistan, 402
Mohi, battle of (1241), 338
Molghor, Mongol noyan, 80
Monggedü, Mongol noyan, 82, 141, 161
Mongge‘ür, Mongol noyan, 100
Möngke, Mongol noyan, 100. See also Möge
Mongols, early history of, 62–3; the ‘Great Mongol People (yeke mongghol ulus)’, 64, 92–3, 189; seen as harbingers of the Last Things, 19, 322; hairstyle, 92–3; numbers, 85–6; siege warfare, 88–9; their mounts, 86; vengeance among, 71–2; their religious policy, 298–300, 312–18; their acceptance of Islam, 10–12, 34, 42, 328–9, 331–4, 336–50, 352–80 passim
Montecorvino, Giovanni di, Franciscan friar, 218, 222
Morgan, David, 1, 5–6, 75, 119, 166, 170, 286, 303
Morocco, 40, 406
Moses, 376
Muktafi, 379
Mu‘awiya, fifth Caliph, 335
Mu‘azzam Tūrān Shāh, son of Saladin, 130
al-Mu‘azzam Tūrān Shāh b. Ahmad, Ayyubid prince of Rāwandān, 257
Mubārak Qocha, khan of Orda’s ulus, 355
Mubārak Shāh, Chaghadayid khan, 103, 106, 149, 187, 195, 204
Mughalistan (the eastern Chaghadayid territories), Mughals, 35, 183, 199, 358, 383, 385, 387, 391–2, 394, 399. See also Jata
Mughals, Mughal empire in India, 25, 390, 392
Mughān, 80, 179, 252
al-Mughith 'Umar, Ayyubid prince of Kerak, 131, 135
Muhadhdhab al-Dawla, brother of Sa’d al-Dawla, 292
Muḥammad, Chaghdayid khan of Mughalistan, 332, 358
Muḥammad b. Bolod, Chaghdayid khan, 359
Muḥammad b. Sa’d, Salghurid atabeg of Fārs, 259
Muḥammad b. Tughluq, Delhi Sultan, 397, 406
Muḥammad Jahāngīr, Timurid prince and nominal Chaghdayid khan, 385
Muḥammad Mūnis, Khivan author, 389, 401; his Firdaws al-iqbāl, 389, 401
Muḥammad Shāh b. Ḥajjāj, Qutlughkhanid Sultan of Kirmān, 260
Muḥammad Shāh b. Salghur Shāh, Salghurid atabeg of Fārs, 262
Muḥammad Shibānī, Uzbek khan, 115, 388
Muḥyī’ al-Dīn Maḥgrībī, astronomer, 226, 228–9, 502n
Muḥyī’ al-Dīn Yaḥyā Ibn al-Zakī, grand qadi of Syria, 317
Mujāhid al-Dīn Aybak, Lesser Dawātdār, 'Abbasid amir, 25, 128, 134, 291
mukūs, taxes forbidden under Islamic law, 356
Mujāhid al-Dīn Aybak, Lesser Dawātdār, 'Abbasid amir, 25, 128, 134, 291
Mujāhid al-Dīn Aybak, Lesser Dawātdār, 'Abbasid amir, 25, 128, 134, 291
Mujāhid al-Dīn Aybak, Lesser Dawātdār, 'Abbasid amir, 25, 128, 134, 291
Mujāhid al-Dīn Aybak, Lesser Dawātdār, 'Abbasid amir, 25, 128, 134, 291
Mujāhid al-Dīn Aybak, Lesser Dawātdār, 'Abbasid amir, 25, 128, 134, 291
Nabuls, 168, 304
nā’ib (deputy, lieutenant), 282–4, 286, 289, 293, 295. See also viceroy
Naimans, 30, 48, 55, 59, 63–6; dispersal of, and survival of tribal name, 402, 417
Najaf, 179, 321, 376
Najm al-Dīn Jīlābādī, chief bitikchi in Iran, 122, 144
Najm al-Dīn Rāzī 'Dāya', 154, 169
Naḵchivān, 160, 315
Naḵchivānī, Muḥammad b. Hindū Shāh, 33, 279, 316
Naḵshbandis, sufi order, 387
Nasā, 80, 158, 165, 172
al-Nasawi, Shihāb al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ahmad, 18, 20, 22, 61, 72, 75–6, 80, 92, 104, 154, 165, 348
Naṣībīn, 167, 257
nasīj, nakh, 212, 252. See also cloth of gold; textiles
al-Nāṣir Muhammad b. Qalāwūn, Mamlūk Sultan, 190, 396
al-Nāṣir Yusuf, Ayyubid Sultan of Aleppo, 130–5, 226, 228, 252–4, 257, 261
Nāṣir al-Dīn Kāshgharī, malik, 293
Nāṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad, ruler of Binbān, 246, 549n
Nāṣir al-Dīn Muhammad b. Burhān, ruler of Kirmān, 267
Nāṣir al-Dīn Qutlug Shāh, Ilkhanid mushrīf of Baghdad, 293
Nāṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī, astronomer and philosopher, 20, 33, 40, 52, 113, 129, 134, 176, 178, 226, 228–9, 236, 240, 311, 316, 346, 379, 395, 413, 416–17; his account of the fall of Baghdad, 40, 42, 129, 136; his
report on financial matters, 113, 316. See also Zīj-i Īlkhānī
al-Ṭāhir li-dīn Allāh, 'Abbasid Caliph, 17, 56, 61, 73, 77, 79
al-Ṭāhir Muḥammad b. Qalāwūn, Mamlūk Sultan, 36, 377
Nasr-Kūh, 79, 88, 158
Naṭanzī, Muʿīn al-Dīn, 35, 266, 355, 357, 361
Nebuchadnezzar, 154
Negübei, Chaghadayid prince, 149
Negübei b. Masʿūd, 24, 40
Negüder, Mongol noyan, 148, 183
Negüderis, 183, 195, 197–8, 205–6, 214, 223, 246, 248, 259, 340, 402. See also Qara'unas
neo-Muslims (naw-musulmānān), in India, 340, 396
Nīshāpūr, 75, 88, 154, 161, 165, 170–1, 173, 175, 178, 180, 197; Mongol capture of, 79–80, 158, 170
Niẓām al-Dīn, malik of Suľūk, 250
Niẓām al-Dīn 'Ali, 164
Niẓām al-Dīn Ḥasan or Ḥasanūya, atabeg of Shabānkāra, 253, 306
Niẓām al-Dīn Shāh, chief bitikchi in Iran, 122
Niẓām al-Dīn Yahyā Faryūmadī, Ilkhanid wazir of Rūm, 274
Niẓāmī-yi 'Arūdī-yi Samarquandi, 58
Noghai, Jochid khan, 12, 183, 192, 194, 208, 213, 219, 332, 342, 353, 389, 404
Noghay confederacy, 388, 403
nökör (sworn companion, associate), 63–4, 102, 144, 402
nomadism, nomads, 2–3, 6, 8–9, 46, 49–50, 54–6, 58, 60, 62, 64–5, 67–8, 73–4, 81, 87–90, 95–6, 99, 101–2, 111–12, 153, 156, 180–1, 183, 199, 201, 203–9, 215, 222, 225, 253, 282–3, 298, 301–2, 365, 392, 394–5, 415–16
Nomoghan, son of Qubilai, 185, 194–5
Nosal or Naisal, Mongol noyan, 109, 120
Nurin, Ilkhanid noyan, 294
Nuṣrat al-Din, Eldegūzid atabeg of Azerbaijan, 244, 249
Nuṣrat al-Din, ispahbadh of Kabūd-jāma, 249
Nuṣrat al-Din Ibrāhīm, atabeg of Shabānkāra, 306
al-Nuwayri, Shihāb al-Dīn Āḥmad, 37–8, 121, 340, 376
Odorico da Pordenone, Franciscan friar, 216
Oghul Qaimish, widow of Güyüg and regent, 98, 101, 106, 112, 119, 318
Oghulbeg, basaqq of Fārs, 251
Oghuz confederacy, 27–8, 47, 49–50, 54, 56, 180, 209, 245
Oghuz Khan, 349
Ölberli, tribe, 55, 61
Öljei Khatun, wife of Hülegü, 270–1, 523n
Öljeitü (Muḥammad Khudābanda), Ilkhan, 26–9, 33, 45, 123, 139, 186, 188–9, 191, 198, 201–2, 204, 206, 219–20, 226, 229, 238, 256, 259, 267, 270, 282, 285–8, 290, 316, 330, 335, 341, 363, 365, 370–1, 377, 379, 403, 415; his chequered religious history, 335, 362; his adoption of Shiʿism, 235, 335, 371
Ong Khan: see Toqghir
Onggḥod (images), 298
Önggüt, tribe, 63, 85, 96, 108, 233, 287, 305
Onon, river, 102, 318
Oran, a Qipchaq-Qangli tribe, 60–1, 72, 76, 78
Örbeli Khatun, 305–6
Orbelian, Stepʿanos, 43, 313, 320, 341, 366, 369–70
Orda, son of Jochi, 383; his ulus, 105, 182, 186, 188, 190, 207, 355. See also Blue Horde
ordo (nomad encampment, headquarters), 22, 96, 106–7, 222, 270, 283
Ordo Qayna, Ilkhanid noyan, 293–5, 302
Ordo Qutlugh, Qutlugkhanid princess, 258
Ordos, region, 63
Orkhan, Ottoman Sultan, 403–4
'Ornac' or 'Ornach', 407, 553 n.
Orontes, river, 257
Orquina, regent of the Chaghadayid ulus, 103, 106, 149, 313
Orqon, river, 63–4
ortaq merchants, 119, 142, 149, 217, 219–20, 223–4, 302
Orus, khan of Orda's ulus, 536n, 545n
Osama bin Laden, 3
'Osmān, Ottoman ruler, 403–4
ot-chigin ('hearth-prince', youngest son), 102
Ötegü China, Mongol noyan, 126, 245
Ötemish Häjjī, 34, 329, 340
Otman, Mongol noyan, 404
Ottomans, 5, 12–13, 244, 388, 390–1; origins of, 403–5
Oxus, river (Amū-daryā), 46, 51, 75–6, 78–81, 90, 109, 117, 122, 126, 140, 144–9, 157–8, 164, 175, 195, 197–9, 201, 211, 249, 284, 290, 325, 356, 389, 403, 411
Oyirat, tribe, 105, 109, 258, 309, 382, 395
Özbeg, Eldegüzid atabeg of Azerbaijan, 161, 244
Pachymeres, Georgios, Byzantine author, 129, 237, 404
Pacific Ocean, 220
Pādishāh Khatun, Qutlughkhanid princess, 258–61, 305
Pagan (Burma), 151
'P'ags-pa Lama (Sa-skya Pandita), 327
Pahlawī dynasty, 325
paiza (tablet of authority), 96, 117–18, 162, 215, 255
Palestine, 21, 84, 131–2, 146, 151, 174, 178, 180, 189, 213, 406
Pamirs, 76
paper, 234–5; paper currency (chao, chāw), 222, 239, 276, 280, 302
Paris, 333
Parkin, David, 329
Parwân, 356; battle of (1221), 80, 88, 158–9, 247
Paul, Jürgen, 156
Pax Mongolica, 9, 210, 218, 220, 222, 416
Pax Romana, 210
pearls, 212, 216, 252
Pegolotti, Francesco, 212, 215–16, 218, 222
People of the Book: see dhimmis
Persian court culture, adopted by Turkish dynasties, 51, 53
Persian Iraq, 174, 177, 179–80, 275, 281, 292
Peshawar, 81
Petrushevsky (Petrushevskii), I.P., 72, 153
Petry, Carl, 173
Pfeiffer, Judith, 258, 347
Pharaoh, 373, 379
pharmacology, 231, 237, 240
Philip IV, King of France, 123, 191
philosophers, philosophy, 225–6, 237
physicians, 26, 134, 225–6, 230–1, 239–40, 333, 367. See also medicine
pilgrimage (hajj), Islamic, 227, 322
Pishepek, 406
poetry, 237
Poland, 85, 173, 189
Polo, Marco, 44, 48, 130, 151, 183, 185, 194, 198, 202, 216, 218, 223, 227, 265, 320, 398, 400; Polo family, 218, 227
Polovtsy, 54; see Qipchaq
Popes, 74, 218, 232, 250, 313, 330, 370, 501n
porcelain, 223
prayers, Islamic, 307, 319, 332
precious stones: see gems
Premonstratensian Order, 43
printing, 239
Prophet Muhammad, 54, 235, 331, 363, 372, 376, 378, 389; depiction of, 236, 238; his Companions, 372; his descendants (ahl al-bayt), 335, 362, 372; recorded conduct (sunna) of, 331
'Protected Peoples': see dhimmis
Ptolemey, 241
pulse diagnosis, 230, 240
Punjab, 56, 81–2, 173, 213, 246
Pūr-i Bahā, poet, 301, 316
Qaban, Chaghadayid prince, 187, 199, 399
Qabul, Mongol khan, 386
Qachulai, Mongol khan, 386
Qadan, son of Ögödei, 103, 106
Qadaq, tutor of the Qaghan Güyüg, 319
Qadaqai, son of Chaghadai, 258
Qadır- (Qayir-) Buqu Khan, Oran chieftain, 61
Qadır Khan, Merkit ruler, 62
qaghan (qa’an), title of, 7, 47, 81
Qaidu, over-khan in Central Asia, 29, 34, 98, 106, 150, 182, 185–90, 194–5, 197, 199, 202–5, 207–8, 213–14, 216, 218, 243, 269, 350
Qaishan, Qaghan, 188
Qājārs: dynasty, 325, 390; tribe, 395
qalān, 111–12, 301
Qal’a-yi Safid, 251
qalandars, 346–7
Qal’at Ja’bār, 130, 167
Qal’at Najm, 167–8
Qalâwûn, al-Manṣûr, Mamlûk Sultan, 22, 36, 264, 343, 367, 377
Qamar al-Dîn, amir of the Dughlát tribe, 238, 387
Qâmul (Hami), 194, 399–400; princes of, 400
Qanât: see irrigation channel
Qangli confederacy, 54–5, 60, 66, 72, 76–8, 85, 93, 156, 163, 171. See also Qipchaq
Qarâ Qūyûnlû, 244, 390, 394, 404
Qarabuqa, Mongol noyan, 179, 289
Qaracha, Khwarazmian amir, 82, 109, 165
Qarachar, Barulas noyan and ancestor of Temûr, 35, 100, 386–7, 389, 391
qarachu beys, 115
Qarakhanid dynasty, 49–51, 53, 56–8, 60, 97, 108, 139, 164, 326, 349
Qârīf, 245
Qatwán steppe, battle of (1141), 56, 58
Qayalîgh, 50, 66, 102, 150, 300
Qayrawân, 224
Qays (Kish), 215, 223–4, 245
Qazaghan, Qara’unas noyan, 358, 385
Qazan, Chaghadayid khan, 357–8, 384, 402
Qazag: origin and meaning of the term, 199. See Kazakh
Qazwin, 30, 79, 82, 160, 166, 171–2, 175, 275, 311, 410; malik of, 249
Qazwinî, Najm al-Dîn Dabîrân, astronomer, 228–9
Qazwinî, Zakariyâ’ b. Muhammad, geographer, 233
qi (‘breath,’ ‘vital essence’), 240
Qilich Arslan IV, Rukn al-Dîn, Saljûq Sultan of Rûm, 126, 135, 244, 252, 255–6, 258, 263, 265
Qilich Qara, ruler of Kûcha/Kûsân, 66
Qipchaq confederacy (Cumans, Polovtsy), 17, 54–5, 60, 66, 75, 77, 80, 85, 89, 93, 100, 105, 118, 136, 163, 175, 191, 212–13, 291, 307–8, 339, 394, 400–1; dispersal of, and survival of tribal name, 402. See also Qangli
Qipchaq khanate, 7, 14, 105, 242. See also Golden Horde; Jochids
Qipchaq steppe, 17, 54, 89, 105, 121, 142, 148, 174, 195, 259, 332, 343, 400
Qiran, Oran chieftain, 60
Qirghiz (Kirghiz), 51, 105–6
Qongqur Üleng, 300
Qongquratai, son of Hülegü, 265, 271–2, 360
Qongrat dynasty, 389
Qonichi, khan of Orda’s ulus, 185, 189
Quanzhou (Zaitun), 222–3, 398
Quchan, Ilkhanid noyan, 295
Qubistan, 125–7, 135, 145, 166, 248, 267; malik of, 249; Ilkhanid administration of, 273
Qulan-bashî, 81
Qull, Jochid prince, 127, 142–3, 145, 148, 340
Qum, 25, 155, 161, 178–9; malik of, 249
INDEX

Qūmis, 271
qumis, fermented mare's milk, 93
Qūn, 48, 'Qūn migration', 54–5, 62
Qunan, Mongol noyan, 100
Qunduz, 82, 223
Qunjuqbal, Ilkhanid noyan, 295
quriltai (assembly), 64, 74, 81–2, 85, 98–9, 101, 103, 105, 107, 112, 144, 149–50, 187, 190–1, 207, 270, 361
Qūtāb al-Dīn b. Naṣir al-Dīn Muḥammad, ruler of Kirmān, 51
Qūtāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shāh, atabeg of Yazd, 245
Qūtāb al-Dīn Mubāriz, atabeg of Shabānkāra, 245
Qūtāb al-Dīn Muḥammad, Qutlughkhanid Sultan of Kirmān, 256, 258–9
Qūtāb al-Dīn Shāh Jahān, Qutlughkhanid Sultan of Kirmān, 267
Qūtāb al-Dīn Shāh Jahān, Qutlughkhanid Sultan of Kirmān, 267
Qūtāb al-Mulk, brother of Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Khālidī Zanjānī, 294
Qutham b. al-'Abbās, shrine of, 347
Qutlugh Bitikchi, basqaq of Fārs, 251
Qutlugh Qocha, Chaghadayid prince, 197–8
Qutlugh Shāh, Mongol noyan and viceroy, 39, 282, 284–6, 294–5, 341–2, 376
Qutlugh Temür, Jochid governor of Khwārazm, 201
Qutlugh Shāh, Mongol noyan and viceroy, 39, 282, 284–6, 294–5, 341–2, 376
Qutlugh Temūr, Jochid governor of Khwārazm, 201
Qutlugh Terken Khatun, regent of Kirmān, 259–61
Qutlughkhanid dynasty, 31, 166, 242, 245–7, 250, 258–61, 349, 411
Qutulugh Shāh, Mongol noyan and viceroy, 39, 282, 284–6, 294–5, 341–2, 376
Qutulugh Temūr, Jochid governor of Khwārazm, 201
Qutulugh Shāh, Mongol noyan and viceroy, 39, 282, 284–6, 294–5, 341–2, 376
Qutulugh Temūr, Jochid governor of Khwārazm, 201
Qutula, Mongol khan, 364, 374
Qutūz, Sayf al-Dīn, Mamlūk Sultan, 132–3, 135
Ra' bān, 257
Rabban Šawma, Nestorian monk, 42, 150, 195, 217, 233, 368–9
Raḍī al-Dīn Bābā, Ilkhanid malik of Mosul, 311
Raḍīyya, (female) Delhi Sultan, 260
Rādkān, 314
Rāfīḍīs, heterodox Muslims, 379
Ra' al-'Ayn, 257

Rasulid Hexaglot, 393
Ratchnevsky, Paul, 112
Rāwandān, 257
Rāwandī, 180
Rāy, 18, 79, 82, 92, 155–6, 160–1, 169, 175, 178–9, 215, 249, 271
Red Sea, 174, 214, 278
Relatio de Davide rege, 73–4, 160, 211
Remler, Philip, 207
rhubarb, 240
Riazan, 252, 487n
ribāṭ (hospice), 179, 315, 369
Riccoldo da Montecroce, Dominican friar, 45, 107, 130, 155, 314, 331, 341
Richard, Jean, 348
rice, 231
Riurikid dynasty, 242. See also Rus`
Romans, Roman empire, 52, 123, 210
Rome, 331
Rossabi, Morris, 220, 240
al-Ruhā (Edessa), 84, 130, 167
Rukn al-Dīn, ruler of Kabūd-jāma, 90
Rukn al-Dīn Khwājachuq, Qutlughkhanid Sultan of Kirmān, 256, 509n
Rukn al-Dīn Kurt, 90, 247
Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad, ruler of Ghūr, 247
Rukn al-Dīn Yusuf Shāh, atabeg of Yazd, 264, 266
Rūm, 18–19, 31, 51, 109, 121, 140, 179, 224, 251, 253, 255–6, 263, 278, 295, 315, 325, 401, 403. See also Anatolia
Rūm Sultanate, 89, 91, 252, 257. See also Saljuqs
Rūmlū, tribe, 395
Rus`, Russia, Russians, 33, 52, 54, 60, 80, 85, 88, 93, 100, 105, 112, 171, 192, 203, 213, 242, 252, 305, 314, 354–5, 388, 407–8, 415, 457n, 494n, 525n
INDEX

Ruṣāfa, 179
Rustamdar, 135
Sa-skya, 242
Sabzawar, 158, 165, 172
Sa’d II b. Abi Bakr, Salghurid atabeg of Fars, 254, 259, 263
Sa’d al-Dawla, Ilkhanid wazir, 266, 276, 278–81, 285, 288, 290–5, 299, 302, 311–12, 376, 412; his kinsmen, 292–4
Sa’d al-Din II b. Abi Bakr, Salghurid atabeg of Fars, 135, 168, 255–6, 264–5
Salind, idaq-quat of the Uighurs, 318
Salji’udai Kuregen, Jochid noyan, 353
Saljuq Hatun, Saljuqid princess, 258
Saljuq Shah, Salghurid atabeg of Fars, 251, 253, 262–3, 265, 306
Saljuqs, 5, 22, 24, 49–51, 54, 56, 74, 97, 179, 209, 211, 244, 259, 297, 299, 302, 326, 329, 351, 365, 390, 395, 404, 412, 416; of Iran (the ‘Great Saljuqs’), 51, 89, 245, 260, 282; of Rum, 18, 31, 37, 44, 51, 82–3, 89, 91, 214, 243–4, 250–1, 266, 273, 299, 401, 404, 412, see also Rüm Sultanate
Sallam, caliphal envoy, 53
Salmas, 271
Samaniid dynasty, 47, 49, 333
Samarqand, 48, 56–7, 75–6, 78–9, 81, 86–8, 93, 97, 102, 108, 155–7, 163–4, 170–1, 173, 176–7, 180, 188, 199, 201, 203, 207, 225–6, 269, 320, 347, 384–6, 391; Mongol capture of (1220), 78, 93, 157
Samoyed, 105
Sandaghlu, Ilkhanid noyan, 311
Sanjan (Sangân), 80
Sanjar, Great Saljuq Sultan, 56, 175, 209, 261
Sâqchi (Isaçcea), 208, 400
Saqsin, 102
Sar-i Pul, 156
Sarab, 156, 161
sarâghuch (sarâqûj), Mongol headgear, 93, 332, 353
Sarai, 144, 208, 214–16, 354, 401, 407
Saraiuchuq, 215
Sarakhs, 79, 155, 159
Sarbadars, 323
Saran, son of Qaidu, 188, 197–8, 203, 206
Sari Saltûq, 40
Sariq Köl, 76
Sarzahan, 179
Sartaq, Jochid khan, 103, 122–3, 145, 317
Sartaq, Mongol noyan, 349
Sarai-Kermen (Cherson), 129
Saruj, 130, 169
Sasanian dynasty, 325, 414
Sasi Buqa, khan of Orda’s ulus, 189
Satuq Bughra Khan, Qarakhanid ruler, 49
Saunders, J.J., 4, 153
Sâwa, 160, 176
Sawran, 47, 164, 189, 207
Sayf al-Din Bakharzî, shaykh, 199, 345, 348
Sayf al-Din Bitikchi, 147, 273
Sayf al-Din Qipchaq al-Mansuri, Mamlûk amir, 377–8
Sayf al-Din Mu’affar Ibn al-Mustawfî Qazwîni, Ilkhanid mushrif of Baghdad, 293
Sa’d al-Din Sawaiji, Ilkhanid wazir, 282, 286, 316, 378
Sadr al-Din, malik of Arran and Azerbaijan, 249
Sadr al-Din, malik of Rây, 249
Sadr al-Din Ahmad Khâlîdi Zanjâni, Ilkhanid wazir, 267, 275–6, 278, 280–2, 285–8, 291–4, 296, 302
Sadr al-Din Ibrâhîm Hamuwayî, shaykh, 344, 346, 372, 377, 516n
Safa’i, 201
Sâhib-diwân (finance minister), 111, 149, 269–93 passim
Shâhyun, 168
Sa’il, Mongol noyan, 104, 141, 149, 213, 246, 251, 253
Saliba, George, 241
al-Sâlih Ahmad, Ayyubid prince of Rawandan, 257
al-Sâlih Ayyûb, Ayyubid Sultan, 84, 213
al-Sâlih Ismâ’il b. Lu’lu’, atabeg of Mosul, 135, 168, 255–6, 264–5
al-Salih Isma’il b. Lu’lu’, atabeg of Mosul, 135, 168, 255–6, 264–5
Salar, Salarid, 169
Sallam, 179
Samarqand, 48, 56–7, 75–6, 78–9, 81, 86–8, 93, 97, 102, 108, 155–7, 163–4, 170–1, 173, 176–7, 180, 188, 199, 201, 203, 207, 225–6, 269, 320, 347, 384–6, 391; Mongol capture of (1220), 78, 93, 157
Samoyed, 105
Sandaghlu, Ilkhanid noyan, 311
Sanjan (Sangan), 80
Sanjar, Great Saljuq Sultan, 56, 175, 209, 261
Saqchi (Isaaccea), 208, 400
Saqsin, 102
Sar-i Pul, 156
Sarab, 156, 161
saraghuch (saraguj), Mongol headgear, 93, 332, 353
Sarai, 144, 208, 214–16, 354, 401, 407
Saraiuchuq, 215
Sarakhs, 79, 155, 159
Sarbadars, 323
Saran, son of Qaidu, 188, 197–8, 203, 206
Sari Saltuq, 40
Sariq Kol, 76
Sarjahân, 179
Sartaq, Jochid khan, 103, 122–3, 145, 317
Sartaq, Mongol noyan, 349
Sarai-Kermen (Cherson), 129
Saruj, 130, 169
Sasanian dynasty, 325, 414
Sasi Buqa, khan of Orda’s ulus, 189
Satuq Bughra Khan, Qarakhanid ruler, 49
Saunders, J.J., 4, 153
Sawa, 160, 176
Sawran, 47, 164, 189, 207
Sayf al-Din Bakharzi, shaykh, 199, 345, 348
Sayf al-Din Bitikchi, 147, 273
Sayf al-Din Qipchaq al-Mansuri, Mamluk amir, 377–8
INDEX

Sayfī (Sayf b. Muḥammad b. Ya‘qūb al-Harawi), 31, 120–1, 170, 173, 178, 195, 203, 247, 303
Sāyin Malik Shāh, malik of Bukhārā, 243
Sayrām, ‘Old’, 189: see Isfījāb
Sayyid Ajall Bukhārī, 398–9
Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn Ibrāhīm, qadi, 322, 510n
Sayyid Ẓahīr al-Dīn Mar‘ashī, 32
sayyids, 57, 167, 171, 299, 335, 389
Schopen, Gregory, 230
Scythia, Scythians, 52, 408
Secret History of the Mongols (Mongghol’un niucha tobcha’an), 15, 27, 63–4, 73–4, 85, 97–9, 105, 112, 123, 374–5, 386
Seleucid era, 229
semantics, 237
Semirech´e, 48, 56
Semuren, 223, 307
Senggüm, Kereyit prince, 63, 66
Sevinch Terken, Qutlughkhanid princess, 258
Shabānkāra, 32, 126, 166, 245; Kurds of, 253
Shabūrghān, 126, 155, 189, 197
Shāfi’ī b. ‘Alī al-Asqalānī, 36
Shāfi’īs, 91, 163, 170, 401
Shāh Oghul, son of Qaidu, 201
Shāh Rukh, Timurid ruler, 385, 399, 493n
Shāh-nāma (by Firdawsī), 30, 39, 53, 238, 324, 326; manuscripts of, 235
shahāda, the Islamic profession of faith, 324, 331–2, 340, 350, 378
Shahr-i Sīstān (Nīmrūz), 158
Shahrazūr, Kurds of, 126, 132
Shajarat al-atrāk, 35, 349, 361
Shāl, Qara-Khitai officer, 165
Shām: see Syria
shamans, shamanism, 52, 58, 273, 298, 346–8, 354, 363, 374
Shāmī, Nizām al-Dīn, 34–5, 386, 391
Shams al-Dawla, kinsman of Sa’d al-Dawla, 292, 294
Shams al-Dīn, qadi of Qazwin, 126
Shams al-Dīn ‘Ali b. Mas‘ūd, Mihrabanid malik of Sīstān, 248, 474n
Shams al-Dīn al-Dimashqī, 38, 174, 395
Shams al-Dīn Itūtumish, Delhi Sultan, 82, 396
Shams al-Dīn Muhammad, malik of Kālyūn and Herat, 121, 506n
Shams al-Dīn Muhammad Kurt, malik of Herat, 121, 135, 144, 247–8, 253, 255, 265
Shams al-Dīn ‘Umar Qazwīnī, 91, 250
Shandong, 86
Shangdu, 183
Sharaf al-Dīn Khwārazmī, chief bitikchi in Iran, 121–2, 165, 302, 312
Sharaf al-Dīn Mukhlīs Simnānī, Ilkhanid wazir, 275–6, 281, 292–3, 516n
Sharaf al-Dīn Qazwīnī, wazir to Berke, 353
Shari‘a, 115–16, 297, 303–5, 308–10, 325, 346, 351, 360–1, 367, 373, 380, 391, 393
Shāsh, 47, 164, 243. See also Tashkent
Shaykh Ahmad al-Miṣrī, 353
Shaykh Arshad al-Dīn, 345
Shaykh Bāyazīd Bīstāmī, shrine of, 315
Shaykh Ḥasan, 345–6
Shaykh Ḥasan-i Buzurg, founder of the Jalayirid dynasty, 358
Shaykh Ḥusam al-Dīn Yāghī, 251
shiḥna (governor, ‘resident’), 58, 66, 108, 159, 161, 167, 245–6, 251, 266. See also basqaq, darughachi
Shī’ī Muslims, Shi’ism, 7, 15, 134, 179, 235, 311, 316, 321, 324, 335, 362, 379; sources composed by Shī’īs, 40–1
Shīktor, Ilkhanid viceroy, 283–5, 295
Shihāb al-Dīn Ghāzī, Ayyubid prince of Mayyāfāriqīn, 84, 251
Shīrāz, 29, 197, 215, 235, 251–2, 254, 263, 266, 279, 294
Shīrāz, Qub al-Dīn Mahmūd b. Mas‘ūd, 9, 25–6, 229, 233, 241, 326, 375
Shiremūn, grandson of Ögödei, 100–1
Shiremūn, son of Chormaghun, 147–8
Shīrwān, 80, 135, 194; Shīrwānshāhs, dynasty of, 244
Shiz: see Takht-i Sulaymān
Shu’ab-i panjgāna (by Rashid al-Dīn), 28, 35, 285
Shughnān, 56
Shūl, 253
sibe, or sūbe (‘barrier’), 194–5, 219
Siberia, 12, 46–7, 61, 95, 182, 215, 388; Siberian khanate, 13
Sibt Ibn al-Jawzī, 21, 37, 60, 91
Sicily, 151
Sidon, 132
siege artillery, 88–9, 127, 136, 138, 227
Sighnāq, 61, 78, 91, 157, 189, 207
Sighnāq-tegin, ruler of Almaligh, 90, 243
silk, 111, 174, 177, 210, 212, 216, 223, 238
Silk Roads, 73, 210–11, 215
silver, 222
Simeon Rabban-ata, Nestorian monk, 315
Simon de Saint-Quentin, 44, 170, 251, 338, 340
Simnān, 249
Simonid dynasty, 73, 156
Simpson, Marianna, 179
Sirāj al-Dīn Shujāʿī, bitikchi, 122
Sīr-daryā (Jaxartes river), 47, 50, 54, 60, 81, 174, 207, 355
Sīr-daryā (Jaxartes river), 47, 50, 54, 60, 81, 174, 207, 355
Sirāj al-Dīn Shujāʿī, bitikchi, 122
Sīstān, 17, 19, 90–1, 112, 135, 154, 174, 179, 197, 245–8, 251, 259, 263–4; histories of, 31; Mongol reduction of, 82, 158, 170; malik of, 207; in the narrower sense of Ghūr and neighbouring districts, 247
Sivas, 83, 162, 213, 215
sīyāsa, secular justice, 303, 394
slaughter-ritual, Islamic, 306–10, 352
slaves, 159–60, 163–5, 199, 206, 212; trade in, 173, 212–14, 221, 332; military slaves, see mamluks
Slavs, 52
Smbat, Constable of Lesser Armenia, 43, 170
Söge or Süge, Ilkhanid prince, 371
Sögetei, Mongol commander, 338–9
Söbe'edei, Mongol noyan, 273, 276
Söhghidan, 211
Solghat, 315, 536n
Song dynasty, Song empire, 16, 75, 85–6, 88, 110, 125, 138, 151, 217, 222–3, 227, 232, 238, 305, 307, 309, 327, 416
Sorqatani Beki, wife of Tölui, 100, 106–7, 120, 122, 178, 313
South China Sea, 222
Soyurgatmish, puppet khan of Chaghadaï’s ulus, 385, 387
sözümiz, documentary formula, 390
spices, 211–12, 216, 223
Spuler, Bertold, 1, 267
Sübe’edei, Mongol noyan, 20, 66, 75, 79–80, 83, 85, 103, 111, 156–7, 159–61
Südāq (Soldaia), 175, 219, 401, 548n
taishi, Chinese title, 108
Taiyuan, 104
Mongols, 344–8. See also ascetics; qalandars
Sughunchaq, Mongol noyan and Ilkhanid viceroy, 128, 224, 262, 267, 277, 283–4, 289–90
Suhraward, 174
Sujās, 174
Sulaymān, Chaghadayid prince, 400
Sulaymān Beg b. Ḥabash ʿAmid, 269
Sulaymān Shāh Ibn Barjam, ʿAbbasid amir, 128, 254
Sülemish, Ilkhanid governor of Anatolia, 403, 519n
Sultān Idechi, Ilkhanid noyan, 295
Sultān Mahmūd, puppet khan of Chaghadaï’s ulus, 385, 387
Sulṭān Shāh, Chaghadayid prince, 400
Sultānchūq, Khwarazmian amir, 136
Sultāniyya, 3, 45, 300, 363
Sunni Islam, Sunni Muslims, 4, 8, 15, 24, 31, 77, 134, 311, 316, 321–2, 324, 330, 335, 362, 383, 413
Suwar al-aqālīm, lost geographical work by Rashid al-Din, 232–3
Sūyāb, 47, 50
suyūrghāl (land-grant), 390
Sūzani Samarqandi, 53
Szuppe, Maria, 260
Ṭabaristan, 19, 478n; Ilkhanid administration of, 273
taboons, 113, 129, 298, 336
Tabriz, 23, 26, 111, 117, 143, 161, 177, 179, 184, 190, 214–16, 225, 227, 236, 244, 260, 279, 288, 293, 314–15, 369–70, 372; malik of, 147; observatory at, 237
Tabrızī, Abū l-Majd Muḥammad, 25. See also Safīnā-yi Tabrız
Tabrızī, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Falakī, 33
Tacitus, 210
Taghchar, Ilkhanid noyan, 273, 276, 285, 291, 294–5
taghār, levy of provisions, 111
Tāḥamta, Salghurid prince, 245
Tahirid dynasty, 274
Tāj al-Dīn ’Ali b. *Jukaybān, Ilkhanid mushrif of Baghdad, 293
Tāj al-Dīn ’Ali Shāh, claimant to the throne of Lesser Luristān, 265
Tāj al-Dīn ’Ali Shāh, Ilkhanid wazir, 292
Tāj al-Dīn Ibn Ṣalāya, ’Abbasid governor of Irbil, 169
Tāj al-Dīn Qamar, 165
Tāj al-Dīn ’Umar b. Mas’ūd, Türkmen chief, 165
Tājikistan, 12–13, 79
Tājīks, 10, 13, 77, 93, 202, 208, 285–8, 294–6, 303, 332, 339, 412–13
Takht-i Sulaymān, 237–8, 326–7
Takkalū, tribe, 395
Taklamakan desert, 399
Takrīt, 320
Talas (Ṭarāz), 47, 60, 122, 148, 150, 164, 188–9, 201, 208, 215, 243; battle of (751), 46
Talas, river, 81
Ṭāliqān, 79–80, 135, 155, 158
Talkhīṣ Majma’ al-ādāb (by Ibn al-Fuwāṭī), 32, 228–9
Tama Toqta, Jochid prince, 194, 219
Temür, a descendant of Jochi Qasar, 206
Temür-i lang (Tamerlane), 11, 34, 35, 65, 115, 357, 383–8, 390–2, 394, 402–3
tenggeri, the sky, 64, 74, 129, 298, 326, 363, 374, 418; assimilation to the God of monotheistic faiths, 363, 375
Terken Khatun, mother of the Khwārazmshāh Muhammad, 60–1, 72, 76, 78–9, 86, 259
Terken Khatun, regent of Fārs, 259–61
textiles, 73, 212, 216, 225–6, 234, 238. See also cloth of gold; nasīj; silk
Tiberias, river, 287
Tigris, river, 128
Tilang (Telingana), 406
Timotheos I, Nestorian Catholicos, 48
Timotheos II, Nestorian Catholicos, 42
Timurid dynasty, 34, 183, 235, 260, 358, 385–6, 388, 390–1; sources composed under, 30, 34–6
Tinim, ancestor of the Qongrat dynasty, 389, 401
Tirmidh, 59, 79, 88, 158, 207
Tiumen, khanate of, 388
Töde Mengü, Jochid khan, 185, 343, 345, 353
Togha (or Taghai) Temür, Ilkhan, 183, 358, 383
Toghachaq Khatun, wife of the Ilkhan Arghun, 519n
Toghachar, Mongol noyan, 80, 158
Toghan, Ilkhanid noyan, 295
Toghon Temür, Qaghan, 45
Toghril (To’oril), khan of the Kereyit, 63–4, 67, 112, 147; given title of wang (hence ‘Ong Khan’), 63
Toghrilcha, Jochid prince, 354
Tolui, youngest son of Chinggis Khan, 77, 79–80, 98–100, 102–4, 140–1, 147, 158–9, 225, 247, 305, 374
Toluids, 184–6, 202, 226–7, 385, 410; their claims on the succession to the imperial dignity, 99–100
Tolun Khatun, widow of Jumughur, 271
Toqa Temür, son of Jochi, 383, 385, 388; Toqatemürids, his descendants, 389
Toqtamish, Jochid khan, 194, 195, 387–9, 536n
Toqtamish, Jochid khan, 194, 195, 387–9, 536n
Toqto’a, Jochid khan, 39, 143, 183, 185–6, 192, 205–7, 213, 219, 342, 353–4, 404
Toqto’a (Toqtoqan) Beki, Merkit ruler, 66
Toquz Oghuz, 48: see Uighurs
töre or törü, 114; tūra, 115, 389
Töregene, widow of Ögödei and regent of the empire, 100, 106, 109, 117, 122
Totoq, grandson of Ögödei, 106, 116
trade, overland, 174, 210–22; routes, 214–15; maritime, 222–4
Transcausus, 82, 113, 145, 147–8, 219, 338, 415
translation, 225, 230–1, 236, 240, 288, 393, 416
Transylvania, 173
Trebizond, 214–15
Tripoli, 211, 214
TÜbshin, son of Hülegü, 270
Tughluq Temür, Chaghadayid khan of Mughalislān, 36, 358–9, 387, 399; his adoption of Islam, 36, 331–2, 341, 345
Tughluqid dynasty, in Delhi, 396
tughra (signature), 390
TÜkül Bakhshi, Mongol shiḥna of Baghdad, 289
TÜkhrāistān, 19, 56
Tula, river, 63
TÜlek, amir of the Dughlat tribe, 341
tümen, military unit of ten thousand, 85–6, 203
TÜmenei, Mongol khan, 372, 386
TÜmese, Ilkhanid shiḥna of Baghdad, 293
TÜn, 126–7, 166
Tunisia, 224, 228
TÜrān, Turanians, 53, 326
TÜrān Shāh, Ayyubid Sultan of Egypt, 244
Turfan, 394, 399–400
Turkestan (Turkistān), 34, 48, 50, 58, 73, 110, 122, 155, 158, 199, 201, 203, 207, 224, 349, 398
TÜrīc languages, 394: Chaghatay, 394; Qipchaq, 393; Khwarazmian, 394
TÜrkmens (Turcomans), 49, 56, 80, 82, 89–90, 92–3, 156, 205, 244–5, 253, 390, 394, 402
TÜrks, 48–9, 52–5, 60, 62, 64, 68, 77, 82, 92–3, 133, 162, 164, 211, 226, 336, 338; as a broader generic term, 52, 57, 68, 326; history of, 27, 30; image of, in Arabic literature, 51–4
TÜrk empire, Türk, 8, 13, 46–7, 64, 67, 74, 92, 95, 114, 139; imperial tradition of, 64, 74–5, 81
TURhiz, 126, 179
TÜs, 79–80, 96, 175, 178, 197, 203, 274, 315
TÜşi: see Nasir al-Din Tusi
Tustar (Shustar), 198, 275, 322
TÜtar, Jochid prince, 127, 142, 144–5, 148, 194
tutmach, 395
TÜyin (Buddhist priest), 299, 319
TYRE, 214
Uchch, 251
Ughan, Mongol noyan, 206
Üghānis, 205–6, 402
INDEX

Uighur script, 28, 35, 65, 110, 114, 287–8, 312, 390, 394

Uighuristan, Uighur territory, 102, 110, 195, 300, 415


Ulugh Beg, Timurid ruler, 35, 183, 241, 385–6, 391

Ulus (patrimony), 102, 104, 182; qol-un ulus (‘ulus of the centre’), 102, 104, 122; the ‘four uluses’, 182–3. See also appanages

Umarī: see Ibn Faḍl-Allāh al-Umarī

Umayyad Caliphs, 323, 335, 360

Umdat al-Mulk Sharaf al-Dīn, malik of Bistām, 249

Uqayba, 378

al-Urḍī, Mu’ayyad al-Dīn, astronomer, 228–9, 241

Ürgench, 108–9, 120, 177, 215, 407–8. See also Gurgānj

Uriyangqats, tribe, 67

Urmiya, Lake, 143

Ürunggü, river, 106

ʿushr, Islamic tithe on agricultural produce, 112–3, 301

Uṭrār, 68, 72, 74, 77–8, 86, 90, 110, 149, 155, 157, 174, 215, 345, 487n

Uzbek language, 394

Uzbekistan, 12

Uzbek, Uzbek khanate, 11, 115, 387–8, 392, 403

Üzkand (on the Sir-daryā), 78, 156

Üzkand (in Farghāna), 243

Uzn Hasan, Aq Qūytinlu ruler, 390

Vardan Arewelts’i, 43, 350

Vásáry, István, 108, 348–9, 355

Venetians, Venice, 214–16

Viceroy (nā‘ib), under the Ilkhans, 262, 282–6, 413

Vienne, Council of (1311), 304

Vikings, 492n

Vincent de Beauvais, 44

Volga Bulgars, 47–8, 85, 105, 171, 333; Mongol conquest of, 85. See also Bulghār

Voltaire, 4

al-Wābkanawi, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad, astronomer, 229, 241

al-Wādī al-Khaznadār, battle of (1299), 377

Wāfidiyya, Mongol immigrants in the Mamlūk empire, 395–6

Wajih al-Dīn Zangi Faryūmādī, wazir of Khurāsān, 178, 274

Walkh, 90

waqf, 26, 214, 312, 315–17, 341, 351, 367, 395, 413

Warāmīn, 179, 212, 249

Wāsiṭ, 167, 172, 176, 267

Weiers, Michael, 324–5, 370

Western Europe, Europeans, 1, 3, 6, 15, 42–3, 62, 84, 74, 133, 150, 183, 187, 190–1, 210, 212, 215–16, 218–19, 221, 250, 304, 314, 334, 338, 343, 370, 393, 405–6, 456n. See also Franks; Latin Europe

women, role and status of, 10, 106–7, 259–62

Woods, John E., 341, 384, 387

workshops (kārkhānahā), 109

 Xi Liao, 56: see Qara-Khitai

Xiangyang, 138, 227

xingsheng (branch secretariat; joint satellite administration), 109–10

Xinjiang, 12

Xiongnu, 52

Xunmalin (Ximalin), 226

yad or yat, magical stone for influencing the weather, 298

Yaghān Shāh, Chaghadayid prince, 400

Yaghān Sonqur, Khwarazmian amir, 82, 109, 165

yaghī (‘rebel; rebellion’), 191
Yahballāh II, Nestorian Catholicos, 74
Yahballāh III, Nestorian Catholicos, 42, 195, 217, 233, 287, 368, 370; anonymous biography of, 42, 195, 367, 370–1
Yahyā, son of Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, 519n
Yailaq, Jochid noyan, 353
Yaḥyā, son of Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, 519n
Yāhīyā, son of Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, 519n
Yāilaq, Jochid noyan, 353
Yājūj and Mājūj (Gog and Magog), 53, 60, 154, 528n
Yam, courier relay network, 96, 103, 113, 119, 123, 220, 233, 281, 302, 308
Yamīn or Amīn Malik, Qangli chief, 77
Yangī, 201, 215
Yangikent, 164, 174, 177, 553n
Yangzhou, 397
Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, 16–17, 19–20, 153, 158, 164, 172, 176–8
Yargh (court of inquiry), 272, 303
Yarghuchi (judge), 114
Yārkand, 108, 194–5, 387
Yarligh (edict, diploma), 41, 75, 90, 117–18, 162, 247, 250–1, 256, 260, 284–5, 308
Yasa (jasagh), 87, 97–8, 113–16, 123–4, 142, 265, 299, 304–10, 312, 342, 359–60, 380; the 'Great Yasa', 114–15, 360; Yasa as a synonym for the Chinggisid 'order' or 'system', 114, 123–4, 250, 379; as an object of polemic in Mamlūk Egypt, 393–4
Yasa/yaśamishi, 115
Yaśa’ul, Ilkhanid governor of Khurāsān, 303
Yaśa’ur, Chaghadayid noyan, 197, 201, 206–7, 248, 345, 356–7, 384, 402
Yaśa’ur, Mongol noyan, 84
Yaśa’urīs, 402
Yaśa’u’s, 402
Yaśi—chemen, battle of (1230), 91
Yazd, 135, 206, 261, 264, 275, 384; atabegs of, 261; histories of, 32, 248; Ilkhanid administration of, 292
Yazdagird, era of, 229
Yazıcıoğlu ’Alī, Ottoman historian, 404
Yazır, 80
Yeke, Mongol noyan, 120
yeke monggol ulus ('Great Mongol People'): see Mongols
Yelü Ahai, 108–10, 178
Yelü Chucai, 16, 96, 158, 177; his Xi you lu, 16, 177
Yelü Dashi, Gür-khan of the Qara-Khitai, 56, 58
Yelü Miangige, 108
Yemek: see Kimek
Yenisei, river, 52
Yestī Buqa, Ilkhanid noyan, 294
Yestī Môngke, Chaghadayid khan, 101, 103, 117, 269
Yesüder, Mongol noyan, 264
Yesüder, son of Hülegü, 270
Yesügei, father of Temüjin/Chinggis Khan, 63
Yesün Temür, Chaghadayid khan, 361
Yesünchin, wife of Hülegü, 270
Yongchang, 194
Yoshmut, Ilkhanid shihna of Mosul, 311
Yoshmut, son of Hülegü, 130, 138, 249, 270, 272, 371
Yosun (custom), 114, 123, 308
Yuan: significance of the name, 327
Yuan shi, 16, 97, 144, 185
Yughūrs (Yughra, Yūrā), 61, 105
*Yula Temür, 30, 473n
Yuulduz, river, 50
al-Yūnīni, Ḥusayn, 37, 285, 350, 367
Yunnan, 103, 398–9, 417
Yurt (grazing-grounds), 99, 101–2, 188
Yūsuf Shāh, atabeg of Greater Luristān, 253, 256
al-Żahir Ghazāʾūs, Ayyubid prince of Ṣarkhad, 131
zakāt, Islamic alms-tax, 301, 331, 378
Zamzam, well of, 392
Zanjān, 79, 160, 275, 280
Zārnūq, 156
Zāwulistān, 19
Zhao Hong, Song envoy, 86
Zhongdu, 45, 71, 184
Zhungar confederacy, 382, 387
zīj (astronomical tables), 229, 241
Zīj-i Īlkhānī (by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī), 229, 241
Zindīq, freethinker, 379
Zoroastrianism, Zoroastrians, 299, 326, 342, 368, 520n
Zūrābād, 80